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LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY

Interviewed by

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Feeney

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THIS IS THE FIRST SESSION OF A RECORDING OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD F. FEENEY AS RECORDED AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL ON 5 APRIL 1974. THE TITLE OF THIS INTERVIEW IS, "A MAN of CONTRADICTION."

LTC FEENEY: Sir, in the first part of our interview, I don't want to make it too structured but we would like to break it down into phases and I think Part I should deal with your formative career years, motivation for being in the Army, family, career at the academy and those years prior to World War II.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think in considering all the aspects of this, it's probably worthwhile to set the framework of the times, because, although there are a good many of us still around, in a very few years there won't be a great many people who really can understand and comprehend the environment of the late 20's and the early 30's when I grew up. To begin with, my father was a lawyer and a rather successful lawyer who had been born in Upperville, Virginia in the aftermath of the Civil War and who had been a very considerable student of the Civil War. For example, he knew all of the homesteads in Upperville and had first-hand accounts of various phases of the Civil War. He also was an archaeologist of some note as it was his hobby at one time. My father had the leading private collection of Indian artifacts in the world, I suppose. So, he was a man of broad interest and as I said, he was quite a successful lawyer. Father had an intense interest in military history and a very intense interest in the American Indian. He wrote very extensively both on Indian culture and on Civil War military history. For example, he has written a biography of every general officer in the Confederate Army and he had an extensive private collection of memorabilia, stamps, correspondence, rare books and that sort of thing. My mother was the daughter of a doctor who had moved to Hope, Arkansas when he was about 5 years old. Hope was a town of perhaps

six to seven thousand people, largely agricultural -- I don't recall any particular industry not related to agriculture except timber. In those days, we did have automobiles. When I was a youngster and growing up, they were not terribly common as I recall. At the time, there was probably not 50 miles of paved road in Arkansas. On our first automobile trip, we made 80 miles the first day and thought we had really accomplished something. Highways weren't numbered or marked. You asked at a farmhouse how to get to the next town. There was no radio, at least not in Hope at that time. In fact, I believe I was about 11 or 12 years old before I heard my first radio. (The newspapers, and we only got a couple of them) The local newspaper was almost entirely oriented towards local news. The Arkansas Gazette from Little Rock was not a great deal different. We, generally speaking, did not have the news magazines that have become so important in disseminating news of the world today. There was the Literary Digest which I would say was pretty mediocre and of course, I realized it when The Digest made a pretty bad prediction on the election. I forget exactly which election it was. It was around 1930. Probably 1928. So, I suppose in terms of what we see today, you would say that I sort of grew up in isolation from the world. Amusements were entirely athletic or reading books. My father had a very extensive library and he used to pay me to read certain books. Not that I perhaps wouldn't have read them anyhow because I did enjoy reading, largely history. The economic situation in those days in that part of Arkansas wasn't particularly good, despite the fact that we think of the great depression as starting in 1929. In fact, it hit Arkansas with the collapse of the commodity markets in the early 20's and there wasn't a great deal of money around. I suppose you would say that we (my family) were well off. We owned about a 1,000 acre farm which my father never set foot on if he could avoid it. He

had an interest in a bank that was formed during these days. So I would say that we were moderately well off, economically, that in considering modern terms, we lived in isolation from the world. The only real consideration given to the world was a course presented in the schools on current events. You got a little weekly four page newspaper which covered things, like conferences and that sort of thing. There were a number of people around Hope who had served in World War I, although I don't really recall knowing too many of them. My father did not. He was too old and served on the draft board. We had, to the best of my knowledge, prior to my attendance at the military academy, two people graduate from the academy. One was a then, Lieutenant Robert Vessay who had graduated from one of the short classes around 1918-1919. The other was my first cousin, Orlando Graining who had graduated in 1922. He left the Army, and after a tour of Polo and selling bonds in New York City, he joined the Gulf Mining Company as a superintendant of production in Venezuela. He died prematurely and he had been dead several years, when I went to West Point. So the influence of the Army in that area was really not very great. Our Hope school was a good one for learning reading, writing, and arithmetic and really very little else. We had history courses, that were pretty good. We had language courses that were miserable. I never studied a language in High School except Latin. But it was basically a pretty good school for that time in that area. Most of the people in High School when I was there went no further with their education. Those who did, for the most part, went to two small colleges about 60 miles away, both of which were church affiliated. One a Methodist and the other a Baptist College. A very few went to college outside of the state. For example, I recall one very good friend of mine who did go to Harvard and studied law at Harvard, while I was at West Point. Another studied engineering at George Tech. But, by and large, people stayed

within the confines of the state. They didn't travel very much. They were not very sophisticated. It would be hard to conceive of the lack of knowledge of national and world affairs that prevailed that time in Hope, Arkansas relative to today's environment. So that's the sort of the thing that I grew up in. I read a lot. I was highly unsuccessful in athletics because I had been a rather sickly child.

LTC FEENEY: We can pause here, sir.

LTG LEMLEY: I was quite young and immature as well as having been sickly, because for some reason, my parents thought there was some great advantage to finishing school in a hurry. I studied at home prior to entering the top half of the third grade. At the age of 5, I covered, I believe, the 2nd or 3rd grade in a half of a year, instead of a full year, and I made up a half year in High School. As a result, I was barely 16 when I graduated from West Point. I don't suppose that I had any really developed ideas, as to what I wanted to do with my life, but generally speaking, I suppose

LTC FEENEY: You said you were 16 upon graduation from West Point or high school?

LTG LEMLEY: High school. Yes, yes. I suppose I naturally thought I would follow in my father's footsteps cause that's what boys did in those years. I had more or less planned to go to Washington Lee University where my father graduated, study law, and set up practice in Little Rock. I certainly had no interest, whatever, in attending the military academy or serving in the Army. In fact, it was something that I suppose I viewed with some distaste. However, I suppose through my father's interest in military history and through his previous associations with veterans of the Civil War, he had always had some military ambitions. In fact at one time when he was in college, a classmate, from I believe Bolivia, had offered him a major's commission in the

Bolivian Army. I rather think he'd always regretted not taking it, but in any case he didn't. He did have as a youth a burning desire to go to West Point, and his family in those times, could not accept him going to school in the North. The memories of the Civil War were still rather bright. In Northern Virginia my grandmother, my father's mother, could remember running from a home, burying and putting silver in the well, and running from a home to escape the Yankees. So he was not permitted to go to West Point because it was in the North.

LTC FEENEY: How old was your father at this time when you were about to graduate from high school?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he would have been 45 when I graduated from high school. He married rather late in life. He married at 29 and I guess he was 45 or 46. He had influenced my first cousin, who had gone to West Point and left the Army, to go there very strongly, and I believe had been very instrumental in securing his appointment. As I recall, on one Sunday afternoon, he asked me to the den in our house and talk to him. He asked me how I would like to go to West Point. I frankly didn't welcome the suggestion at all, but I suppose at being properly behaved, I said I really hadn't thought much about it. He indicated at that time that he was very anxious that I go to West Point, which of course I did. He also sent my brother, my only brother, to West Point who's 5 years my junior. I suppose from that time on, it was pretty well established because although I would have liked to have gone to college and belong to a fraternity, worn a racoon coat and that sort of thing, it never really seriously occurred to me to differ with my father on the subject. There were other considerations too. Of course, times were rather hard and finances were a consideration. I am sure my family could afford to send me to Washington Lee,

had my father not had this deep admiration for the military academy. We did not . . .

LTC FEENEY: Do you think this was based on his doing all these biographies?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he did those at a later date, but I think he was very considerably influenced by the environment of post-Civil War days when he grew up, and his intense interest in history of all types and sort of a secret desire to be a soldier, I suppose.

LTC FEENEY: Maybe he thought this would be the more adventurous life. Maybe he thought law might be a little humdrum.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I suppose so, because he was inclined towards adventure. For example, when he went to college first, the University of Virginia, he studied medicine for a couple of years. This was because he had a uncle, whom he greatly admired who had been a doctor. He found out he disliked it intensely, quit college, went to New York, worked for a fur importer briefly. He rapidly tired of New York and went to work as a section hand on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad for awhile. Then he went back to college as a pre-law student and studied law, but he never intended to remain in Virginia. He actually had the urge to go West and after graduating from college, he did go to Texas and visited various places in Houston. He met an uncle of mine who encouraged him to practice law in Texas, but at that time, the residency requirements for admission to the bar in Texas were quite long. My uncle suggested he go to Arkansas to stay long enough to be admitted to the bar, and then transfer to Texas, which was possible. However, he went to Arkansas, met my mother, and married. His younger brother joined him there. He married my mother's older sister and so, they never got back to Texas. But I think daddy always had a sort of a wonderlust that he really never fulfilled.

LTC FEENEY: Did this ever transpose to you in your life? Did you feel that you had the same or was the Army . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I suppose I've never had any frustrations in that regard because if I have the trait, the Army took care of it very nicely. So, I didn't have daddy's problem in that regard. But to go back, I had not planned to stay in the service after graduating from West Point. At that time, there was certainly no compulsion on graduating from West Point to stay in the Army. In fact, they really welcomed resignations for financial reasons. For example at the Naval Academy at this time, only the upper half of the class were being commissioned. There was not the great need for service academy graduates, which we have felt since about 1940. In fact, I had intended to go to West Point then, later to study law at Washington Lee, and practice law in Little Rock just as I thought I always would. So that's why I went to West Point. Now, it would not have been possible for me to have gained admission to West Point from Hope High School. Although it was quite a good school, the admission requirements at West Point at this time consisted of a rather difficult entrance examination in three areas -- Mathematics, English, and History. (American History and I believe ancient history as well, although I'm not sure) So special preparation was required. I went to Marian Institute in Marian, Alabama, a small, private military school, which then and still specializes in preparation for the service academies. I had to go somewhere because I was still too young to be admitted. I had to wait a year after I finished high school in any case. I went to Marian Institute in the summer of 1930. I don't know exactly why I went in the summer. I suppose we felt that I needed summer school as well as the regular year to be on the safe side of being admitted to West Point. It was an excellent school during the summer session.

I believe we had 6 or 8 students in the whole school. It was strictly a cram course. Where admission to West Point was concerned, they made no pretense of broadening your knowledge beyond the requirements of entrance. The school had excellent teachers and a fine record of getting people into the academy. A rather interesting sidelight to show how informal things were in those days. The class ate in the dining room with the President of Marian Institute, at a separate table from his family. In summer school, there was no particular discipline. We didn't wear a uniform. Military training was suspended for the summer until the beginning of the normal academic year. In September, I suppose the student body grew to around 200 and it was divided into three groups: One High School--because they taught the last 2 years of high school; Junior College; and the service academy prep, which was sort of a special department. A school had a rather distinguished record of . . .

LTC FEENEY: Did any members of your year at Marian go on to the academy with you?

LTC LEMLEY: Yes. There were perhaps a half a dozen who went on to the academy with me. You see in those days, the admission to West Point was entirely by appointment with the exception of a few Regular Army enlisted appointments, which were competitive and a few presidential appointments, which were also competitive. The fact that the majority of my classmates at Marion, did not go on to West Point, is not indicative of the failure of the school to qualify them, but rather of the fact that they lacked appointments. An appointment to a service academy in those days was really a very valuable sort of thing, in an economic way, as well as in other respects. So, I remained at Marion Institute until the 1st of March when

the academy's entrance examinations were held. Actually having received a semester of college credit from my study at Marion, I was admitted without examination to the academy -- other than a physical examination which I passed with minor difficulty. They said I had flat feet and I had some eye troubles. So I finished Marion and went on to . . . I mentioned that there were a number of quite distinguished graduates from this relatively small school in Marion, Alabama. I don't have any comprehensive listing of them, but two that I happen to remember off-hand at the moment are: General Bruce Holloway, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the late 1960's; and General Paul D. Adams who was the first Strike Com Commander. Major General Tom De Shazo, who was a rather well-known artilleryman of the World War II vintage was also a Marion graduate. There are many, many others who have gone on to achieve rather distinguished careers in the military services. In the Navy as well, because there were usually twice as many people studying for Annapolis as West Point because the mid-shipment classes at that time were twice as large. The brigade of mid-shipment was twice as large as the Corps of Cadets.

LTC FEENEY: So it had nothing to do with the popularity of the Navy or the Army at that time?

LTG LEMLEY: No, there were just twice as many appointments and I really never known why that was, but it was true. I'm sure this was related to the fact that only half the class of Annapolis was commissioned relating to the fact of the balance between the services to bring in new officers. And really at this period, the military academies were the only source of officers.

LTC FEENEY: ROTC wasn't . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, the ROTC was not. There had been an integration of officers into the Army after World War I who were not graduates. I'll speak more on

that subject later, and in 1935 and 36, we had the Thomason Act which provided an entry for a very small number of ROTC graduates into the regular service. But, as an example of how small it really was, in the first year of the program there was only one field artillery Thomason Act officer integrated into the Army. So generally speaking, the Army at the time, consisted of service academy graduates plus officers who had been integrated into the Regular Army at the end of World War I, presumably by a selection process.

LTC FEENEY: How was the . . . how did you switch over to a career in the service as you went through your military career because there were excessive commissions and what was the feeling of the country at that time while you were in the academy? I guess it was probably still very honorable - duty, honor, country, was a very big thing still.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Well, actually to go to the first point, I really didn't change my mind about leaving the Army until early in my final year at West Point. I suppose what influenced me most was the glimpse of the Army given to us the final summer of my stay at West Point. We really didn't know much about it. The military training at West Point, when I was a cadet, was pretty rudimentary stuff. It consisted of foot drill, bayonet drill, rifle marksmanship, first aid and a little fooling around on sand tables with squad problems; but, you really got no picture whatever of the service until the final summer. During that summer, we went on a field artillery exercise, a post artillery exercise which was really anti-aircraft then, but it was called post artillery, a cavalry exercise, and made tours of Fort Benning, Maxwell Field, and Fort Monroe, Virginia.

LTC FEENEY: Was this done by bus . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, actually we went by an Army transport boat from New York to Savannah, Georgia, and from Savannah to Fort Benning by trucks. Incidentally this was considered quite a feat to even do this in 1934, to the making of a march of that duration with that number of people.

LTC FEENEY: How many cadets were involved sir?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, in my class I suppose there were maybe 170. There were 165 graduated in my class as we lost a couple in my final year. One through an honor offense. Cheating on an examination which seemed rather odd. He was a brilliant student anyhow. One through suicide. One for health reasons. So I guess there were about 170 of us on the trip. We went from Columbus, Georgia, to Fort Monroe by train stopping over in Columbia, South Carolina for sort of a church supper. It was an affair put on by the local ladies and on to Fort Monroe, Virginia. There we took our anti-aircraft training, such as it was, and then back to West Point by boat. I think it was probably this trip plus the influence of a few pretty fine people in the Army who I had not known very well at West Point, because the relationship between instructors and cadets was far different then than it is now, that convinced me to stay in the service. I only recall three occasions in my whole 4 years at West Point when I was ever in a officer's house. I did have dinner with the superintendent one night and this was a rather amusing incident which probably is worth telling. It won't contribute anything to anybody's knowledge, but the congressman who appointed me happened to be the Chairman of the Military Subcommittee in the Appropriations Committee in the House of Representatives. When General William D. Conner, who was then superintendent, went down to testify for the annual appropriations, the first question the congressman was asked was, "How is Harry Lemley?" General Conner being the very honest soul he was, told the Honorable Tibar Parks, "He didn't know Harry Lemley,

but since he didn't, he was reasonably certain that he was getting along all right." The general did have me over for dinner the week-end after he came back.

LTC FEENEY: So he got to know Harry Lemley?

LTG LEMLEY: He got to know Harry Lemley, yes. The relationship between officers and cadets at West Point at this time was very, very formal. I did have some very distinguished instructors: General Al Grunther, General Maxwell Taylor, and General Frank Farrell. It was a rather distinguished group. So I suppose it was seeing these people and observing what the Army was like, and we really only saw that at Benning, that changed my opinion. The coast artillery at Fort Monroe was more of a recreational project than a military training affair, as was the coast artillery training at West Point. They concentrated on feeding you ice cream and really didn't do very much about any military teaching.

LTC FEENEY: You mentioned there were some influence of Army officers outside of West Point that . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Not outside of West Point. I didn't know any outside of West Point.

LTC FEENEY: Then your talking about the instructional staff?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, the instructors. There was one in particular, a Major Anderson, who headed the field artillery detachment. He took us on a field artillery hike and gave field artillery instruction. He was a very fine man. The exercise was rather an arduous one. He didn't tell you how pleasant the Army was. He didn't emphasize that at all. What he really said after he had made his pitch and I don't suppose I'll ever forget it. He said, "Well, join the field artillery and work." He influenced a great many people, I think,

both to stay in the service, and to choose the field artillery. At the time, your selection of branch was governed by your academic rank in the class. Traditionally, the engineers had been the first choice of the top of the class. The coast artillery had been the second choice. The cavalry and field artillery pretty much went neck and neck for third. That changed while I was there. The coast artillery fell from favor and the field artillery moved into second place right after the engineers.

LTC FEENEY: Where was the queen of battle -- the infantry?

LTG LEMLEY: Infantry was last. There were always a few very senior members of the class who chose the infantry for family reasons as a preference. However, the infantry was not very stimulating in these "piping" days of peace. Basically they did nothing, but foot drill and rifle marksmanship. When I was a young lieutenant, all of my friends in the infantry would always ask me, "What on earth do you want to be in the artillery for because you work in the afternoon and we're free. We go to foot drill in the morning and rifle marksmanship training and come home." They had no equipment to maintain, and few animals. So we, in the artillery, considered the infantry as sort of a lazy man's branch.

LTC FEENEY: It was mostly just tradition that would attract somebody to the infantry, as opposed to really being motivated.

LTG LEMLEY: I believe it was tradition. I expect there was some family influence, too. There were a great many sons of Army officers in the cadet corps at that time, and I presume, if the fathers were in the infantry, their sons probably were inclined towards selecting the infantry. Of course the infantry had no limit on the number of people it took. All the other branches had a quota. You could only select, say 50 of the field artillery, 15 for the engineers or something like that. There was no quota for the infantry,

after the others were gone. The remainder went into the infantry. Another thing that probably influenced the relative unpopularity of the infantry was the fact there were not a great many infantryman who were instructors at West Point. The academic instructors tended to be rather heavily weighted towards the field artillery, the cavalry, the technical branches and technical subjects. Generally speaking, the tactical department was all infantry and tactical officers weren't very popular as a general rule, although there were some very distinguished tactical officers during my day. For example, General Omar Bradley was my tact at one time, another member of the tactical department that influenced me greatly was General Hal Barber, who is long since dead. I don't really know what happened to him in World War II. I would have guessed that he would have risen pretty high, but perhaps he had ill health. I don't know. I lost track of him.

LTC FEENEY: What was your impression in those days of General Omar Bradley? Do you think, did you ever have a feeling that he was going to arise to the occasion such as he did?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't think it really ever occurred to any of us that anybody would achieve that distinction. I mean, it was just totally foreign to our outlook. Nobody really thought much about the possibility of war with the exception of Colonel Henry Beukema who was our professor of history and government and a rather distinguished politician. He rattled the saber, as we used to say, at great length. But with the exception of Colonel Beukema I don't recall the possibility of a war really ever being discussed, while I was a cadet at West Point. General Bradley was extremely well liked and respected by the cadets because he had the same traits of character that have distinguished him throughout his career. I recall one small personal incident with General Bradley. We were not, during my time at West Point, permitted to

have radios. There were a great many hooked up at night and concealed during the hours you would expect a tactical officer to visit you. I very religiously concealed mine; however, I did on one occasion forget to drop the antenna out the window. In those days, radios required a relatively long wire antenna instead of the little poles that we have now. My antenna wire was left running in the window. When I came home from my morning classes, I found a small piece of note paper impaled on the wire and on it was written, "How come?" This was the only thing I ever heard about the radio. It was that sort of an approach which endeared General Bradley to the cadets, and to the many hundreds of soldiers who served under him. He was not by any means a lax disciplinarian. I recall he was a member, being a major at the time, of the battalion board. The board was the agency which awarded punishment for serious crimes. I recall I only went before the battalion board once, in the company of about 50 other cadets. The board at that time consisted of General Bradley, General Simon Bolivar Buckner who was the commandant of cadets, and another rather distinguished officer whose name I don't recall right at the moment. We had gone to New York City on a week-end leave in chartered buses for some purpose. We had a snow storm that week-end, and the buses which were supposed to return to West Point at 1:00 on Sunday afternoon (because you had to be back in by 5:00) didn't show up. We arrived back at West Point I suppose around 2 hours later around 7:00, the 50 or 60 of us. Two busloads as I recall. We were all hailed before the battalion board for being absent without leave, which we regarded as being somewhat of an injustice. It was true the regulations prescribe that if you were late by reason of a common carrier, and at that time it was the railroad, your absence was excused; but, it was proved that these chartered buses were not common carrier and therefore, our absence was not excused. We were each awarded six

demerits and 20 punishment tours. A punishment tour consisting of walking back and forth with your rifle across the central area for one hour. I don't think that you could say that General Bradley is lax but he was greatly admired and respected. Oddly enough, General Buckner was not. In fact when he came in as commandant of cadets, I believe it was in 1933.

END OF SIDE #1, TAPE #1

LTC FEENEY: This is side 2 of our first session with General Lemley. We were discussing General Buckner's popularity at West Point, sir.

LTC LEMLEY: General Buckner, I think I could say, was a very fine leader and certainly was a very distinguished soldier, but he also had some rather definite ideas which were not popular with the corps cadets. For example, among other things and this is a small matter, I recall he banned the sale of aftershave lotion at the cadet store because he considered it feminine. He never wore an overcoat and/or almost never since our uniform was prescribed, we did not either, in the coldest of weather. He took it upon himself to call my class together, in the assembly room up above the mess hall in Washington Hall and addressed us very contemptuously, and offended a great many people. In fact, he brought us a good deal closer to mutiny than I could really conceive of at West Point in that day and age. It was really the entire first class at West Point. The first class is really a very important entity to identify, because of their influence on the younger classes, and this class was too intense in purposes in revolt. General Dennis McCuniff, who incidentally was the other member of the battalion board whose name I couldn't think of a few minutes ago, came up and called the class together and in effect delivered an apology on behalf of then Colonel Buckner who was the commandant of cadets. I believe General McCuniff was the assistant commandant, the senior assistant commandant of cadets. But General Buckner was not well liked in my class.

LTC FEENEY: Is that different from, you know, there's a distinct difference from being well liked and admired.

LTG LEMLEY: No. He was not admired or respected. He was held in low regard by the members of my class. Now I can't speak for other classes. I should add at this point after graduation, I served with General Buckner at Fort Sam Houston, Texas where he commanded the 23rd Infantry. I was a lieutenant in 15th Field Artillery which supported the 23rd Infantry, and I found him to be a fine regimental commander. He appeared in a totally different light. He was extremely well liked, admired, and respected by both the officers and men of the 23rd.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, during the 30's and being a student at that time, there was a very famous man who was Chief of Staff, General MacArther. And of course there were certain incidents that happened during that time that people through the years have remembered - like the Coxey incident.

LTG LEMLEY: But it really wasn't Coxey's Army. Coxey's Army was back in the 1890's. This was the Bonus March on Washington by veterans groups from World War I. I would say there was not any great sympathy on the parts of the people I knew, either in my home environment nor among my contemporaries at West Point, of sympathy for this particular group. Now the reason for this I suppose is two-fold. Of course you didn't have television and you didn't find out about these things until after they had happened. You might see a picture of it in the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune and we were permitted at West Point to take one of those two papers. I always took the Herald Tribune. There was probably not as great an awareness of it as there might have been. But, I suppose the reason that the demonstration didn't elicit any greater sympathy was two-fold. One, everybody was in the same fix. The whole country was in the same fix. People were perhaps not starving but pretty close to it.

We had unemployment. I'd seen the figure. I think it ran up around 30%. Nobody had any money. As sort of an illustrative example of the latter: I believe it was in 1934, '33 probably, that I went home for Christmas to this little town in Hope, Arkansas where I was born and I had a 20 dollar bill. It was not possible to get that 20 dollar bill changed in Hope, Arkansas except at a bank. No merchant could change a 20 dollar bill. So this is illustrative of the financial difficulties the whole country experienced. I suppose we felt that these veterans were probably in no worse shape than anybody else. For another thing, demonstrations in those days were not stylish. Demonstrations, generally speaking, been foreign to our traditions and I don't suppose any of us regarded this as an appropriate way to present their viewpoint to the Congress. In fact, it was only in the early 1960's that demonstrations achieved a degree of respectability in this country. At least that's my belief and that's my observation of the national attitude over the time.

LTC FEENEY: Well, there's a general consensus to back the government. Wasn't it - let it work it out for itself?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. There was very little inclination to fight the government in those days. I will say though, the politicians, generally speaking, didn't enjoy much higher prestige than they do today. In fact, they were not really held in a very high regard. So far as General MacArthur was concerned, it was generally accepted, I believe, that he had his orders. He was the type of individual that would obey those orders regardless of his personal feelings, despite allegations to the contrary in later years. So we all just considered he was doing his job. I think to a considerable degree rather admired the

way he did it. If he had to do something, which I'm sure was distasteful to him, he had at least the strength of character to go out and lead it himself. Which I think was rather respected at the academy in those days. Of course General MacArthur had always held a rather special place at West Point because of his close association with the academy over most of his entire career with the exception at the time when he was, so to speak, in exile in the Philippines. He always took great interest in the football teams. He took an extreme interest in the academy and was very highly regarded for his successes in World War I, which are largely forgotten today, but he really had a remarkable career in World War I for that day and age. He achieved high rank at a very early age for that time, you know. There was no bad feeling towards him and in fact the incident didn't really attract a great deal of attention. There was one influence though throughout the academic world in those days. Perhaps when I say the academic world, maybe I'm referring to what we would now call the eastern establishment: Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Brown and the rather prestigious eastern colleges. This was the arena in which we as cadets at West Point mixed. We played football with them. We had a chess contest with MIT which we won incidently. We had debates with them. We were rather royally entertained when we went to football games in Boston, much less so in New Haven. We never really liked Yale very much. But there was a great unrest, at least at these colleges during the early 30's. There was a tendency to experiment, leaning towards theoretical communism which is not uncharacteristic of youth. It was a time when a great need was felt for change. I mean, obviously what we had been doing wasn't working and it was time to start something else. And as a matter of fact, a great deal of the strong animosity that was developed during the McCarthy era, really had its roots back in those days, because

numbers of people were later denied employment for their activities in these colleges during that time. One interesting sidelight on this, we had a national organization known as the Veterans of Future Wars. It was an anti-military, anti-war movement, which I say, was very prevalent particularly in the eastern colleges. The president of this organization, the national president, was at Princeton. He later served under me in Italy in World War II as a battalion commander and he was a very fine one. This same unrest that was present in the colleges enviatably affected West Point to a degree. Not to a considerable degree, but it was something you thought about and we, of course . . .

LTC FEENEY: Could you perceive this as a world-wide thing because I think, as you know, the English schools at that time, Cambridge and Oxford, seemed to have the same type of theoretical communism influence.

LTC LEMLEY: I think it was probably world-wide except in Germany perhaps, and maybe there too. It was a reaction, a post-war reaction. Granted the war had been over 12, 15 years, but the post-war reaction was still present because we hadn't had any incidents to bring patriotic feelings to the front. The depressions greatly exasperated these feelings. It was a dissatisfaction of the world that was. It was just a total dissatisfaction with it (world) and I suppose the college student was sort of looking for an alternative, which is not uncharacteristic. We've just gone through this phase again now, in much more violent sort of way. The academic heirarchy today is perhaps a somewhat different breed because you see during this period - the Hitler times - the persectuion in Europe. Great numbers of intellectuals came to this country and moved into the academic community. They brought to it social values and an outlook of cultural values that were somewhat foreign to our native American academic heirarchy. So it's quite normal, I believe,

that you would have this reaction and that it should wash over into the service academies as well, as into our civilian educational institutions. However, we didn't at West Point, I don't think it really amounted to much. I guess the reason was that we had really very little academic outlet to become involved in this sort of thing. Our curriculum was very heavily oriented towards engineering at the time and we didn't take very many courses that would fall into the category of today's humanities. We had economics, government, history. I don't recall ever having studied advanced economics in this class. Perhaps the art of science was not very well developed in those days. Government was largely sort of an advanced civics course. More oriented towards structure, the constitution and that sort of thing, than towards the legislative and decision making area at the national level. The history was history of primarily names, states, and places. We really didn't have the outlet they had in the civilian colleges for becoming involved in this thing (revolution) to any considerable extent. I suppose we were effected by our contacts with our contemporaries in the civilian universities and by our girls from Vassar, which is where they all came from in those days.

LTC FEENEY: As you transitioned from the academy to your first assignment, could you describe, I believe you went to Basic Officers School.

LTG LEMLEY: No, we didn't have any such things . . .

LTC FEENEY: Well, how about the equipment in those days . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, we had no training. West Point in no way provided you with the knowledge to move into an assignment and take charge except perhaps in the infantry. In those days and as I said, the infantry was doing two things: rifle marksmanship and close order drill. Well, we got a large dose of that at West Point, but very little else. For example, to demonstrate the full range of my ignorance, shortly after I reported in to the 15th Field Artillery

at Fort Sam Houston, we went on a sort of a one horse field exercise and it became necessary for me to use the telephone. I didn't even know that you had to push the button to talk. I had almost no knowledge that equipped me to assume an officers duty in a field artillery battery. When I graduated, I did know what the cannon looked like. I knew how to clean it. I knew what the sight was like. I knew how to aim it. I knew a good deal about riding horses which was only moderately useful to me because I went to a motorized regiment. My first regiment was motorized, although the horse was still a very important badge up in the Army in those days. We were required, in this motorized regiment, to take equitation training and to ride as lieutenants.

LTC FEENEY: Was this your first assignment at Fort Sam Houston? You didn't go to Fort Sill then?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I had 3 months of summer leave which I don't believe they do anymore. But you see when I was a cadet at West Point, you entered in July and your first escape from the walls was your second Christmas when you got 9 days. Your 3rd summer, you got 2 months off. At each Christmas, except the first, you got 9 days provided you were academically proficient and were not in disciplinary trouble. After leaving West Point, I went home for my 3 months leave, got pretty bored and succeeded in getting a job with an outfit called Geophysical Survey Incorporated of Dallas which still exists, but it's been incorporated into a larger corporation now. I spent the summer doing seismic surveys in what are now oil producing areas of Arkansas. They are pretty well exhausted now. The company made an exception in my case by taking me on. They would not, as a general rule, hire local people because of their fear for the security of their information. They did hire me because I was a West Point graduate. I spent the summer with them, sort of filling for people taking vacations to the extent of my abilities, which were not

very great. I was the least educated man on the seismic crew that I worked on. I was the only one without a masters degree. And, they wanted me to stay with them. In fact, they offered me \$300.00 bucks a month to stay with the company. In many ways it was attractive because even in those days, they were exploring all over the world. They had crews working in Saudi Arabia. They had them all over the world - not only in this country. It was rather attractive, but I really didn't give too much thought. I was fully committed to staying in the Army. I had written my father to tell him I had decided to stay in the service, instead of resigning to study law and I intended to stay in eventually become the Chief of Staff. So I was committed and I suppose this is one of my characteristics. I can become very restless and unhappy until I've made up my mind; but, once I've made up my mind, I don't very often change it. I feel good after I've made up my mind. Another time, well, really I suppose a much greater personal period for me, was the end of World War II. We wound up with our forward CP in Innsbrook and our rear at Garmisch. And we had a party, a victory celebration the night, of V-E Day. While I ordinarily would have joined fully in the festivities, I felt very much disturbed. I stayed around long enough to, you know, to make the proper appearance at the function, then I went outside and I sat on a stone wall, which I remember very vividly. I conducted sort of a series of self examinations and said, "What are you going to do now? You've already done everything you prepared yourself for. Here you've reached the end of the line at the age of 31." The latter bothered me a good deal. I finally resolved my difficulties by volunteering to go Pacific at the earliest possible time rather than exercising my right to redeployment to the United States. Once I made up my mind, I was really quite happy until the Japanese surrendered. So as you can see, my mind was made up and I really wasn't much tempted by the corporation's

offer even though 300 bucks a month in that day and age was quite a lot of money. It was interesting with pleasant associates and that sort of thing. On I went to Fort Sam and reported for duty.

LTC FEENEY: You never had to go through the Fort Sill drill at that time?

LTG LEMLEY: I'd never been to a regular course at Fort Sill. I attended Battery Officers Course Number 7 as a school troops officer in 1940, it must have been 1941 I suppose. I attended a communications course at Fort Sill prior to that. Interestingly enough, the head of the communications course I took at Fort Sill was General Al Grunther, who had also been a instructor of mine at West Point.

LTC FEENEY: As you went to your unit at Fort Sam, could you describe what this was like in those days and all the little problems. You know, like transportation, movement of household goods, the typical soldier's day and your relationship to your NCO's.

LTG LEMLEY: I didn't really have any household goods problem because I didn't own any. My possessions consisted of a trunk full of uniforms and clothing, a 2-door Chevrolet sedan which I had bought for \$465.00 new when I graduated from West Point. So my problems in getting there were really very simple. I don't know why I wasn't a little bit worried about what I was going to do when I got there, but I wasn't at all. I approached it with perfect confidence. I really moved into a period of on-the-job training. We did have some troop schools which were pretty poor quality and not really very useful. They were about eight subjects that were supposed to be covered for young officers in units in those days. I remember one was civil use of military power. One was equitation and animal management. Cooks and baker school which incidentally I did graduate from. There were a very few others, I don't really remember what they were. They were generally poorly taught.

The troop environment in those days had little relationship to the environment today, or the sorts of conditions that have existed since World War II. I joined the 15th Field Artillery which was a regiment of two battalions, with guns. We were equipped with the French 75. We were a part of the 2nd Division, and really in that regard rather unique, because this was the only division size unit in the United States. There was a Hawaiian division which was complete. 2nd Division was not complete. We had one brigade of two infantry regiments at Fort Sam Houston and the other was up in Wyoming. So we were shy one brigade out of the division. Now this being on a division post, I considered it to have been very valuable to me, in that it provided contact with other branches with a minimum of pretty low level combined arms training but nevertheless, there was some. Another thing by virtue of it being a division post, it was considered an attractive assignment, well, not only for that reason San Antonio is a delightful place or was in those days. It attracted a good many rather successful officers. It was considered a good thing to do. For example, being a division post meant that you had a good many Leavenworth graduates. In those days you couldn't be assigned to a general staff position unless you were a Leavenworth graduate. Leavenworth in those days was even more of a dividing line between success and failure than it is today. I believe in my regiment when I reported in, we had two Leavenworth graduates: A regimental commander, Colonel John Honeycut; and one of my battalion commanders, a Lieutenant Colonel Faulkner Heard was a Leavenworth graduate, but none of the others were. The regiment in those days wore very little relationship to a troop unit as we think of it today. As a matter of fact, it consisted of a number of men, considerably smaller than the table of organization and equipment would have called for; and it consisted of a bunch of equipment which was also considerably short of what your TO&E would call for. I don't

recall in the two years that I served at Fort Sam ever looking at a TO&E. I don't think I'd ever seen one at that stage. You just took what you had and did the best you could with it. The recruiting was done by regiment. We sent recruiting parties out through Southern Texas to sign up recruits. We brought them in. We had our own recruit training detachment for the regiment. There weren't very many officers. For example, the two battalions had no staff at all. They had a battalion commander and a sergeant major and that was the battalion headquarters.

LTC FEENEY: How successful were these recruiting teams in those days?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, they were rather successful because you see the depression was still very much with us and although it seems a little odd now, three meals a day, a dry place to sleep and \$21 a month was not as unattractive as it might have been. Now in the areas where we were recruiting, we didn't get the cream of the crop. What we got were good country boys, perhaps half of whom could read and write and a high school graduate. An enlisted position in those days was a great rarity.

LTC FEENEY: Did this help your, certainly wouldn't help probably, but how did this affect the training of these recruits in the quality of the NCO's that you had?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, actually the NCO's were quite good within the limits of their horizon. I would say on the average, the sergeants had 20 years service and a corporal might have 10 or 12. You see back in those days, we really only had PFC's, corporals, sergeants, and a staff sergeant, battalion sergeant major, and of course 1st sergeants, but you didn't have the more complex rank structure that you have today. Well, these noncommissioned officers had a wealth of experience in their own little bailiwick. They had risen very torturesly as promotions were very, very, very slow. A vacancy for a sergeant

at the regiment was something that the whole hierarchy would sweat over for 2 or 3 days. Because as I said, promotions were very, very rare, as you had a rather rigid structure of not very well-educated people, but good old country boys, that were quite expert in the narrow confines of their technical job. The slow promotions along with everything else, I suppose resulted in selecting noncommissioned officers who had marked qualities of leadership even though they lack an education. Really a gun section chief in those days taking care of his section of the field was sort of like another hen with a bunch of chickens. It was a very close sort of paternal relationship. Now the officer corps was rather peculiar. Our regimental commander, Colonel John Honeycut, was one of the finest soldiers and one of the finest leaders I've ever known and I considered myself extremely fortunate to have served under him. He had been an instructor at Fort Leavenworth. He had served in staff positions. He was very definitely a comer. I suppose you would say in today's environment, he was getting his ticket punched as a regimental commander, because he was definitely headed to be a general. There was no question about that in anybody's mind. But when you left the regimental commander, you moved through a very considerable thicket of mediocrity. I would say, well, the lieutenant colonels were all right but we only had one lieutenant colonel in the regiment at the time in those days. The majors were maybe half and half qualified, perhaps a little over optimistic in that half of them were qualified. But our captains, I suppose on the average, had between 15 and 17 years service. They had been doing the same old thing in an artillery gun battery for all 15 years of this time, and they knew their jobs extremely well. But their enthusiasm for doing much wasn't, generally speaking, very obvious. They weren't really much good but I suppose I was lucky. Colonel Honeycut decided when he went there that he was really going to make something of this regiment and moved

out smartly to do so. He was extremely unpopular with the captains in the regiment, I might add, because he wanted to do things a little differently. One thing he wanted to do in the process of improving the regiment was to win the Knox Trophy. I don't believe the Knox Trophy exists any longer, but this was, at that time, a competition between all of the field artillery batteries in the Army to achieve the best four (tubes) on a prescribed test, which is perhaps not markedly different from what a battery test would be today. The mechanics of it were much different, but in the context of that time it was about what a battery test should have been. Colonel Honeycut, decided among other things, that he wanted to win the Knox Trophy for the 15th Field Artillery. He put together a team to win it, and the team consisted of Captain Works, who we called "seldom" and I don't really remember what his proper name was except. "Seldom Works." The name pretty appropriately described him as far as his energy was concerned, but a very deceptive term in as far as his abilities were concerned. He was a very capable officer who could find people he could depend on and give them their head. In otherwards, he let us do the work as long as he was satisfied that we could do it. He was a very capable officer. He had amoderate drinking problem I think. He put together the team. Now, you couldn't move the enlisted people in the battery. You couldn't load the bet on enlisted people. This was one of the rules of the game, but officers were a different proposition because obviously officers moved, particularly since we were in the aftermath of the CCC when one lieutenant might command four companies. The same rules didn't apply to officers and I guess he did load the deck a little bit because I was made the reconnaissance officer of the battery. Major General Elmer Gibson, now retired, was the battery executive and Major General Rosschild, (I don't whether he's still alive or not), was the third officer in the battery. Well, with seven stars in one battery,

that's pretty good indication that he (Captain Works) loaded the deck a little bit. We did win it. We won the Knox Trophy.

LTC FEENEY: How long did you have to prepare for this?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, we had about six months to prepare for it. Well, about six months after the team was assembled, and as I say, we did win it. I suppose I became sort of a favorite of Colonel Honeycut, later General Honeycut. Incidentally, he was killed in an airplane accident early in the war as a general officer; and had he survived, I'm quite sure that he would have been on the top of the heap in the United States Army. I guess I became a favorite of his because I always gave my wholehearted support to his projects. Now there was resistance in the regiment, particularly on the part of some of the older officers to accept the things that he was doing. He was a great believer in spit and polish, for example. I didn't mind that. I could pretty much outpolish most of them around there, particularly since I had no animosity toward it as some did. I also achieved some reputation as a gunnery expert. And in this connection, I think I ought to say something about the training literature that we had in those days and it was pretty rudimentary. It was left over from World War I and each officer when he was commissioned received a personal copy of all Army regulations and all training regulations, as then called, what we now call, field manuals. The set I received when I graduated would cover about four feet of bookshelf and the adjutant generals of the Army mailed you personal changes, as they were published which was rather infrequent. Particularly in the area of gunnery. There was experimentation going on at Fort Sill largely being conducted by General Frank Farrell, Lou Griffing, and General Matheson in new methods for gunnery which don't differ in any great details from what we do today, except we do it more easily I suppose than we did in those days. Because at the time, we were still using

the World War I method which was basically for the battery commander to stand on a OP and give fire commands to the guns left and right, so much the range and yards, with all the fire direction being done by the observer. They had some very complex trigometric formulas, which the officer doing the shooting, applied in his head and you had to do it in your head because a pencil and paper when you were shooting was completely forbidden. It was during this period that at Sill in the gunnery department, these officers whom I'd mentioned and some others, were developing the forward observer system which relieved the observer of all these laborious computations, transferred them to a fire direction center. Fire direction centers did not exist in those days in the tables of organization, and which finally permitted the massing of fires to an extent which had never before been done. Basically, what we had done was taken the French artillery instruction in World War I and translated it into English. Well, this was obviously a rather absolute method. Through reading a field artillery journal and the judicious purchase of some field artillery books, primarily book 161 which was the basic text of modern gunnery from the Book Department at Fort Sill. I learned the new method. I was also quite adept to the old method because I've always been a pretty good mathematician and could work pretty fast in my head. So I sort of became a gunnery expert in the 15th Field Artillery. The first time we ever tried the system I recall, was out at Camp Bullus, Texas, which was a firing range about 15 miles out of Fort Sam. The brigade commander, General Foy, was going to visit the regiment and watch the practice and I was at the fire direction center. I had two radio operators and a sergeant to do a whole operation in some sort of put together equipment that we'd copied out of a reg book.

LTC FEENEY: Well, what was the time frame in this era?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, this would have been 1936 perhaps. It was really a rather

disastrous experience, partly my own fault and partly not. Obviously I had a totally inadequate team to cope with. On the complexities of fire direction, I was not too knowledgeable on the subject but probably more so than anyone else. The radios that we depended upon, and we did depend on radios, were the old hand cranked morse code varieties which are pretty poor excuse for communications. But in any case, we went through with it. I rather dejectedly packed up and headed home only to meet Colonel Honeycut, on the way up from the stables, who highly commended me for my coolness under fire, so to speak, and my grasp of the situation which, of course, made me feel very good. But to get back on the track, after the Knox Trophy incident, the battalion headquarters battery came up without a battery commander. Colonel Faulkner Heard my battalion commander, moved me from D Battery where I've won the Knox Trophy, to command headquarters battery which I'm glad was only a section of the regimental headquarters battery. We'd only have administrative set-up. Well, I perhaps, knew less about my job in this capacity than I had known about my job in a firing battery when I came and reported in to the regiment, but, as we all did, I took what we had and sort of made the best of it. One rather amusing thing when I was appointed as headquarters battery, the battalion commander called in the two gun battery commanders, both captains with something over 15 years service and told them that 2LT Lemley in addition to his duties as Commander of Headquarters Battery, 2nd Battalion, was his battalion executive officer and that any instructions I issued would be considered as being in his name. I would . . .

LTC FEENEY: You must have been walking on water.

LTG LEMLEY: I think that the two elderly captains would have found this a little revolting but in actual fact, I don't believe they did. I'd served under both of them as battery commanders, knew them well personally, and I

think probably enjoyed their respect. So the operation worked rather well.

I was not only battalion executive but I was the entire battalion staff.

LTC FEENEY: Maybe they put you in a envious position. Do you think the fact that you were a graduate of West Point helped in this assignment or was it because, simply because you had done a good job?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, all the lieutenants were graduates of West Point and I think that it was because I had done a good job and attracted considerable attention. I wasn't unique in that respect. Major General George Eckhardt's career in the 1st Battalion of the 15th, followed my own very closely. What he did in the 1st Battalion was pretty much what I did in the 2nd Battalion. We had I guess, the regiment being rather small, I suppose, we must have had 20 officers of perhaps a dozen were lieutenants. I can think of, well, I think I was the only lieutenant general that came out of the regiment. I can recall five major generals that came from the lieutenants that were assigned there at that time. Perhaps there's more that I don't just think of off-hand. But I suppose when I moved into Headquarters Battery, I really for the first time fell heir to some problems of troop leadership. In the two gun battery's I'd served in, the leadership and administration of the unit was strictly the province of the 1st sergeant and the battery commander. It was rare for a lieutenant to even be consultant on any matters of this type. Of course, this was not the case when I was alone in the Headquarters Battery and without knowing very much of what my job was, I suppose I moved into it rather forcefully. One project I undertook and I'm sure anybody in the modern day Army will find this inconceivable; but I did mention the headquarters battery was really a section of the regimental headquarters battery, therefore, we had no mess. We had no dayroom. We had no battery fund. Well, I built a mess and a dayroom in the basement of the barracks without any vestige of

authority. Although I never inquired too deeply into where the materials came from, I believe the 1st sergeant had a set of license plates which duplicated those for one of the quartermaster units on post and he just went over to post quartermasters. The post quartermaster in those days handled construction and I think he probably just went over and hauled the stuff out. I recall the regimental commander was who by that time was no longer Colonel Honeycut. Lieutenant Colonel Falkner Herd had succeeded him when Colonel Honeycut had left. I recall his surprise in inspecting my barracks one Saturday morning to discover that we had a mess and a dayroom which hadn't been there before. I had almost no disciplinary problems as a battery commander. My noncommissioned officers, generally speaking, were entirely reliable. Since they had more technical jobs, they were a little better educationally equipped than you would normally find in a gun battery and I really never had any trouble with them. I do recall one incident which I'm sure must have shocked my 1st Sergeant considerably. One of our sergeants got into some sort of trouble and I can't recall what it was. It was relatively minor, but obviously something that required some sort of disciplinary action and I sweated over this rather considerably because he was an excellent sergeant. Later I'm sure he became an officer in World War II. I finally selected the alternative of a public reprimand which I had administered to him in the presence of all of the other noncommissioned officers of his grade or senior. As I say, I'm sure that the old 1st Sergeant must have turned in his grave.

LTC FEENEY: What was the reason for the action, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I thought it was really a rather effective thing because he was a good soldier and a dedicated soldier and perhaps I was following Colonel Honeycut's example. Prior to this incident with me, one of our lieutenant classmates of mine from West Point, who was a little unstable,

really that got in trouble in a taxi-dance downtown and undertook to do physical battle with the San Antonio police in which he didn't come out very well. As soon as he got out of the hospital, Colonel Honeycut called him out in public, reprimanded him in front of all the officers and the regiment which I felt to be a very effective punishment. Actually, all of his contemporaries were shrinking in the corner and thinking that what in the grace of God there go I, so I was impressed with this. It didn't affect the guys record. He was a good soldier and I think it probably was effective, but as I say, the 1st sergeant must have thought that was a mighty peculiar way to do business. But I enjoyed my service as headquarter battery commander and I recall after I had been in that position for perhaps 6 or 8 months, we got a new brigade commander, General Lesley McNair, then a brigadier general. Shortly after he arrived, he visited the regiment. We had a full field display out on parade ground for him and I had sort of a show battery, the virtue of having done some things that had I looked back, were probably pretty God awful, but they seemed like a good deal, a good idea at the time. For example, I had a set of tools for every vehicle which had been burnished and nickel plated. They had a little decorative claws to display. Of course we had other tools that we used for work, but they were kept in the 1st sergeants garage rather than in the battery. Colonel Herd brought General McNair particularly to see my battery and I don't whether General McNair was impressed or not. I suppose he probably was in one fashion or another, but he did ask Colonel Herd what I was doing commanding a battery as a 2Lt when there were 1LT's around. I don't know what Colonel Herd told him. They walked on off. Later I was nominated to become Lesley McNair's aide. He was looking for an aide and he wanted a working aide who would retain his job in a troop unit during the daytime and aide him at night, which incidentally is a very

impractical arrangement; but that's what he wanted and I was nominated from the 15th Field Artillery. Before any selection was made, I was ordered to Panama and foreign service orders in those days were not subject to change. I don't know whether I would have been selected or not. I did invest a fairly considerable sum for those days. I think probably 60 or 70 dollars for some new tailor made khakis and bought a new pair of field boots on the off chance that I should become an aide. Aides incidentally in those days, got extra pay. You get \$12.50 a month extra to meet the expenses added on the job so I borrowed the money and counted on the \$12.50. I never got to pay it back.

LTC FEENEY: You weren't married at this time were you sir?

LTC LEMLEY: No, I was a bachelor the entire time I was at Fort Sam Houston. I met my wife there. We were not married there. We were married in Panama somewhat later. At that time, bachelors were more common than they later became. While a substantial number of people married on graduation, there were probably a good many more that did not marry on graduation. It was a little tough getting by even in those days on \$125 a month with a wife. You receive no ration allowance for your wife until you were a 1st lieutenant. Really the Army didn't recognize a 2nd lieutenant as being marriageable in those days.

LTC FEENEY: It might interest you to know sir that in my section out of 46 American officers, I only have three bonafide bachelors today so there's a different trend I think for different reasons. . . Was there, you know as in the service today, many very interested in the command information program and, you know, United States strategy in the military role. In those days, did you leave such things as officers calls and things. Did they try to give you the broad picture of what was happening within the Army and where you were going?

LTG LEMLEY: No. No, there was none of that. All of our officers calls and things like that were devoted exclusively to matters of the moment in the unit and I guess I ought to say something about training in those days. You'd have such great stability in the unit except for the officers that it really wasn't awfully necessary to have the progressive type training programs that we have today and have had since World War II. Generally speaking, most of the people knew the job they were in and that they were going to stay in that job. So training was a pretty spotty business. Training was entirely at the discretion of the battery commander except for service practice and training ammunition was so very very limited that there wasn't a great deal of shooting involved. Usually in the firing battery, we would go for drill in the morning. We'd have a period of foot drill I suppose to wake everybody up. I really don't know what purpose it served, but it was sort of nice to have a period of foot drill. Then we'd go down to the motor park and take a motor march of perhaps 5 or 10 miles. This, I think, was the hang over or sort of a mental hang over from mounted service. It sort of became a habit because in any mounted unit, you have to exercise everyday so I suppose without thinking much about it, there was a general feeling that the trucks had to exercise everyday too. We would go somewhere out on the reservation and lay some wire, do some gun drill and things like that. There wasn't a whole lot of variety to it. Colonel Honeycut, when he joined the regiment, did liven it up quite a bit by interjecting regimental problems, more periods in the field out at Camp Bullus and if I recall, he initiated a regimental training program of sorts which was sort of halfway unheard of in those days that bore no resemblance to the tightly controlled conditions under which troops are trained today. I think I mentioned disciplinary problems only in the context of my own in headquarters battery. But there

were some otherwise, and while what we would regard today as serious fractions were pretty infrequent. We did, at that time, take a very serious view of venereal disease and it was common practice to try any soldier who contracted a venereal disease by special court marshal and his only defense was proof that he had taken a prophylaxis upon his return to the unit. That was his only defense. I might add that venereal disease was very common those days. But generally speaking, the soldiers were pretty well behaved. They didn't have enough money to get in very serious trouble.

LTC FEENEY: You moved from Fort Sam to Panama. How was this overseas assignment? How did you view this as a general career assignment and what was it like?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I considered an overseas tour desirable. Had I had my own preference, I believe I would have gone to the Philippines rather than Panama. Most people wanted to go to Hawaii. That was the only foreign service in those days, Panama, Philippines, Hawaii. And I rather welcomed it as an adventure and an experience. In point of fact, overseas service in those days was somewhat different than service in the United States because your resources that were provided you were considerably more plentiful than they were in the United States. For example, in the headquarters battery I'd commanded, I suppose I had only about 60% of my authorized transportation whereas in the 2nd Field Artillery which I joined in Panama, we had pretty much what the law allowed in those days. Also, there was a psychological difference in serving overseas in that you felt a requirement to be in a much higher state of preparedness than you did in the States. In fact, I don't really think that, at least among my contemporaries and perhaps most of the captains and majors at Fort Sam Houston when I was there, that there was any feeling that we would ever be called upon to actually fight. This

is just not something you thought about it. You talked about it but it wasn't certainly in the fore front of your modification. You regarded things like winning the Knox Trophy, like doing a good job in the daily training and administrative activities and things like that. You regarded that with a good deal more of seriousness than you did the end product of combat readiness.

LTC FEENEY: When in Panama and of course being the Spanish influence of that time, there was as you know, the Spanish Civil War and there was a high tide of the fascist vs. communist thing then. How did you look at this political ideology at the time in your troops? Did this look like it was going to get something bigger or . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Not really. The Spanish Civil War developed rather strong emotions, but they were; religion, for example, played a very important part in these emotions and the persecution of the church by the Spanish Republican regime was viewed very seriously among my friends and contemporaries. I don't recall that there was very much sympathy for the Republican cause among my group of people. It really wasn't considered to have any real legitimacy. The fact that Germany and Italy intervened to support Franco, for example, had relatively little impact on us. Russia was considered pretty much beyond the pale anyhow. I think you have to recall that we didn't recognize Russia, I think, until about 1933. And in effect, we were totally isolated from Russia. It was considered a backward nation and not really a respectable member of international community.

LTC FEENEY: Didn't this make you any more aware though that as an Army as a unit commander you could bring home the idea that we may be looking at something larger?

LTC LEMLEY: No, no. Not at all. I think it was generally assumed by most people in the country that if they did have a war in Europe, it was their own business and let them take care of it. We wanted no part of it.

LTC FEENEY: Isolationism.

LTC LEMLEY: Yes. Isolation. The sentiment was very pronounced at this time. There was great disillusion, you see. The League of Nations had collapsed, perhaps not that anyone thought it was too important anyhow, but it had collapsed. Hitler had moved back into the Rhineland and nobody did anything about it. The French had the capability to do it; but, we sort of felt that it was up to them to do it, if they wanted to and that it would have little if any impact on us. But, really we were pretty unsophisticated in both world and national affairs in those days. The greatest concern . . .

LTC FEENEY: When I came in the Army there was consideration of a pay cut.

LTC LEMLEY: I don't know whether you know it or not, but while I was a cadet at West Point during the depression, the pay of the Army was reduced. The pay of each individual was reduced by 15%. Additionally, each officer was required to take one extra months leave a year without pay in addition to his normal leave.

LTC FEENEY: What was Panama like in those days. I remember Dr. Birrer was telling me about how you used to describe your hiking over the hills with your troops.

LTC LEMLEY: Yes. Well, of course I was in a mule pack unit and hiking was a very important part of our training and conditioning and we were very good at it. The Army in Panama was a very close knit group. Generally speaking, we looked down on Panamanians pretty completely. I don't suppose, for example, that I knew more than 6 or 8 Panamanians in my age group. They were ill-treated, they were completely segregated as to employment in the canal zone. They were

called silver employees whereas Americans were white or gold employees. The distinction being that in days gone by, the Americans had been paid in gold and the Panamanians in silver. But really it was a form of segregation. So the Panamanians were pretty much looked down on. The civilian employees in the Panama Canal were not held in much higher regard by the Army. They were regarded as being sort of a step below. You didn't associate with them. The canal zone was run by the Army. You had a department commander and governor of the canal zone, both military who ran the canal zone. Panama was not in any sense of word, an independent country. For example, they were not permitted to issue money except in terms of coins. They were not permitted to print paper money. We, as I say, lived in a pretty tight knit military enclave, including all the married people. I was not married when I went there. I had little occasion to go to Panama City. We might go to one of the beer gardens which were really more casinos then what we could call a beer garden in this country today. A very few of the officers belonged to the social club, The Union Club in Panama. All the bachelors belonged to the Union Club and that's where we would go on Saturday night. It's a rather exclusive social club which admitted Army officers at, I suppose, reduced rates and encouraged their membership though most of the married ones didn't belong to it.

LTC FEENEY: Was this kind of where you could fraternize with the local women and stuff . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, they could to a degree, but in those days in Panama, you could not establish any very intimate relationship with a Panamanian girl because at that time, they maintained the old Spanish tradition of the duenna and if -- I never did, but if you took a Panamanian girl to the Union Club on a Saturday night, for example, the duenna went with you and sat upon the

balcony and watched. So, generally speaking, even when we went to the Panamanian club, we didn't mix much with the Panamanians.

LTC FEENEY: Well, what did the bachelor do, for American boys are always American boys wherever I've been.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there were quite a few Army girls around to go with. We played polo. I played a lot of polo. Tennis. And went to the Union Club every Saturday night.

LTC FEENEY: I guess it must have been more kind of the guys getting together and having a few drinks type of thing.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, it was. Of course we spent some time at the officer clubs too, and there were plenty of them around because we had four or five little posts right there within a few miles of each other.

LTC FEENEY: What was the military population like?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I would guess probably, you see, we had two sides. The Atlantic side and Pacific side and there were only two ways you could get between. One was on the train and one was to go through the canal. So there was very little contact between the two sectors. What I would say on the Atlantic side we had perhaps, a military population of maybe 10,000. We had what is essentially I suppose, a regimental combat team plus a few technical service units. For example, we had a quartermaster group with pack mules to move supplies. I did command a pack mule artillery unit. We had a coast artillery regiment and we had an air corps unit there on one of the sides.

LTC FEENEY: We may be going back to that size, you know, in Panama. And thinking very seriously . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, they had, I would say that probably there was a rumor of an invasion in Panama.

LTC FEENEY: Was this a division size element?

LTC LEMLEY: Oh, I wouldn't say that. I would say on a brigade really. And when I say brigade in those days, I'm speaking in terms of the old square division brigade of two regiments and a field artillery regiment except we only had a battalion field artillery. But the Panamanians were not regarded as being of any great significance frankly. Their sole existence seemed to be to support the canal and . . .

LTC FEENEY: Did you ever go to say the other central American countries for training?

LTC LEMLEY: No. You couldn't do that because the only way you could get there would be to bring a boat in, an Army transport, and 4 or 5 of those were available. They were pretty utilized. No, you couldn't go anywhere else.

LTC FEENEY: And there was no -- you weren't going to be used as any contingency force in Latin America and enforce the Monroe doctrine?

LTC LEMLEY: No, no. There might possibly have been some dreams of that in the War Department, but I think our mission was solely confined to defending the shores of Panama and I'm sure internal security of the canal; though we never did any internal security training or did I ever see any plan to intervene to restore or maintain order in the Republic of Panama. Perhaps there were such plans. We did have war plans that fought out sectors, areas and it was normal to go out and occupy these areas once a year or so.

LTC FEENEY: Was there a real need for forces there then.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, yes, I think there probably was a contingency need.

LTC FEENEY: Or do you feel that these were just one of these places that the Army was maintaining in order that they could have an overseas station and be able to deploy some troops.

LTG LEMLEY: No, I think there was a real concern in protecting Panama, primarily from Naval attacks because you see in those days, the capability of the airplane against battleship was not recognized at all. I think probably the heart of the defenses were the coastal defense guns there in Panama. I believe this was the part that people were concerned about. There was no real danger of any great civil disorder in Panama, but there was a constant threat to order in the Republic by distant elements. They used to smuggle guns in through the Union Club on Saturday nights sometimes. There were two definite factions in Panama and one of the other generally had a revolutionary Army in training out in country the time I was there. It was Mr. Aries that was keeping his powder dry, ready to overthrow the government. You see, Panama had no Armed Forces. They had a National Police is all they had at the time. We, for example, didn't even have an Embassy in Panama.

LTC FEENEY: You talk about these revolutionaries. Who was backing this type of thing? Was this kind of a socialist versus nationalist thing or just . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Ideological.

LTC FEENEY: He who wants power tries for it.

LTG LEMLEY: There were several factors involved. It was purely a power struggle because at that time, there were about five families that controlled Panama and at any given time, there were divided between the in's and the out's. The allegiance or various members changed from time to time but it was strictly a personal power play on the parts of these leading families. So it had nothing to do with ideology.

LTC FEENEY: When did Mrs. Lemley come down?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, she came down after I had been there about a year to visit close friends that had been stationed at Fort Sam, mutual friends, and she stayed.

LTC FEENEY: Not to see Lieutenant Lemley?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, perhaps. I expect her mother talked her into it. We had some real problems marrying in Panama which I suppose today would seem pretty strange. There was -- we had a Catholic chaplain in Panama, a Father Killcoin who we knew quite well, but he was in the states on leave at the time we were married, so we had to proceed through the hierarchy through the Bishop of Panama. As I said, the chaplain was out of town, out of the canal zone, so we had to proceed through the administrative jungle of the Bishop of Panama's office. Since we were married on rather short notice, about two weeks, it took a good deal of doing. For example, my wife had to have permission from her parish priest, certifying she was free to marry. I had to have the same certification. Though not being a Catholic it could come from anybody, so I got one of my classmates to give me permission. In those days, you had to secure the permission of your commanding officer to marry. I don't suppose he could have really refused it, but it was customary to ask him. And perhaps, it was just as well it was for in my case because with no Catholic chaplain in the area, we had no place to be married. In those days, a non-catholic could not be married in a Catholic church. I was living in two rooms in the BOQ and that's not really a very appropriate place for a wedding so we had sort of tentatively selected the battery stables to have our wedding until our battalion commander, Colonel Gus Frankey, invited us to use his house for the wedding, which we did.

LTC FEENEY: That's an unusual story in itself. How was the married life there on the post, pretty well taken care of or, I mean after you became married?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. We had what I considered for the time, a very adequate apartment, a good deal more apartment than we had furniture to put in it.

Like we had hardly any furniture. The social life on the post was quite active and again we relied very heavily on tennis and that sort of thing. There was a golf club in Panama. I've never played golf so we didn't use that. There was swimming of course, there were beaches and we found living quite pleasant. You could go to the movie. You could go to the club. You could go to social affairs and . . .

LTC FEENEY: What was your pay at this time? Do you remember?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I was married three days after I became a 1st Lieutenant and my pay was \$175.00 a month plus \$36.00 for rations - \$18 for me and \$18 for my wife Peggy. And really that was quite adequate. We had no troubles getting along on our pay at that time. Everything was pretty cheap. I recall not too long ago, I was running through some boxes of papers and I ran across the record that Peggy used to keep of our commissary bill. It would run about \$20.00 a month then. That was not, does not mean what the commissary bill would mean today because in those days, the commissaries stocked only issue items. For example, if you bought beef at the quartermaster at the commissary you had to buy a side of beef. That's all they sold. Much of it canned, stuff came in #10 cans which was a little hard to use, but living was quite cheap and entertainment was cheap in those days. So we had no problems. I think I probably ought to talk a little bit about the troop life in Panama too. The units except for being more fully manned and better equipped, didn't really differ much from those that I've described earlier in the states. We did have a requirement, a minimum height requirement in the 2nd Field Artillery. A soldier had to be 5'11 to get into the 2nd Field. This was an animal unit of course, mule pack artillery. And your training requirements went somewhat further than they did in the states in a motorized unit because of course, you

had to keep the soldiers exercising to keep their feet in shape as well as the mules. So without exception, we would make a 10 mile march every morning to start the day off. Then we would do a little gun drill and quite a bit of stables. Here as I had in the 15th, I had the good fortune to serve under a very distinguished commanding officer, Colonel Gus Frankey, who was suffering from some of the same problems that Colonel Honeycut had been in the 15th. He was a comer, a good part of what I would say of the captains, and with one possible exception, all were pretty route step and resisted his efforts to improve the battalion.

LTC FEENEY: Apparently was this just true of field artillery or . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, it wasn't. No, it was not unique in the field artillery. It was less present in the field artillery than it was across . . .

LTC FEENEY: Across the board.

LTG LEMLEY: Across the board, yes. Much less and the reason that it was much less true in the field artillery is that when the non-regular officers were intergrated after World War I. In the early 1920's, General Snow, who was then the chief of field artillery, conducted a very, very selective screening process on those who were given regular commissions in the field artillery and this was not generally true of the other branches. This was an accepted fact. It wasn't just field artillery people who would tell you this at that time. It was accepted throughout the Army that the field artillery had chosen the best to intergrate it more wisely. No, I think it was a product of stagnation that set in between World War I and to about 1939. You have to remember that these people I'm talking about had been lieutenants for 17 years - many of them. They had done the same sort of thing. They had served in the same kind, essentially the same kind of field artillery battery as lieutenants for 17 years. About the only escape any of them had had was during the days of the CCC when they went out and organized these

Civilian Conservation Corps camps. So, they were quite naturally, I believe, felt that they were quite expert at running their batteries and it was generally accepted that a company or battery commander ran his battery and the battalion or regimental commander sort of sat back and shuffled papers and he really didn't stick his nose into it very much. Whereas these two individuals that I'm talking about had a good deal more life and ambition. So I think it was a natural product of this stagnation. I'm sure if I'd had to serve 17 years as a lieutenant in a gun battery, I would have felt much the same way that they did.

LTC FEENEY: Your implication here is also that leadership wasn't exercised to get these guys moving either. There was only a few good leaders.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I don't know how many there were. But I would say that really the officer corps fell into three categories. Lieutenant Colonels and colonels and some majors who had succeeded in the Army. They had attended the Command and General Staff College and this was sort of the past fail point even more so than it is today who could see a future for themselves, who were still charging. Then you had this great group in the middle that saw nothing ahead except a sort of a route step progress towards whatever grade that they could achieve by 64, which was the retirement age in those days and who felt that it was a pretty hopeless proposition. They weren't getting very far and they knew that as long as they stayed out of trouble, they would march along in progression because all promotions was strictly on the basis of seniority. There was no selection below the grade of brigadier general. So it was - this does not, you know, create any desire to charge. There were, of course, exceptions to that, but there weren't too many exceptions. And you also, I suppose, have to remember that people who, captains and majors, who have demonstrated a greater ability; tended to be picked out of troop unit and

sent to West Point Field Artillery School, Command and General Staff College or War Department General Staff. Of course you couldn't go to the War Department General Staff unless you had graduated from the War College. But they were picked off for staff assignments, aides, and adjutants. Adjutants were very important people in those days. For example, when I went to the 15th Field Artillery, I don't even recall that we had an S-3 and I don't believe we had one in the 2nd most of the time I was there. Nobody had an S-2. I think probably the best had been sort of picked out of a herd as I saw it. But the commanders were chargers. Then of course at the lower end of the line, you had the eager young lieutenants to whom it was still new and who had energy and ambition to go ahead. And I suppose partly through pride and partly to get results, these more energetic commanding officers tended to look to the lieutenants to get things done without contravening the chain of command, but at the same time, to a degree, going around it.

LTC FEENEY: Since you were a young officer then and you were in this category of a new lieutenant, what was your opinion of -- we were approaching a situation where there was becoming more hostility in Europe. The United States should have been a little more aware of its state of readiness and what was your feeling on this and did you take any action to try to get people to get ready or look for improvement . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No. Well, you always, I think, try to improve your unit, but that was more in the nature of competition in the local environment than it was any conscious necessity to prepare for war. You see, it wasn't until Munich and the invasion of Poland had these world affairs began to concern people at my level. Well, for example, when Italy went into Ethiopia. Well, everybody's reaction was, so what, Where is Ethiopia?

LTC FEENEY: How about the Japanese invasion of Mainland, China?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, this was not regarded as a matter of much consequence.

LTC FEENEY: It was an Oriental thing?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Pretty far away. Now that did have a little more impact on the Army and there was more consciousness of that because we had troops in China and I forgot that. We did have the 31st Infantry in China at the time and this was considered the choice of foreign service. But China, I think you have to remember, really didn't exist as a country during these times. It was warlord society and the Chinese were fighting among themselves. Even our troops had their enclaves. Our troops and our business people and everything had their enclaves and lived largely a part from any contact with Chinese. Chinese were servants and we were the rich foreigners and that sort of thing. Nobody ever associated with any Chinese in China.

LTC FEENEY: It must have been a decade of the great white man?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes. Of course that condition in China was established perhaps without written treaties but it was just an accepted fact. You had these U. S., German, French, British enclaves in China and nobody really wanted the Chinese to get together and gang up on them.

LTC FEENEY: I guess it just wasn't vogue to sit back and reflect and see that the Japanese invaded Russia early in the century. Now she builds her military structure, became a recognized power in the 20's with treaties she signed, but now she was going into China - but nobody sat down . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we were on relatively friendly terms with Japan, you see. We, for example, we sent officers to the Japanese military schools before World War I? There was some concern when Japan invaded the mainland. I believe it's Washington Naval treaty which limited Naval armaments after

World War I. There was some concern, but by and large, Americans didn't believe much in disarmament in those days anyhow. They were skeptical of it at best. And you have to remember, there was no threat to the United States. Now, it's always been, the United States has always had really one basic policy. I say always. I would go back a good many years on this and I don't know how long always is but it always is, The Monroe Doctrine. In otherwords, keep out of the Western hemisphere. And that no single power shall dominate either Asia or Europe. And you won't see this written down anywhere, but if you examine our foreign policy over the years particularly in the 20th century, it becomes quite obvious that this has been the driving force and perhpas the only basic national foreign policy we've ever had.

LTC LEMLEY: You see, none of these developments posed any threat to the United States. The Navy was our first line of defense. We had a good Navy we thought. There was no earthy way really that the Japanese could invade the United States. The airplane was not recognized as an important aspect of national power. After all, it wasn't during this era that we're talking about when Lindberg first flew the Atlantic. The big news in air travel back in those days was the dirigible Hindenburg and . . .

LTC FEENEY: That ended abruptly didn't it?

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, that did. Very abruptly and I think perhaps prematurely. I'm not sure that this was the place.

LTC FEENEY: As a matter of fact, I agree with you. I did some studying this year. My classmates think I'm full of balony but . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, in these days, we used to teach a course in ballooning at Fort Sill and General Barksdale Hamlet is a graduate, a lunatic from a balloon course at Fort Sill.

END OF TAPE 1

TAPE #2

LTC FEENEY: I was wondering what, I guess there was about this time you mentioned Munich and Poland. General Marshall took over as the Chief of Staff right at the end of the 30's and had an awful time with Congress. How did you as the officer perceive that or really did you feel this would take care of itself.

LTG LEMLEY: That was strictly beyond us. It was too far away. You see, we didn't have the communication to me in those days to keep track of things like that. No radio, well, we had radio then. But in Panama unless you had a short wave radio, you couldn't listen to any. No T. V. news. In Panama, you had one newspaper, the Panama American. Now it was largely a local devoted to the interest of the local American community and very little national world coverage. The military budget and things like that were not reported to any extent even in national press. Certainly not outside of Washington or New York and even had they'd been, it would have been very difficult for us down in the troop unit to interpret what was being done because you see, all of the appropriations in those days were to the technical and administrative services and the adjutant general got all the money for pay of the Army and that sort of thing. Chief of Ordnance got all of the money for weaponry. The Quartermaster got most of the rest of the supply budget and so even if you had access say to the congressional record, it would have not of been very meaningful for you because we didn't have budgets for this or that kind of airplane in those days. It was - the money was all appropriated to the services who did the procurement and maintenance. And all of that was a great mystery to us. For example, we'd never had any instruction in how this was done at West Point. Nor in the best of my knowledge, in any service school except perhaps the senior service schools. But generally speaking, there was little

or no consciousness of the world situation. Now, this did develop in Panama fairly rapidly in 1939 because there was a real fear that the Panama Canal might be sabotaged. So when the war broke out in Europe, the whole energys of the Army in Panama became devoted to providing security guards for ships going through and incidently, every ship had to have an Army security guard on it including U. S. Naval vessels. Why that was I don't know. In addition to our security duties, plans were made to greatly reenforce the Panama Canal department and the troops that weren't guarding ships going through, quit what they were doing and went out and cleared jungle to build camps, airfields. For example, my last 3 or 4 months in Panama I devoted entirely to clearing jungle to build an airfield right there near Albrook.

LTC FEENEY: They were reenforcing the canal zone at that time or planning to, right?

LTC LEMLEY: Yes. This was so. And we did all this with troop labor, incidentally, I mean, there wasn't any contractor to build this airfield. That was the 2nd Field Artillery's project and I took my soldiers out there and we chopped trees and burned them every day.

LTC FEENEY: I read where there were stories of the crisis years as General Marshall calls them, '39 to '45 and my feeling was though, you know, the present day Army officers very tired of favortism among assignments and selection for this and that, but it seemed to me that General Marshall relied upon this very heavily. Was this fairly prevalent among the Army and do you know that case in particular about the Chief of Staff's office?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I know what is said about General Marshall that he liked to rely on sort of a select group of people that he knew and I'm sure that this is true. This was not general throughout the Army. It was unheard

of to ask for anybody to be assigned to you. The first time a commanding officer would know who was coming is when he got the orders the same time the individual got the orders, so there wasn't any of that. But in the case of General Marshall and people of his time who were in the upper echelons of the Army, I think you have to remember that they were under terrific pressure to get things done. I mean there was just a great great urgency about getting things done in a hurry and big things. In a case like that, and General Marshall was not a young man when he was in this position. You can't afford to take chances. Now, I think the Army had its ups and downs on this cronyism and this sort of stuff and its always been my basic philosophy that any lieutenant colonel that reports in to me for duty, can have a battalion and I've had some fine ones, fine battalion commanders that nobody else would take because they had, they didn't think they had the right kind of experience. Well, I don't agree with this. I have not, generally speaking, messed too much with the slate that comes to me. I'm inclined to take pretty much what I'm given and do the best I can with it and I found this to be very satisfactory. But you had a different situation with General Marshall. To begin with, you had this fantastic expansion in the Army. For example, a division was permitted to have assigned a maximum of six regular Army officers in the division except for general officers, six. So the availability of people was pretty limited. He couldn't afford to take a chance on taking some major general who had been relieved as a National Guard commander on the Louisiana maneuvers and putting him in a responsible position on his staff even though the guy might have been ideally suited for it. So he had to go out and get the people that he knew, whose capabilities he knew, and on whom he could depend for these key jobs. So I don't fault him for this trait now. The extent to

which it has been exaggerated I really couldn't personally say. I think it had some influence on him, but I think it's a characteristic that all of us as we get older and more senior, tend to have. You develop a feeling for people your comfortable with. You know, their capabilities, their limitations. And it's much easier to work with them. Now, I'll cite my own example as DESOPS in this business. I think I can say I had almost absolute privilege in getting people and I know I had it in firing people. All it took to fire somebody was a phone call, and say, he's gotta go and you didn't have to say why or anything else. Just, he goes. I never found it necessary to do this. Perhaps I exercised this and in one or two instances. I recall one in particular. I got my formal aide assigned to DESOPS. Well, he's sort of like a son to me and I did that not necessarily because I preferred him in this job to somebody they picked out of the card file downstairs, but I did have this affection for him and I was interested in his career. He had had a very good career coming back from Vietnam and, it wasn't his second tour. It was his first tour. And I just felt that his age and his time in the service, it would be to his advantage to get a look at the way things happen in DESOPS, so I did influence his selection. I was very careful in selecting my general officers in DESOPS. But I think I had to do this because I have to depend absolutely on those people. Because my span was not such that I could ride herd on them. So I did exercise my prerogative in that regard very carefully. But I don't think this favoritism in the Army that General Marshall has been accused of and various other people, is as prevalent as it's believed to be. For example, I know that General Harold Johnson is regarded as my mentor in the Army and I don't know why. I may have met him as cadet. I don't recall really ever having met General Johnson until I reported in to him as Chief of Staff of Seventh Army

in 1958 as a colonel. When I came here as his assistant commandant, he was not consulted. In fact I think I knew it before he did.

LTC FEENEY: I think that's a very important point. Favoritism probably is perceived to be greater by my grade and lower than it really is in actuality.

LTG LEMLEY: The individual I think that probably influenced my success in recent years more than anything was General Clyde D. Eddleman. And I was not particularly a member of General Eddleman's team. I first met him in 1949 or '50 when he was a brigadier general, Chief of Plans Division in DESOPS and I was a lieutenant colonel action officer in the Operations Division on my fourth year and we were having an internal difference on an organizational matter concerning the set up of the MATO commands, UCOOM, command structure in Europe and everything. We had a difference between the two divisions and I had occasion to represent our position in his office which I did rather strongly. I was in my fourth year in DESOPS and you don't argue with a fourth year action officer very much on his subject and I suppose I got a little out of line. In any case, he more or less threw me out of his office and I won't say that I considered him an enemy, but I certainly didn't regard him as my mentor. The next time I saw him was some 7 or 8 years later when I was a colonel in G-2 and I happened to discuss the policy matter with him with my boss, General Gaither, who was the G-2. It was pleasant enough but it was strictly a business proposition. I went with him to Seventh Army, but that was as much, I think, coincidence as anything else. My tour in G-2 was running out. I had no--nothing in mind. In fact, I was seriously considering retiring from the Army and going into civil life and my executive officer Colonel Smith said, well, General Eddleman is going over to Seventh Army. Why don't you go with him? And I

said, no sir. I don't think he cares very much for me. And he says, well, you all get along mighty well. He says, you mind if I speak to him about it? And I said, well, if you speak to him about it, that's your business. Not mine. I'm not going to ask you to or anything. Well he did speak to him and General Eddleman says, hell, I've known Harry Lemley longer than you have and I'll be glad to take him. The only spot I have is the G-2 spot to fill. So that's how I happened to join General Eddleman. Now, this was a very happy relationship. He came to depend upon me personally for things totally outside of my technical job as G-2. He was, for example, having trouble getting a speech written to his satisfaction to come back to give before the War College. Much to my surprise, he took it away from the G-3 and handed it to me right then, and I wrote him one which apparently he liked. So I took on his speech writing job as G-2. I organized some briefings and things there for the headquarters that really fell outside my job. I wrote a paper on Berlin making suggestions or justifications for a rather drastic change in U.S. policy that he thought being worthy of further consideration. In fact, he and I flew up to present them to General Hodes who was the CINC USAREUR and both of us got thrown out of that one. So then he says, I'm going to take you with me when I go up to USAREUR, but not in G-2 and so he did take me with him. He very shortly appointed me as G-3, a major generals position as a colonel, and got into awful nasty trouble with the Chief of Staff for doing it. He showed me the correspondence. So in a sense, I became General Eddleman's boy and he's the one that sent me here to Leavenworth, not Harold Johnson. I think this is illustrative of the sort of thing that you find on this so called favoritism. There is some. The older you get the more you like to lean on people of proven abilities whose views are reasonably compatible with your own, but it's not the factor that it's considered to be.

LTC FEENEY: That's how it seems to be. How was, prior to World War II, the officer efficiency report thing looked at?

LTG LEMLEY: There's very mixed emotions about this. I've gone through a lot of efficiency reports in my 36 years of service and I'm not sure that any one of them was any better than any other and there all essentially pointed at the same objective and they reach it by remarkably similar means. The only exception -- there was one exception and this was in the late 1940's. It was designed to deny the rater any personal bias. You had a bunch of things you check with an electrographic pencil, three choice type of things, you know. You'd had three boxes and you check the one that best fit this individual and then you mail them in and they were scored. Well, that didn't last very long. There were some criticism, it became pretty obvious it didn't produce much. You might think a guy was the comer in the world and crucify him because you didn't know what was good and what was bad on the thing. Well, that's about the only one that was really much different. Now in World War -- prior to World War II, the efficiency reports were maintained by personnel in the office of the chief of branch in my case, the office of chief of field artillery, and he controlled the destinies of all field artillery officers. It was a simple form, but basically it said, how did he do his job? and how well -- satisfactory, well unsatisfactory, very satisfactory and excellent. Very satisfactory was considered to be highly complimentary in those days and he kept these and of course he was dealing with a relatively small number of people and I think the selection system worked about like it does now except of course you didn't have boards because when your number came up for promotion, you were promoted if you were still in the service and you could only be eliminated from the service by either courts martial or by what they call "D" board, class D, and there

were some of those but it was, they were quite rare. Well, when you were put in class D, you were kicked out. Elimination. Elimination board really.

LTC FEENEY: Well sir, I think that's it if you so desire, I think we've gone pretty heavy today.

THE FOLLOWING IS A TAPE RECORDING OF CONVERSATIONS OF THE SECOND SESSION BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD FEENEY AS RECORDED AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ON 8 APRIL 1974.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, to begin the second session, could you describe the finance systems, the medical care systems that you experienced in those days in Panama to give some kind of comparison from the issues of those days as compared to, you know the present issue of today?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, as a matter of fact, there were two different systems, finance systems for the pay of the Army. One for the officers and one for the enlisted. The officers system was not unlike that of today. You could be paid in cash; you could receive a check through the mail; or you could have a check mailed to your bank. I don't recall there was any provision for an allotment for the care of dependents prior to World War II, although I could be wrong on this score because I never had occasion to investigate. In the case of the enlisted man, the pay was always by cash and it was customary for each battalion, regiment or separate, unit to have an agent or finance officer who picked up the money and the payroll at the post finance office and went from unit to unit paying the men. Now in addition to receiving their pay, the men paid their bills at that time; twenty-five cents for the soldiers home, so much for cleaning and laundry; so much for canteen checks and the sorts of things that the battery or company collected for. As a result, the soldier didn't always get a whole lot of money when it came to the end of the line. But generally, it was strictly a cash system. I recall once in Louisiana maneuvers, this presented a particularly difficult problem. We had a pay day coming and the soldiers generally speaking didn't have facilities for getting their cash home to their families who needed it badly on a day to day basis. And I got myself involved in an

awful mess, trying to issue them personal checks that they in turn could mail back to their families. Banks in those days were not as easy to do business with as they are now. I believe that is about it for the finance system. The medical service was provided to officers, enlisted men and their families through post hospitals or dispensaries. We at Fort Clayton, where I was stationed in the Canal Zone, had a very small hospital with one doctor that was really not equipped to provide anything other than limited outpatient service, but we did use the facilities of Gorgus hospital down in the Canal Zone which was a very fine hospital for its days. There were no particular problems with regard to medical care. It generally was available and quite adequate subject to the limitations of the times.

LTC FEENEY: What was the feeling of the line officer to the medical officer, you know, today our medical officers are paid huge bonuses to remain in the service and there is developing some animosity. They are keeping -- they have a different promotion system that -- how would the line officer feel about the medical officer in those days?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course in those days they also had a promotion system that was different, in that, the medical officer was always one step ahead. He came in as a first lieutenant and I think this caused some resentment, but in point of fact, the contact between the line officer and the medical officer was much less in those days because you didn't have medical people in your units. They were all pooled, you didn't have detachments with the battalion. But the animosity has grown over the years and of course it was not so many years before . . . I know of back in the late 1800's medical officers were not commissioned officers. They were surgeons. And it seems to me that some such approach would be better today to alleviate this animosity, which I myself have felt. If you are going to have a captain,

have a captain. If you are going to have a field surgeon class three, have a field surgeon class three and you can pay them differently and treat them differently much better if they are not called the same thing. But medical service presents some real problems. Of course the problem of attracting doctors back in the late 1930's was not of anything like the proportions that it is now because at least in the Army they got paid in dollars and in civilian life they got paid with chickens and pigs and things like that because the people, generally speaking, didn't have any money. Also, in those days there was no such thing as hospital insurance and that sort of thing, so it was commonly considered an obligation adopted to provide free medical treatment if the individual was unable to pay for it and it was also very common to charge different people different fees for the same surgical procedure on the basis of the ability to pay, in other words, to make up for the charitable work on the other end of the spectrum. But generally speaking, the medical care in the Army was pretty much on a par with that and I would say in a metropolitan area. So, it was satisfactory and wasn't considered to be a problem.

LTC FEENEY: Well, sir after considering that aspect of it, one of the problems that I, well, I won't say it's a problem, one of the things I've always, from being an intelligence officer, we always liked to consider The Day in the Life of Ivan Desonovich or whatever his name is, but also, the day in the life of the average soldier, in that, while he was in Panama and on duty to include his messing and his ration, the type of rations he got, you know, which was typical of the period, I think.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, actually the life of a soldier in Panama was very much like that in any other part of the Army except that generally speaking, we started earlier and quit earlier. As I recall, the soldiers day started

about 6 o'clock with reveille; followed by breakfast. Then a period of occasionally some foot drill, not always; and then he would go down to the stables and, generally speaking, we would pack out and take a road march of eight to ten miles every day, sometimes more; followed by a period of perhaps of three quarters of an hour of gun drill and stables grooming, feeding, watering the horses. After which, he would go to lunch. After lunch we had either athletics or fatigue. Fatigue consisting of maintenance around the barracks and stable area; butting grass on the post or any special tasks that had to be done. He had his supper about 5 o'clock and then he was free to do as he saw fit. There wasn't a great deal available to him for his evening entertainment. He could go to a post movie for fifteen cents, as I recall. He could go to a local beer garden which was pretty cheap, or if he was flushed with money he could go to the area that we call the Cocoa Nut Grove which was the legal prostitution district in Panama City.

LTC FEENEY: Was this sanctioned by, this area was sanctioned by the Army and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, it was not off limits. I would not say it was encouraged. It was patrolled by MP's as well as civil police.

LTC FEENEY: Effort to keep the VD down with this?

LTG LEMLEY: There was an effort to keep the VD down but in point of fact, the legal area in Panama was pretty well policed in that regard and I don't know whether it was done by a combination of the Army, the Canal Zone and the Panamanians or done strictly by the Panamanians. I have a hunch that the Army and the Panama Canal played a pretty big part in policing the health of Cocoa Nut Grove. It was not an area where you ever ran into very much trouble because it was pretty well organized Well patrolled by both

police and military police. I might add in those days when I speak of military police, there were no MP units as such. It was customary to place a levy on the various troop units to provide a number of military policemen on special duty to a detachment, either on the post or in the case of Panama at the department headquarters. Now, messing in those days was strictly a company troop or battery proposition. You received a ration in money, which as I recall ran about thirty or forty cents a day and it was up to the mess sergeant and the mess officer to procure, prepare and serve the food within that allowance. This was not particularly difficult. There were some very, very good messes and there were some very, very bad messes and there were some that were sort of middle of the road. I would say off hand that the Army mess today is a much better operation than it was in those days on account of this wide variation in skills and management. Because today, well you might have had some in the old days that were better, but you had a whole lot that were worse and I would say that the average mess today is a good deal better than the average mess was in those days. Now, in Panama, particularly, this messing system provided some temptations to the mess sergeants to take kick-backs from suppliers because it was not possible to buy any fresh produce at the commissary. They didn't . . . they stocked canned goods largely in number 10 cans and meat in sides of beef. So you did, of necessity, go into civilian market and purchase fresh produce and this in many cases did provide a means for crooked dealings. And there were a good many who took advantage of it.

LTC FEENEY: Was there any effort to stop this or did the . . . was it accepted by the command as being a part of the system that . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, it was not accepted, but . . . by the command, but I think it was accepted in the fruit and vegetable business, probably a good deal

more in the mess sergeant business than we realized at the time. So it . . . it was a bad thing. Another great defect of the messing system in those days was messing in the field. Now, we had no field units to provide the field rations. We had no C-rations. The only hard rations that were provided to go into the field were corn beef and hard tack. And when I say hard tack, I'm not talking about the kinds of crackers that you get today, it really was hard tack. And coffee. So messing in the field did become quite difficult for any length of time under these conditions. And, of course, in a pack unit we were limited as to the kinds of cooking that we could do because we cooked on a little thing they called a "buzzy cot" which was really a grill, sort of a folding grill and we had no ovens or anything like that. So, it was a little hard to feed the soldier in the field but then we generally fought our maneuvers from 8 to 5 in Panama and so this hardship was not as apparent as it would perhaps have been had our schedule been a little bit more realistic.

LTC FEENEY: Who was . . . I'm greatly interested in this mule pack unit and I know you commanded one and that it seems to me that Doctor Burrier made reference that you took quite great pride in your ability to march these men. Could you describe the . . . how you trained your people in their tactics and the physical training for this . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there wasn't any great amount of tactics involved because when you get right down to it, a pack unit once it has reached it's destination doesn't function a hell of a lot different than any other. It did require a very high degree of physical condition because we marched at speed of four miles an hour which was adjusted to the gait of the mules, not the men. And it was when we were marching in the field, we would normally average, oh, about thrity-five miles in twenty-four hours which is a pretty good walk

over a period of, say, four to five days. But, our conditioning consisted strictly of marching. Now, there is one aspect of a pack unit that I think really tends to negate it's value in any sort of a hard fight and that is, its logistics. To begin with you can't carry much in the way of ammunition on a mule. We used to carry nine rounds on one mule and each gun section had three ammunition mules so, there you have twenty-seven rounds which isn't a great deal. It's true that we did in our motorized service element have a capacity to haul it by truck and I don't recall just what the capacity of that was but here again if you take advantage of the tactical mobility of a mule, the trucks don't do you much good. And on the one occasion when we really did this, we didn't carry any ammunition, but used the ammunition mules to carry forage for the rest of the animals and like I said I believe we stayed out about five days and we just about used our mule capacity to carry the forage and the equipment without any ammunition, well obviously this isn't a very satisfactory situation if you are really in a fight. There are other problems of course in an animal out there. You not only have to worry about the physical condition of the men, but you have to worry about the physical condition of the animals. And they have to be exercised everyday, too. So we did a great deal of conditioning. There are many legends about mules. Some are fairy tales and some aren't. A mule is much smarter than a horse. A mule will, generally speaking, stay out of trouble and you'll find it's extremely difficult to place a mule in a hazardous situation because they tend to recognize it and they just don't do foolish things. They are generally considered to be mean which is not true at all. In this regard they are like any other animals, if they are mistreated, they tend to become vicious. If they are

treated well, they are quite docile. Some of them are ticklish. I recall we had a mule called Tarzan, and it was very difficult to clip and this was an operation that was only undertaken under the direst circumstances but actually Tarzan was not a mean mule, he was just ticklish. Now, in the mule artillery the officers rode horses and this presents some problems for horses. To begin with the gait of a horse and the gait of a mule are different. And it's very difficult for a horse to walk as fast as the mule does normally, so you wind up sort of at a hard jog which is a little rough on the horse and also a little rough on the rider. But it was interesting service and sort of a novelty and I suppose I've always taken some sort of special pride in being one of the rare breeds that has ever served with mules.

LTC FEENEY: Well, you know we in this modern day of technology we kind of forget about our basic capabilities and I have trained in mountain and winter warfare but I have never had an experience training with an animal and I can foresee that maybe our . . . maybe we kind of ignore that and yet that might become, I can't see the situation at this time but I could see, say, if we had to go through southern Europe, through Yugoslavia and that area where it is so mountainous, that we could use animals again, I don't know and of course we don't have any, I'm sure we don't have any contingencies for it.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, in actual point of fact, pack animals can become very useful in modern war and they were used extensively in Italy in World War II to supply front line units to evacuate the dead and wounded where motor vehicles couldn't go and they can move quantities of supplies over difficult terrain pretty efficiently. Now of course the helicopter has perhaps rendered the mule obsolete in this role. I think probably he has. I think

there is another thing that you have to think about when you consider this. In areas where pack animals are useful, you can generally procure the services of local animals and animal handlers much more cheaply and easily than you can train your own and bring them from the States. Then, too the local animals usually are better acclimated to the conditions under which they live there and for example, in Italy little mules were much better than big mules. Our mules tend to be big and theirs tend to be little so I don't think . . . I think it is something people should keep in back of their heads but I don't think the role of animals with the possible exception of dogs, is ever going to be very great again.

LTC FEENEY: Since we got in the subject here of World War II, maybe we can kind of break off our transition from Panama and maybe you could describe your transition from Panama into your preparations for World War II. Did you . . . when you thought it was going to happen and this type of thing. How you moved out of Panama and back to the States?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course I left Panama. I was ordered to attend the regular course at Fort Sill the following year and in those days they were very religious about the length of foreign service tours and when your two years was up you came home. So I went to Sill on the 1st of December 1939 as what we called the snowbird. I went there to attend the course starting in August, the following August, and was assigned to a school troop unit. Well, I think about a week before I reached Sill, the requirement for a rapid expansion of the Army to meet the threat of World War II had developed and as a result all of the service schools were curtailed. And as I recall instead of graduating in June, they graduated around February of that year. There was some complaint in the class that in curtailing the course that they curtailed everything except equitation and they did a full year's

equitation at the expense of some things that might have been more useful because there was in the field artillery of that day, at least in the office of the chief of field artillery, General Danforth, an attraction to the horse that probably went beyond the reasonable limits. So, there was great stress put on equitation. Now, after the regular course was curtailed and we then moved into a series of short courses of various types. They experimented somewhat with them but, generally speaking, we went to a three months course which consisted of quite a lot of gunnery; quite a lot of rather poorly presented tactics and some smattering of communications and a very, very poor course in material and maintenance, care and maintenance which as I recall the only thing I remember about the course in except to the fact that we didn't learn very much was that the high point of it was putting out a bunch of axle grease and various lubricants and you were supposed to taste them and determine which was which. Which I always thought was fairly useless exercise. But I think you have to remember if I'm critical of the maintenance course it was largely devoted, well, we were pretty good on maintaining our cannon but nobody in those days really knew much about maintaining motor vehicles. It was just an art that had never developed very effectively. And the quartermaster Corps which was charged with this function at the time, did it quite inefficiently, resulting in it being turned over to the ordnance who developed the same sort of maintenance system for motor vehicles that we had for weapons and when properly carried out the ordnance maintenance system for World War II was very good. It wasn't always properly carried out. Now, at about this time the expansion of the Army started and we developed a good deal of turbulence both among the officers and the men. Moving out cadres for new units; providing fillers for this or that purpose and life became

really quite turbulent. I think it was probably in the spring of 1940 that when the Germans overran France that a realization became quite general amongst pretty much all ranks in the Army that eventually we were going to become involved in this war and it did bring a new sense of urgency towards readying units for combat. For one thing the Army was growing; for another there was much more pressure on the supply system to supply your needs than there had been heretofore. We called in and integrated substantial numbers of reserve officers which we did not have before. Of course, eventually we called up the National Guard. And so it was really in the period while I was at Fort Sill that we shifted gears from peace time garrison to a phase of actually preparing for hostilities.

LTC FEENEY: What type of problems did you perceive in the calling up of the Guard and the integration of these Reserve officers and the initial training of these troops. After all, this is something that the Army today is going to have to go through if we get back to this again.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, of course, I think I would like to talk about the Reserve officers first. The younger Reserve officers, the lieutenants and to a lesser degree, the captains, were fresh enough out of ROTC and eager enough that they presented no problems at all, they were really quite competent. Now in the case of the senior officers, this was not always true, because our . . . we really had no organized Reserve prior to World War II. People had mobilization assignments. For example, in my first regiment as a second lieutenant, I had a mobilization assignment as the battery commander of service battery of the 15th field artillery. Reserve officers in that general area would have mobilization assignments to come in to that unit and serve as the lieutenants in A battery, for example, and that sort of thing. These people were fine. You had a number of very patriotic and

very fine older officers who really had no capacity to serve in their grades except in certain technical specialities which were related to their normal division occupation. To begin with they were too old for the grades they held. So that pretty much covers the Reserves and we had no enlisted Reserves at that time that I know of, I never heard of one. So really we were just talking about a group of officers who had received reserve commissions from ROTC and who had done two weeks of training a year, somewhere, and that training was pretty rudimentary because they were just integrated in with the unit and if a lieutenant came into, reserve lieutenant came into my battery, he just rode around with me, he didn't really do anything except look. They also had extension courses from the schools which were generally speaking, of much, much poorer quality than those that we have today as a matter of fact, they probably hadn't been revised since immediately after World War I and were obsolete if nothing else. The National Guard was a totally different proposition. And mobilizing the National Guard would probably present many if not most of the same problems, today, that it did then. Not to say that the training in the Guard isn't better now, but the problem with the Guard is that the kind of a person that you need to hold a unit together as an inactive National Guard unit is not the kind of person that you need to command it in combat. In the first place, you need older people who are established in the community and can afford the time away from their businesses and their other pursuits to devote to the Guard. These are generally older people. Secondly, a Guard unit with its orientation towards a locality presents some very serious disciplinary problems when the unit is called in to active service because the battalion commander may not be regarded by many of the non-commissioned officers of the unit, for example, as a

particularly outstanding sort of guy and of necessity he - to hold the unit together in peace time - he . . . it's sort of a political process, he's not elected anymore but it's not greatly different than the days of electing officers back during the Civil War. So, really what you have to do when you bring a National Guard unit in, in my opinion, is to shake it up thoroughly, move about half of the people out particularly the more senior people; replace them with younger and more experienced leaders and this presents no particular problems, because generally these older people have skills that can be very effectively used in other areas. For example, I remember one National Guard unit in which I served in the, Oh, I suppose it was 1942, we . . . the regimental commander was a dentist. Well, he was a pretty good dentist and a very poor regimental commander both technically speaking in terms of leadership. Well, he saw the light of day and asked to be transferred to the dental Corps where I'm sure he performed with distinction and you have to do these sorts of things. It is an unfortunate fact of life that when you bring a National Guard unit into active service, if you want to make it effective very rapidly, you probably should shuffle out and replace most of the field grade officers in the division.

LTC FEENEY: Does this counter-act what we have the National Guard for, though I mean if they thought we were going to do this, this might cause wholesale mutiny and rebellion or at least dis-enchantment.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course, the much of the National Guard finds this distasteful and did find it dis-tasteful during this period prior to World War II. But, I believe, that it was generally recognized within the Guard as well as outside the Guard that this had to be done. Now it can be done rather tactfully. Regimental or battalion commander in one National Guard

unit may be relatively ineffective where as you can move him to another unit from a different locality and he can be quite effective provided that he has the training background. Really it's a favor to them to move them. Now they don't like generally to have regular Army officers move in wholesale and I don't think this is necessary or desirable. So, it is well to mix them up. The soldiers and younger officers of the National Guard unit are not greatly different than the ones you find elsewhere. Here again it's frequently desirable to shuffle them around within the unit. But, basically speaking their quality is quite as good as the regular Army and once they get into the swing of things it goes pretty well. I don't believe and never have that there is any future in pretending that the National Guard and Reserve, organized Reserve units that we have now, can ever be brought to a combat readiness prior to mobilization. It just isn't to be done in my opinion. Now I have served as the chief of a training inspection team of a National Guard unit that comes on its two weeks summer tour. In fact, the 36th Infantry division of Texas National Guard and the number of assorted units that came with it. Now these people had very high esprit. They were, perhaps, in correcting these deficiencies which I found and announced every afternoon that their critique were perhaps better than the average active Army unit and doing something about it. But this is over a two week period, you know and they are steamed up about this and I don't think you can sustain that level of enthusiasm over a period of 6 or 8 months. One interesting thing in this division, the division commander had been relieved in World War II as the battalion commander. Two of the three regimental commanders had also been relieved, yet in their peace time roles as National Guard unit leaders they were most

effective. Of course they were all too old for combat. So that, I think, about covers what I would have to say about bringing mobilization and the problems associated with it.

LTC FEENEY: What training did you and your troops receive when you moved to points of embarkation and can you describe that Fort Sill transition.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think we are getting a little ahead of ourselves a bit. The first summer that I was at Fort Sill I left my unit to attend a, what was supposed, to be a one month communication specialists course at the field artillery school. This course was run by General Al Gruenther as a matter of fact. It was a very good course. In the middle of the month it was changed to a three month course, which I'm sure made it much better. And it was a pretty good course. As a result of this I was given command of a headquarters battery in another unit, the 349th Field Artillery, which was the first Negro artillery unit ever to be formed. It presented many special problems because of course, no enlisted men in the unit had ever served in the artillery. I had one man in the battery that had a drivers card and he was the motor sergeant. Totally ill-equipped for the job but the closest thing I had to it. Of course I only had one truck, too, so it didn't make as much difference as it might have. And I used to take the unit out and load the communications equipment in the back end of my personal automobile and drive out, the men would walk out and we would conduct our training out in the field that way. I suppose it was here that I first became aware of the tremendous problem of rapid expansion. This unit, this battery which I commanded was required to furnish about six months, after it was activated, three cadres for three other similar units and when you consider that my problems with my motor sergeant were pretty much extended throughout the battery except in the mess and in the administration where I

was fairly well equipped it becomes pretty evident that rapid expansion presents tremendous problems. Now and in this regard, I think that I want to refer back to some of the things I said earlier about the quality of the soldier and their educational levels somewhat earlier. While it is true that all of these fine non-commissioned officers who perhaps could barely read or write, perhaps not read or write at all, while they were very well qualified to perform in their assignments in a peace time volunteer Army, they were not in any sense of the word prepared to move higher and provide the command structure for a much expanded establishment and I believe this is a problem that we will run into increasingly with our return to a volunteer Army of a couple of years ago, so it becomes very difficult to furnish a cadre when all of your people are really serving at the top level of their capabilities. As a result of my attending the communications course when General Leroy Collins was assigned to be the Brigade Commander, he had formally been the assistant commandant of the artillery school at Fort Sill, he moved me to brigade headquarters battery, that was because I had rank number one in the communications course and he was a great believer in the school. This was an interesting assignment for me and I think I . . . it had some useful lessons. We, the Army really had until 1940, had not spent much time in large scale exercises or any realistic field training. Prior to 1939 the field training consisted of going out to an area where you had the proper ranges and shooting your weapons. You might have some tactical exercises but as I have indicated that they were in Panama, these were mostly 8 to 5 exercises and you were really doing the same sorts of things you did in garrison except that you were shooting with live ammunition and you were living in tents. But this situation

changed with the Texas and Louisiana maneuvers of 1940 when sizable numbers of large units were brought together in a more or less continuous two-sided field exercise. And it was here I suppose that the deficiencies of the peace time Army became most apparent. We knew how to move as a battery or as a battalion but we hadn't the vaguest idea of how to move divisions and logistical units. As a result these things were largely big traffic jams. Another thing we had very poor communications and when I say very poor communications and I'm not only speaking of physical communications which were miserable because in the artillery we still had the hand cranked Morse Code radios. The wire and maneuver was pretty much out of the question because of the distances involved and time compression of the exercise. So orders were not generally transmitted very effectively. The troops were not generally speaking, oriented toward the field exercise what we were supposed to be doing and why we were doing it. In fact, as far as I was concerned as a battery commander in these early maneuvers all they meant to me was moving. Being told on short notice to move, perhaps you knew your destination, perhaps you did not. We had no maps except gasoline road maps and it was, really, as far as the troops were concerned, a sort of a farce. However, it did serve a very useful purpose in bringing the senior commanders and the staff to an appreciation of the sorts of problems they were going to have to face and in many cases they had to face them somewhere else because as I recall the first Louisiana maneuver I went on was in the 8th Corps commanded by General Dan Sultum. And every division commander and every separate brigade commander without exceptions were relieved either in the process of the exercise or upon its completion. Now, these weren't bad people but they just didn't have either the personal appreciation of the job that had to be done nor did they have the staff which could properly

assist them in doing it. So, these things, as I say though were a disgrace in the early days and reflected very unfavorably I think on peace time norm did serve a most useful purpose in bringing the people into the real world of life in the field as opposed to the 8 to 5 garrison type thing that we had done before. I left Fort Sill on 1st of February of 1942 after several false alarms on going somewhere in the Pacific and somewhere in the Atlantic which I suppose would have been Iceland or perhaps bearing for North Africa. And I must say that getting away from the garrison atmosphere of Fort Sill to the more primitive one that pertained in Camp Bowie in Texas which is where my unit moved was pretty good. It really was.

LTC FEENEY: What was your job at this time, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I was commanding the brigade headquarters battery when we moved. Shortly after that I attracted the favorable attention of a Brigadier General Vincent Meyer who had replaced General Leroy Collins when General Collins was relieved. I attracted the favorable attention of the brigade commander and temporary promotions were beginning to open up so he moved me to the 142nd field artillery an Arkansas National Guard unit where I learned some of the things that I mentioned earlier about the National Guard.

LTC FEENEY: And took command of the field artillery battalion?

LTG LEMLEY: No, I was a battalion exec. I was a captain at this time. I was a battalion exec and the 1st battalion of the 142nd field artillery and I expect I fared somewhat better than most regular officers who were moved in to similar positions because I am an Arkansan and my family was well known and had some influence in Arkansas, so I was probably more acceptable to the 142nd than some of the other people who moved in. I stayed there six months, was promoted to Major and moved back to the brigade as a brigade

executive officer and this presented some problems to major at the bottom of the list because as I recall everyone on the staff, every principle staff officer was much my senior but it did not create any insurmountable problems . . .

LTC FEENEY: Well, I've cut you off, sir.

LTG LEMLEY: I think I might carry on a little bit more about the atmosphere at Camp Bowie. It . . . the transition, the move from Fort Sill I think afforded us the psychological opportunity to really get down to field training and we did very extensive field training at Camp Bowie. We had good ranges, plenty of maneuver area and by moving people around and I was one of them when I went up to become brigade exec and we brought up another, Captain Robert M. Burnett who has long since retired, he retired from the Army early to take a civilian job after World War II. We sort of pulled the outfit together. Now General Vincent Meyer, a very fine man and a man of high standards and a forceful and effective leader, but he had a serious back problem which really precluded him taking an active part or as active part as he . . . you would expect a brigade commander to do in the training and preparation of the brigade. So he pretty much left it up to us. And we developed an extensive series of closely controlled exercised; some shooting, some not shooting, that were all run from the brigade level. Now I don't mean to say that we tried to run every bit of training of the unit because I don't believe in this and I never have believed in it. We took what I considered to be the proper approach of setting time phased objectives for achieving certain levels of proficiency which we in turn would test in the field and for an artillery unit there is no test like shooting. So, we did a great deal of this with relatively small amounts of ammunition. And of course a key element in readying the brigade for active service was

getting the right people in the right spots. And I won't say this was hard to do because of the constant turnover of officers and senior NCO's. I think they knew you had plenty of chance to switch them around but on the other hand it's something that has to be done and I think the senior commander in a situation like this where he has a mixture of National Guard and Regular and Reserve units, has to do this. And this is where he gets the opportunity to shuffle up the units. As I indicated earlier in this connection, I might add that the brigade at this time consisted of a Regular Army unit, the 77th Field artillery; two National Guard units, the Arkansas National Guard the 142nd, the 147th-174th pardon me, from Ohio; and a newly activated field artillery group, the number of which I don't exactly remember, it was somewhere in the 400's. So, it's here that you set your objectives; that you let the units prepare themselves for meeting these various time phased objectives. But then you test them out very carefully. All the time you have to keep control of your personnel. And supplies and logistics become somewhat of a problem. And I am afraid I screwed up the United States Army logistics system rather considerably at this time because we were constantly being alerted and unalerted. Our priority was changing and when you are alerted or placed in a top priority, they immediately re-equipped you. Well, this presents all kinds of problems, I suppose today and I know it did in those days, because really the Army has never done this before except perhaps in the early days of World War I when things were simpler. But we would get in a trainload of radios, which were incompatible with another trainload of vehicles that came in. And I was constantly involved in negotiations with the G-1, G-4 people at Army on personnel and various types of equipment.

LTC FEENEY: Who was your commanding element of this artillery brigade. Was it a separate brigade and you responded directly to . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we were under the tactical control of . . . tactical training control of the 8th Corps. But for logistics and personnel, we came under the . . . I believe it was then the 3rd Army at San Antonio. And I suppose working under this mis-apprehension that this equipment or re-equipment that we were getting in, was what we were going to fight the war with. I was very picky-itish, and I think I turned down about half of the trainloads that came in during the two or three exercises we went through before we finally left. I still, when we finally got on the train and headed for the point of embarkation thought that we were going to take this equipment with us right up to the front lines. In fact, we had sent details to Norfolk to supervise the loading of our vehicles and weapons on cargo ships, whereas we went to Camp Miles Standish in Massachusetts. Though when I left on the train, I didn't know until after I got on the train where we were going in the United States. We were under sealed orders so to speak, I think we learned the night before. Well, actually of course, what happened, we shipped our equipment over to the Mediterranean theater of operations or the North African theater I suppose it was at the time. And it just went in the pool but we wound up with not all of this bright new A-1 equipment that I insisted that we be equipped with but a bunch of shot-up stuff from the Kasserine Pass when we got overseas.

LTC FEENEY: The guys got there the day before and got your stuff, huh?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, and so but actually I think our training at Camp Bowie was very effective and when we left, I would say that we were quite well

prepared to do our job except in one respect, and this is really I suppose consists of knowing exactly what our job was. Because we were a Corps artillery unit and the . . . at Sill at least when I went there, they never got around to telling you much what purpose you fulfill, although they did say that the division artillery provided support to the moving elements and the Corps artillery provided counter battery but counter battery was a great mystery. And it was generally taught in the context of what kind of ammunition do you shoot in an enemy battery or how do you locate it or something like that. And the intelligence aspect of the training was very poor, very, very poor. But, anyhow, we moved out to Camp Miles Standish. We were very efficiently processed. And on about two hours notice, placed on a train to go to the New York port to board ship for movement overseas. Now, I think I do want to say a little something about the voyage overseas and I since this is the last time I've moved under similar conditions, it may not be pertinent but it certainly was a mess. In that, General Meyer, being the senior Army officer aboard ship, was the commander of troops which meant that our little headquarters, the 18th Field artillery brigade headquarters became the command element for the ship. Well, the only things that we were given to organize the ship after we got up the gangplank, we didn't know anything about it until we got on board, was a list of shipment numbers, identifying numbers, that were put on equipment to associate it with the shipment. All we had were a bunch of shipment numbers with the numbers of people that were in them. So as a result, in the process of organizing the ships, you know, the military police detail, cooks, and everything; we wound up with a package of Army nurses as the military police and all this thing had to be sorted

out with some difficulty after we got aboard. And I say with some difficulty because the characteristics of a ship which was the USS Monticello, formerly the Italian liner Conte Grande, was such that you could not once you got people aboard, they pretty much had to stay by their bunk because there wasn't any other place to go. There was no deck space where you could move people up.

LTC FEENEY: Well, what numbers of people are we talking about on that ship, sir?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, we never found out exactly how many people we had on the ship but it was somewhere around 8,000. But this was a problem, we . . . the entire voyage over to Oran which is where we disembarked. We tried to determine just how many people we had on the ship and we never were able to. I might add, we had two near curses on the ship going over. One was an epidemic of dysentery and with no capacity to separate people with all the crowded conditions this could have become very serious, very fast but we were fortunate in having this hospital with a lot of doctors aboard and were able to cope with it. Another, we blew a steam pipe about one day west of Spain, the Spanish coast, and were left dead in water and a rather heavily infested submarine area.

LTC FEENEY: How did you manage to get out of that? Did they repair that right away aboard ship and then you picked up . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, they repaired it and we went on. We eventually caught the convoy because we were . . . they were zigzagging and we were going direct . . . in any case after a few hours once we got the ship repaired we moved under the air cover from patrol bombers from Gibraltar. Everyone, including the ship's Captain, who I happened to be with at the time, thought we had been torpedoed when this steam pipe went. In this connection I think

I do want to say something to our colleagues in the Navy about moving troops. They are absolutely miserable at it. They treat you like a bunch of cattle. Totally inconsiderate of your needs of the requirements for some sort of amusement for the troops aboard. For example, the executive officer of this particular ship threw all the special services material, magazines and this sort of thing, overboard that was delivered to the ship prior to sailing because he said that it would clog the toilets. They were just God awful. In fact, they were so bad that it was a common saying among the troops and the junior officers that as soon as we got through with the Germans, we were going to take on the U. S. Navy. That, of course was before we rode with the British Navy and after we rode with the British Navy, the U. S. Navy took third place. They were worse. But the Navy needs to conduct some sort of training in how to handle troop movements. And they need to put some fairly competent officers in command of transports, which they do not do. Now, I probably wouldn't bring this out, except that I am reasonably certain that this same condition would obtain again and the reason I say this is because the last trip I made on a Navy ship which was coming back from Germany in 1961, as a Brigadier General, I found conditions just very much the same. And so I don't think it was just a war time condition. The Navy is disgraceful in this regard. Now, I will say that when you move from the troop transport type vessel to the attack transport that are used in amphibious work, you move in to an entirely different atmosphere and I think they do their job there very well. In fact, I made the landing in southern France somewhat later from the USS Beatlegoose, which was an attack transport and I would say everything from the reception handling the troops aboard and the debarkation on the hostile shore that everything went extremely well. But the Navy does dump on these

troop transports both in peace and in war and they ought to do something about it. So, I think I've run along quite awhile. Do you want to go back and expand on anything that I've covered? I think that is all I want to say about the Navy and the movement to the far shore. I probably should state at this time that when we arrived in North Africa the hostilities there were just over, so I did not participate.

LTC FEENEY: About what was the time frame of that, when you got there?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we got there as I recall on the 2nd of August of 1943 and I don't recall exactly when the final surrender in Tunisia was. It was not long before that. And naturally we were quite interested in and curious in learning from those who had been there before. What went on and how people did things. I honestly believe that there were two or three rather important factors that governed the campaign in North Africa and I'm not speaking of the initial landings. That's hardly worth talking about, that was . . . there was some fighting but not any considerable amount in Morocco or Algeria. One thing I do want to mention, not that I would guess that anybody would ever do it again, but some individual, and who, I haven't the faintest idea, conceived the brilliant idea of having a destroyer charge the mole in Algiers. In other words to go right up to the dock with its guns blazing. Well, of course this was a very unfruitful activity and we lost the entire assault element of the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Infantry, a unit of the 1st Armored Division when this destroyer went down. I looked into this a little more because it was commanded by a classmate of mine who was also killed with the elements of his battalion. But this is really my first realization as to the extreme vulnerability of destroyers and cruisers to land based artillery fire and this was later reinforced at Anzio when we had a good deal of trouble with our Naval

support because they would not come within the range of the 88th on the shore. I'll go into that more later. But the factors that I think really most decisively effected the outcome and the progress of the battle in Tunisia were principally two. One is air power. And I don't believe that the Army Air Corps of that day was fully prepared to operate effectively in providing air cover and support to troop units. In fact I'm not sure in my own experience that they ever demonstrated any very high degrees of effectiveness in this regard. But I think it was particularly important in North Africa where we suffered so considerably from the German air effort. That was one of the vital factors in the battle . . .

LTC FEENEY: Did the Germans have good . . .

LTG LEMLEY: The Germans had excellent close air support, yes, excellent. The other factor was the ability of the logistics chain to support distant operations and I think this had a most important influence on our troubles at the Kasserine Pass. We were up sort of at the end of the line and I think that's what finally led to the defeat of the Africa Corps is their inability to support themselves in Tunisia. Also and since I am an artilleryman I think I'll mention this, prior to our going in to the war, there were a great many people in the Army who thought, who felt that the advent of the modern airplane had pretty much eliminated the need for quantities of field artillery. One of these I happen to know I'm sure he later changed his mind was General Krueger who I talked to this about on a maneuver one morning down in Texas somewhere, who flatly stated that there was no need in this modern day for the artillery that there was nothing the artillery could do that the Air Corps couldn't do better. As I suppose a result of this the forces that were initially

committed to North Africa had relatively very small quantities of non-divisional artillery. And I'm not sure exactly how many they had, I think they had only one brigade of three regiments, two regiments of 155 howitzers and one of 155 gun, I'm not sure of that figure but they are the only ones that I know were there. Well, when they got out in these rather wide expanses, this in effect meant that large sectors had no artillery support, other than the direct support weapons and the general support units in the division and I think this, too, had an important influence on some of our troubles in Tunisia. I might add that by the time we arrived, there had been a great awakening as to the needs for re-inforcing our artillery non-divisional artillery.

LTC FEENEY: It was quite a, not hearing that before, that's quite a surprise to me and I was wondering how the Army ever could develop a doctrine like that, that they . . . it must have been the air people must have had the ear of our senior officers to . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, I don't . . . I think this was arrived at not through any process of indoctrination or brainwashing. You see we had no combat experience. The United States Army had none in the air age because the airplane in World War I, it really did only two things; one was reconnaissance and one was fighting each other. I mean it was a little separate war that they carried on of their own and really the only impact of the airplane on the ground soldiers was in terms of reconnaissance. It was recognized as being a very important intelligence arm. So, you see we just didn't have anybody with any experience and in terms of the end product in front of the infantryman, well, a five hundred pound bomb makes a pretty big splash, bigger than a 155 projectile and everything. I think what was not appreciated

was the lack of training of the Air Corps in this role because they had none. And the problems of coordination and communication, so that really I just don't think it was appreciated how difficult it is to get a bomb drop exactly where you want it and as I say I never in my own experience did I find the U. S. Air Force in World War II as effective in this regard. So, really I think those two things; logistics and air power are . . . were the principle factors governing both sides in North Africa. I do want to say something else though, and that's about tank destroyers. Of course, we don't have tank destroyers anymore but the tank destroyers were the wave of the future in the days when we were preparing to enter World War II. We had been much impressed by the role of the anti-tank gun in the battles in the desert of Montgomery, Rommel and all of these things. And great emphasis had been put on activating and training tank destroyer units at what is now Fort Hood. And these were pretty much failures.

LTC FEENEY: Just the U. S. were or pretty much failures from everybody?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I can only speak for the U.S. unit. To begin with, their equipment was grossly inadequate. They had half-tracks with .75 cubes mounted on them which were highly vulnerable and quite ineffective against the German tanks. For another, anti-tank gun is only useful against the tank if it's so located that it can shoot at the tank when the tank comes at you and so there...they were never at the right place and when they tried to move, in the open desert country they were immediately highly vulnerable to air attack. They never could get to the right place at the right time and they were generally considered to be a total failure.

LTC FEENEY: But we probably had them through the whole war . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we kept them through the whole war because while they were almost useless as anti-tank weapons they were very useful as assault

guns when working in combination with infantry. So, after Africa we pretty much gave up on them as anti-tank weapons and used them as assault guns to move with the infantry. And they were effective in that role.

LTC FEENEY: Who controlled the tank destroyers? Were they controlled by our artillery units or were they controlled . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the original concept was that you would have a tank destroyer command in a Corps, I believe. And this tank destroyer commander would shuffle his units around to meet the threat and sort of act as a supporting unit to the divisions, in actual practice the, without exception, as far as I know the tank destroyer units were attached to divisions and tank destroyers companies were farmed out to infantry regiments, to platoons, to battalions and they were pretty much dissipated throughout the unit and used as assault gun. We had anti-tank platoons in the artillery at this time. I believe the infantry regiments did. They had anti-tank companies too. They were equipped with the 37 millimeter anti-tank gun which was totally useless. And I recall only one instance where a determined effort was made to bring all these separate anti-tank platoons together and defend against tanks and it was most disastrous because they just couldn't live with tanks, with that kind of equipment, it was just hopeless. So, really the battles in North Africa sort of saw the demise of the tank destroyer concept that we had developed before we gained experience in anti-tank warfare. Well, I don't think of anything else in particular that would be of very general interest about our stay in North Africa. Basically we only stayed there long enough to get our equipment and this takes a little doing because equipment wasn't awfully plentiful so we spent a good long time sleeping in grape orchards not doing anything. Just waiting to get enough equipment to form our units

and to move to Bizerte which was where we went to move to Italy. The Sicilian affair took place during this time that we were in Africa, but I know very little of that operation. In fact, I wasn't involved in it. In due course, we collected our equipment and made a road march to Bizerte and after hanging around there a couple of weeks awaiting for shipping, we moved administratively from Salerno to Naples which had just been captured. As an interesting sidelight, I spent my first night in Italy in a building right next door to one where my office was when I retired from active duty, also in Naples a couple of years ago. I'd like to add, it is a great deal different now. I want to say a little something about the Salerno landing because while I was not directly involved, I was thrown into contact with a great many people who were and whose knowledge of the situation was quite fresh when I talked to them. And basically the problems at Salerno were problems of command and this same sort of problem arose at Anzio and so I think it is something that young people who may in the future be called upon to move into position to higher responsibility ought to be aware of these things. At Salerno as I understand it, the 6th Corps then commanded by Major General Mike Dawley, moved ashore to take command fairly early in the game. But the commander was unable to arrive at a decision as to what should be done when he assumed command of the Corps and as a result the divisions went their own way and it was not a coordinated effort. It was a failure in decision making that led to General Dawley's relief and I think he probably deserved it. What I think probably was not deserved was sort of a wholesale slaughter of general officers. They seemed to hit every other layer in this Salerno affair and I think some injustices were done in this connection. I want to highlight something that I think is most important in leadership and that is when you fire somebody, you've

got to have the guts to look them in the eye and tell them why you did it. In other words, any relieved commander deserves his day in court and the reason that I mention this is that I was still in North Africa when General Dawley was relieved and reduced, he was relieved as Corps commander and reduced to his permanent grade of colonel and came back to North Africa. He visited our outfit. And General Eisenhower refused to see him. Well, as I say, I think probably, General Dawley deserved -- should have been relieved but I also think that he was entitled to his day in General Eisenhower's office and I never developed a full respect for General Eisenhower as a result of this incident. I mean it's just a sore on his character as far as I'm concerned.

LTC FEENEY: Clark relieved him on orders from Eisenhower?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. I don't know whether Clark asked Eisenhower if it's okay if I relieve Dawley or whether Eisenhower called Clark and said, "Fire Mike Dawley." I don't know. But I would sort of guess it was the latter. I have a high regard for General Mark Clark when I first met him at his headquarters in Algiers during the period I've just covered. My brigade commander and I and two other members of the staff had gone to Fifth Army Headquarters to see what we could do to expedite our equipping and to hurry up our move into Italy and I was standing in the outer office while General Mauer was in with General Gruenther who was at that time Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army and General Clark came in and he walked over to me and the other two officers and shook my hand and said, "Clark's my name," which really made quite a favorable impression on me at that stage. I was, well, by that I was a Lieutenant Colonel but obviously a youngster and he was a very senior individual that he would even bother to notice me looking at the map in his outer office. I took this as a pretty nice thing and while I'm talking about

General Clark, I want to pass a few more kudos on to him in areas where I found he was rather unique for he and his headquarters. For one thing, no representative of a troop unit, no commander or staff officer from a troop unit ever went to General Clark's headquarters with a request without being warmly received and being provided with what he needed to the extent that it was available. The personnel administration and logistic support provided by Fifth Army Headquarters was superb. It was just extremely good and the reason I say this is because this was not my experience with the Seventh Army later and those were the only two I ever served in during World War II. I'd also like to highlight the fact that General Clark did exert considerable personal leadership on the battlefield in that he spent every waking hour or every daylight hour out with the troops. I suppose mostly being seen and getting a feel for the battle but I can hardly recall a day in the area south of Casino when his headquarters was such that he could get to the troops. I can hardly recall a day that I didn't see General Clark's jeep circulating around the battlefield. Now, it has been said that he always took the press with him and plenty of photographers, perhaps this is true, I never really saw any evidence of it but he did always wear an overseas cap when other people wore helmets which people considered to be exhibitionist but I don't . . . the important thing was that you saw him and he on the occasions that you talked to him, now when I saw him, I didn't generally talk to him, I did occasionally, he always expressed concern and interest in your situation, and so I'm a great supporter of Mark Clark and I think he is a real leader. I might add that in all of my other experiences in the Seventh Army in France and Germany and then the Eighth Army in Korea, I almost never saw the Army Commander and I was, in fact I had, we had one Army Commander that I never laid eyes

on in the Seventh Army in Southern France and I understand his health was poor. But, I might also add that the administrative and logistic support that you got from the Seventh Army was pretty poor in comparison. When you . . . the Seventh Army headquarters in particular seems to have brought with them a full set of Army regulations and very little else and this doesn't lend itself to good support in the field. But to go on back, I diverged a good bit, well, I think I'm about through with Salerno and . . .

LTC FEENEY: What was the 82nd, you know I read in some of the background of the role of the 82nd in Salerno, was that very effective as they say.

LTG LEMLEY: No, I don't think it was and I don't say this to be critical of the 82nd Airborne division which was a very fine unit. But, I know of no instance in World War II where Allied, U. S. and Allied Airborne troops were effectively employed. And I questioned, seriously, the role of parachute troops in an environment involving heavy combat. Now, they did make fine infantrymen when you beefed them up with a little heavier weapon and vehicle and stuff. We later had the 504th parachute regiment with us at Anzio and it was very, very fine, very fine outfit. I think probably now I ought to move on into the campaign in southern Italy, generally referred to as the Cassino campaign because it was the most prominent battle but there were a great many others of lesser known that didn't receive as much publicity. After we landed in Naples and collected up our equipment again, we moved north and joined the U. S. Sixth, II Corps, II Corps commanded by General Geoffrey Keyes. And it was generally operating up along what is now they call the Auto Strada of the sun between Naples and Rome, that was sort of the main axis of the II Corps operation. And they were pretty well bogged down because actually once they had broken out at Salerno the Italian campaign moved very rapidly without any heavy fighting up to the

range of hills about, oh, I suppose about five to ten miles south of Cassino. And it's a very impressive range. I should remember the name of the dominant hill but I can't think of it right now. It had a monastery on it, I recall and it was here that the Fifth Army had more or less pulled itself together, regrouped and they were stopped by a combination of German resistance and the weather. The weather was miserable, this time. This was in November of 1943. And we joined the II Corps there. To give you an example of how bad the weather really was, it took us about a week once, in that area to move a battalion of 155's, you just had to wench them all the way and the mud was awful. It was cold and our infantry up in the mountains was having great difficulties with frozen feet. We were very ill-equipped for this sort of thing. As a matter of fact, some of the troops were still in khaki's. I suppose they had read something about sunny Italy, and it certainly isn't true up in those high mountains down there. We had no galoshes. We were just . . . no winter clothing except to be called such, we didn't even have field jackets in those days. That didn't come along until, oh, about late '44 or early '45. We had a little wind breaker, very much like these new green ones that officers wear on chilly days now. That's about all we had in the way of winter clothing. Our footwear consisted of laced shoes, not boots and canvas leggings which were useless or worse. No, none of the linings or parkas and stuff that we have in this day and age. No winter caps or anything. It was miserable weather and the first operation I participated in and, I think, at least as far as the war in Europe was concerned, this was probably the first coordinated artillery operation involving non-divisional artillery that ever took place. The first special service force which had just come in was going to make a night attack on this tremendous range of hills, by scaling supposedly impassable face of

the mountain, which we did. The regiment that did it was led by Colonel, later General Ted Walker and they did it very effectively. But we moved in up there and in the II Corps we had one division, the 3rd, as I recall. We had the first special service force, it was a very narrow sector and not much. We had two brigades of artillery and the two brigade commanders were rivals and not particularly friends, which didn't ease relationships. At that time you had no Corps artillery headquarters, such as we have today. You had a Corps artillery section and in the II Corps that was headed by General Harry Stork, who later became quite well known and his deputy then a lieutenant colonel was later Major General Red Cooper. These two people were having a great difficulty coordinating the activities of these two brigades. There was no counter battery section anywhere. There was really no central fire planning agency for the Corps because the Corps artillery section didn't have the people to do it. The people were in the two brigades and the situation was such that the Corps Commander didn't consider that he could subordinate either brigade commander to the other one. So this fire planning which, I think was the first instance and at least in Europe, I can't speak for the Pacific, that had coordinated a Corps fire plan was ever made. Well, we had a bunch of conferences at which there was much talk and very little light shed on the situation and it very soon became apparent to me that while I certainly was a novice at this game and that I didn't know exactly what we were supposed to do except in a very general way to contribute to the battle, that nobody else did either. And we were sort of floundering around and Harry Stork and an officer named John Boyette who was the S-3 of the other brigade, I was in the 18th and he was in the 73rd, I think it was, field artillery brigade. We sort of got together and talked to the divisional people and sort of worked up our own scheme. Now,

I don't think at this particular time anybody had ever before really appreciated what sort of intelligence service could be provided by the air reconnaissance and I must say that the setup in the Fifth Army and its supporting Air Force, and I forget the number of it, was very, very good and it was here that we discovered all of this intelligence target lists and things that were available from these people and so more or less on a committee basis we established this fire plan. Decided who would do what and the operation was quite successful. I don't know whether that had anything to do with the fire planning or not, presumably it did. But of course, the key to it was scaling this impassable cliff by one of the regiments of the first special service force and we did capture this range of hills. And got the dominant terrain south of Anzio, I mean south of Cassino. And the Germans withdrew to the next range, there were about three smaller ranges in between that, didn't amount to much and the fights for those were not on a particularly large scale but we did, after this first exercise, I think, finally get the Corps Artillery organized after a fashion and participating in the battle. And as I say, I think this was the first time it was ever done. Because I for one, had never, oh, I knew about air photographs and things like that, but nobody had ever taught me or told me what was really available along this line and I might add, I've never seen . . .

END OF SESSION (2nd Session)

THIS IS THE 2nd TAPE OF THE 2nd SESSION OF RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD FEENEY AT THE COMMAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ON 8 APRIL 1974.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, we were discussing the artillery at Anzio.

LTC LEMLEY: Actually we were talking about . . .

LTC FEENEY: The Cassino.

LTC LEMLEY: Southern Italy, south of Cassino and I think I'd just was saying how highly effective the Army Air Corps Photographic unit was in the Fifth Army and in fact when we ran off that last tape, I was saying that I had never seen an operation that measured up to it since either in the Seventh Army in France and Germany nor in the Eighth Army in Korea and this is something that I suspect is not as good today as it ought to be or would not be as good under similar circumstances. They just provided tremendous support to us and it permitted us to make what I consider relatively effective fire plans considering the planning handicaps under which we were working of no single boss, a general lack of knowledge as to what needed to be done and everything like that. But anyhow, we went on and we had fights for a few other hills and I think our roles, corps artillery role I think we made rather constant improvement in the support that we were providing to the infantry because as I say, we started from a base of about zero sophistication and we were learning a lot as we went on.

LTC FEENEY: How did you happen to arrive at the idea of having this coordinated fire plan. It certainly . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I visited I guess in turn sort of a funny war story, but I'll go ahead with it. After we had floundered around a couple of days, finally the senior brigade commander, General Carl Bear, called a conference of the artillery officer, all the battalion commanders and staffs and everything to discuss the fire support of the coming operation and we gathered

in a cave in a little town called Pachilli, in Italy and everybody got up and had his say. It was all talk and no doing. In fact, interestingly enough, after one rather long winded speaker was about half through, heard a goat came by, walked in the door of the cave, gave a loud bah, which sort of broke up the conference but it was apparent that nothing was going to be accomplished in this sort of an exercise and it was after this that I gathered a few of us together to sit down and work up this sort of committee, planning operation, and I certainly don't cite this as an example of extreme effectiveness. It was just a poor solution to a rather serious problem. It would not have worked had we been in a fast moving situation but we were moving anything but fast. You'd take one hill and wait two or three weeks before you even attempted to take the second one. This was the combination of weather, lack of troops, fresh troops, and various other things. Lack of ammunition and this sort of thing. We just didn't have the capability in that weather and supply situation to move very far very fast. So we went on and then I want to say a little bit about Cassino. Long about December of 1943, I would say early December, the decision was reached to carry out the Anzio operation and the VI Corps was withdrawn along with the 3rd and 45th Divisions and a British Division, the 1st British Division as I recall it, the 504th Airborne Infantry, the first special service force. All of these people were withdrawn to train and plan for the Anzio operation. Well, this left us even thinner than we had been. We were in pretty hard times as far as troops were concerned and it was at this time that we made our first attack on Cassino and very wisely, General Keys, I presume it was, selected to move over the high ground towards Cassino around behind it and to cut it off and this was really quite a successful but a very costly operation and we fell short of capture again,

oh, I would say one infantry battalion. Cassino. Had we had one fresh infantry battalion to push through the 45th Division that was up on the high ground above the abbey, on Monte Cassino. We had one fresh infantry battalion to push through. I'm sure that many lives would have been saved. Anzio was Winston Churchill's idea. It was his personal one. He more or less forced it on the United States and on the theatre commander because originally our sole objective in Italy was to capture the airfield complex around Naples and supposedly we were going to capture that and then stop so that the amphibious shipping and everything could be moved up to England for the Normandy invasion but he thought that by carrying out the Anzio operation, that he would force a withdrawal by the Germans in the south with the troops that went from Anzio to the high ground, the Alban hills, cut them off and slaughter them and also capture Rome which was psychologically important. Everybody I think in the chain of command protested and General Lucas who was the force commander charged with conducting the operation actually made one final appeal to Winston Churchill who was on his sick bed, I believe in Algiers at the time and protesting the operation very soundly so, but anyhow, we went ahead with it. But what this had done is taken away from the Cassino front, the resources to push that successfully while not providing an adequate force to go into Anzio. So as I say, we failed at Cassino for the lack of one fresh infantry battalion, one fresh infantry battalion. We had it and I don't know -- we probably would have been in control several months earlier had we had those fresh troops. Anyhow, we didn't. So that failed and then they brought in the 36th Division and I mention this because it's sort of an notorious action in history, particularly in Texas. They brought in the 36th Division to conduct the operation across the Rapido River and

Mark Clark is still detested in Texas because he was blamed for this operation. In fact, I think it was a British General Alexander who conceived the plan and not Mark Clark. I don't think Clark had any alternative to it. It was very poorly planned. It involved crossing the Rapido River and preceeding up the Liri Valley without holding the high ground on either side and it was a miserable failure. The 36th Division got its leading elements across the river, became isolated from them. They couldn't control them or communicate with them. We had a very, very heavy fog which precluded the kind of artillery support which they needed and also air support to conduct this operation and it was ill conceived in the first place so it was a miserable failure. In fact, it was a failure to the extent that I received a phone call the night the operation started in the early morning hours before daylight and I received a phone call the following night from the 36th Division telling us that our brigade unit should look out for their own protection because as far as the division unit, there was nothing in front of us. They said the division had disintegrated which in fact did as a division, and I must say that planning and conducting an operation with the 36th Division Headquarters at this point in time was not a very happy thing. The 36th Division had grown up on the concept that they were three separate regimental combat teams and they fought as three different ones with no pulling together at the division headquarters and I blame this as much as I blame the faulty plan for the slaughter that took place at the Rapido River. I do at this point want to pay a little tribute to the Germans. They've been condemned as being inhumane and so forth. But after this horrible debacle, we had large numbers of dead and wounded on the far side of the river or within the German lines and we didn't know how many were there or anything about it. The Germans on their own initiative offered

as a 12 hour truce to permit us to come across and pick up our dead and wounded which I thought was a very gallant and Christian thing to do. So we had a 12 hour truce in the middle of the battle and I know of no other similar instance in modern history. But anyhow, after the failure of the Rapido at the same time, the Anzio operation and Rapido operation were supposedly coordinated and when the Germans heard about the Anzio operation, they were supposed to run instead of stand and fight. Instead of running, they did stand and fight which is another reason for the slaughter of the Rapido. They reenforced very rapidly, reenforced Anzio with units from Northern Italy very, very rapidly and effectively because Anzio was unopposed. There weren't any Germans at Anzio. The landing was unopposed. And it was a few days after this failure at the Rapido and the landing at Anzio that on the 1st of February, my brigade was ordered to Anzio. I remember that and the brigade commander sent me and two of my staff officers up to an advance party to plan and plan for and write an order for the brigade which we did. We went up there on the 1st of February. I must say that when we checked into VI Corps Headquarters at Anzio, it was utter confusion. The original concept had been that the VI Corps would land at Anzio and precede as rapidly as possible to the Alban Hills to cut off the retreating Germans from the South. The Alban Hills, I would say, are some 25 miles from the port at Anzio and with three divisions, that makes a pretty big beachhead. So when they got there, General Lucas had been torn between his desire to carry out his mission of occupying high ground in the Alban Hills and his very valid caution about leaving the port. He couldn't keep the port and go to the hills and he couldn't go to the hills and still have the port. So as a result, he wrestled with a decision as to what to do for several days and

issued no orders. So the divisions were operating on their original amphibious plan modified in varying degrees by the division commanders. At this time, resistance was building up. These troops coming in from Northern Italy were reenforcing very rapidly and resistance was getting pretty stiff. Well, due to the lack of decision on the part of the corps commander, one regiment of the 45 th Division and one brigade of the 1st British Division moved on out, continued to move on out toward the hills. The 1st Division refused the flank to the left to try to keep control of the port while we put some troops in the hills. The 3rd Division moved out as far as Cisterna or almost as far as Cisterna, met fairly heavy resistance and they stopped and dug in and the 45th was refusing it right flank with this left regiment moving on up. Well, these two regiments got cut off and were completely destroyed by a German tank task force. I don't know what unit it was. I don't recall, I think I did at the time. Well, this was what was going on when I arrived at Anzio. They were having their first real fight and they weren't winning. I tried rather unsuccessfully to get a mission from orders or something out at the VI Corps Headquarters which I was unable to do. The artillery officer still had no Corps Artillery Headquarters. They had an artillery staff officer. Colonel Edmonson was resentful of the fact that we had been ordered up so they would have an artillery general at Anzio and he wasn't very much interested in talking to me. I couldn't get anything out of the Corps G-3. He was too busy on other things. As a matter of fact, the corps staff spent more time fighting each other than they did fighting the Germans. It was a pretty disastrous situation. Well, about 3 days after we got there after I'd finally located the headquarters and located some positions for the units that were moving up, the corps headquarters was bombed. At the morning staff meeting and in

effect disintegrated for about 3 days. Well, the combination of the indecision and the battle losses and the disintegration of the corps headquarters led to the relief of General Lucas and General Truscott was brought in as the Deputy Corps Commander for the day or so that Lucas still hung around. General Truscott, although he was extremely unhappy with the corps staff, didn't throw them all out. As a matter of fact, he kept most of them. He did bring in later, he did bring in General Ben Harrellas G-3, General Bill Rosson as Assistant G-3 and his own Chief of Staff a General Carleton. But generally speaking, he kept the corps staff and really made it quite effective. The G-1 and G-4 were very fine people. Very capable. I believe that the G-2 section was pretty good. I know it had some very good people in it. I think they did a good job. They didn't serve us particularly well. We had to handle our own intelligence in the artillery because they were not oriented towards serving us but they did assist us where they wanted to. But I've never seen a large unit so electrified as was the VI Corps within 24 hours after General Truscott moved in and it had a long way to go. There was, I think a rather serious doubt throughout the corps that we were going to be able to stay on the beachhead after losing this British brigade and the American regiment and after suffering rather heavy casualties otherwise. There was a general recognition that there wasn't a really effective leadership in command of the operation and he moved in the first night and had members of his staff go out and visit every battalion level infantry or armored unit on the beachhead. I was one of them. Our mission was not anything very specific but I think more to bring out the fact that things had changed, that he was taking a firm hold. Oh, I suppose within 2 or 3 days after he took over, a big crisis of beachhead came and through

some very fine intelligence, and I don't know the source of it, but believed it to be communications intelligence. We discovered, I believe it was on the 16th of February, that the Germans were going to launch an all out effort to eliminate the beachhead which they did. It was very nearly effective and they missed by about 100 yards because we were able to hold a piece of high ground out along the railroad tracks called the fly-over. And it was largely, or at least General Truscott gave major credit to the artillery for saving the corps on this, from this German attack. We fired a massive counter preparation in the 2 hours prior to the known German H hour which I later heard resulted in rather tremendous casualties in the German forces to the fact to the extent that they were using bulldozers to bury their dead and I believe that Field Marshall Kessering in his post war integrations further confirmed these other things that I've heard about it. Well, that counter preparations putting it together was a rather massive job between 8:00 in the evening and about 4:00 in the morning and needless to say, it kept us on the run. I'd really never done anything quite like that before, but I was able to pull things together because by this time we had a single artillery headquarters integrated with the corps headquarters and as a result, a much better feel for the situation and much better control over our own units and a much better coordination with the divisions and we put that thing together in about 6 hours of hard work. We fired it on time and it did materially assist the the VI Corps in saving the beachhead. After this exercise, there was a massive, well, I won't say a massive, well, it was a massive buildup, but not a very rapid buildup. A force is in the beachhead to break out and it was during this period that I think I first learned how a high level headquarters should operate and I'm going to get into that a little bit because

after all, this is the Command and General Staff College. General Truscott had a morning staff meeting everyday after which he went out and visited the battlefield. Without exception, he never stayed in headquarters during the daytime. He would come in at dark or shortly thereafter, have dinner, and then he would sit down with his Chief of Staff and work out a concept of operations which the next morning would be turned over to his planning group which consisted of myself, Ben Harold, Bill Rosen, and for a time, a British officer but later he was, he disappeared. I think he got fired. And we would present it to General Truscott who would go into the outline plan in great detail, very great detail. Every aspect of the outline plan at which point if he approved it, it was given to the staff for further development. And I suppose before we broke out of the beachhead, we must have gone through some 20 of these planning exercises. And I mentioned this mechanism because I think it's the way it should be done. In other words, I think the commander must develop his concept. He must have a relatively small group of people who can flush it out to a point where the whole staff can tackle it and he must go over it very carefully himself. But in any case, that was the way we did it in the VI Corps and as I say, I think General Truscott was one of the most effective combat commanders I've ever known and now I want to talk a little bit about . . .

LTC FEENEY: Before you go off this sir, this particular basic identity you call, you know, we call it the planning sequence. You mentioned that the commander comes in and gives his concept after being out in the field all day and see what he visualizes as what should happen.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he has a feel for what the capabilities and limitations of the troops. He's been out there and you can't have that unless you been there in person.

LTC FEENEY: You feel that this can be applied at both the division and corps level or do you feel that this is just kind of a corps thing where it can then turn to a special group to expound on his conscious . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think a corps is the key level in the conduct of battle and in this connection, I don't believe that we were moved in the right direction in trying to combine the functions of the corps in the Army. The conduct of battle doesn't fit too well with long range planning, administrative, and logistic support. They are two fairly distinct functions and I just don't think one headquarters in performing this logistic, administrative, and long range planning thing can keep up with the troops. It becomes, well, it takes too many people. Too much communication equipment. It gets immobile. So with the guys running the battle has got to be in the midst of it and that was another thing that General Truscott always emphasized in "we" in the VI Corps artillery always placed great emphasis on was being in the battle. We generally kept our corps artillery headquarters forward of the division artillery headquarters and General Truscott would keep his headquarters, would leap frog the division headquarters when he moved his corps headquarters when we were in a moving situation. Of course we weren't at Anzio. But he would leap frog the division headquarters to push them forward and I just don't think you can do this with a headquarters that has all the complexities of logistics and administrative planning and that sort of thing. So I think there is a place for the field Army. There is a place for the corps. Now the expand of the control can be considerably bigger than we often had it since World War II. For example, there at Anzio I believe we had at one time seven divisions which is a pretty sizeable corps.

LTC FEENEY: I think this is important -- your philosophy here I think is extremely important because I think what your telling present Army developers is that I don't care what you call your administrative and logistics people.

You should relieve the corps of this in your and as we haven't now with echelons above division corps, kind of takes this responsibility now and is going to support the divisions with its logistics. We're putting a lot of money in the cost come and as I see it, you don't appreciate that viewpoint too well.

LTC LEMLEY: No, I think it's a mistake. You need a headquarters comparable to the World War II Corps Headquarters as a battle command post to fight the battle. A division can't fight alone. And if you don't have this adequate direction of the battle, you'll have the same situation that led to the debacle at Anzio when every division went its own way and we nearly got creamed. So really it was the lack of an effective corps headquarters that led to some of the early disasters at Anzio and it led to the near disaster at Salerno.

LTC FEENEY: O.K., then I'll ask you questions on top of this then. One, are management information systems, the few that are going to be available to the corps commander to gather the data and be able to do this will be much more rapid and much more helpful in the decision making process and help the staff officers such as these material centers and maintenance centers, these functional control centers that there going to have at the cost come and tied in to the theatre. One thing that they feel is that this could eliminate the field Army.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I think we've gone way overboard on this thing. Now, these information systems are very useful for logistics management, for administration and I think for intelligence collation. I think it's really quite a great future in that and there also very useful in fire planning if they can be made mobile and rugged enough, reliable enough. But knowing how many people are in a battalion, how much equipment they have, how much ammunition which is all you get out of one of these systems is not by any

stretch of the imagination knowing this battalion like you have to know it as a corps commander to intelligently direct the fight, the battle. You've got to know whether the battalion commander is tired or rested. You've got to know whether all these people checked in last night and don't know each other by sight or name. You've got to have a feel for the capabilities of a unit that aren't, can't be represented quantitatively and in this connection, the corps commander did and I think should fight battalions. He doesn't fight divisions. It's true that he uses the division commander to see that his orders are carried out, that he uses him to provide the divisional support, both logistic and fire support, to coordinate that to see that that's taken care of. But the corps commander when he plans and executes, he does it with battalions and I can't conceive of effective corps commanders who doesn't know and know well every battalion commander in the corps.

LTC FEENEY: What was the role then did you feel of the Fifth Army or the field Army headquarters. For example, you have your theatre, your battalion theatre or whoever was running that, Mediterranean theatre organization . . .

LTC LEMLEY: And you have the Fifth Army theatre headquarters in Caserta and a base section in Naples, a very effective base section I might add, tremendously effective logistic organization. But their job is to respond to the needs of the front line. Now the Army has the job of planning ahead and that's what they ought to be doing all the time is planning ahead and insuring that the logistics support is at the right place at the right time and that you have the proper balance between the various elements of the Army to do the job that they're given and as I say, the Army commander ought to get around to like Mark Clark did, but he can't really conduct the battle. The corps commander has to conduct the battle.

LTC FEENEY: Well, I think it's invisioned with this new concept that the theatre Army component reacting to the theatre commander will be the planner and logistician with the task com to support the corps and this takes away this middle echelon. You don't think this is feasible in combat?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think the old system is much better. I would hate to have to think of General Truscott worrying about where ordnance maintenance companies and that sort of stuff were located and what they had on hand and everything while he was directing the battle. I just don't think, you either got to look from the front or the rear and enviably if you have both jobs, your going to concentrate on one and forget the other. So it's fine to be lean on headquarters but I would rather have more smaller, more and smaller headquarters. In other words, they tend to get fat and I think it's better to have the traditional echelons rather thinly manned than to try to lump them all together. I don't think, for example, that the consumption of paper in a corps headquarters ought to be very great and it wasn't very great with us. It wasn't. We didn't write, the G-4 didn't write to the G-3 and all this sort of stuff. Fact was the exception of final plans that we adopted to break out of the beachhead. I don't ever remember producing an operations order in the VI Corps. Well, of course we had one for the landing in Southern France, but that was a litte different

an amphibious operation. But the more you can keep the paper out of the way, the better your going to fight. And if you get heavily involved in logistics and administration, enviably you get piles of papers and the fact that you have a machine that sorts it out and puts it together in different form, it helps. But it's still an impersonal thing. It's not responsive to the needs of the battle commander in my opinion. I'd like to sort of go on in to the piping days of the modern day Army in Germany

or Korea or wherever you may be. I think one reason that we tend to want to consolidate what I call the battle headquarters was what I call logistics administrative in command headquarters is a basic failing that I have noted in the Army, well, really since the end of World War II and this is the tendency to funnel the same sort of shaft through every level of command. For example, when I was later with the Seventh Army in USAREUR in Europe, I found that instead of following the normal Army channels of supplying and administering the non-divisional units that we had a tendency to go through the corps commander and the corps staff on every minor matter and to adhere strictly to a single chain of command as opposed to the dual combat administrative chain of command and I suspect that the youngsters who grew up in this post-war World War II environment and who presumably are doing the policy planning for the Army today having grown up in this environment, all they see is layers. I mean, the Army commander talks only to the corps commander and the corps commander only to the division commander and the corps artillery commander and things like that. Everything funnels through everybody. We did this in the Korean War too at least in a lot of stages. So it's true if your not going to accept the concept that you have one tactical headquarters and one administrative and logistics headquarters. If your going to intermingle the two and impose the same burden of paper on them, there's no point in having two, but I would submit that in large scale conventional operations largely a wartime operation, that something is going to suffer if the corps commander worries about the numbers of courts marshall in a corps artillery battalion which really is not his for administration and logistics and that sort of thing. I mean, you just become swamped and I think it's this mis-application of the original concept that grew up after World War II which has resulted in

a feeling that something had to be done and indeed something has to be done but I suspect that we're maybe doing the wrong thing and may have to learn some lessons over again. Over that I can't be sure. You want to probe headquarters any further?

LTC FEENEY: Well, I think we might get back to the Anzio situation.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, after the breakthrough and then you had the Battle of the Fly-Over. Yes, and I might add, well, I think I'd like to go on and talk about the artillery in Anzio a little more. I might add that in that Battle of the Fly-Over we had a serious supply situation and artillery ammunition which was only solved by through the use of LST's to transport the battalion ammunition vehicles back to Naples to pick up ammunition, rolled off the LST to the dock back up on the LST up to Anzio and right out to the guns. We were almost flat out of ammunition at this point. That's a just a rather interesting . . .

LTC FEENEY: What was the round trip or that?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it was about an 8 hour round trip from gun divisions back to gun positions and as I say, we ran awfully low on ammunition.

LTC FEENEY: I don't know as if we could ever do that today.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you probably, I'm not sure that today we have the command direction that we would get the LST there because these LST crews were not very happy about bringing ammunition into Anzio at this stage. It was pretty unhealthy down at the port at this period. But I guess it was at Anzio that I think I finally fully learned the job of the corps artillery. I think really we'd gotten pretty proficient on supporting fires, maneuver support down below. I think we become quite proficient at that. But we really didn't have any counter battery capability down there of any significance or which crew we had two artillery observation battalions and we messed up a great

many nebel werfers. A nebel werfer is a rocket that the Germans designed originally to smoke but later adapted to HE and since they were short of artillery, they used them extensively. There terrifying things, but not terribly effective because the observation battalions almost enviably located them on the first round from fire tails on the rockets and we rather slaughtered them down below so I guess to that extent we were pretty good on counter battery. But it was really only at Anzio that we developed a completely effective counter battery operation and at this point, I want to say that a counter battery operation is 99% intelligence and at least in that day and age, the intelligence was about 80% aerial photography and perhaps 10% communications intelligence and I suppose you'd say 10% all others of which the majority was the aerial OP's like artillery observation aircraft that we relatively knew in those days. And it was here that this photo setup became so important because General Truscott realized the capabilities and limitations of his artillery. He was demanding of it and he in turn accorded us a photographic priority which permitted us to give him excellent service and we would have by phone at 6:00 in the evening all the preliminary photo intelligence reports from the photographic center. Have them by phone by 6:00 in the evening. The photography had been flown that morning. We'd had our running counter battery list which was active which wasn't. We had a very elaborate system of shell reps which is useful though I will say most shell reps are so much in error that they are of somewhat doubtful help. But we developed this system so effectively largely from guidance given to us by our British Canadian and South African members of the corps artillery staff. It was these people who taught us how to do it really because we did have an integrated staff there. And I would say that we could neutralize any active German battery about 80% of the time within 15 minutes of the time it started shooting. We really were tremendously

effective and unfortunately most of the lessons we learned the hard way at Anzio seemed to have gotten lost in training literature and everything because somewhat later I went to a short course at, a refresher course at Fort Sill before joining the 1st Armored Division in 1951, and I was appalled at the quality of the counter battery instruction. Later in Korea where I'd served as a division artillery executive for part of the time and division artillery commander for part of the time. I was appalled at the lack of proficiency on the part of the 1st Corps Artillery Headquarters in providing counter battery and I think it's such a great pity that this lesson seems to have been lost.

LTC FEENEY: Can you feel its lost today too, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: I think it is. Yes, I do.

LTC FEENEY: Could you describe this system as you used it again here in one spot in this tape so that we can record it.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, as I say, counter battery is intelligence and it requires a very current update of your intelligence plus a very systematic and good record keeping and basically your counter battery list is a number of positions identified by accurate map coordinates that may or may not be occupied at any given time. But people have a tendency to go back to them, the same ones when the battle stabilizes for awhile and as I say, the key to our was good photographic support. A high priority for the photography, a quick interpretation by good photographers at the Pictorial Center. I don't know where it was. I suppose it was at Foggia. Perhaps it was in Naples. I'm not sure exactly where it was physically located. But they gave us these very prompt preliminary reports. So we updated our list every night. Now generally you don't accept a counter battery location until its been confirmed. An exception to this is in the case

of aerial photography because it's not really too much chance for error in aerial photography but there's a great deal of chance. Suppose you see a battery firing and you shoot at it from an aerial OP or something like that. Well, you don't really have a good location on it. You think you do but maybe you never came within 500 yards of it, you know, even though it looked pretty good from the air. So you keep this list. You reconfirm everyday and the key to it was this photographic center. Now I didn't carry the final conclusion. We got this preliminary report from the airfield and that night the photographs, the actual photography was delivered to us and we had a team of about four photo interpreters to go over it again and refine it and this was a constant operation. It was a people consuming operation. We had about 6 officers not counting the photo interpreters in this counter battery section which perhaps was more than we needed. They didn't seem to have much time to spare. But I have the feeling that a great deal of intelligence that gets lost in the process before it gets to the artillery. Intelligence in the artillery is a target. Just to give an example, I want to, this is perhaps unrelated but to give an example of the kinds of artillery fire I'm talking about at Anzio, we could in the active sectors of the beachhead, mass the fires of about a 1,000, between a 1,000 and 1,100 cubes at any given moment. That's in the active sector.

LTC FEENEY: That's all calibers?

LTG LEMLEY: All calibers, including some unemployed tanks and anti-aircraft.

LTC FEENEY: What would you think is your most effective type of fires, weapon systems that you had against say armored equipment in fortified positions that the Germans seemed to . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the most effective counter battery and anti-tank artillery is the 155 howitzer by far because it's fast shooting, but generally speaking,

medium and heavy artillery is the best anti-tank insurance that you can get because you can deliver that when nothing else is available. If there's no airplanes flying around when the tank comes over the hill, it's not going to do you much good because he'll be right amongst you before they get there. 105 and lighter calibers are generally ineffective and if your anti-tank guns are only effective in the immediate locale that they cover. So it's the medium and heavy artillery that you can shift rapidly to meet the emergency of its supplies tank stack and it is very effective against it. For destruction, the 8-inch howitzer is very, very good and so to I suppose to the 240 but when you get down in the 240 ranges, generally speaking, you just don't have the observation to adjust on a point target with precision.

For example, the 155 gun was a very useful counter battery weapon primarily because of its range and dispersion. You know, we in the artillery always tend to put a high value on accuracy and rightly so because particularly if your firing at close to troops. You don't want to splash too far from the center of your pattern but there's also some virtue in the high dispersion that the 155 gun had because when you get out in the longer ranges, the accuracy of your target location is not as good and it does scatter up over a fairly wide area. The only weapon I would say that we had in World War II that was relatively useless was the 8-inch gun and I never felt that with one exception, I never felt that the 8-inch gun was worth having around. The single exception much later in the war when we were up in Alsace and I awoke one morning and realized that the 8-inch guns could hit Karlsruhe, so we dumped a few rounds on Karlsruhe and caused a run on the bank. It was psychological. The reason we had so much ammunition is, there was nothing shoot at before that we could locate as a hit. It's impossible with the skills and observation means that we had in World War II and I

think with the ones we have today to adjust an 8-inch gun. So it was a very useless thing. Of course we have the 175 today and I understand it's quite effective though I have no personal experience with it.

LTC FEENEY: It makes an awful lot of noise.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Well, so does the 155 gun. In fact, we had a lot of trouble, lung trouble as well as ear trouble in the 155 gun batteries in World War II. They fired so much and the concussion was so great that . . . But that counter battery business is important and as I say, I think it's probably a lost art and we longer learn it again the hard way. It's awfully hard to keep these mechanisms going and it's difficult to exercise in it in peacetime because I notice, you were talking about camouflage. Well, camouflage is very effective as long as they guy doesn't have to shoot, but once he has to shoot from his position, the blast gives him away every time. I don't think there is any camouflage that is effective against aerial photography that will cover weapons, firing. I just don't think there is. And I guess while we were at Anzio, I might talk a little bit about covering deception.

LTC FEENEY: Good sir. Just hold on one minute.

LTG LEMLEY: Generally speaking, cover and deception is a wonderful thing but when you try to carry out effective cover and deception, you've got to make yourself credible and when you come down to making yourself credible in a deception plan, this generally involves an effort that you can't afford to make. In other words what I'm saying is that you can't effectively deceive without committing substantial resources to it even if your talking about the so-called rubber ducks. You still got to have an awful lot of people to pull them up and place them. You've got to do an awful lot of digging of artillery inplacements and that sort of thing. In this connection,

we dug so many of them at Anzio that I think the enemy must have been pretty fully deceived because before the breakout to provide us flexibility as well as cover and deception, we dug and stocked with a thousand rounds of ammunition per gun, 4 positions for each battalion but that obviously involved a very extensive effort so assuming it was successful and I think it probably was, it still involved a very heavy commitment of resources, resources which you don't generally have. Now we did have one rather effective cover and deception, Operations Anzio which was unintentional. We moved convoys of shipping from Naples to Anzio every night, LST's, LCI's with replacements, LCT's with supplies and this sort of thing, mostly amphibious vessels. We moved them up from Naples everynight to the Port of Anzio and Nettuno and one night the Naval convoy commander got lost and turned in short which created no end of consternation in the German ranks because they were amphibious vessels and here they came, would come again to the coast halfway between Naples and Anzio and that's really the only cover and deception operation that I've ever known of that I'm sure worked. That one did. But generally speaking, you can't afford to commit the resources that are needed for effective cover and deception. So I think it's a nice thing, but it's something that you can't always afford. And I know there have been people and this was discussed thoroughly before we went into the amphibious operation in Southern France as to whether we wanted to direct our preliminary Naval bombardment and bombing so as to deceive the enemy or whether we wanted to direct them so as to prepare the way for our assaulting troops. And General Truscott solved this one with dispute very well by saying that no amount of deception could possibly replace the preparatory bombardment, both Naval and Air that we needed to prepare the beach for the landing and he certainly proved right because every coast defense gun, every defense

position on the beach in Southern France was thoroughly pulverized before we moved in there. It also comes up with whether you fire preparatory fires for, in the attack because preparatory fires are sort of a give away and anybody who holds his fire for purposes of deception is an utter fool, just an utter fool because the preparation is much more remunerative than the deception you might achieve by remaining silent. Now I do think that manipulating communication can be effective than cover and deception and to the extent that you can afford to do so. I think this is an aspect of planning that should always be provided for. Now this capability is probably a good deal greater today than it was in the days of World War II because basically we were telephone oriented. Our radios worked buy by and large, we lived off the telephone wire and of course this cover deception is not particularly applicable to telephones.

LTC FEENEY: I think we ought to get back to using wire.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, if you can it would solve many problems. Of course there are times when you can't do it and I don't know . . . A little earlier, you know, I mentioned the first special service force and its highly successful assault on the hills south of Cassino and I might mention that we also had the first special service force with at Anzio and it was an extremely effective unit. On our south flank, it was relatively swampy, open country and the first special service force was given the mission of protecting that south flank by screening and patrolling which they did most effectively. They would, oh, patrol to a depth of perhaps 15 miles within the enemy lines at night, cut people's throat and put a shoulder pad sticker on their scar and this area was manned by the San Marco Marines of the Italian forces that stayed with the Germans and they were very effective over here. It was an area which didn't lend itself to large scale operations.

It was swampy and they provided very effective cover there. They also participated in an assault role in the breakout. In fact, this was the end of the special service force. They were not equipped to fight tanks and as a result, they were decimated to such an extent in the breakout from Anzio that the force was disbanded and was never reconstituted. Much of the same things happened to the Rangers at Anzio, Darby's Rangers, you know were part of the Anzio force and they too were wiped out at Anzio and very rightfully I think were not reconstituted and neither was the first special service force. You just can't maintain that kind of a unit in an intensive environment. The casualties are just too great. And while I'm talking about casualties, I would suspect that the people who thought this kind of hard conventional warfare are pretty much gone from the service today and maybe some of the younger people coming up ought to have a sort of a feel for this and to give you an idea of the level of fighting at Anzio and the same was true at Cassino and the same thing is true anytime you get in a heavy slugging match. The 3rd Infantry Division lost 15,000 battle casualties in the first three weeks at Anzio and I mentioned the 3rd Infantry Division not because it was in any way unique but was representative of the kinds of people or kinds of losses that you have. Down around Cassino, it was not unusual to have rifle companies with 20 people in them and you just lose tremendous numbers of people very rapidly in this sort of a business and although many of them come back to you from after treatment, at the same time the turnover is tremendous and this presents a leadership problem that battalion level people and below ought to always keep in mind because you tend to be fighting with people that never laid eyes on each other before. The man on your right may be somebody who gave up last night and you haven't even met him yet and the

leaders don't know the . . . have no opportunity to learn the capability. So you have to carry on training and fairly intensive training during combat. Now you do this when the troops are in reserve and you have to provide them the reserve time to do this. We conducted, for example, extensive training at Anzio on fighting in cities having in mind that we might meet resistance when we eventually went into Rome which we didn't. There's a requirement for constant retraining at the small unit level to hold them together and this is something that I don't think is universally appreciated these days, the level of turnover that you have, the requirement for training and unit teamwork that you run into. I think another thing I ought to say a little something about at Anzio is the combined operation aspect. It was a combined British U. S. operation. This does present peculiar problems because the British don't always operate exactly like we do. They have a little different outlook on things and generally speaking, they are understaffed and overly oriented towards small unit operations at which they're very good. But they're not terribly good on larger unit operations and perhaps this is a reflection of their school system which unlike ours, devotes very little attention to command above the brigade level. You also in an operation of this type, run into conflicts of national interest. We, at this stage of the war, tended to go ahead and keep pushing regardless of the cost and incidentally, I want to be fully understood when I say what's regardless of the cost. If you've got to take that next hill, you can fiddle around with it for a week and it will probably be more expensive than if you charge right out and take it at a rather heavy one-time cost and life. If the British at this stage of the war were people hurting, I mean their manpower pool was running low and although I couldn't verify this with the document or the sworn statement or anything, they had a directive from home to save lives

and to forgo aggressive operations in the interest of preserving their manpower. Yes. For example, in the final breakout from the beachheads, General Truscott realizing the British condition only required that they conduct aggressive patrolling to pin down the forces to their front which they refused to do. As a result, three days after the battle, they were still sitting in their foxholes. Now I don't say that critically because they are very brave and very capable fighters. Generally speaking, they don't provide the level of combat support to their troops that we do. As an example at Anzio, I would say perhaps 20 nondivisional artillery battalions we had, only one was British.

LTC FEENEY: I think it's a good observation particularly from the schooling aspect, because I think that's true even today.

LTC LEMLEY: Oh, I'm sure that's true today. I'm sure it's true today. Because when I was commandant here, I visited Camberley and studied there modus operandi, both Camberley and Kingston in Canada. That's really more of an advanced course at Benning than it is a Command and General Staff College as we conceive of it.

LTC FEENEY: And as we still lined the regimental type of brigade and battalions?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, yes. But I'm not sure of their organization today. But at Anzio a division consisted of three brigades or roughly three regimental combat teams we would have called them in this time frame. And they had, for example, no medium artillery at the divisional level. They had very little in the way of support. It was, division headquarters was sort of a task group headquarters and they just didn't have the back-up either in terms of combat or logistic support to forstain combat that we have. I don't think this was any lack of appreciation of the requirement for it though it might

have been reflected.

LTC FEENEY: Maybe they felt we would take care of them?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, no, I think it was just a resource problem. I mean, you know, they only had so many resources and they, and that's the way they elected to use them. Of course it might too reflect the early experience in France back in 1939-40 when they were overrun by the Germans who used much the same method. I guess I ought to say something about the German artillery. The German artillery was not terribly effective on a sustained basis because to begin with, they didn't have a great deal of it. I think they fell into the same policy that we did early in the war of feeling that there was nothing artillery could do that couldn't be done better and cheaper by the aircraft and in point of fact, this worked very well for them when they overran Poland, large parts of Russia and Western Europe because they had a complete air superiority and when they got down to Italy where they achieved local superiority at various times over the battlefield particularly at Anzio. They had local air superiority every night because we didn't have anything up there and our anti-aircraft was ineffective because we had radars that could be readily jammed with chaf so all they did was make noise. They didn't hit anything. You'd see four guns and a battery pointing four different directions. I think as a result from this ~~reliance~~ on close air support, the German artillery was not very good nor was it very proficient. They apparently had not had the benefit of people like General Frank Farrell, Lou Griffing, and all those people I mentioned earlier still who were developing the art of mass fire support. I don't believe the Germans knew how to do this. In fact, I'm sure that's true because after the war, I took it upon myself to interrogate a number of German artillery generals and their concepts at the end of the war were not much further than mine were when I started out. In fact, I

don't think we've ever fought since perhaps World War I and I'm glad I know very little. I don't think we fought anybody that had the artillery capabilities that the United States Army had.

LTC FEENEY: Did they fire a lot of counter battery fire?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, but relatively ineffective. We got shot at lots of times, but it didn't hurt as much. It took some ammunition bits of fire which is a terrifying thing but really, so you lose 10 rounds. What difference does it make? They'd knock out our communications, but we had the radios and knocked out our wire but we had the radio to fall back on. The same was true of their aerial bombardment of our artillery position.

LTC FEENEY: Where did they inflict their casualties on us? Was it all with our armor?

LTG LEMLEY: No. It was really their infantry and their armor which were very good. And they had, I think they perhaps had somewhat better tank weapons than we had. I think their machine guns were better than ours in World War II. And at least, they were pushed down in Italy. They were fighting from a level of battle experience that we didn't enjoy. They have a tremendous capability to pull a failing situation together. You know, and I suppose every other Army I've ever seen, when a unit structure is destroyed in battle, it becomes almost totally ineffective. The Germans seem to have a tremendous capability to pick up the pieces of a disorganized battlefield and put it together in a new package and fight effectively with it. And I just don't know what the secret of this is, but they do have that capability to an extent I never otherwise observed. I think we've tried to do it perhaps more in the American Armored Division than anywhere else where we've had the doctrine anyhow, a great flexibility in composing task forces. Here again, I think we've lost some of that capability as a result of our post-war

experience of having, well, a fairly fixed organization for combat in Germany, for example, by its governed where their billeting and that sort of thing and I don't think we've had too much of that. Certainly not in the early days of World War II.

LTC FEENEY: We do task organize practically everything though really in war plans.

LTG LEMLEY: And you talk about it in the school system but there's, when you get out in actual practice, we don't do it nearly to the extent that we should and this was one point that General Bruce Clark emphasized considerably in the 1st Armored Division when I served with him. He would never let his combat commands remain stable. He shuffled them about once a month. So it's a development to work with strange units and I think this is very important and as I say, it's not something that we do as much of as we should. I think I want to say something about SOP's too.

LTC FEENEY: Please. I hope somebody does.

LTG LEMLEY: I guess what made me think about this was my experience in World War II when we had various units moving in and out of our command and they would always come in when the battalion commander checked in, he would always ask for a copy of our SOP which we very readily handed him. It was about 10 lines on one sheet of paper which described our code words and procedures for massive fire and that's what I think SOP's ought to be. This isn't the tendency in almost every unit I've served in, you've collected great sheets of paper and with all manner of rehash of Army regulations, supply policy and everything. But really an SOP to be effective has got to be in the hands of the people that are using it and publishing reams of paper, rehashing training manuals, Army regulations and that sort of thing accomplishes nothing. But it was a cheerful surprise to most of these incoming battalion commanders to be handled to one sheet of paper which they did need

because obviously if your going to use a code word, people have got to know what the code word is, but I guess I don't believe in published SOP's. And indeed we don't need them because our school system produces a common understanding of how we do things to a degree that very well provides what you need in the way of standard operating procedures.

LTC FEENEY: I agree very strongly with you sir, but I will also submit that there's an awful lot of emphasis on having SOP's written in the . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, that's because it's on some inspector generals checklist or something.

LTC FEENEY: I guess maybe it's the only way people will believe that you are doing something about something.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I watch I think. I've never neglected to read one when I went into a unit, but I don't think I've ever re-read it very often. Because a man on the battlefield doesn't have time to go look at the SOP when he's under fire.

LTC FEENEY: I'm sure he doesn't.

LTG LEMLEY: I talked a good deal about the planning for the breakout at Anzio and I guess I want to talk a little bit about execution and I think it was a highly successful operation. The biggest problem we had was mines and we lost I believe almost every tank in the 1st Armored Division in the breakout to our own mines which had been planted rather indiscriminately in the early days of the beachhead and we paid a cost but we lost very few crews and were able to replace the tanks in about 24 hours. But on mines, I suppose land mines was a terror for World War II, particularly in Italy where the terrain is such that it's relatively easy to mine all avenues of access and we lost an awful lot of people, both to land mines and anti-personnel mines that the Germans planted. Now it's fine to plant them if you don't have to go back yourself and, but you want to be sure that you do follow the

procedures for marking and recording mine fields because as I say, we had tremendous losses breaking out of ant hills on our own mines and the only thing that saved us was that they weren't very good mines. They were far inferior to the German anti-tank mines. In fact, about all they'd do would be to knock a track off a tank, our mines. The German mines would pretty well mess them up. And the Germans did employ mines very effectively and this is something we should not lose sight of if we're to fight this kind of war again which I think enviably we will sometime in the future. And I guess that's really about all I have to say about Anzio and the Italian campaign unless you have something you want to develop further. After we broke out, we very rapidly went through Rome about a 100 miles up the coast, essentially without encountering resistance and at that point, we turned around and went back South to get ready to go into Southern France.

LTC FEENEY: Who replaced you on the front then?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't know who replaced our artillery unit. You see, the troops that were going to Southern France were just taken out and taken away. Now they did convert the remaining anti-aircraft in the Mediterranean theatre into sort of a ramshackle infantry division and gave them a sector in which to operate. But until later in the Italian campaign after I'd left, we were not replaced. We just moved out. Did you have anything you wanted to develop sir, on what we've covered?

LTC FEENEY: No sir.

END OF SESSION

THE FOLLOWING IS A TAPE OF RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD FEENEY MADE AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ON 24 April 1974 AT 1330 HOURS. THIS IS THE 3rd SESSION.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, in this third session, we've progressed to this point from Anzio up to Anzio and if we could kick off this third session with the discussion of the invasion of Europe through Southern France and the planning sequence that went on with that.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the planning of the invasion of Southern France was conducted in Naples at a place called the "block house" which is now a military school and present for the planning effort, we had the amphibious commander, Navy Admiral, whose name I don't remember. He was rather a well-known one and a very successful one. This was not his first amphibious effort. In his headquarters we had, of course, the Logistic Headquarters which later became Headquarters Southern Line of Communication in France commanded by General Wilson who also commanded the base section in Naples, peninsula base section. We had the newly reorganized Seventh Army Headquarters which had been reduced to more or less cadre strength after the Sicily campaign plus the VI Corps Headquarters and staffs from all the division and separate task force elements involved. I am not sure that I remember just which divisions were represented but I believe it was the 3rd, 36th, and 45th. They were sort of our old stand-by's and we activated for the purpose of the invasion the 1st Airborne Task Force commanded by General Frederick who had formally commanded the special service force which I think I mentioned was pretty well wiped out at Anzio. And we all got together down in the "block house" and conducted very detailed planning and I think the essence of any amphibious operation consists of first your fire plan, both your preparation air and Naval bombardment, and your support operation. We had pretty good intelligence

on the beaches and knew pretty well what was there. They were fairly well dependent as a matter of fact. They had quite a bit of heavy artillery that had been there since the year "1" I suppose. Fairly obsolete but still quite effective.

LTC FEENEY: Was this coastal type artillery?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, it was coastal artillery. Some mobile and some fixed in placements and despite the fact that they have sort of gone out of style and had gone out of style at that time. They are quite effective against Naval forces and I think I'll regress at this point and mention the Naval support that we'd experienced at Anzio particularly on the South flank, we had no Army field artillery. We only had one 105 battalion over in that whole area that the special service force defended and when we could, we supplemented that with Naval fire support. We also used other areas of the beachhead. And that was not defended by any heavy or medium artillery, but even the few 88's that the Germans moved over were sufficiently effective. The U. S. Navy was not willing to operate in the area. In fact, on several occasions they declined to provide fire support, heavy patrolling really was all it amounted to but they just declined to provide it. They said it was too dangerous to bring destroyers in particular up there. So to get back to Southern France, they had much heavier and a bit more artillery there which is quite effective against destroyers and crew ships. And I suppose most of our preparatory fire support, both air and naval, was directed at destroying these coastal sites and they were, for the most part, destroyed particularly the inplacements. The permanent ones were not difficult, though I think we spent about 2 weeks of very intense air and naval preparatory bombardment up there. Well, of course, the fire plan was the first thing that we worked on and in this connection, General Truscott insisted on every preparation having participated

in the Dieppe operation a year or so before I've had become convinced that with adequate fire support, any amphibious operation could be successful. So he overruled the school, thought that perhaps surprise was more advantageous than elected preparation. But that of course, the second biggest factor in any amphibious operation, comes down to allocating shipping and the loading and assault plan. I would say that an amphibious operation is about 30% fire support and about 70% getting things loaded in the proper order on the proper ships so they come out in a orderly fashion in the order in which you need them. And of course this sort of planning was conducted both on the largest scale on which I participated and on a smaller scale going down battalions because obviously shipping is always short and you have to pick and choose on what you take both between units and within the unit on what you take with you. There's not much room for kitchens and baggage and that sort of thing. In this connection, one very wise move was made as a part of this plan and that is to use artillery ammunition as ballast within the ships. In almost any amphibious operation it was necessary to carry ballast in your ships because tonnage wise they were not loaded but space wise they were very full. So you have to have some weight in them and in our case, we used artillery ammunition to provide this ballast which later proved to be of tremendous value not only to us but to the 3rd Army which later on in the operation was on our left flank. In fact, both the Third and the Seventh Armies and I think possibly some other troops in France were provided with ammunition from this ballast.

LTC FEENEY: How many rounds are we talking about, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, your talking about thousands and thousands of rounds. I don't have any idea what the total tonnage was but it's a rather tremendous amount and I'm sure that the Fifth Army in Italy suffered later because we

took so much of it. In fact, I think we took their theatre reserve out with us which they discovered a couple of days before we left but it was too late. It was loaded in the ships. And really aside from this, adequate intelligence, adequate fire support and proper utilization of your available shipping are the keys to an amphibious operation, the Marines notwithstanding. There's no great trick to it. But you must plan very, very carefully and it takes a good deal of imagination because once the ships are loaded and in route, there's no way to correct the mistake. So it went very successfully. We had wonderful labels for it, for the landing, and I was in the assault landing myself included the Battleship Texas and I think really seeing the Texas fire in support of that operation was one of the most impressive sights I've ever seen. It was tremendous at least on the sending side. I'm not so sure on the other end. The landing went perfectly. The beach was defended, but the preparatory bombardment had so reduced the fire support available to the Germans and so messed up the communication that it really proved entirely impractical for them to provide anything except uncoordinated and scattered resistance to the landing. We got ashore the first day with very few casualties, rapidly moved off the beach and got a pretty good start. We did . .

LTC FEENEY: When you say a pretty good start, did you establish a beachhead or a beachhead line?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, actually we had three principle beachheads and three assault areas. The one that I landed at was at San Maxime which was the center beachhead. And of course once we moved in, we secured the beach and moved right on out and we were able to do this the first day.

LTC FEENEY: What was the depth of the beachhead? Do you remember? Was it like 20 kilometers or . . .

LTC LEMLEY: The first day, I imagine we probably got about 10-15 miles inland with our advance elements.

LTC FEENEY: Still light resistance?

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, and uncoordinated resistance. And in addition to the beach landing, we had this airborne assault, partly glider and partly parachute, by the 1st Airborne Task Force and it was quite the successful operation, successful in that except for one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion that got dropped right in the midst of the naval bombardment. All of them got where they were supposed to go, landed with pretty much minor casualties but a few of the gliders came in rather hard. The Germans had, in all the open fields had directed these telephone poles for that purpose as to prevent airborne operations and although through coordination with the guerilla movement, we had had a number of these cleared the night before. All the guerilla operations were not successful, so some of the gliders cracked up pretty badly. The airborne task force though landed in a pretty much an unoccupied area and they had little or no resistance and I visited General Fredrick. I think on D-Day plus one about noon and he was about 30 miles inland at that time and pulled his forces together. So it was a tremendously successful amphibious assault. I do think that we would have countered perhaps substantial opposition had not the Germans elected to devote their main defense to the Port of Marseilles which they did and it got pretty rough over there on that west flank. Very wisely, General Truscott decided not to push too hard on that flank. We went on up, oh, we went quite a ways in but we didn't really make a main effort against the main German forces. Rather we went up through the mountains up through Grenoble and then moved west to cut the enemies line of supply at Montelimar which we did successfully. We cut his supply line and of course having detected this movement while it was in progress, the Germans decided to withdraw, but by the time they were able to extricate themselves from the covering force we had there on the

west flank, we had secured the high ground over the Rhone Valley there at Montelimar and were able primarily with artillery so there was a great deal of close combat too when the Germans were trying to break out, but primarily with artillery. We just slaughtered that entire German Army on the highway there in the River Valley, the Rhone River Valley. They had no where else to go. They could try to break through us into the mountains but once they broke through, there was no place to go. They did try that. They couldn't get across the river, the Rhone in that part of France, was a very substantial river, and they couldn't move their heavy equipment across it effectively. It was too close though. The lines were too close for aerial bombardment so it was the artillery that interdicted the highway and destroyed a German Army. I've never seen anything like the 15 or 20 miles of road where we destroyed that Army. I mean, men, horses, trucks, tanks, artillery pieces just folly. And that of course really broke the back of any defense of Southern France because we'd cut off and destroyed the troops and there were no more readily available to bring in. We did lose one LST on the landing. on the landing. It was sunk by a single aircraft on the night of D-Day and it had one of our artillery batteries on it. We lost all our equipment. Practically none of the people because it was in the harbor waiting to unload when it was hit. Is there anything more you'd like to talk about about the landing there?

LTC FEENEY: Yes. I'll discuss that with you, sir. One of the things that I would like to have you discuss, sir, if you could, would be the comparisons of fighting the Germans in Italy and then the resistance in France and the capabilities of the German Army, you know, when you went into France, air power, etc.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course the Germans had very considerable air resources left, but they were pretty well committed up north and we had some aerial

opposition but not nearly to the extent, for example, that we'd had down around Cassino and at Anzio and at our own planes from Corsica initially were able to provide pretty good support to us. So we really had no air problem in this area nor indeed do I think that it would have been particularly effective had the Germans had somewhat more because we were so well dispersed. Once we got out of the beachhead except for the beach areas, there was really nothing much that they could have hit that would have hurt us very much. The Army troops in that area were not anything like the same qualities that we had encountered in Italy. They were short on armor. Course we were too. They had relatively little artillery. They were dependent to some degree on animal transport and they were older and less effective troops. They were really sort of a home guard type. But really what contributed I think primarily to their defeat was their estimate that we would head immediately for the port of Marseilles and the fact that we did not do that but very wisely elected to go up through the mountains and out flank them. Now once having made this commitment to make their main effort at Marseilles and having failed in this, there then weren't any Germans to fight much the rest of the way up through Southern France. In fact, it wasn't really until we reached the area of the ~~Mur~~ the River that we encountered any significant resistance. You would run into an occasional isolated unit. I remember around the fortress town of Besancon which was the American Artillery School in World War I. We did have a fight there. It lasted a couple of days. It didn't amount to much. We did have rather serious logistics problems moving up rapidly through Southern France over rather long distances. At one time we were supplying our ammunition battalion over a 500 mile line of communications because it hadn't been possible to move the dumps up behind the troops. The railroads, bridges were all destroyed.

LTC FEENEY: You know sir, you bring something to mind now. This is the second time that you've mentioned the battalions having to get their own ammunition. For example, at Anzio taking a big water trip down. Now here again, we've run into the same situation. Not the same situation but the same type of thing, the battalions having to go to some supply point well displaced to the rear and we could never keep up with it. I wonder if there's, could you see any solution to that type of . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, I can't. In contrast to the situation at Anzio where ammunition was very critical, the fact of it is we weren't shooting a great deal of ammunition because the opposition was not very hard and we were moving so rapidly that our capability for finding targets was not awfully good. We had our own aerial OP's but aerial photography, of course, was fairly useless because by the time you got it, it was ancient history. So we weren't using a whole lot of ammunition. Now gasoline was a little tougher problem, but we managed. Actually what we did, we used the railroad. We had used the spots between bridges and it was the only bridges that were destroyed. We'd use the trains between the bridges, ferries. If it was worthwhile, put it on the railroad again and run it on up a little further. But we did run our own battalion ammunition trains all the way back up to the beach. On occasions pick up ammunition. Now of course at Montelimar we used quite a bit and that was all truck hauled ammunition and mostly by our own ammunition trains as opposed to truck companies and things. We didn't have any truck companies. You just don't have room to carry those things on an amphibious operation. They take up too much space. But there's one thing that's characteristic of war and it's well to bear this in mind particularly in logistics planning. You're either shooting or moving. You don't often have to haul at the same time large tonnages of gasoline and large tonnages of ammunition. If you are hauling ammunition you are not moving

over great distances. Another thing perhaps I should mention and I don't say this to be critical, but the Seventh Army almost completely lost the operation. They established a headquarters on the peninsula south of San Maxine and our progress was so rapid that communication was almost entirely impractical. I think this occasioned some friction because as I may have mentioned before, General Truscott was always very aggressive in pressing his headquarters forward to keep the pressure on the divisions and the regiments to stay up on the bit so to speak and it would not be unusual for him to move his headquarters three or four times a day during this period. Now, all during this rather rapid advance, we were taking fairly large numbers of prisoners. You find a 100-200 isolated Germans who had run out of ammunition, I suppose, that were awfully anxious to surrender and these things become quite a problem because we were short of rations, the supply line being so long. We didn't have anything to feed them. We didn't have anybody to guard them and it did present some problems. Actually in the course of this incidentally, two Russian battalions of the German Army surrendered to us and joined us. They were not awfully useful because we couldn't supply them but we did use them as labor and I believe we encouraged some political criticism though I was pretty far down the line to be conscious of this.

LTC FEENEY: Cause they were formally communists. Was that the main idea?

LTG LEMLEY: No.

LTC FEENEY: Or because of their relationship with the Germans?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think there was some fear that the Russians might take offense that we would take what they regarded as traitors and put them into the U. S. Army which is, of course, what we were doing. But it was an interesting campaign on the few occasions that we did run into some resistance. It was always scattered.

END OF TAPE 4

TAPE 5, SESSION 3

LTG LEMLEY: I was remarking that the resistance that we encountered in this rapid movement up through Southern France was rather scattered and I think I would like to cite one example of just the sort of things that happen in a pursuit or exploitation of this type. On one occasion, when we were fighting a little bit I happened to visit the headquarters of the 36th Division Artillery and when I arrived there I found the division artillery commander in somewhat of a flurry because he had just discovered that they were shooting to the rear instead of to the front and in fact what had happened was the division artillery headquarters had gotten out in front of everybody. You just kept moving along, you know, as rapidly as you could and while I was there the battle finally caught up with us and we mobilized a few free Frenchman with miscellaneous arms to defend the artillery headquarters against a very minor attack which I think is right amusing.

LTC FEENEY: Did the Germans have any behind the lines resistance to you? Did they have any guerrilla's of their own? Had they enlisted the French to help them?

LTG LEMLEY: To the best of my knowledge there were no -- there were no guerrilla activity behind our lines. Now, of course, a great many small units, platoons and companies were bypassed in the rapid advance and so you did have little minor actions going on in the rear. As far as I know there were no Frenchman fighting us. Now inevitably as we moved on, the Frenchman started fighting each other in our rear because the -- guerrilla movement was not really awfully cohesive. It was cohesive only to the extent that they were against the Germans. There was the communist faction and the non-communist faction and in fact in the city of Lyon they had a battle lasting about eight days between the French Communist and the non-communist French.

In fact, the situation was so bad there that American troops were prohibited from entering Lyon. There was no particular reason to go there. There were no Germans left there. They hadn't made any effort to defend the city but there was a great deal of that and a great deal of settling old scores as the front lines moved forward in the rear and there was great bitterness between I would say about three French factions. Those who had actively collaborated. The more or less passive middle of the road Frenchman and the Communist. There was one French regiment, the 6th Chasseurs Alpine which had never surrendered and it was in the mountains around Grenoble and they came out of the hills and joined us when we went through Grenoble. I thought that was rather interesting that that regiment had survived more or less intact through the years of occupation. I might add to at this point that on the effectiveness of the so called free French forces of the interior. The free French as they were called. I am sure that they made a very considerable contribution in terms of intelligence of varying quality because they really weren't trained intelligence people but I would also say that their military contribution was pretty close to negligible. It really didn't amount to very much. If anything . . .

LTC FEENEY: The Marquis with a free French regular forces . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Now these were the -- these were not regular forces. They were guerrilla forces organized by the -- yes, by the US, OSS, and their British counterpart. In fact, the British were quite active in this part of Southern France and I ran into several British officers who had been serving behind the lines with these people but I would say there were not very effective nor was there any particular reason I suppose that they should be. I'm sure they were very poorly supplied with miscellaneous quantities of weapons and there wasn't a whole lot they could do and of course this is excellent throughout

the country. They -- there's some pretty remote areas -- they're going up through the mountains there.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, from your conversation about the effectiveness of these -- the French guerrilla. I'm not quite sure about what you aren't exposing the principle here that maybe in a large scale conventional war that maybe we had not spent an awful lot of time trying to equip and train guerrilla troops. I'm thinking in particular, say the special forces type of thing where we were, you know, dedicating a whole element of the combat power towards us.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, it is my belief that we shouldn't devote major resources to this sort of activity. However, there is a place for specialized operations of this type and I guess I'm speaking of areas away from the main stream of the battle and that sort of thing and to disrupt a retreat. I don't think guerrilla forces can be effective against a victorious conventional force but once it's worth of fallen apart and everybody's running they can blow bridges, ambush people on roads and that sort of thing but there's not an awful lot of future in it in Western Europe certainly.

LTC FEENEY: Did you have good communications with these guerrilla forces or was that one of the problems that you . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, there were good communications at the higher levels but it's my belief and I think you'll find this is true anywhere where you have operations of this type that you could coordinate fine at the upper echelons but then neither the guerrillas nor the conventional forces can get the word down to the troops so as to make any on the ground coordination effective on a timely basis. In other words, I don't think that it's physically possible to have a coordinated guerrilla conventional forces operation except in such cases as when we used these people to go out and clear the fields for the gliders and that sort of thing. I mean where you can preplan a couple months

ahead of time and where you can have various specific and limited tasks not involving heavy combat. That's why they can prove very useful and in those situations, of course, there's another. France is not a very good climate for guerrilla operations. It's my observation that nearly all Frenchman are inclined to accept the powers that be regardless of who they are. They may not like them but it's their nature to obey the law so to speak. So I don't think that the average Frenchman in this part of France was comfortable with the Marquis. They regarded them as pretty doubtful characters at best and while they were not anxious to tattletale on them at the same time they were not particularly anxious to provide the kind of support that guerrilla's need. You know, the popular cover. That's another reason that I don't think that they were particularly effective. I think you'd find the same conditions in obtaining Germany as well. I have heard though that in Northern Italy that they were rather useful and here again I think this goes to the temperament of the people. The Italians are not basically law abiding people. The French and the Germans are.

LTC FEENEY: Do you want me to scratch that sir?

LTG LEMLEY: No, it's true.

LTC FEENEY: Well, I think that's a very basic premise for a guerrilla activity that people have to -- that a certain climate has to be there whether it's the nature of the people or other aspects of the environment that have to be there in order to conduct . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, they have to have at least a passive support of the people they're living with. This is -- you've just got to have it and the western world by enlarge doesn't accept terror as a legitimate weapon to enforce the support by the local population such as they do in Asia. I mean we just don't accept this as being a reasonable course of action.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, as you moved up to Southern France and came to the Meurthe, I'd like to have you discuss the Meurthe river operations in detail if you could sir, such as, if I remember correctly, it seems like the terrain was favored to the enemy, there was a lot of flooding, it was back again something similar to Italy although it wasn't as drastic in the environment, the land.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, it is true. The terrain favored the enemy. Also, at least initially the situation favored the enemy because they had elected the mirth as a point to stand and fight and you see they really hadn't been able to put anything together until about that time and I think this was in November as I recall and while they were able to get themselves set, prepare their positions and so forth when we got there we were pretty well at the end of our logistic and we were scattered from hell to breakfast back to Southern France. We didn't have the ammunition, supplies and so forth to go much further. We didn't have the troops because our front had been constantly expanding as we went up. So we had to settle down there for a period of, as I recall it was about three weeks while we pulled our tail up under us and we also were reinforced by two fresh divisions, the 100th and the 103rd and an armored division, I believe the 6th Armored Division, I'm not sure but anyhow we did bring up an armored division and we had been essentially without armor up to this point except separate battalions, tank destroyers and that sort of stuff. So we settled down and this operation was an extremely well planned and well executed operation. We were dealing except for these -- except in the case of the new divisions with pretty old hands at the game and we -- we had battle session highly capable troops. As good a troops that you'd ever find anywhere. So with these reinforcements and having our tail up under us inspite of the fact that the weather was miserable,

it was pouring rain. We were in good shape. Now one reason that we didn't have the mud troubles in France that we had in Italy was the extremely fine network of roads. The road network in this area of France is far superior to that in Southern Italy so it's pretty easy to get around on hard surfaces. The operation itself was textbook sort of affair. We had a quite extensive artillery preparation as I recall. We made the river crossing at night and were established on the far banks of the river when daylight came.

LTC FEENEY: When you say established, sir, are you talking about . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we had secured the bank of the river to the extent that we can move engineers in . . .

LTC FEENEY: Couple kilometers.

LTG LEMLEY: . . . for ferrying operations. Well, probably at least that I would say maybe five or six. We can move our engineers in and ferry and built bridges and that sort of thing and the engineer effort there was very commendable. I mean we very rapidly got our bridges in and moved our armor and artillery across. The weather, of course, being what it was, there were no air operations and I would guess that had the Germans had even a limited air superiority or anything approaching the quality in this area and had the -- and I don't know whether they did or not. It -- it may well be that they -- they could of supported it but in any case the weather concluded it and -- but air would of made a mess of this operation very very quickly because we had got awful traffic jams and -- and that sort of thing that are always associated with any river crossing. You back up behind the river and then you get to much in the beachhead across and things get to be pretty messy so we didn't suffer from the air and . . .

LTC FEENEY: German artillery must of been quite lacking at this . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the German artillery was really never very good. They at least from observation have never acquired the capability to mass fire like we did. They never really coordinated their artillery effort. I don't know just what their ammunition situation was. It was my impression that it wasn't very good but later on when I had the business of disposing of the remnant of the Germany Army after the war. There was an awful lot of ammunition to get rid of and so I'm inclined to think that it was a failure to appreciate and exploit their artillery rather than any physical shortages.

LTC FEENEY: This is kind of a way you felt about throughout the whole war, didn't you?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I did and I particularly felt this after I talked to some of these German artillery generals after the war. I felt that they lacked almost totally an understanding of artillery as the United States Army used it in World War II. I think this stems from their early successes with their dive bombers in a somewhat different situation where their dive bombers were roughly reapposed but we did see German aircraft. I mean they were there but that was really the first what I would call pitch battle that we had after the landing and . . .

LTC FEENEY: Meurthe?

LTG LEMLEY: The Meurthe, yes, and once we broke through there we moved very very rapidly on out into Alsace where I think some mistakes were made.

LTC FEENEY: Before we get into the Alsace operation, sir, could you describe this night river crossing a little bit in depth for we are not very good at night operations presently in the US Army and this might be something that should be recorded.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we just more or less did it by the book and really all we did was use the cover of darkness to move our assault elements across the

river. Now this was all planned, coordinated, they had a good fire support plan, our communications were excellent, everybody knew exactly where everybody was and what was happening.

LTC FEENEY: A lot of rehearsal went into this?

LTG LEMELEY: No, there was no rehearsal that I know of. Now, I think it's probable that these two new divisions did goody of rehearsing because they perform quite well and this is not something you usually expect from a fresh division that's never been in combat before. For example, later on we had another new division and the whole rear area sounded like a fire fight all night. Fact we didn't venture forth on the roads much if we could avoid it because these people were so trigger happy. This was not true of the 100th and the 103rd and I think they did some rehearsals though I can't speak authoritatively on that.

LTC FEENEY: When you -- since the Germans were gonna make a stand here at the Meurthe and you were gonna cross this under night. Did they shoot any aluminating rounds at you or did they -- how did you move into your assembly areas so that they couldn't detect this?

LTG LEMLEY: As far as I know the -- except for mortar I don't believe the Germans had any aluminating shells. We had them and we used them some though not nearly to the extent that we did later in Korea. Now aircraft flares were used considerably at Anthio. I mean by the Germans not so much by us because we never had any airplanes up there at night but the Germans did every night and they used flares very extensively up there. Here there were none because of the weather. The weather just didn't permit any type of air operation except our own little light aircraft and they really did a tremendous job. These artillery aircraft in World War II. They were just great.

LTC FEENEY: Then you broke out from the Meurthe. How long did that operation last and then you went right on . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I suppose it took us about three days to move on up through the Vosges and out to the Alsacean Plains but this was against very scattered resistance much more affective resistance than we had encountered say in Southern France but it was still scattered and not coordinated in anyway because the Germans just -- well, with their backs against Vosges which inaffective what they had. Their lateral communications were pretty miserable. There was no place to go except forward or back and they didn't have the capability to go forward so it was a chase up narrow mountain passes with limited lateral communications. So there was no really effective resistance and well, actually not until we got well out into Alsace and almost up to the German border where we ran into the Siegfried Line, of course.

LTC FEENEY: Did you want to discuss -- describe these -- you were talking about mistakes or errors in the Alsace operations?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, I guess the biggest mistake that was made and perhaps it was more of a fact of circumstance than it was a mistake. We didn't protect our right flank and as a result . . .

LTC FEENEY: Who had the flank sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the French Army was coming in on our flank. The first French Army, but they really hadn't gotten there yet so while we were exploding our break through and charging on out to the German border. The French were not able to move up in Southern Alsace around Colmar fast enough to cover our flank and I say they weren't able, I don't know why they didn't. I suspect it was just a lack of capability to do so. So as a result we develop this nasty situation down around Colmar in the Southern Alsace which eventually required us to divert two divisions from our main effort to contain it where as had this been -- had it been taken care of on a timely

basis this diversion would of not been necessary. In other words when we went on into Alsace there was nothing there around Colmar but the second French armored division, General LeClaire's division moved into Strasbourg, took it over from us. We moved up in the outskirts and they moved in and took it over and it was our belief that they camped in Strasbourg and enjoyed it when they should of been going on south down to Colmar to protect, to eliminate what was then a rather insignificant German breach, bridgehead along the Rhine. Now, to what extent that represents prejudice and rumor I don't know but that's what everybody believed that they spent too much time celebrating the liberation of Strasbourg which has a very special place in a Frenchman's heart, you know, next to Paris, Strasbourg is probably the most important city in France to a Frenchman.

LTC FEENEY: Least to the Second French Armored, ah?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think to most Frenchman because there's a motion involved and at Strasbourg is really a French city in a German country because Alsace is certainly just as much German as it is French and perhaps a little more or certainly it was at that time. They used to take potshots at us there in Alsace at night and I don't think there was any organized guerrilla resistance but there was a lot of hostility which they tried not to show but when they could get away with it they did. So what you have then is Strasbourg which is entirely French. It's French as Paris practically and in a ^{en} ~~non~~cleave and a fairly hostile and countryside and it's very emotional with the French but that was what I was afraid to mistake the failure to eliminate this relatively minor bridgehead that the Germans held on the west banks of the Rhine when it was minor because it later became a very very bitter fight down there and lasted as I recall a couple months. I do want to mention one thing about the march up because it's, well, I think it's a rather interesting to begin

with and secondly I think it makes a point for people who have no dealt with heavy fortification. We moved into a little town as I recall it was called Adelshotten and we were moving very rapidly this was after we were exploring the river corssing and I remember our headquarters moved in really when the leading infantry elements were clearing the far side of town. We moved in on the south side when they were still pushing the Germans out of the north side and to the southwest of the town was an old 1870 French Fort. Heavy stone construction and I don't know the afternoon after we moved in there we'd been there several hours. This French Maqui came into to tell us that this fort was occupied by the German and we didn't have very many people who were flunt in French. We could probably of communi- cated with him but he wanted somebody to come with him and we had a Red Cross girl that we had recently acquired. We never had Red Cross girls in Italy but we did in France and they had joined us a month or so before who was very fluent in French and so she took this French militia unit and charged the fort while they were rather unsuccessful in reducing the fort and the fort wasn't causing anybody a great of pain at the time because we were still moving pretty fast but the Corps Commander got a little un- happy with having this German unit and I don't know what size it was. I think perhaps a battalion in this old fort back there so he finally sent a platoon of the 3rd Infantry Division, I think the 15th Infantry back to accept the surrender of the fort. Well, the fort didn't surrender so we then sent a platoon of tanks up to reinforce them and that -- the tanks had no effect on it. We bombed the hell out of the fort but that had no effect on it either and then we took a 155 gun up to blow it apart under the command of, now General Dutch Kerwin. Well, the gun was highly un- successful in reducing the fort because it couldn't depress enough to hit

it where it would of been affective. We lost General Dutch Kerwin who got shot in the knee and had to be evacuated back -- you see we finally wound up with two battalions of the third division diverted from their principle task just to reduce this fort and it was finally done by loading a half track with TNT and running it into the wall and blowing hole in the wall and all of this took about two weeks and I would say diverted perhaps, oh, I don't know 12 or 15 battalion days from the main effort which to me was a luster-tive. Palnasty one of these fortifications maybe -- can be even though it's quite an antique and not considered to be of any consequence. Of course, you have to have pretty determined troops in it to make it effective but these were very determined troops and it's an interesting little sidelight and later on of course when we ran into the Siegfried Line of fortifications which were very extensive. They presented tremendous problems in getting through them and he just didn't go very fast. It was one concrete pillbox at a time and you really can't get at them with anything except explosives carried by troops not in the form of artillery, projectiles or bombs but I thought that was an interesting little sidelight on the affair.

LTC FEENEY: This is a continuation of the third session with General Lemley on 25 April at 1210 hours. Sir, I couldn't really document this period between the -- after the Meurthe river crossing and to the end of the war and I'd like to have you continue on with the 6th Corps and your experiences from there to the end of the war. If you would please.

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, I'd like to -- well, after we crossed the Meurthe we moved very rapidly out into the Alsatian Plain and except for the difficulties that I mentioned yesterday around Colmar we had little trouble till we reached the German border and the Siegfried Line. We did -- it did I suppose take, oh, perhaps on the order of a month or two to work up through Alsace there because

resistance was thickening as we got closer to Germany and the weather was extremely bad and we had some pretty tough fighting there for awhile but we moved fairly rapidly to the Siegfried Line and were in the process of reducing yet sort of a pillbox at a time when the Battle of the Bulge broke up north and I think we made or I think that a rather serious mistake was made when they dispatched elements of the Third Army north to reduce the Bulge in that we of course thinned out in the 6th Corps. We extended our sector considerably but rather foolishly I think we withdrew from the Siegfried Line back to that river and I can't remember the name of the river that runs through Mulhouse and north of Saverne there and I think this was a great mistake because we gave up ground that had cost us fairly dearly and when the time came to go back and take it we had to fight for it again. I don't think it was necessary to withdraw when we extended our sector because the Germans were having the same sorts of problems that we were. I mean they needed troops to and I doubt seriously if they could of -- if they had the capability to launch a very effective counterattack on us their in the Siegfried Line. I think this was a mistake. In fact it was my impression at the time of the Battle of the Bulge that there was a great of unwarranted . . .

LTC FEENEY: Concern?

LTG LEMLEY: . . . alarm over it. I didn't view it with alarm. I viewed it to a tremendous opportunity. In fact I recall when I first heard of it. I was getting my hair cut one morning there in our command post and I said, by God, this is the greatest thing that ever happened. This is the end of the war which in fact it was really I mean to all intense and purposes but I think the alarm and undue concern stemmed from lack of battle seasoning on the part of the commanders and the troops up in the north. They had broke

out of their beachhead on the Caen Peninsula, they really hadn't had much of a fight and their -- the battle experience of most of them was pretty skimpy and I think there was unwarranted panic at all levels and I would include supreme headquarters in that. So that was my own reaction to it as I say I thought we made a mistake in giving up about 10 miles of territory that had cost us initially to take and was equally costly going back through it but really after the Bulge calmed down we got some new troops in, some really infantry divisions except they weren't divisions. They were three infantry regiments with nothing but direct support artillery. They had none of the division troops with them, we got some of those people in that took over some of the quieter sectors and then we were able to push on back up to the Siegfried line fairly rapidly not that it was a hard fight but we made it pretty easily and then about that time of course the Remagen Bridge up north collapsed and the Germans started the general withdrawal. We crossed the Rhine at Kaiserslautern, not Kaiserslautern at Mannheim and rushed rather rapidly down through Germany and had no fights to amount too much till we got down around Stuttgart and Heilbronn where the Germans made sort of a last ditch stand and held us up there for I guess about three or four weeks but generally speaking it was pretty unexceptional fighting for the rest of the war. We wound up with our forward headquarters down in Innsbruck and our rear in Garmisch which is a very nice place to wind up the war and that was about it. One rather interesting little footnote when we did wind it up we had to accept the surrender of the first and 19th German Army and this presented some problems to the Corps Headquarters because I guess writing a surrender instrument is not something they teach in the schools and nobody really knew what to put in it. In fact, it fell to my lot to issue instructions to the two German Army Commanders after they had

withdrawn to a designated consecration area. A area we designated after the surrender and I was rather hard put to find anything to tell them so I told them to turn over all of their cards and to treat the German civilians well and we said they had no intention of treating them otherwise. One interesting aspect of it though and I've really never seen anything about this in any of the writings on the war. There was where a few SS units in these two armies that held out, that refused to surrender and as a condition of accepting their surrender we required the German Army to fight the SS units, to capture them and bring them into the pole which they did quite willingly and that

LTC FEENEY: What kind of a effort was that to neutralize those two SS units?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the SS units didn't amount to a whole lot though it wasn't a major effort but it was rather difficult because of the terrain. You see they were down in the Alps and so it did represent some pretty rough terrain for rounding people up. I'm sure some of them got away but not in any organized units.

LTC FEENEY: Was this any effort do you think to allow the German hierarchy to escape to any, you know, they certainly did have a lot of people to get out?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there were a great many refugees both senior German military and political people and senior collaborators from Belgium, the Netherlands, France and various other countries that were all cornered down there in the little boundary between Switzerland, Italy, and Germany down in Austria and there were lots of political figures and wanted people down there. So called war criminals and units were sent in to screen these and pick them up and take them.

LTC FEENEY: Was it done with any real sense of organization?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes. The US Group Control Council which was the US element of the military government for Germany or at least it was the headquarters

for it had organized task forces back in England to round up these people and they had a central registry of the people who were wanted, their descriptions and what they were wanted for. There were very very large numbers of these people. There were political figures, there were military figures wanted for so called war crimes. There were all the leadership down to a pretty low level of all the Nazi Party organizations. The SS, The Waffen SS, and there were two kinds of SS you know. The SS that were concentration camp guards and security police in Germany and the Waffen SS which were the armed SS, they were in units up to division side and there was the Right Arbeits Dienst and all sorts of party organizations. The Hitler Youth Leadership of all of those things. Just great numbers of people that were wanted and this -- the criteria for these people had been established by the European advisory commission which was established in London for quite awhile before the war ended. It was a Russian, British, US group with some French participation not very much. I don't believe the French were officially members of it that established occupation zones, wrote up the rules for the military government of Germany and established common principles. So everybody -- all the major allies had a hand in writing these lists. Now a interesting aspect of that European advisory commission and the occupation of Germany it's well known and well established in history but I won't say it's generally known. The Russians didn't accept the French as participants in the big league and . . .

LTC FEENEY: Sir, may I interrupt you here?

LTC LEMLEY: Yes.

LTC FEENEY: Before we get into that aspect of it I'd like to wrap up the end of the war if we could and there were two questions that I had and I'm gonna bring this allied commission out. Write that down here in the Russian

versus French situation. Well, there are two questions that I thought were -- that I'd like to have your opinion on if I could. One was the great personalities that develop as a result of World War II and there is the Patton and the Bradley and I know you're a great admirer of Bradley's and the Eisenhower at the end of the war. The relationship of these fellows and the other question was and you can answer these in any order you wish. The other question was when you were stopped say at this last ditch stand at Stuttgart and you had the two weeks that you were stopped. What was the corps doing in preparation to regain the initiative?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we've been moving very rapidly through Germany and basically what it consisted of was pulling our tail up under us, you know, getting supplies up, ammunition, that sort of thing. Getting the troop pulled together because it had been an all out pursuit and it was a good part of it was just pulling ourselves together to launch a coordinated operation. It was during this period that the 10th Armored Division broke through about 30 miles into Crailsheim and got cut off. They were isolated down there for about four or five days at Crailsheim. You could get there in aircraft. I mean they weren't out of communication but you couldn't get a tank through for example took them there for about four or five days. As a matter of fact, I went down to visit them one day and I made the mistake of taking light aircraft piloted by Air Force Air Corps pilots rather than one of our artillery pilots and he asked me before I took off where I wanted to go and I showed him on the road map which is about 1 to 100 thousand mile I suppose, yes, where I wanted to go and I wanted to fly down the road because A -- that's an easy way to find the place and B -- there wasn't much anti-aircraft around there. Well, this guy apparently was totally incapable of flying by map and we got up and he headed off in the wrong direction and I

tapped him and said over there and showed him the road and then he went down the wrong road and I had to tap him again. We wound up completely lost because in the process of trying to get him down the right road I got dis-oriented myself and we spent about an hour cruising out over the German lines and I tell you when we finally saw when of these white stars on a OD truck it surely did look good.

LTC FEENEY: I can imagine.

LTG LEMLEY: But that was not a major operation had we, you know, had our tail pulled up, we could of probably gone on through there in two or three days.

LTC FEENEY: I guess what I'm trying to bring out, I think, is what does the corps staff do when your attack is stopped and you're no longer a exploitation or pursuit but you're stopped. The whole thing stopped -- do you start putting your troops on the defense and start planning for area defense or do you . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No. We didn't move into a defensive situation. In affect we, you know, you see these things coming gradually at first you don't know whether you've hit a few isolated roadblocks or whether you hit a organized defensive line which we had and so you sort of come up to it gradually as soon as you develop a feel for the situation which you do fairly rapidly then you fly around to the division headquarters, drive around to them, draw some boundaries on the map, give on a objective, successive objective and pull the corps artillery into it. You see during this pursuit we hadn't been shooting to amount to anything. Oh, fire maybe 10 rounds a gun a day something like that that you know stop when you hit a roadblock and shoot it up but really what you do you get people organized into definitive sectors. You organize a fire plan and go on through but it's a situation that develops. It's not something that happens suddenly. We were never on the defensive in

France and Germany except there at Montelimar where we were holding -- keeping the Germans from breaking out and that was a pretty bitter fight. That didn't last too long. We were on the defensive from time to time. Not generally on the defensive. Not the entire corps but we did take some counterattacks there in Alsace and that sort of thing but generally you just come up to it. It's sort of like an infantry company in the old days you know where you had the advance guard, the point and this sort of thing and it just develops. We probably would have had if all the troops been in the quality of our old divisions. The Third, the 45th, and the 36th, we probably would have gotten through a lot faster but we had lost some of those people to other corps and we had some new people and it did -- it always takes longer for them to grasp the situation. You have more of a communications problem than you do with your old hands where you are used to working together. So I suppose that contributed something to our problems there at Heilbronn.

LTC FEENEY: How did you keep your, say divisions or regiments when they started to -- when you could see them starting to halt in certain sectors, I'm sure it didn't happen all the way across the front.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, they did pretty much all the way across the corps front at Heilbronn, yes, because the Germans were making a stand there and it was our belief which proved to be erroneous that they were attempting a major delay while they organized the so called Redoubt area in the Alps. You know it was widely believed that there was going to be a hard corps resistance movement in the Alps. Now whether one was ever planned or not I don't know, if it was ever planned, it was not successful. I mean it never developed but that's what we thought it was at the time and as I say it was a good fight but not like you had down in Italy. I mean we just didn't run

into those things for more than a few days at a time in that part of France and Germany. You mentioned the various figures in the war. Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton and so forth. I'd known General Bradley for years so he was my TAC at West Point. I knew General Patton primarily because his son-in-law, later General James Totten was a very close friend of mine and so I had gotten to know General Patton through him but we were pretty far out on the limb and our contacts with anything -- any headquarters other than our own corps headquarters, the adjacent corps and to a limited extent the Seventh Army were pretty limited. As a matter of fact I have to confess one time when I was there in Alsace a West Point classmate of mine came in from supreme headquarters from SHAPE--SHAF they called, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedition in Forces and I had to ask him what that patch was he was wearing. I didn't even know so my knowledge of the relationships between those people isn't very extensive. As a matter of fact I never met General Patch our Seventh Army Commander. I never laid eyes on him. He was in ill health and didn't get around at all. In fact . . .

LTC FEENEY: This was true. I've heard this said of a lot of Generals during World War II. Maybe they were hangers on, you know, older gentlemen anyhow when the war became -- began but there has -- there has been an awful lot of talk about the age of our general officers during World War II. A lot of them experienced poor health.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, well a number of them did. In fact, both of the Generals I worked for. I was the exec first of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade and later the Sixth Corps Artillery and we had General Vincent Myer down in Italy till early in the Anzio thing and he had a bad back which really limited him a great deal. He's a wonderful man but not -- he was not an effective commander in Italy primarily because of his health. In fact, he once early

in the war he called me off to one side after dinner one evening. He says, Harry, he says, I want you to run this outfit but he says, please when you tell them to do something have your people say that General Myers said to do it and not Colonel Lemley. I think . . .

LTC FEENEY: I think we oughta -- real glad to say that the General says it rather than . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, and I think it makes people worse setting in that regard and then of course General Myer was evacuated from Anzio and went back to the States and later became the military advisor of this European Advisory Commission in London. He's a great friend of mine. He's still alive. Lives down in Carolina's but then General Carl Baer took over and General Bair too was in very poor health. He had heart troubles and he also had mental troubles stemming from the death of his son on one of these PW ships in the Pacific that our own planes sunk. I don't mean to imply that he wasn't mentally alright but -- and he, I think, really sort of wanted to get himself killed. He used to take his jeep and a M-1 rifle and go out with the advanced elements and shoot at Germans and he spent long periods when he couldn't really leave his little trailer.

END OF SESSION:

LTG LEMLEY: As I was saying General Baer too was in poor health. He had heart trouble and required an attending physician consequently. He really wasn't up to his job although he's a very fine man again and this plus observations from other people more or less convince me that there's no place for a sick man in war. Perhaps you can function on a higher staff with some physical disabilities, a theatre staff or a communications on a staff or something but there's no place for a sick man or a old man in combat and this was recognized because they had a policy limit that no colonel over 45 could command a regiment and there were exceptions but not very many. General Baer, incidentally was one of the oldest officers in combat. He was a contemporary of -- well, I believe he graduated from the academy about 1910, I think and General Vincent Myer who I mentioned before was a 1911 graduate of Annapolis. So they were getting along. Here you had two brigadier general's both with over 30 years of service and they were just a little too old for their jobs. So although there are exceptions as the general rule, you need youth to fight a war because it is very fatiguing and demanding and a division commander even a corps commander leads a very very tough life. It takes a young man. I might add that before we got to Alsace, General Truscott left the VI Corps and the atmosphere in the corps really was never the same after he left. It wasn't perhaps as dramatic -- the change wasn't as dramatic as when he joined but I won't say I never saw the corps commander after that, I did but I don't recall that the corps commander ever visited us after General Truscott left. In fact I don't remember any, well, it was extremely rare for any member of the corps staff to come down to our headquarters and this was certainly a dramatic change from General Truscott's day. About the only time I pacifically recall and this was right amusing. This was after we had pulled back

in Alsace and the Germans shelled the corps headquarters with an old railroad gun that they drug up from somewhere and they had a few casualties, not very many and the next morning the Corps Chief of Staff, General Charlie Palmer, came down to visit the headquarters and assemble the staff and gave a short lecture on the importance of counter battery which I thought was perhaps a little inappropriate. That's really the only visit I remember from.

LTC FEENEY: General Palmer, is that General Bruce Palmer's father or . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, Bruce Palmer's not related. That's Willy Palmer's brother.

LTC FEENEY: Well, sir, are there any other remarks that you would like to make in closing World War II before we move . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't think really anything much of any great interest to put in. Maybe we better move -- leave World War II behind us.

LTC FEENEY: What about the policies for the occupation of Germany?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, the policies for the occupation of Germany were developed in London by the European Advisory Commission during the last year or so of the war. I don't know just how long they meant. I had no real contact with them. Of course, the policies that they had agreed on, the occupation zones and everything were ratified at Potsdam and became the Potsdam Agreement which was the allied rules for the occupation and demilitarization of Germany. The US rules were almost identical and they were contained in the JCS paper. A policy paper which really represented the so called Morgenthau Plan for the occupation of Germany and after the war I volunteered to go to the Pacific but that war caved in before I got out of Germany and so my old friend General Vincent Myer who had been the military advisor to the US element of this European Advisory Commission and later had become Chief of the Armed Forces or really the Army Division. Now the US element of the

control council in Berlin. He asked that I be assigned in Berlin so I went on up there to work for him and that was a pretty miscellaneous outfit I might add. He didn't know how many people we had in our staff division and we didn't know where they all were. Really didn't know what they were all doing. They were scattered all over Germany and we later found out we had a rear echelon in London which we would of forgotten completely I suppose except they asked for some money in people wants and it gave us the opportunity to disband them.

LTC FEENEY: What was your job with the Army element of the commission?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, there was an Army element, the Army Division they called it and the Navy Division. They were separate. The Army Division was concerned with disposing of the German Army and Air Force, discharging the people, disposing of the equipment, destroying fortification, writing regulations and policies for the demilitarization of Germany and while we did this for the US element and transmitted the instructions through SHAF in Frankfurt. They supervised the execution and instructions we were policy making outfit but we negotiated with the French, British, and Germans on a quadripartite basis to establish uniform term -- rules in this area for all of Germany. This was not a highly successful operation except in one respect which later became extremely important and this Army Division which I was part of, it was more or less half of what's now Army and half what's now Air Force, but we were all Army in those days, but the one thing that we did that was probably worth doing. We did negotiate the air transit rules, the air corridors into Berlin for access to Berlin, and this of course during the days of the Berlin blockade became extremely important and I might add that the Russians pretty much honored those rules even during the blockade. Also they set up what's known as the Berlin Air Safety Center

which is the only quadripartite activity that survived the Berlin Blockade and the disintegration of the Allied Control Council. In Germany that quadripartite Air Safety Center is still operating in Berlin and controls air traffic in and around the city. So that was one important thing we did. The negotiations were interminable. My God, you go down there and sit four or five hours talking to your French, British, and German counterparts and they -- we never accomplished anything. I think we did agree on one paper that abolished military toys and we, I believe agreed on a common discharge document. This was necessary because as the Germans were discharged they were returned to their homes so it was fairly important that there be a uniform discharge documentation. We also exchanged information on progress and the destruction of fortification and disposal of material, equipment, ammunition, and incidentally this is no simple job. Getting rid of large quantities of artillery ammunition and chemical ammunition there was a lot of that, is just extremely difficult. You might think that you could just put them in piles and blow them up but you can't dispose of any considerable number of rounds that way. What we finally did was the projectiles was to bore holes in them, melt the TNT in hot water, put them in a hot bath, drew off the TNT which we made into blocks and sold as commercial explosives and sold the steel as scrap, but this was really quite an extensive task getting rid of a German Army and . . .

LTC FEENEY: How did you get the idea to drill out and take the TNT out of it? There's an . . .

LTC LEMLEY: No, this was something our ordnance people cooked up and disposing of these fortifications is not easy either because many of them in metropolitan areas and I recall the submarine pens up in Bremerhaven. I don't think we ever did get rid of them because you couldn't use explosives

without unexceptable damage and so I don't know what finally ever happened. I guess they're still there. One interesting aspect though in the demilitarization of Germany. The British by virtue of having their occupations zone where it was located, had almost the entire German Navy to get rid of and they kept them intact. They didn't disband the German Navy. They changed the name to the German Mind Sweeping Administration and kept the people in the ships and put them on mind sweeping duty. So the German Navy was never actually disbanded. The German Navy today had its roots in this German Mind Sweeping Administration but the British set up much to the consternation of the Russians. The Russians didn't like this at all. They were furious about it as a matter of fact. We did something of the same thing in that we kept German Tech Service Units and used them to support our occupying forces since ours were pretty much disbanded, you know, at the end of the war when we had the mass discharge, had the riots in Frankfort and everything and they just swept anything out and so we used these German Tech Service Units we called them Labor Service Units but actually they were ordnance company's and quartermaster company's and that sort of stuff to provide the support for our own troops. We had some difficulty with the Germans about this but not nearly to the same degree that the British did or with the Russians, in other wrds, but that was rather uninteresting time in Berlin. The control council was quite ineffective, but you did have pretty much the problems of most of the world all reflected in this little group of people there in Berlin and so I found this an interesting job, not from the standpoint of my work which really wasn't very extensive but from the appreciation I gained at some of the problems of the world by first hand contact with the Russians, the British, the French and really the military missions of all of the other countries that were located there in Berlin. We had contact with most of them.

LTC FEENEY: How did you perceive the Russians at that time and, you know, in their coordination problems that you'd have that will arise with them and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we had great difficulties with them stemming really from two things. One's a language problem or understanding problem. I'm not really speaking tech -- technical translations so much communication. We also had sort of a problem because the Russians there and I suppose everywhere in the world all work on Moscow hours, I mean they run on Moscow time not on local time which made it rather difficult to -- made a rather short day that you could get a meeting together because the British wouldn't meet after tea time and the Russians would be closed up during a good part of the day because it was night in Moscow but basically the Potsdam agreements were not in fact agreements and we and the Russians and the French interrupted them differently. Of course both the French and the Russians had suffered considerably for -- from the Germans and both were pretty much on their knees economically in this sort of way and the question of reparations was a very difficult one. Primarily the Russians and the French wanted to loot Germany. They wanted to take old factories and did, dismantle them, move them back to Russia, both the French and the Russians, and this is where I got involved in it to a considerable degree. Wanted preparations in a form of labor and both wanted to hold the German POW's for extended periods as laborers and this was very contrary to our policy and it was something that was never resolved. It was particularly embarrassing to us because the Geneva convention and all prisoners the French had were prisoners that we had turned over to them and we as the capturing power under the Geneva convention were responsible for their treatment and orderly repartition after the war and we had real problems with that. In fact we had to send

large quantities of food, clothing, and medical supplies to the French held POW's from whom we were responsible because the French weren't giving them very decent treatment and I'm sure the Russians weren't too, but we had no responsibility other than a posse responsibility for those that the Germans held. Another big question that arose at this time. I think I ought to mention it because it later became extremely important as you know there were sizable numbers of Russians fighting with the Germans. I mentioned some of them we captured in Southern France and they joined us and we had in Berlin numbers of these pretty senior people that the Russians regarded as traitors and criminals and that they wanted back and we were not at all anxious to give them back though we did eventually forcibly repopulate a number of the Russians in the refugee camps down in Germany which was a rather disgraceful episode I thought. We forcibly turned them back over to the Russians where I'm sure they were all shot but it was this . . .

LTC FEENEY: Is there any indication to you when you make that statement?

Is there any indication that you felt they were shot or did you know . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the Russians wanted them to punish them for surrendering, in some cases for being turncoats and for various reasons and they had been in the German concentration camps and which is where we feel air to them.

LTC FEENEY: So they got a double dose.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, they really did and in a say it was rather disgraceful when we forcibly repatriated these numbers of Russians and not just Russians, there were other East Europeans, Hungarians and that sort of thing and actually it was this business of our keeping people that the Russians wanted that precipitated the Berlin blockade later on because we were shuffling these people in and out of Berlin on their military train which we insisted we had every right to do. We insisted that this train was sovereign territory

of the United States and the Russians had no control over it whereas they insisted that they had a right to know who was riding on it and I don't know why we used the train for that purpose because it would of been very easy to fly them but we might possibly even avoided the blockade had we done so but it became an emotional sort of issue particularly with General Clay.

LTC FEENEY: Was there -- did you have any knowledge at all as to what was really going on in Europe at that time -- you mentioned that they were stripping the industrial facilities but do you have any idea that this was really that they were gonna turn us into a Communist Iron Curtain Satellite?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the curtain hadn't yet been brung down but I think it was generally accepted that, yes, that the Russians were going to install communist governments in all of the so called satellite countries. Now it was not accepted that they were gonna establish a communist government in East Germany. We would of expected of course that their burgermeister and local officals and that sort of thing would be communist, but the key element of the Potsdam agreement was that Germany would be treated as a single entity. In other words that there would be no -- there wouldn't at sometime in the future be a central German government established by the Allies which would govern all of Germany and of course this never happened and when we came up against this time and time again finally in 1948, spring of 1948 we did establish a government for the U.S., British, and French zones which was a breach of the Potsdam agreement issued separate currency and this brought about the demise of the Allied Control Council. The Russian representative walked out of a meeting a few days after this was done and they never met again. That was in May of 1948. In fact I was back in Berlin on the day that it happened on a visit and the blockade started a very few days thereafter. A matter of four or five days as I recall.

LTC FEENEY: Before we continue into that postwar phase I was wondering about any incidents that were created or any knowledge that you have of the Nazi's continuing to create sabotage or to take some, you know, steps to keep its life growing. You know you mention these SS troops down south . .

LTG LEMLEY: No there were no instances of that that I ever heard of. The big problem with the Nazi's was -- the big problem we confronted was in finding effective local officials, administrators, police and this sort of people who were not Nazi's and this was one of our basic policies that no Nazi would be given any position of authority in the postwar Germany and so what it boiled down to is that you didn't have any effective people to take charge of industry, the railroads, the municipal governments because all of them that had any capabilities were Nazi's and this was a constant problem in Berlin at this time. In our outfit of course they didn't effect me directly because I was only concerned with German Armed Forces and there weren't gonna be any. So it didn't effect me, but that of course, it's that issue that resulted and General Patton's relief from command in Bavaria -- he had contrary to policy install people in responsible positions who had passed -- had a Nazi passed and he might of gotten away with that but he held a press conference and implied that the Nazi's were not any different than Democrat's and Republican's back home which . . .

LTC FEENEY: Probably right.

LTG LEMLEY: That line publicity had . . .

LTC FEENEY: Well, I guess it was probably very difficult though to find people who -- it would be difficult in our country to find somebody who isn't a Democrat or Republican. I mean if you all of a sudden outlawed that party that hadn't belonged to them or registered with them because this was and I think that the Nazi's in 1935 or something required all public officials to swear ^{allegiance} ~~regions~~ to the government.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, all of them I think were either party members or members of organizations affiliated with the party. They weren't all party members but when we set our criteria for selecting new people it pretty effectively eliminated anybody in Germany who amounted to anything. Most of the able people that were not in anyway associated with Nazi's had either come to this country as refugees or had been exterminated in the concentration camps so it was just, well, not impossible to find anybody to run anything and those people were very very badly needed because we had to get the German economy back on its feet. They were not starving but they were very very poorly fed and you see the Russians had most of the better agricultural area of Germany and we had the industrial area and the US and the British zones so it was extremely urgent to get the mines, the factories and the farms going again and of course they had been kept going during the war with this slave labor and so you had problems of labor, supply, problems of food, money problems. The only acceptable currency in the US zone was cigarettes and cigarettes were used as money. I mean people didn't smoke them. It was the commonly accepted currency of the realm. The so called occupation marks. The Germans considered them almost worthless. They really didn't consider them with money. So there were tremendous problems and I say it was a very interesting period and I learned quite a lot.

LTC FEENEY: What was your feeling of the reaction of the German to the Nuremburg Trial. You know we always tend to go to Germany. I don't think I could ever find anybody that would ever admit that they ever fought an American you know, we all know that there were plenty who did but I . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, in fact, back in those days he could never find anybody that had served on the western front. They had all fought the Russians, but nobody had ever fought against you. Well, I think the German

reaction to the early trials would be a little hard to gauge. It's my guess that they resented them and I don't blame them much. I think they were travesty myself.

LTC FEENEY: Could you elaborate on that part of it?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you know we have a concept that's basic to our system that nobody is responsible for violating an ex post facto law. In other words you're not responsible for something that you did today that next week may be against the law and really what we were doing was trying these people under laws that we had made after they had committed these offenses as terrible as they were and well, for example, the German general staff was a defendant at Nuremburg and that means that every member of the German General Staff Corps was a criminal. Well, this seems really quite absurd to me. Of course, the German General's of the Staff were a little different from our General Staff. Our General Staff is just whoever happens to be wearing the little star, General Staff Insignia at the time. Whereas the German General Staff was a distinct element of the German Army. Well, it was a branch and it had special responsibilities and special authorities but to say that every member of the German General Staff was a criminal is just utterly absurd but we did. I believe it was not convicted but the -- outwardly the Germans that you would hear express anything and that not very many were all highly in favor of the wartime trials. They were very subservient and I don't really have any feeling for what German people actually thought in those days because we had this policy of nonfraternization which lasted most of the time that I was in Germany. In other words, you never associated with any German except on a official basis. So you didn't entertain them in your homes, you didn't go to their homes. You had no contact with them and that was a very firm policy and pretty well enforced to the extent that it could be. So that made any real feeling for the German situation a little difficult.

LTC FEENEY: Did you think that the military should have a civil affairs rule?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, you have to because a commander who's operating in a populated area has to have some control over the civil population. It's absolutely essential. This is true whether you're operating in a friendly country or an enemy country and now of course the degree of control that you exercise might vary with the situation, but yes, you do have to have a civil affairs military government capability and particularly a occupied territory when you go in and throw all the localities in jail, somebody has got to run the little towns, the industries, and this sort of stuff.

LTC FEENEY: I think what I was trying to drive at here was, do you think the Army should have as much a responsibility as it did have or should this be more of a State Department responsibility?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, no, I think the Army had to do it because the Department of State has no capability to organize and administer and they have no resources in terms of transportation, supplies, and that sort of thing and no understanding of how to get things done. Incidentally, in 1948, this is after I had left Berlin. We were going to turn over the administration of military government to the Department of State upon a high commissioner, we later did, Mr. McCloy. We were going to do this in 1948 and the reason I happened to be in Germany when the blockade broke I was negotiating the agreement between the Army and the Department of State as to what support we would provide to them in this situation. Well, that thing collapsed completely because when the Berlin blockade broke out the State Department wanted no part of this operation anymore, so that project which was, say was initiated in March and April of 1948 collapsed and it wasn't until much much later that we did in fact turn the administration over to the high commissioner for Germany. Now when he took it over we'd already had state

and local governments functioning -- German state and local governments functioning and the economy was on its feet more or less again but it takes the Army to run a defeated country. Another aspect of it is that if you are dealing with Allies other than a few of the western European countries, civilians are not acceptable to the military of the other countries. For example, no US civilian would ever have been acceptable to the Russian as a counterpart and this is true today in Turkey. They have the lowest regard for civilians. It's true in Greece today and I would think in many many parts of the world. So there was no real alternative to having the Army run Germany, now when I say the Army ran it, I don't want to imply that this US group control council which later became the office of military government. The United States was a very military organization. It was far from it. The people wore uniforms but they were not military and there was a great deal of, well, I guess I would just have to call it fraud involved in this operation because when you got over into the finance element. The industrial elements and all of those parts of the office of military government you found people who were drawing two salaries. One from the US Government and one from their company back home. For example, the finance element was loaded with employees of Chase National Bank and First National City. The industry division I guess we call it, was loaded with people from US corporations who had interest in Germany before the war. General Motors, General Electric and I thought this was a pretty bad thing. I consider it suspect. It was extremely inefficient and there were just a great many conflicts of interest involved. I thought it was right much of a disgrace to be perfectly honest. Now I would not say that necessarily that this was true down at the lower levels. In the US zone of Germany I had no contact with those people except in a few instances where disposing of the Armed

Forces were involved but I'm sure there were some problems down there too.

LTC FEENEY: You say that people were so called double dippers I guess, because I think we've been accused of that to but these people were at the higher levels of this military government of Germany?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, yes. They were at the top level there in Berlin and were establishing policies and finance and industry and commerce and this sorts of stuff with a view towards not only -- not necessarily only serving the United States and the Germans but of serving the interest of their own companies and in many cases picking up the pieces of their companies which of course had all been taken over by the German. There were also a great many employees of the office of military government and fairly senior positions to who were refugee Germans. Some of them hardly spoke English and so they were lots of what I call carpetbaggers involved in this operation to Germans who had gone to the United States as refugee's and come back in an official capacity and I'm sure they must of settled a good many personal scores too because it was relatively easy in these disorganized days. You mentioned earlier though the . . .

LTC FEENEY: Well, I want to get off that if I may. You know, this is a little contradictory here. Here we were no administrators because we had set up this law that they didn't want to have Nazi's in the government and then was this an attempt on our part to bring these refugees back from the United States in order to serve . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, we brought them back as experts, yes, experts in our own headquarters. No, it was always in visits that eventually we would gradually set up a local governmental structure staff with Germans at which we did but that was only after it was never -- no progress much was made towards it until after Secretary Burns's Stuttgart speech which more or less reversed

our policy something more than 90 degrees not perhaps a 180. This was when really this laid the ineffective which said that we're never gonna get this done working with the Russians so let's go ahead and go our own way and do what we thinks right. At that time the nonfraternization policy was dropped. The very strict criteria on placing Germans in responsible positions who had had some sorts of affiliations with the Nazi's was relaxed. Not completely, but the more extreme aspects of it were relaxed and . . .

LTC FEENEY: I didn't mean to interrupt that. Go ahead with the . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I believe I've forgotten what I was gonna mention. It was something . . .

LTC FEENEY: Yes, I think it is -- I think it was important that we clarify that we were our own worst enemy in that thing by bringing these Germans back and I just want . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I just don't think it was a very wise policy and even the military people in military government. I mean the ones who had really actually served with troops and things like that were not our top people. It was widely considered during the training days, the mobilization days back in the states that if you had a problem Major or Lieutenant Colonel, the easiest way to get rid of him was to send him to the military government school and I don't want to imply that they were a bunch of bums but a great many of them were selected for this assignment because they were not doing very well where they were for various reasons.

LTC FEENEY: Could you describe the Clay Show as it's called or the impact that General Clay had on all of this and his role?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I guess I ought to begin by saying I'm not a great admirer of General Clay. He's a brilliant man and a forceful man in his way but he ran a lousy headquarters. It was impossible to process a policy paper through

his office. You would send it up and a month later he would of never done anything about it. I mean eventually it would come back and say perhaps resubmit this some other time or I don't know whether this was a problem of the organization of his office or whether this is -- he's one of these people who . . .

LTC FEENEY: Never satisfied.

LTG LEMLEY: . . . doesn't like to make up his mind on some things. I really don't know that. On the other hand it was extremely easy to get a decision from him orally. In fact, you'd walk in and bring up the subject and he would give you his decision which wasn't always the one you would consider the most desirable one. So it was a -- I considered it a inefficient headquarters and one that was very difficult to operate in. I recall the one weekly staff conference. We had weekly staff conferences every Saturday morning and all the people were gathered around and the guy who is the public safety guy was explaining his progress and denazifying the police and all this sort of stuff and he also was responsible for some of these band organizations and General Clay asked him if he was using any Nazi's, and he said, yes, that he had to use a few of them. That he just couldn't get anybody else and General Clay says, well, get rid of them all by two o'clock this afternoon. This was 12 o'clock on Saturday, that's the sort of decision you might get if you went in and presented your problem in person. So I considered it a very unsatisfactory headquarters to work in. So General Clay is a brilliant man and a likeable man. I liked him.

LTC FEENEY: Was he the responsible one for rehabilitating Germany? Do you feel that whenever -- you point a finger at a individual, he is certainly the most prominent . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, I think he was almost entirely responsible for the setting up West Germany as the going concern and you have to respect him greatly for that because it was an extremely fine job and the reason I say that he was almost totally responsible was because that there was not a hell of a lot of control exercise from Washington. The State Department in World War II almost disintegrated. It became practically defunct and the Department -- the War Department took control of almost entirely of foreign affairs in Western Europe and I suppose in the Pacific though, I know little of that, and this was run through the civil affairs division of the War Department General Staff and I don't want to be critical of them but I think they're best characterized by a cable I read to my distribution one morning after I'd gone back to Germany to DESOPS which started out, "Disregard our message so and so which was garbled in preparation."

LTC FEENEY: He said yes.

LTG LEMLEY: It was garbled in preparation but the correction was a little garbled to. The civil affairs division was not the most effective outfit that I ever saw and they really didn't have the weight to control General Clay. Now of course he was not the military Governor of Germany. He was the Deputy Military Governor but neither General Eisenhower nor General McNarney who were the military Governors while I was there, ever devoted very much attention to this area as far as I know. They didn't appear to. They rarely came to Berlin and I don't think General Clay ever went down to Frankfurt much.

LTC FEENEY: What would you recommend after this experience of fighting an enemy, gaining his own land, conquering his own land who else? Say if we were ever to do this in Russian territory?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we would face the same sorts of problems that we faced in Germany because we had determined that the German Government at all levels had to be just sweep out. You see this was not like World War I, postwar World War I when we had occupation forces too but we accepted the most of the old German administration and I'm sure if we went into Russia or if we would insist on sweeping out everything that was there and so there's really no alternative to the sort of operation that we undertook in Germany. I think it's remarkable that we did as well as we did.

LTC FEENEY: Did you -- maybe some of these questions will probably reappear but were you aware of any -- of the US rule that we were trying to develop in politics for -- did you see any direction to this?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, . . .

LTC FEENEY: What did you feel we were accomplishing or trying to accomplish in Europe?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, . . .

LTC FEENEY: . . . for over the longest span.

LTG LEMLEY: What we were trying to do was to reestablish Germany as a democratic and unwar like nation in Europe and on the larger scale it was out policy to make the United Nations an effective peacekeeper. In fact, for several years after World War II, the United States had no war plan. Our only military planning was directed towards structuring a United Nations military force and a US contingent of that force. That went on for several years. In fact the day the Berlin blockade broke out the United States Forces in Europe had no war plan. None. They had held a few discussions with the British on what they might do if the Russians attacked but this effort had been quashed as not appropriate. So we had neither a national war plan nor theatre war plan and our military policy was directed towards turning over

all military responsibility to the United Nations and providing an appropriate contingent to operate under the United Nations command.

LTC FEENEY: This brings to mind, you know, you're talking about the ineffectiveness of the State Department. In World War II, the military strength of this country was very effective and historians have related this to the administrative capabilities of George Marshall. What was your opinion of George C. Marshall and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I . . .

LTC FEENEY: . . . not only as a military man but as a statesman?

LTG LEMLEY: I think he was a very great man and I think he's directly responsible for the effectiveness of our mobilization in World War II and the effectiveness of our operations. Now, I'll grant he had a great many very able assistants but he picked them and so I think he deserves great credit. The only aspect of General Marshall's operations that I have found it difficult to understand is the China thing after World War II. I don't of course, I was pretty remote from it and I don't know much about it but I'm rather amazed that he undertook that mission to China after World War II which was obviously doomed to failure but I do think that in this era of the first couple of years after World War II that we were suffering from something of a vacuum in our national leadership. You see Roosevelt had never involved Truman as Vice-President in any of the major policy -- major manage of foreign policy. So, Mr. Truman when he suddenly became President, was in a rather difficult spot. There were all the really high policy messages were kept in the White House by Roosevelt and he didn't even know of their existence. In fact some of them didn't turn up for five or six years afterwards. A very key one on the Berlin blockade we never found till after the blockade was over. There were some very definitive agreements between Roosevelt and Stalin that nobody in Washington at that time knew existed. So he faced a rather difficult

situation when he first moved into office. Now he's a very great man and I think he did remarkably well, but you know it's not easy to take this over right on the -- under those circumstances and as I say the State Department was almost totally deaf -- they weren't doing anything. They exercised no influence in matters. We, the War Department General Staff, we never even consulted the Department of State on matters pertaining to Germany or some of the military assistance things that we undertook in those days. They had an outfit called the State War Navy coordinating committee, ^{WCC}SWANK, with a number of sub committees for various areas that was supposed to keep the State Department abreast of what was going on but I think it was fairly ineffective in that regard.

LTC FEENEY: It's a good name for a State Department organization, SWANK, I have a feeling there's something Fruedian about that. Sir, that comes about the end of this tape, would you want to knock off at this time and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: It's up to you.

LTC FEENEY: . . . start another one.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it's up to you. I've got another hour or so . . .

END OF SESSION

*U.S. Army Military History
Institute*



**SENIOR OFFICER
ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM**

VOLUME II

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY

Interviewed by

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Feeney

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LTC FEENEY: Sir, on this tape which is the third tape of this session, I'd like to have you talk, if you would sir, about the reorganization of, under the National Security Act of 1947 and your position as you came back from Germany.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, when I came back from Germany in the summer of 1947, I joined the operations division of the War Department General Staff. The boss was General ~~Lauris~~ Norstad of the Air Force. We were exactly half Air Force and half Army. But it was customary to assign actions and responsibilities without regard to the basic background of the individual. For example, I handled many air matters when I was there and in turn the Air Corps officers who were sitting there in the same group with me, were handling many Army matters. In other words, we were not treated distinctly, but we were exactly half and half. And the issue of course, in the reorganization under the National Security Act was whether the Department of Defense would become a bigger War Department with the Navy brought in or whether it would be a relatively small coordinating headquarters for the three departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force which would retain essentially their own operations and just coordinate through the Department of Defense. And as a result of Navy opposition, the integrated operating department was not adopted, the reason for this opposition on the part of the Navy, I think is rather interesting. The Navy felt that they did not have the people with the capabilities to carry their own weight in this integrated military department, and in fact, they didn't. Because the Navy at this time had almost no staff system and I had a good many contacts with them because almost anything relating to Western Europe which was the area I was operating in OPD, did involve the Joint Chiefs. Either the Joint Chiefs acting or the Army acting as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs. So I had a great many contacts with the Navy at fairly

high echelons and in those days when a JCS paper came up, it was normal for each principle element of the Navy staff to write its own uncoordinated view of this problem, if it had any and send them all the uncoordinated ones up to the Chief of Naval operations who would decide which, if any, he wanted to take and develop his own position from them. Well, obviously this sort of staff system didn't produce individuals who would have been capable of carrying their weight and a unenlarge War Department, because we didn't do business that way. We had a much more effective staff system. So, I think most unfortunately, the Tripartite organization was adopted instead of the single integrated headquarters because if we had gone that way, we would have had an operating military staff in DOD today which we do not have and I think an operating military staff could be . . . would be much more effective than would what we have today. Certainly much less cumbersome. And to illustrate by what I mean by operating, which wouldn't be very understandable to people today; but the War Department General Staff and the Operations Division, any branch chief could sign a directive to the commanding general of the Army, Air Forces or to the commanding general of the Army ground forces. He would sign by order of the Secretary of War as this has the force of an order to the Ground Army or to the Air Army. So, it was quite different from what you find today. Any branch chief in OPD could do that.

LTC FEENEY: I can assure you that is not the way it is today.

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, I know that. As a matter of fact, I've always thought that I had more real authority as a Lieutenant Colonel in OPS in those days as I did as a Lieutenant General when I was in DCSOPS. In fact, I'm sure of it. But, initially, the Department of Defense was didn't really amount to much. I recall when Mr. Forrestal was Secretary, the Department of Defense consisted of about a dozen professional level people. I mean that. Who all

sat in his office. I, as a Lieutenant Colonel of the staff had occasion to go up there from time to time to secure his approval or something and it was . . . really, all he had was just a little, very small group of people and he did not interject himself into the business of the Department, very much, I mean there was no coordination of the budgets. For example, initially. Now later on, the Department grew.

LTC FEENEY: Were these things that were left out for selfish reasons by the military departments. Did they try so that their own budgets could be separate, or were they things that everybody thought really didn't need to be addressed at the time, I know, you know, we often make a lot of mistakes . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the departments had been used to operating very independently. And really, except for the President and the Congress, there were no restraints on them. And Mr. Forrestal who had been Secretary of the Navy, though this was the way it ought to be, I mean it was a decision on his part that this is the way that the Department of Defense would operate. For example, in those days, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were members of the National Security Council and attended meetings, presented papers and voted to the extent that you vote in the National Security Council, which you really don't. We never checked out any question of the force levels in Europe, with the Department of Defense, or we never checked out any directives that we issued with the Secretary of Defense. And really, not a whole lot with the Service Secretaries, the civilian Service Secretary, because their offices didn't amount to much in those days. And they, generally speaking, it's not entirely so, but generally speaking, service secretaries put aside and let the uniform people run things. They did . . . were very active in the field of Congressional relations and in matters of awarding contracts and that sort of thing that had political and economic implications. But the Secretary of

War, the Secretary of the Army never interjected themselves very much into operations. They were very accessible. I used to go up and see Secretary Royall quite often when he was Secretary or the Lieutenant Colonel Action Officer in OPS. And, so it was . . . people in uniform were running the military. And this lasted for several years after the passage of the National Defense Act. The first element, active element that was established in the Department of Defense was the budget director. And that came, oh, I don't know, I suppose not until about 1950 or 1951, 1949, 1950. That was after Mr. Forrestal committed suicide and then the budget man was rather active, but still the uniform people were pretty much running the services except on the budget and even the Army staff in those days, you see, didn't get very much involved in the budget. Because all appropriations were made to technical services. In other words, nobody in the infantry or the artillery or anybody had any money to dispense. It was the chief of ordnance, the quartermaster general, the surgeon general, they had the money. And if you were a post commander, you had no control over their money other than the fact you wrote their efficiency reports. So, it was a much different system than we have today. Actually, I think it's a great pity that we didn't just bring the Navy into the War Department. I think we would probably be a lot slimmer today if that would have happened. We would have a lot less people involved in pushing papers.

LTC FEENEY: That would be nice.

LTC LEMLEY: I think I'd like to mention the early days of the Joint Chief's in connection with this National Security Act. The Joint Chiefs had existed on an informal basis during World War II. But it was a much different sort of a JCS than we have today. I think about the only problems they really confronted with some difficulty was the question of the MacArthur-Navy relationship in the Pacific and I have a feeling that the Chiefs dealt on a rather

informal basis and that papers were probably not acted on in the same manner that they are today. In fact, I'm sure they weren't. But with the advent of the national, and incidentally, I might add the Joint Chiefs had no staff and . . . in World War II, and even in the early days of the Joint Staff, it amounted to little if anything. There was a small group in OPS that worked exclusively on Joint matters, sort of a coordinating element. Because everybody worked on them but they sort of coordinated an element of people that went down and sat informally at meetings. The early days, not very much in the way of volume of paper passed through the Joint Chiefs. They were mostly either matters of very high policy and there weren't very many of them because as I say, we were not very well up on the bit in just what our role in the world was going to be, or they were handled by writing, as a paper war. Somebody would put up a paper, some service would put up a paper and the other services would send written comments, either agreeing with it or suggesting it and eventually over a period of time, you would arrive where everybody would come to a meeting of the minds but there really weren't so very many meetings of the type we have today. Most of the work that you would find in the Joint Chiefs today was handled by the service staff. In the case of Europe, since the Chief of Staff of the Army was the designated executive agent, he was responsible for everything in Europe. And it was within the discretion of the Army Staff whether they would act unilaterally or whether they would bring in the other services. If you felt that the other services had a concern in the matter which usually you didn't, you would bring them in, so what was . . . is now a very complex process was a very simple process in those days. As a matter of fact, the Joint Chief was a pretty peaceful outfit until the famous B-51 controversy, when the Navy was sabotaging the B-51 to the extent that they could. In fact, they set up a special office under Admiral Burke to do this and it reached a point where the JCS couldn't

meet and this is where the chairman came in. There had been no chairman and Mr. Truman sent General Bradley over to hold them together because the Chief of Naval operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force wouldn't sit down together. And so Mr. Truman fired the Chief of Naval operations, brought in a new one and appointed General Bradley as the . . . who had been his military advisor in the White House, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I think that is rather interesting little bit of history. We in the Army took sort of a side line position on this B-51 controversy, very wisely, I think. We didn't choose sides on it. I think that's about all I have and we can move on to the next area of interest, I think.

LTC FEENEY: How was the atomic bomb accepted as a weapon in the inventory and in the post war, you know, a lot of people, this was the first weapon of this type as . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course it had a quite an impact, but at least in military circles in the 1947-1948 the nuclear weapons were considered to be the province of the Air Force. And although the Navy had some interest in them, it was generally handled by the Air Force and you didn't have many matters come up that involved it to begin with. We had very, very few, I don't know what the inventory was but it was probably something less than a dozen. We had very little idea as to how they might be used appropriately and we had adopted the national policy that we would demilitarize the nuclear weapons, you know, and turn them over sort of to the UN. I don't . . . we made a very bold proposal on adapting to the nuclear age which was never accepted by the Russians and so they didn't come up very often. I do recall that on one of my trips to Germany during the period of the blockade when things were getting rather tense and they were quite tense, General Huebner, who was then the military commander over there though General Clay was nominally. General

Huebner commanded the troops, asked me to transmit to the Chief of Staff his desire that if war broke out in Germany that a bomb be dropped on Berlin. But we really didn't . . . I don't think we had fully adapted to the nuclear age in those days, in fact I'm sure we had not. And another thing all this was much more secret in those days than it is today. Knowledge on nuclear matters was very, very limited. As an example, in the late days of World War II the Deputy Chief of Staff of logistics who played a relatively small role in World War II, incidentally, his staff consisted of eight people during the war and it was all run from Army Service Forces. But he was, he thought the Manhattan district which General Groves headquarters which developed the bombing, he thought that was an engineer district much as Missouri River district is today. He . . . so you see the knowledge of it was very, very limited and I suppose, yes, I had that "Q" clearance, I don't know whether they still call them "Q" clearances or not but I had almost no involvement with the nuclear weapons in those days. And as I say, we sort of looked to the Air Force to take care of that aspect.

LTC FEENEY: You said that the atomic power or atomic weapons were proposed to the UN for their use?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, no. But in effect, what we proposed was to ban the bomb but to release to the World our nuclear know how, so it could be used for peaceful purposes.

LTC FEENEY: Did that . . . was there an atmosphere, say, between 1946 and 1949 that World War II really ended the international conflict or was . . . were people really just kind of sitting on the edge of their seats waiting for something big to happen?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I believe that in 1946, yes, there was a general feeling that war was banished forever from the World and that we were going to get

along with the Russians and everybody was going to cooperate and that the UN would be in some respects, a world government with peace keeping and peace enforcing powers and capabilities. Actually though the . . . there was a rather rude awakening. About the time I went back to the Pentagon in the summer of 1947, for example, I recall the first week that I was there. A Yugoslavian division marched up to the truce line in Trieste, we occupied Trieste at the time, we joined occupation with the British. The Yugoslavian division marched up to this outpost and by a recon platoon, a cavalry recon platoon and said they were coming through and take Trieste. And this lieutenant that commanded the recon platoon, said, "No, your not." And he moved his light tank up to the border and pointed it at the leading elements of this division and they say there for a matter of hours. We were in communication practically with this lieutenant from the Pentagon and he said they sat there for a couple of hours and the Yugoslavs turned around and went back. Well, a few months before, the Yugoslavs had shot down an American C-47 which was sort of a nasty thing. And there were the communist uprisings in Greece was going on. The British dropped out about the summer of 1947. It had been primarily a British show, entirely a British show before that. And there were some threats against Turkey and so when I went back in the summer of 1947, I would say that it was just becoming very apparent that things were not going to be like we had expected and had planned for, and there was a realization that the world situation wasn't very good. Now the big shots, though, came and, I think it was February of '48 when the Russians took over Czechoslovakia. That was a tremendous shock and, of course, it was followed in May by the Berlin Blockade, so by that time the concern had become very, very great. And we weren't in any position to cope with it. At that time there was one regimental combat team in the whole United States

Army that was capable of fighting and that was the 18th Infantry in Germany which General Clarence Hubner had readied on his own so to speak. So this came as a . . . as a very rude shock and particularly during the Berlin Blockade things became very very tense.

LTC FEENEY: That kind of brings us right up to the Berlin Air lift and I'd appreciate you going into as much detail as you . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I mentioned a little earlier that the control council broke up, I believe it was the 12th of May, 1948, after the United States and Britain, Great Britain and France had, in effect, said they were going to establish a separate government; I don't believe France was involved, it was the U. S. and Britain, in their zones of Germany and they had also adopted a currency reform which, in effect, did away with the occupation mark which had been acceptable in all four zones of Germany. And a few days later, and this may have been the 12th of May instead the date of the control council broke up, the Russians stopped the Berlin train in Berlin and refused to pass it unless they could examine the identity documents of every passenger on the train.

LTC FEENEY: Was this the first time they had ever stopped the train or was this . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, yes, this was the first time they had ever stopped, well, you used to have a lot of mechanical difficulties and stuff, but and sometimes the Russian locomotive wouldn't show up when the train was ready to cross but they were . . . obviously they were just foul ups and, no, this was just the first time they had stopped it. Now, they had protested it bitterly. This carrying what they regarded as war criminals on the train. Non U. S. military, they accepted the U. S. military could ride on it but the British too, I suppose the British had their own train. And they had protested this but they had never stopped it. But they did stop it and General Clay unilaterally decided

that he would not accept this demand and after a few hours he ordered the train back to Berlin. Well, since the train didn't go to Frankfurt, there were lots of passengers in Frankfurt who were waiting for the train to go back to Berlin, so General Clay decided that he would fly them in, which he did in Air Corps planes. He put MP guards on the planes in case they were forced down or something, armed the MP's. They were a scared bunch of people. I was in the Frankfurt airport where they took off and they were pretty shook. So the . . . that stopped the train. And it just didn't run anymore because the Russians wouldn't let it through without seeing the identity documents and General Clay refused to show the identity documents. Now General Clay never asked anybody in Washington, he told them what he had done, he never asked anybody. Which was a matter of some concern to some people in Washington and in some cases, including President Truman. But this was the only interference with access to Berlin not permitting the train to go through. So we immediately organized with all the truck companies that we had available in Germany, we organized a truck supply for Berlin, and ran it up the Autobahn and this worked all right for awhile. Then the Russians said, 'We're sorry, but this bridge over the Elbe has got to be repaired, so we are going to have to close the bridge at Magdeburg and you are going to have to use this little ferry, little hand operated ferry, Detour off and go over on the ferry. Well, the ferrying by hand is a pretty slow way to supply Berlin. Now at this time there was no problem whatever on supplying Germans in Berlin and the German trains were running. So the only people we were supplying was the U. S. Garrison by truck. Well, this doing it with the ferry went on for awhile but obviously it effectively messed up the truck movements. So then we started flying. And here again General Clay did it with the planes he had available, he started flying the supplies for the U. S. Garrison in C-47's

through the corridor. Then the Russians closed the ferry. And all of this went on over a period of about six to eight months and eventually they closed off the trains but the barge traffic was still going to Berlin and then they closed the barge traffic and by that time the . . . we had to supply the whole city of Berlin by air. And I recall, this was almost incomprehensible, but when this requirement for great quantities of airlift developed, it was on a Sunday, and I was in the office. Because I was working pretty hard, I was the Indian in charge of the Berlin Blockade. I was a busy man in those days because there was only one of me and I had no helpers.

LTC FEENEY: Did you say you were in charge of doing all the airlift and scheduling and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I was the guy in the Army that was responsible for the Berlin Blockade. It was my baby. I was Mr. Berlin Blockade. Now, of course I worked with logistics people and things like that, and civil affairs people, but I was it. And when they wanted an NSC paper written on it, the Secretary of the Army's office would call me and say write it and have it up here by noon, and that sort of stuff. I was wheeling and dealing and I was going to tell you on starting the airlift, we . . . it was on a Sunday that this thing became critical. And I, and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, and the Chief of OPS in the Air Force, which was separate by this time, and I sat down in his office on a Sunday morning, and the three of us decided that we would send them the airlift they asked for, to the extent that we could and we ordered C-54's out of Panama from all around the world and told them to get on the way to Germany, I didn't ask anybody. We also alerted three B-29' squadrons and ordered them to get on the way to Germany. Eventually only one of them got there because in the cool light of day on Monday when more people found out about it, they stopped the other two, one in the UK and one in Iceland. But

this is an example of how an Indian in OPS could operate in those days. Nobody criticized me in any way for doing this. General Wedemeyer who was then the DCSOPS did get quite a bit of static from the commander in Panama for taking his airlift away without even asking him. So then we started this business and of course the big problem was coal. That . . . the food you could manage but when you started, when you had to supply the city of Berlin or West Berlin with coal, that's when the going got tough. Now there were lots of ideas on what to do about it. And one of the ideas, of course, was economic sanctions, which we didn't later adopt, against everything to the East. But I had in my possession, I wrote the Secretary of Commerce and asked him what -- how effective economic sanctions might be and I got a reply signed by Mr. Remington, I think was the under-Secretary, maybe an assistant Secretary. This guy Remington, some six or eight months later was under very urgent investigation for communist affiliations, in fact, he committed suicide as a result of these investigations. So at least that would lead you to believe that he was guilty. He said there was nothing you could do in terms of economic sanctions that would be effective. But that's an interesting side light. General Clay, at one time when the planes in the air corridor had been buzzed by Russian fighters, ordered fighter escorts for the transports, unilaterally on his own without asking in Washington and he . . . that was not well received in Washington and his order was not countermanded but he was advised to please talk these things over before you do them. He proposed the idea of using troops to open up the Autobahn. And this of course was turned down because it's manifestly impractical. Incidentally, when he made this recommendation, he didn't advise his military staff in Heildelberg that he had made it so when we queried them in the middle of the night by telephone, we had daily teleconference. I had a daily teleconference with Berlin and when we got the planners

in Heildelberg out of bed to find out what they had in mind with this armed invasion, it was the first they had heard of it. But it was obviously impractical because the President had decided that we would not fire the first shot. Well, you walk up to a barricade, your sort of like that Yugoslavian regiment, if you are not willing to fire the first shot, you are not going anywhere because . . . but it was a very tense time and it, well, it's. . . I just find it amazing the number of teleconferences with the commanders in Europe, both in Germany and in Vienna because there was a threat in Vienna to do the same thing. I sat in with all the powers that be in the Pentagon and with the telephone to the White House making decisions and Mr. Truman never hesitated to make a decision. And I think they were mostly wise ones and it was an interesting time. I do think that the Berlin Blockade was not a deliberate planned act on the part of the Russians. I think it is something they sort of stumbled into. And the reason I say this is the way it started -- stopping the military train on account of us transporting people they thought we had no right to carry in. And so I think it was a situation that built up where you have a series of actions and counter-actions, with no communication between the two parties and no real end objective in sight. In other words, I don't think that when the Russians started it, that they had any idea as to where they were going. And of course when the thing was finally settled, we did agree to show the documents and still do.

LTC FEENEY: I was wondering if there was any, you know the Russians have tremendous fear from security, from a security standpoint and we were running a lot of intelligence operations at that time out of Austria. You bring that up and I'm sure . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Also in Berlin . . .

LTC FEENEY: Also out of Berlin and I'm wondering . . .

LTG LEMLEY: A great many in Berlin . . .

LTC FEENEY: And I was wondering if this had anything to do . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, that did have something to do with I'm quite sure, because these were intelligence targets that we were running in and out, mostly out. I might add, you mention intelligence activities in Berlin. General Clay at one time directed that they be discontinued. This was back while I was still in Berlin. He said, "If I want to know anything about the Russians, I'll ask them." They weren't discontinued because they really weren't under his control.

LTC FEENEY: Who controlled them?

LTG LEMLEY: I'm not sure. I guess the War Department G-2, controlled them probably. You see we didn't have the CIA in those days. And I imagine the War Department G-2 was controlling them but I was involved in them to a very small degree while I was in Berlin.

LTC FEENEY: Could you give an example of something like that they were doing at this time?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think mostly . . .

LTC FEENEY: Without mentioning, you know, any, I'm sure it's not classified . .

LTG LEMLEY: I think mostly they were seeking and getting defectors. And you see, in those days, in the early days anyhow, it was getting into Berlin was no problem. There wasn't the wall, for example, the day I reported into Berlin, back in September of 1945, I inadvertently missed the turn to go into the city and went on to Frankfurt Am Oder all the way through what's now the Soviet Zone by mistake and no problem. The only problem I had with the Russians was, I couldn't ask directions from them and it was access to Berlin was very free in the early days and I'm sure that what they were doing was raking in these defectors and running them back out on the train. Of course,

that went on for years, well, it still goes on though it's become much more difficult to get out of the Soviet Zone since they put up the wall. As long as, before the wall was put in and I guess it was 1958, I think it was '58, there was completely free access throughout the city of Berlin, I mean you could drive your car through the Brandenburg Gate, nobody bothered you. In fact the Russians used to go through our sector every day on their way to work, they all lived out in Potsdam and their headquarters was over in East Berlin, so there was complete freedom of movement in the city of Berlin for many years after the war.

LTC FEENEY: Were we in any problems with the Berlin Blockade, and were we close at any time to really being in deep trouble with it as far as being able to support it?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, yes, it was touch and go. It was always touch and go because we just didn't have the resources and transport aircraft, we didn't have the airfields in Berlin to handle the traffic. And you know, weather in that part of the world is pretty uncertain, so it was always touch and go on the airlift and it really was a marvel of efficiency in transport for those days. And of course you know who ran it. It was General Curtis LeMay. He was called specifically from somewhere in the Far East for that purpose. Because he had, by the recommendation of my boss, General Wedemeyer, who had been associated with him when he set up the Burma airlift in World War II. He was involved in it. No, it was a marvel of efficiency but it was touch and go all the time. They didn't, you know you didn't have electricity in Berlin except for about three hours a day during the airlift and I recall when Christmas came, the people would have to start cooking their turkeys about a week ahead of time and cook them a little today and a little more tomorrow, it's a wonder they all didn't get poisoned. Of course, the combination of

Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade brought a very much increased concern over our military posture, which as I said, was pretty bad. We had one regiment, world wide. We didn't have any troops in the States that were in any way capable of combat. And on this trip, while I was over there, when the Blockade started, the day before I came back, they asked me to please bring the theater war plan back to present it to the Chief of Staff as soon as I got off the plane. Well, that's when I discovered anyway, that there wasn't any theater of war plan and they wrote one up very, very hastily, which I took back in my brief case. It wasn't much of a plan either. Took back in my brief case and I went directly from the plane at Andrews, not Andrews field but the military used to use -- Washington National, we used to use Washington National, there used to be a military terminal over there, and I went directly from there to the office about 6 o'clock in the morning to brief General Wedemeyer and the Chief of Staff on the theater war plan and I recall it very well, because when I got through, General Wedemeyer looked at me and, sort of disapprovingly and he said, "Harry that is a lousy plan" and . . . which made me feel very badly because you know, sort of the way he said it, I felt that it was my plan and not their's. But we did then start taking some measures. The question of whether to evacuate dependents from Germany became

a very controversial issue and it was a controversial issue in the government. We never did bring them home, but there was great pressure to do so. And a great many people, including myself, felt that it would be advisable to do so. We had lots of family battles over that one in the Pentagon. Another thing, and this is sort of a . . . I've always considered rather interesting. When we didn't bring the dependents home, we felt that it was essential to provide some means to evacuate the dependents in the event of hostilities. So, I and my counter part in logistics scrapped up a bunch of baby food and Kotex and gasoline and stored it. And then the graves

registration depots in France, you see, we still had a very active graves registration effort going there, and we stocked an escape route in effect with the kinds of things that families would need to get out. C-Ration, gasoline in cans and that sort of stuff.

LTC FEENEY: How many dependents did you have?

LTG LEMLEY: I don't recall, I should know. Maybe about 150,000 perhaps, I'm not sure exactly how many, I just don't remember. I used to know the number by heart.

LTC FEENEY: It would be a sizable stackage for that number of people . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, it was, although . . .

LTC FEENEY: Where could you fund this from or wasn't this . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, this is the funny part of it and I don't know where we funded it from. Anyhow we did it and we told very few people about it. It was a very well kept secret. But then, you know, you have storage limits on gasoline in cans and C-Rations and that sort of thing and stuff and the . . . it began to become a problem when these stock piles had to be rotated but not a critical problem. The critical problem arose when the decision was made to inactivate the graves registration command in France. And I recall I got a message for action one morning from EUCOM headquarters, there by then it was in Heidelberg I think, stating that they had orders to inactivate the command but in view of these stock piles unless these orders were . . . unless they were specifically told again that they, by somebody besides the quartermaster general, that they wouldn't do it and I took this message over to then Lieutenant Colonel Duff, he's retired three star general, later the Comptroller of the Army. I took it over to him and I said, "Charlie, let's just don't answer this message and see what happens." So, we didn't answer it. And so they never got their instructions and meanwhile the quartermaster

general was frantically trying to inactivate this thing and it just wouldn't inactivate. You couldn't kill it. Well, finally it all came to a head up in the office of the assistant Secretary of the Army, they only had two assistant's in those days. One was Assistant Secretary, one was The Assistant, there was no under-Secretary, much smaller operation than it is now, and it came to a head up in the assistant's office when I was hailed before him along with the Chief of the Graves registration Service, the quartermaster general had everybody and I confessed to my sins and they accepted my action as reasonable and necessary but the Quartermaster General said, "Please, if you ever do it again, let me know you have done it, will you?" I thought that was quite amusing. Actually this business of the baby food was the genesis of our line of communication across France and this sort of became a crusade with me. I was obviously with no line of communication you couldn't conceivably have a war plan in Germany. It was just not worth the paper it was written on. So, I more or less, unilaterally undertook to setup this line of communication and I got the blessing of General Willie Palmer who was the Chief of Logistics in EUCOM at the time and General Hubner the Commander there in Heidelberg on the thing and I pushed the thing on through. I had a great difficulty with it because the logistic people wanted to run it out to Cherbourg which is for very obvious reasons, I mean the port facilities are much better and shorter, the rail connections and everything are better. But I wanted it to go to Bordeaux so it could provide a line of repeat to the Pyrenees, and this was our plan, was to withdraw to the Pyrenees and join the Spanish Forces and anything else we could pull together in defending them and we thought we could do it and I think today that we could've if we would have had to. But I took a good deal of pride in getting this thing setup because among other things, we got

the French to pay fifteen percent of the cost of it, or that portion of the cost that could be paid in franc's as opposed to dollars, they didn't have any dollars, nobody had any dollars in those days. And I thought really it was quite an accomplishment and it was with some regret when I went back as DCSOPS in 1966 when my . . . the first really critical thing was disbanding this thing and getting it moved out. So, I set it up and we were doing other things. This was in the time of the Korean War when we built up a five division force and . . .

END OF TAPE

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY EXTRACT OF THE TAPE MADE DURING THE FOURTH SESSION IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD F. FEENEY, AS RECORDED AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ON 6 MAY 1974.

LTG LEMLEY: I think we might go back on the discussion of the Berlin Blockade to some little personal things that happened at the time and one rather considerable problem that was constantly arising was the lack of confidence on the part of the military command in Washington and I think perhaps it may even have extended as far as the President and General Clay. They had great confidence in him as a very capable executive and a very able man but they didn't have the same confidence for obvious reasons in his military capabilities. And, I think this is quite understandable, when you consider the kinds of people he was dealing with in Washington. Bradley, Collins, people of that type who had had considerable combat experience and recognized that well, General Clay had done some very fine work, he hadn't seen very many soldiers in his career and had been primarily a high level engineer, which is what he was. He was an engineer. As a result, the high command on occasions and when I say high command, as far as I'm concerned I'm referring to the Chief of Staff of the Army because that's who I had my dealings with, then General, I believe, I'm not sure whether it was General Bradley or General Collins, you know they were right close together there; but in any case, we used to send military directives addressed to General Hubner in Heidelberg who was really the Deputy EUCOM Commander, with information copies to General Clay. This, plus the fact that some of his recommendations, such as fighting our way into Berlin and so forth, which had been rejected, led to rather considerable peak on the part of General Clay and on at least two occasions I know of, he asked to be relieved if this was going to continue. I thought the reaction was very amusing. I was handed the messages, they arrived through

a private channel and asked to draft a reply and in both cases I took my drafted reply up to the Chief of Staff which was the diplomatic sort of apology that you would expect a lieutenant colonel to write to, I think he was, I don't know whether he was a three or four star general at this time, and in every case the Chief read them over and he said, "Oh, I just think we won't answer that message." So, everytime General Clay turned in his suit there was nobody there to take it. But this did create something of a problem. There was also another mild problem in military relations, with Europe at this time and that was the nature of the headquarters. Headquarters European Command consisted of General Clay's personal office in Berlin and the military government side of it, also located in Berlin. And General Hubner's Headquarters, sort of the main and the forward, General Hubner's Headquarters in Heidelberg. Well, the Air Force people, having recently separated, I think were a little sensitive as to the joint nature of this headquarters because the fact of the matter is, there were hardly any Air Force uniforms around. General Clay did have with him in Berlin, his only principle general staff officer that he had with him up there was his chief of intelligence who was an Air Force general officer whose name I don't remember, I used to know. And I believe the only other Air Force officer that was in any position of responsibility down in Heidelberg, certainly the only one I ever had any dealings with, was a Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan who was then the plans part of G-3, so the . . . this joint headquarters was almost ninety-nine and forty-four one-hundredth percent pure Army. Incidentally, Sullivan later became the senior Air Force instructor here at Leavenworth. He was here when I came here in 1962, and was a very capable guy. But, I guess for several reasons, this mild sort of resentment never came to a head. For one thing, the newly created Air Force staff was staffed in nearly all key

positions by people who had started on the War Department general staff with me, in other words, the half of DCSOPS and the War Department general staff that was Air Force, went up and established DCSOPS in the Air Force. That was one reason. Another reason was, of course, General Vandenburg who was the Air Force Chief of Staff had also served in the Army General Staff. He had been the Army and War Department General Staff, G-2, and so our relationships in those days were rather more friendly and these little differences never achieved the standing of interservice arguments. In this connection to illustrate the full impact of this on joint actions or at least high level joint actions at that time, this was after the Berlin Blockade, somewhat later, when the Brussels Pact was established and our delegation went to London headed initially by General Lemnitzer to provide our participation in the Pact to which we were not signatory. The Pact had established an international command planning headquarters with General Montgomery as the head of it, as the Commander at Fontainebleau. And General, or Field Marshall Montgomery prepared his plan for the defense of Europe which assigned roles to the various national element including the U. S. element. But, only one copy of the plan was sent back to Washington. Well, obviously, fairly urgent action was required. So, I rushed out a piece of paper to the Joints Staff which turned instant green, recommending that the Chiefs, as a matter of urgency, approve the plan and approve the U. S. participation in the plan as a part of Field Marshall Montgomery's Command. Well, you know these things hit Indians pretty hard and there was this one copy of the plan and I got frantic calls about eight or nine o'clock that night from my counter parts in the Air Force and the Navy saying what in the hell was this and what do we do about it and I said, "We had only one copy of the plan, unfortunately I couldn't release it because I had to brief the Chief on it in the morning but I would be glad to provide them with a copy of my notes, which

they could convert under their letterhead and provide their Chiefs the next day, which I did. And the Air Force primarily because of their confidence in the operations part of the Army General Staff, and in me as an individual since we had all worked together. They accepted the plan on my word and the Navy accepted it on the theory they then followed that if there were no Navy people involved, let the Army do what they damn well please. Europe was considered an Army enclave as far as the Navy was concerned and they very rarely became involved in it. But I thought that was a rather unique was to get a red stripe on your green paper in the light of some of the difficulties that we go through on it today. It would never, I supposed you would have had to clear it through the White House today, but we didn't. And I don't think off hand of anything else during this particular period, so where would you like to go on now?

LTC FEENEY: Well, sir, we were discussing earlier about the MacArthur situation in the Army during the Korean War. I think that a historical precedent was set there and of course your having discussed this with President Truman and I thought you could give us some insight into this?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I'd be glad to go into that and, I think, to sort of set the frame work, I'd like to draw my own picture of what General MacArthur was and where he stood at this time. In the first place, I think you have to remember that General MacArthur had been out of the United States for many years. Oh, I don't say he hadn't been back on visits, I'm sure he had, but actually he had been physically located in the far east for some fifteen years or so, I'm not sure exactly how long, some fifteen years or so at the time the Korean trouble broke out. He had left the Army before, the United States Army, before some of the ways of doing business that we developed during and immediately after World War II had become standard. He . . .

LTC FEENEY: Suppose you are talking about the decision making process and coordination . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, and sort of the way of doing business. Now back before World War II, I have a feeling that, which I and I'm pretty sure this was generally true even though I was a pretty low level in the hierarchy at the time and it was customary when you got an order to comply with the order and if you didn't get an order, you went ahead and went your own way. I mean there was no, none of this business to any considerable extent of protesting an order or on the other hand of receiving suggestions as to what you might want to do and of course during and particularly after World War II this developed. How would you like to do so and so, what do you think of doing so and so and when those kinds of messages were dispatched to theater commanders, they were generally considered to be more or less of an order, in other words they were sort of binding on them. And I don't think General MacArthur had ever lived in this, with this way of doing business. For another thing, he was a very self confident man and rightly so, I think, and had been pretty much isolated from the power structure in the United States for a good long time. On the other hand, in the United States, you had dealing with him officers who had been very, very much junior to him, Eisenhower, for example had worked for him, I believe as a Lieutenant Colonel; some of the younger people that were in high positions had never even worked for the guy. He was just sort of a legendary figure as far as they were concerned. And there was a reluctance on the part of these people and I'm talking, really about the Chiefs of Staff, because in those days there wasn't the day to day civilian control that we have today. I mean anything that was done was generally done on a fairly high level through military channels and not without any great civilian middle . . . any civilian middle man getting involved in it. So, these people were reluctant to issue orders to General

MacArthur. They were . . . stood somewhat in awe of him and when they arrived at something that had to be done, something on a fairly high level, for example, in the case of the Inchon operation, they generally sent somebody over to talk over with him what they were going to tell him and as an example of this, after a more or less firm JCS decision not to go along with the Inchon landing, General J. Lawton Collins, then Army Chief of Staff was dispatched to Tokoyo to tell General MacArthur not to do it. Well, General Collins went over there and was presented with a very persuasive briefing and presentation on the Inchon landing and when it was over, General Collins didn't feel that he could tell him not to do it. So, I'm sure that after consultation with the other Chiefs, though I don't know this, you know through message's, I don't know this because I wasn't involved in it personally, but anyhow, he never told him not to do it. And this is sort of the example of the way things went. Another example, and this is a picking thing, the troop information education program was then in bad trouble when the Korean War broke out or just before, I think it was when the war broke out and it was getting a lot of bad publicity in the press and they sent General MacArthur a message explaining that the TI & E program was being displayed in a bad light and getting a lot of bad publicity and would he like to say anything that might be helpful and publicizing it as an effective program and he replied, "You make the policy, I carry it out." In other words, he made no effort to do what they had asked him to do. Now, of course, the firing incident came as a result of the publication in the U. S. News and World Report, I believe it was, of an interview, I think it was, with General MacArthur, in which he expressed differences with the conduct of the Korean War. And this had been going on for a long time. I mean this if he hadn't been in tune with the national policy on this thing for a long

time. Well, after he had given the interview, he received a message saying, "Don't do this anymore." And he tried his best to recall the interview, but U. S. News and World Report was already in the mail. So, he couldn't, it appeared and President Truman relieved him of command for this. And I think it was sort of an unhappy situation all around. Mr. Truman himself, has told me that Dean Acheson who was then Secretary of State, urged him not to do it, but that General George Marshall who was then, I suppose Secretary of Defense, I'm sure he was; after reviewing the correspondence said that really that he had no alternative and that he should be relieved immediately. Now, I think this is . . . weighed rather heavily on President Truman's conscience. Not so much that he wasn't entirely within his rights in relieving General MacArthur, not that there weren't adequate grounds for it; but I just think that he . . . it weighted heavily on him. That he had relieved a highly competent military commander of a military command over this matter. Now, what was the trouble between them? Well, as I see it, the basic trouble between Mr. Truman and General MacArthur was not any personal conflict, but a failure on the part of the military command, and I am now talking about the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of Staff of the Army, to clearly and unequivocally transmit to General MacArthur the orders and guidance that the President had given them for transmission. Again, it went back to this. What do you think of so and so? For example, at various times during the campaign I know he was sent messages indicating that maybe he should not go to the Yalu. What do you think of stopping along this line and holding it instead of going forward? And he would say, "I don't think very much of it." And that was the end of it. In other words, it was this reluctance, I think on the part of the military people to carry out their responsibilities as go-between's between the President and General MacArthur that brought it on.

LTC FEENEY: This brings up an interesting point because I won't say I have had this same experience but sometimes there is a tendency towards reluctance for certain personalities in the system for the system to really bang them, you know, and say I don't care, that's wrong. This is what I want you to do.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, this is very true and it's true today, too. And I noticed this same tendency and weakness in the Joint Chiefs during the Korean War. They were torn between this feeling that a loyalty to the theater commander and their loyalty to their own responsibilities. And I think in a number of occasions since World War II, the Joint Chiefs have failed in their responsibilities in this regard. And in my own view, we would do a hell of a lot better if everybody would do his job. Now, it's true that the theater commander, his wishes should weigh strongly in arriving at a decision in Washington, but on the other hand, there is a requirement that the Joint Chiefs stand up to their responsibilities in exercising command. And these responsibilities primarily fall in the area of providing resources. Now, I don't think that the Chiefs should interject themselves into local decisions, which this too, has been not so much Joint Chiefs as the civilian hierarchy in later years, this was not true at the time of the Korean War but it has been true later particularly in the '60's; they shouldn't interject themselves into his decisions. Well, as an example, Westmoreland's decision to defend Kusan in the latter days of the Korean War. This was accepted very reluctantly by President Johnson and he required each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide him with a certificate, signed certificate that he believed that he, the Chief, believed this was the proper course of action. It really seems a little odd for a President to go to the lengths of covering his tail on a decision like this. In reality, I think that was something that was entirely within Westy's prerogative. He was not exceeding the limits of his

instructions. He was not requiring the additional resources from the States to do it and this sort of thing, I think is awful. This messing in day to day conduct of the campaign. Of course, this did develop . . . the same thing developed later in the Korean War in the late stages, particularly after Eisenhower moved in. It became fairly normal to run every detail from Washington. But anyhow, to get back to the Truman-MacArthur controversy, we diverged somewhat. There's been a book published lately which I haven't read but I read some press extracts on it that indicate that there was friction between MacArthur and President Truman at the Wake Island meeting. I think it was Wake Island, shortly before the Chinese intervention in the Korean War not too long after the Inchon landing. Nothing could be further from the truth. They had a very warm meeting, I think they had developed quite a lot of mutual respect. I've read the minutes of the meeting which have since disappeared. They don't exist anymore but I've seen them and you know, papers like that sometimes cease to exist in Washington. Another example of one that ceased to exist is the Wedemeyer report on China. It doesn't exist but it was made. So, I think it's a great mistake to consider that Truman-MacArthur were at swords points and . . . over a period of time and that in a fit of peak, President Truman relieved him. That certainly was not the case. And I honestly believe that when President Truman did it that he was relying on the council of General George Marshall and that it weighed on his conscience rather heavily because I suppose I've seen him and talked with about this a dozen times and he always brings it up. I think he, you know, wanted to get it off his chest sort of.

LTC FEENEY: You mention General Marshall in your conversations with President Truman, did the . . . was this based on . . . Marshall's decision, was this based on something that he felt strongly against MacArthur, was he jealous of

MacArthur or was he -- just felt this was the way a military man should act?

LTG LEMLEY: I don't think there was any personal animosity. If there was, I never knew of it, in any case I don't think that was behind it. No, we were under considerable diplomatic pressure, particularly from the British to restrict and limit the Korean operation and I think General Marshall, in fact, felt that General MacArthur had not only exceeded his authority but had violated his instruction which, while technically true, actually was not, and perhaps General Marshall realized the built-in difficulties that I discussed earlier in dealing with MacArthur and felt that you were never going to get this full rapport and understanding between Washington and General MacArthur because some of the built-in inhibition. This is pure surmise on my part. But, there were lots of funny things that went on at this time. You know, the question of bombing the bridges on the Yalu became a great national issue here after we had pushed on up to the Yalu River and I happened to get involved in this, I think because it was a Sunday and I happened to be handy because the Far East was not my normal business. But, I got involved in and in fact, granted a message on this business of bombing across the Yalu. But, really we didn't know what we were talking about because nobody could determine with any degree of certainty what the Yalu River was, there are a hell of a lot of rivers up there and the maps that we had in Washington, anyhow, were not sufficiently clear to really consider this thing in any depth. I mean that sounds absurd, but it's true. And I suppose that probably was the beginning of the friction between General MacArthur and Washington that eventually led to his relief. But, actually, I think Mr. Truman rather liked General MacArthur and vice versa, basically. And I rather think that maybe we need a new mechanism for the exercise of the President's ultimate authority as Commander-in-Chief. You know, the President

never issues directives to military commanders. They all go out -- the highest person wants you to do so and so or something or the other. They are . . . the content is arrived at through verbal discussion with the President, usually between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense and the President with, in many cases, other people sitting in. And I rather think that quite definitive policy instructions should be prepared, approved in detail by the President and issued in his name. I think this would go a long way towards improving the field commanders understanding of what has in fact, been decided by the Commander-in-Chief. I honestly believe this. Now within my knowledge of Presidents and I have served within shouting distance of Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon. In other words, I have served in a capacity where I had to feel for what the President was thinking about and deciding. But I know of no case where a President has in fact, issued a directive to a field commander, there may be some, there may be some. But when he does this, it should be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs with -- and the reason I say this, if you get a lot of back channel traffic between the President and the field commander that the Chiefs haven't seen, things will get screwed up to high heaven. And as an example of this, this really doesn't refer to military commands so much, but there was correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt that bore very heavily on the Berlin Blockade that nobody knew existed until years after the Berlin Blockade was history, when they were finally discovered in an old safe over at the White House. Another example, there were some private teleconferences during the Berlin Blockade between the Secretary and the Chief and General Clay, where General Bradley and the Secretary of the Army, then Mr. Royall had discussed the matter with the President and had a teleconference with General Clay and this was all kept in a very private file in DCSOPS there. I was given access

to the file, not after the fact access, and it was nothing but a bunch of junk because they were just clips out of a teleconference and you couldn't say what day anything was said or what questions answered, in other words they had just scraped paper off the table and stuck it into a brown envelope and marked it "eyes only" -- Chief of Staff of the Army. It is important to have a very clear record of who did what to who and to have it available to at least a limited number of people or at least enough people to insure that you are playing the same tune all the time.

LTC FEENEY: I think we've covered that fairly well, sir. If there's anything you'd like to add on to it . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you did ask me a little bit about what the civilian structure, what part the civilian structure played in this time frame -- time frame of Korea and Berlin Blockade and the NATO build-up and all those things, and the answer is that they played a very small part in it. The people involved with running operations from Washington in those days were uniform people plus the President. And you see Mr. Truman did use the National Security Council through a considerable degree and various Presidents do different things on the National Security Council. But, Mr. Truman did use it. It's true he invited other people and at that time, all of the Chiefs of Staff of the services were members of the National Security Council, as well as the Service Secretaries. And so, really, for the most part the decision making process really consisted of the President with his advisors in the form the service secretaries, Secretary of State and so forth, sitting down at a table and talking to the uniform people and making military decisions. DOD at this time didn't consist of anything much. Initially as I said, it was just a personal office for Mr. Forrestal, later and actually this was considerably later, after Mr. Forrestal died, they did have a comptroller up there and

they got involved in a budget, but it wasn't until a great deal later that you had all these assistant secretaries, International Security Affairs, System Analysis, Research and Development, that was a much later development and it was unusual for the office of the Secretary of Defense to become involved in these things, so the Secretary himself might have a considerable voice in these meetings at the White House. Now, of course, with General Marshall this was particularly true. But you got to remember General Marshall took over, he was Mr. Truman's trouble shooter in many respects, you know, and he took over a disaster from "Engine" Charlie Wilson of General Motors who was widely blamed for our early troubles in Korea, I think blamed -- I think really he received much more blame than he should've though he was not well regarded in the Pentagon certainly by the military people. As a matter of fact, I had a rather interesting personal thing on this, at this time, I was considering an early retirement and thought of half way looking for a civilian job and a friend of mine had arranged an appointment with me with one of the senior officers of McKinsey and Co., the big New York management consultant firm, I guess really the leading one in the country, certainly at that time it was, and I went up and talked with him about job prospects and what I ought to do and everything, and this was right after "Engine" Charlie had been fired and he was fired, there was no question about that, and he asked me what I thought about it and I said, "Well, obviously this was a highly successful business man that he must have been great for General Motors but that he was a disaster as far as the Armed Forces were concerned and I thought had made a completely negative contribution and I was very much amused with the remark when he said, "Well, maybe General Motors solved a lot of problems when he went to Washington." Interesting commentary. And since they did management consulting work for General Motors, I suppose he knew.

LTC FEENEY: What ever happened as a result of that interview with you, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, really nothing happened. He referred me to another outfit there in New York where I went and put in a resume and then I had some job offers, but I really never got but one attractive one. And that was from, I believe it was Northrup Aviation, where some of my old Air Force cohorts in OPS of several years before, wanted me to join them and I . . . it was attractive but when the offer arrived, I had already decided to go to Germany with General Eddleman and had my household goods packed and so I said, "No, thank you." But I never got any . . . anything else that was in any way attractive to me, I mean I had some fair money offers and things like that but it was not the kind of work that I wanted to do.

LTC FEENEY: What was your relationship at this time, during this Korean War conflict, before we just get into discussing the war with the Joint Chiefs and with the various secretaries who seemed to have got a pretty good handle on what was . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I really wasn't . . . I was a European hand so to speak and really only became personally involved in it when I was thrown into the breach by happening to be in the Pentagon on Sunday or something and I did some of these I mentioned this earlier thing. I also carried, at least on one occasion, prepared a message and took up to Mr. Pace who was then the Secretary of the Army. I did a little of it on the side but mostly I was on the side lines on this but at this time, DCSOPS, was a very small outfit. When I joined what was the European Middle East branch of DCSOPS and really we only had three in the operations directive at that time. We had Latin America, Far East, and Europe and Middle East. When I joined that, the Europe Middle East branch, it consisted of six officers and that was only four Indians. When the Korean War broke out, I think the Far East branch had nine people in it and since we were small, we were rather close together and so we kept

pretty good tract of what was going on, but mostly I was on the side lines as far as the Far East was concerned and had only occasional direct personal involvement in it. But at the same time, as I say, you were able to keep up with things very well because you were close knit and small. One interesting and rather amusing thing. I think within, oh, three months before, or less than three months before the Korean War broke out there was a move afoot to dissolve the Far East branch of operations and in defense of its existence, they wrote this paper which in effect said, "We aren't doing very much right now, but we've got to do an awful lot of explaining from what has happened before," and that pretty well reflected what they were doing in these days as a matter of fact. Explaining what went wrong in China and this sort of thing. I thought it was right amusing. They did grow fairly rapidly when the Korean War broke out, but I don't think they ever had more than about twelve or fifteen people. We used to do with a hell of a lot less people in those days because there was . . . well, channels were much clearer and there was much more delegated authority and we could do a hell of a lot with one piece of paper in those days, it would take a hundred today.

LTC FEENEY: Why is that?

LTG LEMLEY: Because of the build-up of the civilian hierarchy in DOD primarily. And in the service secretaries offices. There are so many layers now. There weren't the layers in those days. And for another thing of course, the Joint Chiefs in those days were . . . function much more simply than they do today. They were more closely aligned to their proper statutory function of being the senior military advisor on matters of high policy, and you didn't get all the kinds of junk going through them today . . . that you have today in, for example, the relationships with the commands were conducted almost entirely by executive agents. And the Army Staff ran Europe and the Navy Staff

ran the Far East, pretty much up until the Korean War. And then during the Korean War the Army took it back over because it was a ground fight and the Navy didn't have any other Navy to fight so there wasn't particularly Naval threat, so the Army . . . the Army Staff really . . . during the period I served in it, back in the '40's, late '40's and '50's, it was running the show, world wide.

LTC FEENEY: The Navy will probably continue today to fight to maintain the interests in the Far East, I don't know, you know . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't . . . this doesn't really bother me too much. Of course we're talking now in a much later time frame than we have been. It seems to me that our major interests in the Pacific are more closely attuned to Naval operations and to some extent to Air operations than they are to the Army. But of course, when the Army gets involved in fighting on the ground, then you've got a little different proposition because neither the Navy people nor the Air Force people feel any great confidence in their ability to second guess ground operations. They really don't, I mean, they sort of accept in their own mind that this is a tough job and it has to be done by people more expert than they.

LTC FEENEY: When you were looking on the Army Staff in those days, and this is a question that -- you can spot people, you know, they are real comers in the service. Did you see people in those days that you felt were really going or maybe your contemporaries or slightly ahead of you, who were really going to make it or were they obvious then and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, they were pretty obvious.

LTC FEENEY: Particularly in a small organization like this, I guess they would stand out even more.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, one particular example is Ted Parker, who was a lieutenant colonel with me in DCSOPS. Hank Byroade, it's true Hank got out of the Army

and went into the State Department but he's had a rather distinguished career in the State Department. He's been an Ambassador for, I guess, twenty years perhaps, since he went over there. He had his problems over there because he had a way of telling people bad news that they didn't want to hear, which is very unpopular in the State Department. They sort of follow the old principle of kill the messenger, if it brings bad news, and Hank had the misfortune to bring the bad news from Egypt when our relations became strained after Mr. Nasser came in. But there were a great many others, I would say that probably of the people I served with in DCSOPS between when I went there in '47 and when I left in '51, I would say probably half of them became general officers. And there were a great many very, very able people there. It's a wonderful training ground. I mean it . . . it broadens your perspective terrifically to serve in DCSOPS and in parts of OACSI as well. I'm less sure about some of the other elements but I suspect it . . . the Army Staff draws capable people and provides them a platform from which their abilities can be displayed and recognized and I think it is a very useful thing for an individual to serve on the Army Staff, both from the standpoint of his personal career objectives and from the standpoint of his development, career development. It's a hard school, though.

LTC FEENEY: What was your feeling about the . . . since you've been through both the Korean Wars and Viet Nam War, what was your feeling about the countries reaction to these . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I . . .

LTC FEENEY: And why do you think that these things . . .

LTC LEMLEY: I think . . .

LTC FEENEY: I don't want to get into the Viet Nam thing too much because I will cover it in detail, but I just thought it was a good time to compare these two.

LTC LEMLEY: Yes. Well, I think the American people have a fairly low level of patience. And I think they will support military operations so long as they believe they are in the national interest and so long as they believe that the national interest is being well served expeditiously. And I had no great feel for opposition to the Korean War. I know it did develop in the latter stages but by that time I was in Korea myself and had no feel for it. There was no earlier opposition of any consequence to it.

LTC FEENEY: Did you feel as a Staff member that this was something you were going to get into and get out of pretty rapidly or . . .

LTC LEMLEY: The Korean War? No, I'm afraid not. I think I described our readiness situation a little earlier and what I said earlier pertained equally to the time frame of the beginning of the Korean War. I mean we hadn't gotten any better. We were very ill prepared for it, and you can't raise and train an Army and move it into a theater of operations and achieve any quick results. In other words, we started from too low a level. Well, as an example, my . . .

END OF TAPE:

THIS IS THE FIRST SIDE OF THE SECOND TAPE OF THE FOURTH SESSION.

LTC FEENEY: General, we were talking about the Korean War and readiness.

If you'd like to continue . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I think as I was saying, the Army was in a miserable condition which I did describe a couple of days ago when we were out here and I was going to cite a single example. Dick Knowles, my former deputy when I was DCSOPS, he's now in Korea except somewhere. He went out with an artillery battalion from Sill and to find -- to get a light aircraft to take with them. They had to take an old piper club out of the museum and was the only way they could get one to take to Korea with them. Well, this is the sort of thing that was going on all the time and we also had a terrific problem of a rapid buildup in strength and to accomplish this we called back involuntarily large numbers of reserves both enlisted and officer reserves. The enlisted reserves in particular were rather bitter about this and I think for good reason they fought throughout World War II. They had done their share for the country and they had come back and they had entrenched themselves in businesses and jobs and this sort of thing and they felt really that it was quite unfair to call them back when there were so many who hadn't done their part. Say this was well justified and I had to deal with a group of these disgruntle people soon after I went to the first armored division from the Pentagon in 1951 but I found that I was able to explain to them from my perspective that I had had in Washington. I could see that this was the only solution to the problem and when I explained the reasons for it, why they, I must say that these people understood it and accepted it rather cheerfully but I think their resentment at being called was natural and reflected on them in no way. Now in the case of the officers some of our sins were of the post World War II days were visited upon us because then a mellow moment after the end of

World War II or when all the reserve officers who didn't elect to stay on were being separated. The countries decided that they owed them something so anybody who had not been promoted during World War II or during certain period of World War II, I don't remember the exact rules of the game, would automatically awarded promotion of one grade on separation. Well, that was fine in some cases of people who had had a little hard luck but there were also a lot of people that were not promoted for good reason and so we didn't have a lot of people called in in grades which they were not up to feeling among the officers but that did present some considerable problems. This was particularly true, I think, in the grades of captain and major. So we were ill prepared for Korea. It came as a total surprise and I think anybody sitting where I was realized that this was not going to be any short easy fight and then of course when the Chinese came in this made the outlooks even more gloomy and of course that's another -- that's an example of a pitfall we've run into on a number of occasions to my knowledge when we base our decisions on estimates of the enemies intentions rather than his capabilities. Of course this is what later got us in trouble -- in deep trouble in Vietnam is accessing the enemies intentions. I later had, after the Korean War period when I went back to the Pentagon in the intelligence business I had some long and lasting arguments with Sherman Kent, the CIA who's considered quite an intelligence authority on capabilities versus intentions. He's a strong believer in intentions and I don't know whether he's ever been converted or not.

LTC FEENEY: Probably never fought a war.

LTG LEMLEY: No, I don't suppose he has. I think he was a college professor before he became CIA. He's a very nice guy but this old intention's thing will trip you. It won't trip you everythime but intentions are changeable,

you know. Capabilities are relatively fixed but within certain limits you can change your intentions and actually I think the whole Korean War resulted from the communist making the same fatal mistake. I think they estimated the United States intentions and estimated wrong. I think the Russians did this on a number of occasions during the Berlin blockade. They thought they'd turn the screw one turn tighter and we'd see some zest and we didn't and this is a very dangerous thing when you get in the intention business.

LTC FEENEY: What did you think of the possibility of using of nuclear weapons in Korea?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, I don't think it had any future. I think it was very definitely the wrong thing to do from standpoint of national policy and I seriously doubt that we had any realistic capability to employ them had we desired to do so because you see our nuclear capabilities in 1950 were -- well, they were great. Relatively these will be the rest of the world but they really weren't as good as they might of been but I really question whether we had a violable capability to determine where we wanted to drop one and to get it there on a timely basis and I expect if we used them we would of just cremated a lot of hillsides with nobody much on them because you see the kinds of things where the types of nuclear weapons that we had then would of been affective, air fields, lines of communication and that sort of thing. They really didn't exist in Korea. Our effort was unopposed. The enemy logistics were primarily coolies on back trails. We had enough conventional capability to keep the rail lines from operating so I just don't feel that -- A. We had any very affective capability or B. that the environment was such that it would of been desirable. Most of our problems -- well, our early problems in Korea acrose from this lack of readiness in which I discussed a little earlier. I'm talking now about the days of the Pusan Perimeter. Our later

problems such as they were related to an overextension of our forces. I mean we just -- when we got up there on the Yalu we had just outrun the capabilities of the troops that we had there and despite the publicity in realistic terms these disasters that we suffered in Korea were not of great magnitude. I mean we had a lot of people chewed up but the kind of things that hit the front page in Korea that wouldn't of even made the news in World War II. I mean they were the sorts of things that happened everyday and so really I think we did pretty well in Korea. Now in the late stages of the war after we started we had started negotiations, you got involved in an entirely different situation. You see there you were back to this tight control over Washington and it's my feeling and belief that in the last year or so of the war that you could not conduct a platoon size operation without the approval of the Eighth Army Commander and I expect a battalion had to go to Washington. I don't know this for a fact, but this is the feeling I had when I was over there and we were just sitting on this line. We had no capability to fight affectively because of these restrictions on our activity. We couldn't attack and actually what we should of done at the time of Pork Chop which I happened to know more about then any of them because I was there. All we could do was respond to enemy initiatives. In fact all we could do on Pork Chop was reinforce Pork Chop. Now to conduct that operation the enemy had practically denuded his line throughout that part of Korea to get the troops for that major effort and had the commanders -- had the latitude which permitted a counterattack not at Pork Chop but somewhere else, you know, a war of maneuver instead of trench warfare which is what it was at this time and had we -- had the commanders had that option the situation would of been much different and you know in a situation like this even at a relatively low level. It's very difficult to exert your combat power as a

commander affectively if you have no objective other than to sit still. It just becomes extremely difficult and I used to struggle with this thing every-day. What are we going to do today as to further the war effort and it becomes very difficult to arrive at anything when you are limited to reacting to enemy initiatives. It's just impossible. So that's why I hold -- that's one reason why I hold my theories of the chain of command that we've been talking about before on what is proper and what's not proper. I honestly don't see how General Taylor could or his predecessor, General Taylor was there when I was, could really of conducted a very effective military operation with the inhibitions of higher authority which he had. You just have to have some freedom of maneuver.

LTC FEENEY: I guess we can bring that point out pretty well on Vietnam also.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, same thing. In as a example in Vietnam of course you have the Cambodian situation and what a total difference was made when restrictions on entering Cambodia were lifted and also going into Southern Laos even though our effort there was not as successful I think as it should of been. We should of done that a long time before but that was the same problem that you had in Korea and this I guess really comes back to my thorough distaste for a war of limited objectives and I think the American people are ill suited to fighting a war of limited objectives because really when you reach the point of going to war what you in effect are doing is attempting to enforce your will on the enemy and to enforce your will you have to have the conditions which will permit you to eliminate his fighting forces as an effective element in the equation. In other words, I frankly think that to properly achieve our objectives in Korea, we had to go up and destroy the government in Pyongyang which of course we were not permitted to do and in Vietnam we really should of been in Hanoi. So when you go into this off

limits business that inevitably is a product of a war of limited objectives, you place your military commanders in an impossible situation.

LTC FEENEY: Maybe then it was rightful that we never called the Korean War a war not only because it wasn't declared such but maybe it really wasn't by his military people. So it could be defined as that because we weren't allowed to destroy the enemy.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there's some truth in that, yes, but defending something within restricted geography becomes a very difficult proposition and why we've fallen into this trap, I'm not sure that I really know because we accepted in World War I and World War II that these heavily fortified lines were not really the way to fight a war and incidentally that was the root of the differences between the United States and the French and the British in World War I and there were many many policy conflicts at the command level because we in the United States accepted a war of movement as the only way to military success at which we proved as a matter of fact in which the -- was proved by others in early World War II. Even before we got in it, we in the military tended to ridicule the, what was the French Line, I forget.

LTC FEENEY: Maginot Line?

LTG LEMLEY: Maginot Line and the Siegfried Line and all of these things and in fact it later proved these were not, they were pretty useless but really when we went into Korea and finally accepted when we started negotiations that we weren't going any further north, we then built our own Maginot Line and said we'll fight it out here till hell freezes over and we lost one hell of a lot of people because there's no fortification that can't be overcome, absolutely none. You can't substitute concrete and ditches for fire and maneuver successfully and when you accept a limited war that in effect is what you're doing, you're saying that we'll do it with fortifications and defending real

estate rather than engaging in a proper war of movement designed to destroy the enemy forces and enforce your will upon him.

LTC FEENEY: You mentioned this business about a terrific, maybe you didn't say terrific but you implied that there was a large amount of casualties taken during this period when we returned to defend this line. Do you know statistically that this is correct, is this the greatest, where our greatest losses occurred during this time?

LTG LEMLEY: I don't know that statistically. I know that we lost one hell of a lot of people in the Seventh Division while I was there as commander and as Chief of Staff. But it was the old business you -- you have a company out on Pork Chop or you name it, any other hill and there were many of them, Arsenal was one of them, Baldy, which wasn't in the Seventh Division sector was right next door and I used to sit and watch them get ground up over there but you send a company out to rescue a company and it gets ground up and you send another company and it gets ground up. In the Pork Chop operation we lost, I believe, five battalions. Now I don't mean they were all killed but they became ineffective through combat casualties and you just can't fight that kind of a war and of course we attempted unsuccessfully to substitute firepower for total combat power and you can't win with firepower. It takes fire and movement and in fact firepower is only useful as a air jump to movement not that you don't need it but you see this was a pit we fell into in the early . . . when Korea broke out. We were gonna win it with the Air Force at first and then the 24th Division went over and then the Second, the Third, and all the others.

LTC FEENEY: I want to thank you for bringing out something to me and I want to bring this home right -- real quick because I think it's a point that you're making here and you haven't said it but it's -- you've implied and I

know you want historians to get it and in World War II you were talking about how we relied upon this new thing called air power instead of artillery. Now here again in Korea we make the same mistake at the outset of the war that air power was gonna bring it home and of course I think we saw this same thing happen in Vietnam. That air power is not the answer.

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, and of course in the late days of Korea, of the junior period that I was in the Seventh Division, we were in effect relying on artillery to accomplish the mission of the division and while I am in no way ashamed of what the Seventh Division Artillery did. What I'm really saying is that firepower, whether it be delivered from the air or ground is relatively ineffective without maneuver and I guess we're -- I don't think of a great deal more on the Korean War unless you have some specific questions.

LTC FEENEY: Well, I did. There were things that were happening at that time like the Indochina situation was happening and you know as a young man I never even heard of Indochina even though it was very big in the news at this very time and what was the US military feeling at that time in our regards to supporting of the French down in Indochina when we knew that -- I think it was General Ridgway, maybe that was a little later on but he had made a report saying that we shouldn't get involved in . . .

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, he did. He took a very strong position on that and of course I was, when all this was going on, I was sort of out of the main stream. So what I know is mostly historical. There was no great -- at first no great concern with Indochina. For two reasons: 1. I guess we all felt that it was the French problem and they could handle it. 2. It was pretty far away and we had our hands full in Korea and we didn't really have any real idea of becoming involved and the only incident in which I was ever personally involved in. It was at the time of Dien Bien Phu when a requirement came up from our

military assistance mission in Vietnam to provide some expertise on the use of field artillery to suppress Ack, Ack which we had done, particularly my outfit had done quite successfully in Italy and I was called back to Tokyo to -- well, I thought to go on down to Dien Bien Phy and service the expert on suppressing Ack, Ack. Actually when I went back, there was a young staff officer there who apparently wanted to make the trip and so I explained it all to him and he went and I didn't but it really was after the Korean War was over that things in Indochina reached sort of a crisis stage as far as US involvement was concerned and there was a Army policy that was established by General Ridgway that we would not support US involvement. Now General Ridgway's feeling in the matter was a very valid one. He felt that to intervene effectively was going to require the committment of resources which we wouldn't be willing to come up with. I mean it was great foresight, well, on his part. In other words, he felt that it took more than the United States would be willing to come up with to do the job and here again he was arguing against the old business of doing it with air naval forces which of course was the concept he was fighting. He said, no, if we go in lets do it right and he just didn't think that the United States was willing to do it right and as it turned out that was certainly the case. There was a feeling to at this time among at least my contemporaries that we were by sending in this outfit they called Term which was the first US element in Vietnam after the French caved in. It was sent supposedly to recover our military assistance equipment which had been given to the French in which they were leaving there. It was a feeling, my feeling, and I believe that of my contemporaries that it was a mistake to send anything there that inevitably you would, it would be like fly paper you would get your hook hung and get your foot hung and that you'd have to do more and if this was going to be

the case, General Ridgway thought, you oughta do it right to begin with and in fact that's what happened. This equipment mission or whatever you call it went in and it soon developed into a rather large scale military advisory group which was engaged in equipping and training the South Vietnamese Army. In fact, I recall General Lawton Collins, who at the time was Ambassador to South Vietnam came back and spoke to us at the War College and the feeling in the class was that the picture wasn't really as encouraging as he painted it.

LTC FEENEY: Is there a tendency for us as military people to want to get involved . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, I don't think so.

LTC FEENEY: . . . in things in no matter what -- just a ord -- you know that -- so we get a piece of the action no matter what it is.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there is an empire building tendency in the military and that the services seek functions to justify troop levels. I've always felt this was wrong and I later ran into this in DCSOPS, particularly when I became so deeply involved with the Joint Chiefs. You know we do a lot of dog robbing for the Air Force.

LTC FEENEY: Dog robbing?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Performing service functions for a hell of a lot and our service people, particularly the communications people, the engineers, and others who do this were always very reluctant to let the Air Force to assume any of these support functions for themselves. It came up particularly with regard to engineers in Vietnam. I sort of -- well, the Army was able to back off from that position because I felt if we couldn't provide the level of engineer support that they needed that they were perfectly within their rights to go out and make their own. We also had this business of the air base

security units. I forget exactly what they called them but they consisted of lightly equipped infantry. Mortars and that sort of stuff to protect air bases and because they felt they weren't getting the kind of protection they wanted and an actual fact the units were not particularly effective but I could understand their philosophy on the matter. We went through it in World War II down in North Africa we created a hell of a lot of air field security units which to the best of my knowledge never saw the light of day in action but the Air Force did create them under the guys of Air Police in Vietnam and we in the Army opposed this because it was trespassing on our function. Well, it really wasn't entirely because it was trespassing on our function because it involved money, you know, and it was money that they would get perhaps instead of us. The only instance I know that these air base security units in Vietnam ever did anything very worthwhile was the unit that was stationed at Tan Son Nhut at the time of TET and they did have a very critical situation there at Tan Son Nhut one night, and this Air Force security unit put up a very good fight supported by Army helicopters which was sort of reversing the roles but was right abusing. The Army provided the Air Force and they provided the ground force and it was except they did a good job but this is an example of the sort of empire building I'm talking about. I think it's wrong and I've always sort of opposed it. I've made some enemies that way.

LTC FEENEY: What do you mean you sort of opposed it? Can you give me an example?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, when I was DCSOPS and these things came up, I would frequently reverse the Army Staff position.

LTC FEENEY: Can you think of anything . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I can think a lot on the engineer units. The air base engineer units that I mentioned. I back off on that and there were others. I can't offhand remember too well.

LTC FEENEY: . . . it's been kind of a sore point with . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, some of the communications business, you know, this communications -- strategic communications has become sort of a mixed up inter-service function and the Army alone, this installation, and the Navy this one, and the Air Force that one without any particular rhyme or reason and I've backed the Army off on a good many of these communications.

LTC FEENEY: How about internal empire building within the Army? I've . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, there's a . . .

LTC FEENEY: That's count -- that's actually what I kind of meant when I said something of . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes.

LTC FEENEY: . . . involved with. A guy who seems to get involved with the first seems to end up making the star or something, you know. I can think of a guy by the name of Lonzdale from the Air Force here getting involved and then kind of building his own little intelligence pacification empire. You know, Richard Komer, in Vietnam building the pacification empire.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I know Komer very well.

LTC FEENEY: . . . and I . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Bob Komer.

LTC FEENEY: Yes, sir, Crabber Komer.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I know him very well and my brother works for Lonzdale. I don't know him. Well, yes, there's a certain amount of that but I don't think there's an awful lot of -- I think personal empire building gets to be a little exceptional but there are empires which used to be centered in the

offices of the chiefs of ranks, the chief of infantry, the chief of field artillery and all of those things, and the chiefs of the tech services and these are all now centered in ACSFOR in the Pentagon, and I always said that the assistant chief of staff of force development had an impossible job because he sat at the peak of a pyramid of special interest which were competing with each other and that he was not in a very good position to get objective advice from his subordinate elements.

LTC FEENEY: ACSFOR goes in two weeks, you know, no more ACSFOR.

LTG LEMLEY: It may go but it takes different forms under the . . . It just -- it'll be a different thing. Well, that's going back the way it was before and it's a mistake because the DCSOPS has more than he can handle without taking on ACSFOR to -- what will happen is exactly what happened before. The DCSOPS will still do the sorts of things that I did as DCSOPS and the Deputy will do the things that ACSFOR did and they wouldn't get done as well as if they were in a separate element because indeed they are. It's a different function.

LTC FEENEY: I'm sure the people in ACSFOR would like to have -- hear your argument of -- of voiced out a little louder.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you know, this happens all the time. I mean it's not new. When I went to DCSOPS in 1947, it was pretty much like it was when I went back to it in 1961. We had the same sorts of functions. Then I don't know, I guess it was about 1949, maybe 1950 that we took whatever they called -- well, organization in training which was the predecessor of ACSFOR. We took it in to the fold, we kept it there several years, we found it was unmanageable and so we separated it out. Now we're doing it. We'll separate it out again four or five years and I also heard the other night they're putting communications electronics back in DCSOPS and I fought successfully to get

rid of it when I was there because the DCSOPS has got enough to think about without all of these things and it was utterly absurd to run these communications electronics. These very complexed technical things up through me because I had no capability to act intelligently on them. Even if I'd had the time to do so which I didn't. The DCSOPS is almost completely buried in the tank. I mean the DCSOPS as an individual. It's just almost completely buried in the tank. He has very little time to devote to other things.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, how did you perceive the military and civilian relationship during Korea? You know we really got split in Vietnam and I . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, there wasn't enough of civilian hierarchy to make any difference during the time of the Korean War. In other words, the power grab hadn't been made and civilian control sort of consisted primarily of a power of decision in matters that affected congressional and public relations. The service secretary, neither the service secretaries nor the secretaries of defense, until General Marshall came along. Exercised any particular influence on military operations. In fact they avoided them and I'm sure that in the case of General Marshall it was the fact that he was General Marshall rather than the fact that he was Secretary of Defense that he didn't participate in some of the operational decision making that was at the present took to himself during World War II. So we didn't have the problems that later grew up of massive staffs and direct civilian involvement and every aspect of purely military matters.

LTC FEENEY: Did you see any difference from the problems that faced us in the Korean situation as opposed to what had gone on in World War II as far as leadership.

LTG LEMLEY: No, I don't think the problems were greatly different. I -- without having any personal involvement at the Washington level in World War II and being pretty distant from it. From what I notice darkly and from what people

who are directly involved there at the time tell me the Korean War operations and the World War II operations were very similar insofar as the Washington level was concerned because some of the problems that we had in Korea were limited objectives and this sort of stuff. Well, perhaps of a different scope, were not greatly different than the problems of Roosevelt versus Churchill and Stalin in World War II. In other words, where do you put the effort and everything. I think they went through the same pains in arriving at a decision as to what theaters to put the effort behind than that the same nature in the problems we faced in World War II of what restrictions there would be on military operation. I think they were the same kinds of restrictions that the management or command mechanism was much the same in both wars. It was really only in the 1960's that we developed this very painful decision making process and it's very close supervision military operations from the Washington level. That really came with Kennedy, I think. There were I suppose to some extent after Korea -- after World War II in particular, after Korea and during the 1950's when nuclear weapons became more generally recognized as being the terrific things that they are. They've developed a great body of theoretician's in the academic community who thought that they knew how wars should be fought and how far in policy should be conducted and they never achieved any -- well some of them did but not to any considerable degree. They never achieved any great influence on the Eisenhower administration but they did form sort of a shadow cabinet in, as the British would refer to it in the Brookings Institution, and they were democrats -- liberal democrats mostly and it was these people largely from the academic world that Kennedy brought in. They prepared his policy papers on military matters for the campaign and then they came in and they never have completely gotten out. Many of them are out now, but it really was this

academic involvement in political, military studies that brought in all the new theories of what they call crisis management and we don't have any very effective crisis management at the national level and we never will because the crisis can only be managed -- a military crisis by a commander who has the resources and authority to react properly and you can't painfully react belatedly after long winded committee discussions and that sort of thing which is inevitably the result of the system that came in with Kennedy. I'm not saying this to blame Kennedy. It could happen with anybody but these groups were setup in all of the eastern universities and that's the root of our trouble. It's fine to do research in this field but doing lab research becomes very costly in soldiers lives and unfortunately computer simulation's don't very accurately reflect the realities of combat. So I think it's a pit we've fallen into and I don't think we're out of it yet by any means but we surely got pretty well off the track there.

LTC FEENEY: There are several events that happened while you were in Washington and of course while you were in Korea, and you may not recall them too well but one thing that really brought us to our senses I guess was the Rosenberg trial where we finally realized and were well aware that the Russians had an atomic weapon and I was wondering if you could, of course, this had -- I don't know whether it did, but I would imagine it had a lot of impact on Army planning.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course, it was a terrific blow nationally when the Russians did develop a nuclear capabilities. The Rosenberg Trial really had no great impact at the time. We had some subversive and intelligent problems during World War II because you see we took a great many people into the government, the Army. Some in positions of considerable responsibility whose first loyalties were to the Communist Party and not the United States. And the interest of the Communist Party and the United States coincided only

insofar as they related to the destruction of Germany and you could see the results of this in the troop riots in Germany after VE day and the B flag and the Stars and Stripes. A great many of these people wound up in information activities and we had real problems and I don't think it was necessarily a shock to any of us to discover that there was spies around. There were and there were a hell of a lot of them and they undoubtedly influenced policy against the interest of the United States. Alger Hiss is an example. This guy that was over in the Commerce Department who I mentioned earlier in relation with the Berlin blockade. He was another one. So I don't think that it came as any great surprise that we had some spy troubles and that secrets weren't always as well kept as they might be but when the Russians got underneath their capability it was a great shock and of course this brought a very considerable, though not a very rapid change in our national military policy. It was slow in coming because national military policy evolves. It doesn't change overnight but I think we accepted the things like this were going to happen. Well, an example of the penetration even of the military services. When I went to ACSI, after I finished the War College in 1955 and in a responsible position, I was briefed on the security situation in ACSI and we had a very senior analyst, I don't remember her name. I'm not particularly trying to protect her. I don't remember what her name was. She was a lady. I believe a GS-14 in the USSR branch who had been apprehended turning papers over to the Soviet Embassy and had been reinstated. In her high level position and the Soviet branch of ACSI, because she had been caught through wiretaps so I think all of us realize that we had a real security problem and . . .

LTC FEENEY: Just a minute, sir. (Tape switch)

LTC LEMLEY: Well, continue with the security problems. You know, we had those MacCarthy hearings and I believe most people felt that the -- it was most unfortunate that they were referred to as the Army MacCarthy hearings because it wasn't the Army. It was the Secretary of the Army versus Senator MacCarthy and certainly MacCarthy didn't play by the rules. He made his own rules and I think he was a demagogue but on the other hand he was plowing some ground where there was a good deal to be found. I was told at the National War College in 1954 or 1955, I don't remember which, by one of the well-known commentators, newspaper man, I forget exactly who he was but he was one of the, you know, one of the more prominent ones. One that when Eisenhower took office that he was presented with a list of 30 members of the Communist Party that occupied very senior positions in the United States government and there was a lot of it and there still is. I don't know why we have our ups and downs in this business because I'm sure the problem is just as great today as it was 15 or 20 years ago. Look at all of these things that come out. Look at Mr. Brandt's personal confessor who was just discovered to be an agent. Look at this Maiko scandal of a few years ago. All of this stuff is still going on and I suppose the reason we're in a bound cycle on it right now stems from the fact that these people were able to infiltrate and I think to a considerable degree control the anti-war movement during Vietnam and I'm sure we've got a real problem today and it's unfortunate that we have our ups and downs in this business. So it's a real problem and I would say offhand that we're now in a very poor position to cope with it. Very poor position to cope with it.

LTC FEENEY: Getting off the subject fastfully, do you feel this is a military area that ought to be, you know, everybody splits hairs on this thing and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course, the military role is pretty well defined both in law and custom as being limited to it's own personnel. In other words, internal security within the uniform services, but the fact the matter is that nobody except the military has ever had the capability to cope with it and in times of stress such as during the period of these awful riots both on the campuses and in the cities during the late '60's. The President had leaned on the military to do the job and this was when we set up this very effective counter intelligence operation that a couple of years ago was destroyed because the Army was spying on individuals and doing political spying. Well, it was, and the reason it was was because President Johnson directed the Army to do it. When Mr. Ramsey Clark who has lied about it a good deal came up and said that the FBI couldn't do it and the only way the problem could be solved was for the Army to take it over. It goes back to the same sort of thing we were talking about on military government. The only agencies of the government which really have capabilities to do almost anything are the military services. We have the people of the know how to get a job done when it's given to us. So I guess what I'm saying is that it's not the Armies job to do this, but that nobody else really has the capability to do it. So either the Army does it or it doesn't get done. Now in this connection I've been very much interested in all the Watergate business that's come out over the last few days. Particularly about the plumbers. Here again was a recognition that the FBI was totally incapable of running the kind of security operation that needs to be run under certain circumstances. The President also said, well, CIA wasn't competent. It's not any of CIA's business. This is outside their statutory authority and they shouldn't have security mission within the United States properly so I -- the reason the FBI can't do it, I believe, is that they are collectors

and they're very good at collecting counter intelligence information in the United States. They're quite good at it. I mean have the capability to collect it but after they collect it, they don't really know what to do with it and they really have nobody to send it to who can act on it. So it's a troublesome situation right now and it's one that causes me great concern because I think we've fallen way behind in it and of course this Watergate business is going to further damage what little capability we have.

LTC FEENEY: I'd like to discuss if we could, when you took over as Director of Foreign Intelligence at the ACSI during 1955, 1958, you spent a couple of years there.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I first went there as the Chief of Estimates Branch from the War College and the reason I went there was because I'd been General Art Trudeau's Chief of Staff in the Seventh Division. It had nothing to do with my capabilities in the intelligence field. I'd never been involved in it in anyway except as a recipient of intelligence and, I didn't particularly want to go as a matter of fact, but it was a very stimulating time to be in the business and I thoroughly enjoyed my assignment as Chief of Estimates and although General Trudeau was fired shortly after, I left for exceeding his authority. I was able to establish rapport with General Robert Scow who replaced him, and I went from estimates to the Chief of the Production Division, of ACSI, and really it was here that I think I achieved something that was worth achieving and badly needed doing as Chief of Production I had access not only to the production division but to all the compartmented.

LTC FEENEY: When you say Chief of Production, sir, are you talking about when it was -- you're Director of Foreign Intelligence?

LTG LEMLEY: No, there was no such thing.

LTC FEENEY: Okay.

LTG LEMLEY: I was arriving at that, but as Chief of Production Division, I found that I was the recipient of unevaluated intelligence from all the compartmented activities in ACSI, as well as the routine production from the open market in the divisions immediately subordinate to me, and I found this to be very unsatisfactory because in effect I was the only one who had access to the whole picture and this put on me personally the job of doing the evaluation which I didn't think any one man can do and I know that to be the case. So I at great lengths, undertook to develop within ACSI, an all source production element which I was able to sell to General Scow and so when this all source production was set up it was set up under a Director of Foreign Intelligence. I was not the director. I was a colonel at the time and Lieutenant General Johnny Davis retired, was the Director of Foreign Intelligence. I was his Deputy and so that really is how the office came to be created and I thought it was probably achieving this integration of sources in the production of all source intelligence was probably one of my greatest achievements in the intelligence business during the time, four years I spent in it.

LTC FEENEY: How did you view the relationship of the ACSI Staff to the Department of the Army staff as a whole? Always seems to be a little trouble of identification there.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there is a problem between ACSI and the rest of the Army Staff and a lot of this problem stems from compartmentation and clearances. It's a problem that manifested itself infinitely more at the lower levels than it does at the higher levels. In other words ACSI's creditability at the top level in the Army Staff is very high. It's creditability at the lower level is not very great and this is unfortunate. The problem is not entirely one of compartmentation. You realize when I'm speaking of ACSI I'm

speaking of something that isn't actually today. I'm speaking of the ACSI of 1955 to 1958, which had infinitely greater responsibilities than ACSE has today. For the collection, evaluation and examination of intelligence but one of the problems was that there are an awful lot of very high ranking civilians. There were an awful lot of very high ranking civilians in ACSI. Some of them were extremely capable and some of them had achieved their exalted positions by long service rather than any particular contribution to the war effort and there was a tendency in DCSOPS and I imagine other elements of the Army Staff. Though, of course, DCSOPS was a big consumer. There was a little resentment about this. There was also a lack of responsiveness in ACSI at the time I went there and this was resented in DCSOPS and I suppose other elements. Everybody always felt that ACSI didn't want to do anything. They could come down and ask for something and ask for an estimate and would be told this will take six months when they needed it next week and this was due to a lack of understanding between the two elements and I think I was able to relieve this a little bit. Relieve this problem a little bit when I went to ACSI as the Chief of Estimates because I'd served on the other side of the fence and I knew that the kinds of things they wanted we could produce and we did produce for them but they would come down and ask for an estimate and to the average professional action person that ACSI of that day that meant a volume of 5 or 600 pages when actually all OPS wanted was a few well chosen paragraphs that in condensed form gave the kind of information that they wanted to get and there was, the two things I've mentioned. One is lack of mutual understanding, the other the compartmentation that made for a less than adequate relationship between OPS and ACSI. Now again this is felt at the Indian level. I mean where people have to produce papers not at the DCSOPS level and at that time General Eddleman was the DCSOPS and he thought

he was very friendly and very appreciative towards ACSI. I've been in his office a number of times to answer questions. General Taylor, the Chief of Staff at the time. We never had any problems at the top level but at the lower level where paper had to be produced we did. Another irritant in the OPS, ACSI relationship was the Foreign Liaison Branch which taught all sorts of work on OPS that had to be done in a formal fashion. Oh, I guess when I was at OPS in the late '40's and the early '50's, I'd probably get 20 pieces of paper from ACSI, mostly from the foreign liaison branch that had to be answered with a piece of paper and in those days at OPS we believed in legs, not paper. We pounded the corridors and then the guy could come up and ask me a question and I could of answered it in five minutes where as a processing a paper would take hours. So there was this kind of resentment.

LTC FEENEY: How did you feel about strategic intelligence versus tactical intelligence at this time? Is there a going back to . . . did we loose our sight of tactical intelligence at the time developing this or because it . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, no, we didn't. I mean in the period I was OACSI in 1955 to 1958, we didn't. This effort is not--was not a very visible one and when I say visible, I mean ACSI never got any plaudits for turning this out, but we were very conscientious in doing our job with regard to the kind of troop level intelligence. Things need handbooks and this sort of thing and we turned these out I thought on quite a timely basis and quite effectively but this thing doesn't see the light of day too much because it's only when you start fighting that you need them and you -- it only becomes visible when you don't have them. When you need them and don't have them but we did, oh, by far the major effort. When I was in ACSI during those days was devoted to just this sort of thing. The tactical level intelligence and I think we did a very good job of it. Now I'm afraid that this is something that's gonna

fall between the cracks with the centralization at DOD level because there's nobody from the front office breathing down your back to produce this kind of stuff until the crisis comes. For example, I don't recall that General Taylor as many times as I was in his office and talking about intelligence. I don't recall him ever asking if we were doing this sort of job. I guess he assumed we were but there was no heat on ACSI to do this job. Heat from higher levels. It was just something we did as an accepted responsibility and as I say I think did well but the pressure is all on current intelligence and really political military intelligence with the accent on political. So that's the part that sees the light of day at eight o'clock every morning not this other kind of work that you do day in and day out on pretty much eight to five basis but it is very important and I just sort of suspect that with the centralization in DOD that this is all going to fall by the wayside. Because in the first place I don't think that there is or will ever be any appreciation in DOD for the kinds of things in this field that need to be done. In other words when the money in people get tight well, what do we do that for anyhow and so I suspect this is something that, well, gradually whither away over a period of time in the Defense Intelligence Agency. I don't know this to be the fact but I'm reasonably sure that that's what is happening. Now another thing that's not appreciated outside the intelligence field, yes, that if you don't have this kind of an effort going on all the time, this sort of basic intelligence effort then your ability to produce timely and adequate current intelligence is very limited because the kinds of things that they carry around in the black book every morning. It's funny, I used to go to work at five in the morning to prepare that thing. It doesn't all come out of the New York Times even though it might look like it because you can only interpret current events in the light of many basic background

considerations. Terrain, economic capabilities. Ethic idiosyncrasies and that sort of thing. So I view with alarm the centralization of intelligence and of course this comes about by the unwillingness of, I would say just about all civilians, I might accept the presence I've known on this but almost all civilian to do their job as bosses or commanders. They don't want to hear differing interpretations from five or six intelligence agencies and accept the responsibility of a decision based on these desperate views that have been presented to them. What they want is one guy who comes up and says, this is it. He says, okay, I'll do so and so and if it goes wrong then he can say it was an intelligence failure, you see, but it's not the job of the intelligence community to present a cohesive picture. It's their job to present the uncertainties with the certainties and it's the commanders job to decide which of these disparate views of the enemy situation he's going to base his decision on. The T2's job is to present what he knows and what he doesn't know and it's the commanders job to choose his course of action with these uncertainties in mind. Now at the national level it's only if you have a galaxy of agencies that you get these uncertainties presented to you.

LTC FEENEY: But isn't there a tendency for when you have this type of thing, that when they aren't centralized, that you get people withholding information from one another so they can do the type of thing. I know . . .

LTG LEMLEY: I don't think so. I don't think so. Incidentally, there is a problem in this regard, but I don't think it's the problem of jealousy or, you know, I've got a secret sort of thing but as you well know in the intelligence business there's this need to know factor which may or may not be interpreted correctly but it's true and I may know something that I'm not permitted to tell you. For one reason or another. In other words if you're

gonna get it, you've got to get it from somebody who's got the right ticket and I'll cite an example of this. I used to sit on the watch committee and the Chairman of the Watch Committee was the Deputy Director of CIA, General Cavall, Air Force at the time, and we had this particularly tough situation in Syria and the fact of the matter is that we had cranked up the Turkish Army to invade Syria under the direction of our MAAG Chief. To solve the problem, and the watch committee was addressing the problem of whether the Turks were going to attack Syria. Well, I had to sit down there and listen to all of this, knowing full well that the Turks would attack Syria if we said so and they wouldn't if we didn't say so. Well, you see this is an embarrassed thing, but I didn't feel at liberty to divulge my knowledge to General Cavall. With that, no, I wasn't keeping a goody for myself. I just didn't -- I felt if -- he needed to know, somebody other than I would of told him. So, no, I don't think there's any holding things back as a general rule but there are different perspectives and I think you need these different perspectives because there's a tendency when you go into the, I believe they call it the National Intelligence Committee now. Isn't it?

LTC FEENEY: You said United States . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, we called it something else when I was there. When you go in there to negotiate obviously each agency goes with a unified view and there is a tendency to adhere rigidly to the unified view. I mean this is just human nature. I don't say it critically because it's human nature, and back there in the '55 to '58 when I was a regular attendee at USOP meetings, except that I say we called it something else then. There was a great deal of this and I think it was recognized generally that this was good because of the footnote power. When you produced a national intelligence estimate or a special estimate if I couldn't accept the majority view I had the right

and obligation to present my view in a dissent and I have dissented. I've argued with old Dulles many times because obviously enough though I was not General Scow's Deputy, when he had to leave a USOP meeting for some reason, he always left me to represent him and even though I was pretty far down the totem pole as far as rank was concerned, I spoke with the full power and authority of the Army when I spoke at the USOP, then I've argued on a number of occasions with Allen Dulles most of which I lost, some of which I won and it's not appreciated how vitally this intelligence at that level affects national policy. As a colonel in ACSI in those days my access to the White House was probably a good deal better than Chief of Staff of the Army because we could and did have things presented to the President and it's also intelligence that drives national military policy. It's not all these brilliant Indians up in OPS that do it. It's intelligence that drives it which isn't generally appreciated incidentally but here again you see I'm talking a different era when Army intelligence really carried most of the burden for national intelligence. I would say that we alone in ACSI at that time probably produced between 60 and 70 percent of the national intelligence that was formulated in the form of intelligence surveys and estimates.

LTC FEENEY: That brings me to the point of talking about the capabilities of Army intelligence in those days to collect the information. Such as the technical intelligence and the human type of intelligence.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, . . .

LTC FEENEY: If human meaning, of course, referring to human intelligence sources.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I'm not sure exact. Now that's a term we didn't use in those days and I'm not sure I know exactly what your talking about.

LTC FEENEY: Well, the collector, you know, the actual espionage agent or the information that is gathered from say, counter espionage operations.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, actually . . .

LTC FEENEY: As opposed to the technical side comments again.

LTG LEMLEY: Our capabilities were really quite good. Primarily through the attache system and when I say this I guess I'm referring to our capabilities and the areas that were critical at the time. We didn't have any very considerable capability. Well, we had almost no clandestine capability because that was a field that was denied us except to the extent that we operated under and at the direction of CIA. That's their statutory responsibility of the clandestine foreign intelligence. So we had almost no capability but actually in the little crisis situations like the Arab-Israeli thing which was just as tough then as it is today, and Latin America and the undeveloped areas of the world. We had probably the best intelligence collection in the United States and the reason I say is because it's military people -- native military people who have what you want to know and partially as a result of our international effort in the Army school system and partially by the fact that we spread MAAG's, attache's and missions around rather generally and partially just as a result of the national inclination of soldiers to talk to soldiers. The Army attache's in most area's of the world had the confidence of the local military people and for that reason their capabilities were considerably greater than those of CIA which really isn't secret enough and isn't trusted in the general field and the state department and the political field. You take countries that are ruled by military people. They're not really very anxious to talk to civilians. They don't trust them whereas the -- they do trust other military people and sense most of the areas we interested in our not thin air or water. It's the Army that has the contacts that get what you want to know.

LTC FEENEY: Do you see this as something that we should exploit at this time since this program obviously has been de-emphasized. There has been a centralization of the attache . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, there's been a centralization . . .

LTC FEENEY: . . . but there's certainly other things that we could do.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. I think it was a mistake to centralize it. I think it's been a mistake to de-emphasize it, but when you get right down to it, when you centralize the production of intelligence and the Defense Department, there was little option to centralizing the collection and the collection as I say leans heavily on the attache system so you pretty much had to put the attache system with the centralized production system.

LTC FEENEY: How did you visualize the agency, CIA's role? Do you think they really best serve the Army interest or . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, CIA doesn't really have the capability to produce military intelligence. They just don't have the professional talent to do that and this always presented something of a problem and getting the same as clandestine effort parted in the direction that we needed from the standpoint of military intelligence. They tended to play around, you know. There was a certain lack of direction in it and a lot of lost motion. I remember one incidence. This is right amusing. There was a CIA project for which only two people in ACSI were cleared. One was General Scow, the ACSI, and the other was I, and they used to bring over documents in black briefcases, you know, well covered by their cloak and deliver them personally to me because General Scow usually wasn't there, in any case, he didn't want to bother with it. He wanted me to look at it first and about half of this stuff you could of bought in any good book store in Washington. One of them was "Mao's a Thousand Flower Speech." They brought that in this highly secret thing that

we put inside a safe behind limited access, locked doors and all that sort of stuff, and that's the sort of thing I'm talking about when I say a lack of direction to the collection of military intelligence by clandestine meetings.

LTC FEENEY: I'm going to get to something that . . . go ahead sir, I didn't mean to . . .

LTG LEMELEY: Yes, I don't want to condemn the CIA as being worthless, it's not. Actually they do some very fine work but they're not particularly good at military intelligence.

LTC FEENEY: How did you feel -- what was the Army reaction to the Hungarian revolt? Now I have been told that you had some part in this -- the crisis that -- the actions that foul this for the defectors or refugees?

LTG LEMELEY: Yes, I got involved in that a little bit, but actually the morning of the Hungarian revolt and it coincided very closely with the French, British invasion of Suez, you know, within a matter of a day or two. I just happened to be in Paris that morning and was calling on Supreme Allied Commander with a group from the Army Staff that was presenting sort of an annual update briefing on what was going on to the commanders in Europe and when I went up to the headquarters I went out a little early and the G-2 out there was sitting by a little transistor radio curiously trying to prepare a briefing for, I guess it was still General Norstead, and on the Hungarian revolt. So I was not there when it happened. I did become involved later in exploiting the refugees but there was nothing really very special about this. I mean we did -- we setup, you know, interrogation centers to screen and get what information we could and we got some very good information from them. One thing that was a source of some satisfaction to me was that, you know, comint is sort of an on and off thing because when people don't talk you don't hear them and in the piping days of peace you don't turn on your radios very often

but when you get in a fast moving operation which the Soviet intervention and Hungary was. People have to talk a lot on the radio and I thought we did a wonderful job of keeping abreast of the military situation in Hungary primarily through what we got out of comint.

LTC FEENEY: Now you're saying that you were monitoring -- you were talking about you were picking up the information from Soviets?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, there's . . .

LTC FEENEY: You do a lot of talking while the Soviets are just experts at maintaining radio sounds and . . .

LTG LEMELEY: No, nobody. No, no. We were able to keep very well abreast of what was going on through communications intercept and we got a lot of useful information out of exploiting the refugees but it was not the kind -- not very startling information, you know. I mean it's useful on the long -- it's part of your long term intelligence base but not something you would rush up and tell the Chief of Staff tomorrow morning.

LTC FEENEY: What is your view of electronic warfare as a element of combat power in the fifties?

LTG LEMLEY: In the fifties?

LTC FEENEY: Yes, if you -- it's evolution was just -- has always been there somewhat, but it was never . . .

LTG LEMELEY: Yes, well, of course I suppose my first experience with electronic warfare was at Anzio when the Germans used Chaff very effectively. I mean it completely neutralized our air defense effort at Anzio. Our radars couldn't cope with it and it's a tremendously important thing in certain areas and for air penetrations, naval operations, air defense operations. Electronic warfare is probably the key to success in this day and age. Now from a tactical standpoint looking at it as a ground soldier. I don't think our

requirements in that area are very great. I know some of the work gets done. I guess I know most of it because I was the chairman of the Army EW council or whatever we called it for couple of years anyhow but really about all we can do to assist the foot soldier is jam artillery fuses. Jam the enemies tactical communications and jam some of his detection devices. Now I don't think that jamming tactical communications has any future because if you radiate enough power to jam the enemies tactical communication you are gonna jam your neighbors. So you see that's not a one way street so I really just don't think that has any good future and anyhow sometimes you do better listening to them than jamming them. The proximity fuses. Yes, you might do something with that if you could develop a sort of a cheap machine that didn't weigh very much that you could carry around with you that would be in the proper frequency spectrum you know but it's not something I would put very high on the priority list for spending R and D and production money. As far as jamming his intelligence devices I'm talking about tactical radar and that sort of stuff. I just sort of doubt that that's worth pursuing very much because in the first place getting adequate current intelligence in this field is almost impossible. You know the short range devices and I just don't think that you could come up in the piping days of peace with an effective -- with a machine that would necessarily be effective against the kinds of things he had and anyhow I'm not sure those things are that damaging to you. I think we have rather grossly overestimated the capabilities of these devices and that we probably spent too much money developing our own and that any EW money that we spent in this regard would probably be down the drain so except in the field of air defense, I don't think the Army is, and in the case of light aircraft if you can get a -- get machines that, you know, don't weigh too much. I just don't think the Army stake in EW is anywhere near as

great as the Navy and the Air Force, but you've got to have it to conduct any air operations and most naval operations. You've just got to put a hell of an investment in electronic warfare.

END OF SESSION:

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY EXTRACT OF THE TAPES MADE DURING THE 5TH SESSION OF RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD F. FEENEY AS RECORDED AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ON 10 May 1974.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, to begin the 5th session, I think it would be appropriate since we finished electronics warfare the last time to start off with your career in Germany in the Seventh Army.

LTG LEMLEY: Right. Well, as you know, I went to the Seventh Army in July of 1958 as the G-2 of Seventh Army Staff, having been requested for that assignment by General Eddleman who despite some earlier differences apparently had a fair respect for my abilities. And really, I think the year I spent with Seventh Army Staff was one of the most pleasant and rewarding of my career. To begin with, I moved in with a new commander, General Eddleman, at essentially the same time. He'd been there a couple weeks when I got there. We had an exceptionally fine group of people on the staff. There was room for a great deal of creativity and improvement in Seventh Army operations, not that there was anything particularly wrong with them before. But moving in with a new commander, you do have opportunities that you wouldn't always. I guess this was particularly true because General Eddleman's philosophy of command and that of General Bruce Clark differ considerably though their both great commanders. General Clark, I think, has always had a tendency to dig into the lower levels and has been accused by some of bypassing the chain of command although that was certainly not my experience with him either in the 1st Armored Division or later. He turns out a great mass of paper advising the small unit commanders and most of this is well worth reading and well worth following if it suits your particular circumstances. General Eddleman, on the other hand, tended to work through his staff. He tended to follow the chain of command very rigidly. He was not a person for

surprise visits. When he was coming to a unit, he let you know and expected you to be ready for him. He also had a much broader political military outlook than General Bruce Clark who concentrated solely on troops and there were opportunities in this area, particularly in working with the relatively new German Army, to do some thinking and to influence things in the local areas. So I enjoyed it very much. Actually my job as G-2 was not a terribly demanding one. There was a little problem with G-2 at U.S. Army Europe who felt like he ran everything and I thought that Seventh Army ought to run it, oh, it's intelligence operations and in this regard, I was quite active in working on our collection elements out on the border and that sort of thing and I think probably improved their performance somewhat and I'm sure made them feel more cared for. Also, I was, I suppose, fortunate in that General Eddleman being an old Army type, always thought the calvary belonged to the G-2, so I was sort of a boss of the three calvary regiments as well as our own intelligence battalion. But I really wasn't just the G-2 because General Eddleman looked to me for advice and recommendations on any number of things. He, I suppose, I did a good share of the G-3's work that would have normally been considered the G-3's because he particularly wanted me as an individual to do it.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, does this, I don't mean to interrupt you here, but this brings back a thing, you know, where we tried to split the functions of the various staff elements but in this particular case which your bringing up, it's really the personality of the staff officer and how he fits with that commander as to what he really does.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, that's true. That's true and of course ideally your G-2, G-3 people work very closely together and consult very close together which I certainly did with General Pat Cassidy who was the G-3 and was General Max

Hawkins, his Deputy. We worked very closely together but I probably did overlap the G-3 to a greater extent than you would normally expect. For example, after I arrived I wrote all General Eddleman's speeches which had formally been sort of a G-3 function. He didn't have a personal speech writer. I was in charge of keeping him abreast of the operations in Lebanon which properly I suppose since they were U. S. operations were perhaps more of a G-3 job. I had a Saturday morning briefing for him which really extended a good deal beyond the normal intelligence briefing and tended to become more of a discussion of world of elements and broad policy and that sort of thing. In this connection, I did dream up an idea on the Berlin Blockade. This was the time of the Khrushchev confrontation when he was threatening to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and turn everything over to the East Germans thereby backing off the Soviet occupation responsibility to the United States, Britain, and France and also this was the time, about the time the Berlin wall went up. And it seemed to me that a good approach to this would be to give him a little of his own medicine and say, o.k., we're going to go ahead and do that and we'll just turn our part of Berlin over to West Germany and Garrison it with German troops which we could have moved in. We've got to air-lift them in but we could have done that. And I thought that we ought to turn Berlin over to the Federal Republic, put perhaps a German Division up there, withdraw our own troops with a firm guarantee that we would stand behind West Germany and wouldn't permit any Soviet engrossment on West Berlin. I thought this was a good idea for several reasons. For one, I thought psychologically if they probably forced troops to back down and I still believe that. Because I felt that the presence of German troops and West Berlin would exert terrific psychological influence on the East Germans. I also felt that this would put us sort of at arms length from the

day to day problems of Berlin which are considerable and they involve matters where we really don't have very much flexibility where as the West Germans would. So I thought it was a wonderful idea and General Eddleman did too. He took me up with him to brief USAREUR commander. We both got thrown out of the office. He still thought it was a good idea and that's why he told me he was going to take me up to USARUER with him but not in G-2 and I did assumptionally go up and eventually became the G-3 of USAREUR. When I got my first star, I was made DCSOPS of USAREUR. That too was an interesting experience. But I think not awfully noteworthy. Actually I liked Seventh Army service much better because we were close to the troops and in Heidelberg you got awfully involved with housekeeping chores. So it was pleasant and interesting, but I found Seventh Army service more to my taste. Well, shortly after I got promoted, I went down to command the 24th Division Artillery in the 24th Division commanded by General Ted Walker. He was an old personal friend of both me and my wife. My wife had known him for a good deal longer than I had. He had been a good friend of her older brothers. I'd known him at Anzio as a regimental commander in the 1st Special Service Force and I had also known him during his brief and highly unsuccessful tour in DCSOPS in the late '40's. He's a very peculiar sort of guy. He's a fine soldier. Really he has, he unquestionably made the 24th Division the best in Europe in every military regard and he started with an awful lot of troubles too because he had taken over from a rather indecisive individual who hadn't been a particularly good leading commander. And he was a fine soldier as I say. He devoted his efforts almost exclusively to training field exercises and this sort of thing and really was a wonderful division commander. Now he did have this idiosyncrasy about politics that I believe he had probably developed when he was in Little Rock during the school troubles

there. He had been there at the time they broke out and had had some responsibility but not much latitude for the Armies operations in Little Rock. In this area he was a very gullible guy and he undertook a program of indoctrination based generally upon rather extreme right wing viewpoints. But the magnitude of this thing was never anything like the press indicated. I mean, its impact on the troops was negligible. The officers did have a little more pressure put on them, eased whole conferences and talk about it. He was pretty much egged on in this by a sergeant major whose name I believe was Flynn and a medical administrative corps officer named Roberts who were sort of his action guys on the thing and he placed great confidence in these people. They both had direct access to him through the back door and I really blame a lot of his troubles on these two individuals and on his Chief of Staff, General Skeldon, who didn't fulfill his obligation to keep General Walker on a reasonable middle path and who pretty much let these people run wild. And he didn't have to do that because Ted Walker was a reasonable man most of the time. As a matter of fact, a lot of this stuff that Ted Walker was pushing was stuff he'd never read himself. It was based on what these two guys told him and they say Sheldon was completely a "yes" man. He never told the boss anything he didn't think the boss wanted him to hear. It was always, that's the greatest idea I ever heard.

LTC FEENEY: How did he happen to allow this sergeant major, I suppose the command sergeant major probably and the MSC officer . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, no, he wasn't the command sergeant major. He had been plucked out of one of the battle groups. We had battle groups in those days and brought up there. He really had no PO & E position. He was just in the division headquarters there and this Major Roberts was in somewhat the same category though I think he was holding out on some sort of SGS thing or

Assistant Chief of Staff job. This thing was a matter of great concern to me and also to General Frank Mildren who was the assistant division commander not that it impinged on us in any way because I felt sufficiently confident of my own position in the division, my relationships with Ted Walker, that I didn't have to bow down and scrape and carry on about these things and so did Frank Mildren. But it was a matter of concern to us, the trend this thing was taking, and I suppose if it hadn't broken, we would probably have jointly gone in to discuss it with him which we were about to do when the thing all flared up. Well, what really happened, the "Overseas Weekly" blackmailed Ted Walker. He established a requirement which was perfectly finished right but whenever any newspaper reporter and this was aimed at the "Overseas Weekly" entered the division concerned that they would be accompanied by a member of the public information office, perfectly within his right. They had obtained a blown-up accountable of this , "Blue" Program. That's what he called it. And they threatened to publish it if he would not revoke his order requiring that their reporter be accompanied by a member of the PIO office and he threw him out of his office and they did publish a grossly distorted account of the business. In fact, it was so grossly distorted that he won a libel judgement against him in the German courts as a matter of fact. But in any case, this landed with a loud thud in Washington, all these publications and allocations by the "Overseas Weekly" and he was rather summarily relieved of command, not through the military chain of command, but by some civilian and the Secretary of Defense's Public Information Office who called him at Garmisch one night where he was on leave and told him he was suspended. I've never heard that term used before with a military officer but he told him, in any case, that he was suspended. And I took command of the division. This relief was an awful

blow to the troops because he was admired, respected as a very fine division commander and it really hit with a loud thud. I felt it incumbent on me to visit all the units the next day which I did and every major unit in the division and talk to the officers and senior NCO's to explain to them that this was a great blow to the division, that we all felt terribly about it but nevertheless we still had a job to do and the best thing we could do was to keep right on working towards improving our combat readiness in getting the job done. It had to be done regardless of our personal feelings with regard to General Walker Lee. This apparently did the job. Things perked up. We never had any real problems while I had the division.

LTC FEENEY: How did a civilian notify him he was relieved?

LTG LEMLEY: By telephone.

LTC FEENEY: What right would he have? Wouldn't it be the USAREUR Commander or somebody . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he didn't have any right. Yes, well they didn't tell him.

LTC FEENEY: Well then, what right does . . .

LTG LEMLEY: I think General Clark, who was the USAREUR Commander, found it out from Ted Walker when Ted called him. In any case, . . .

LTC FEENEY: No orders were issued?

LTG LEMLEY: No orders were issued.

LTC FEENEY: Maybe he should have said to the guy, go jump in the lake.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, perhaps so.

LTC FEENEY: Maybe he did.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't know. But it was a very peculiar sort of thing. Now I do think that Ted has had at that time a brain tumor. And the reason I think this, is that shortly before his permanent relief when I was up at Graffen with the division artillery, I received a call that he had had a

sudden seisure, not on the hunting trip, and was in the Munich Hospital in very bad shape and naturally since I was in command of the division, if I was going to be in command for a period of weeks, obviously I would move back to Augsburg and turn over the division artillery to my Deputy so I called the hospital, Second Field Hospital in Munich, and I asked Colonel Orr, now General Orr, what the situation was and he said that he was almost completely certain that Ted had a brain tumor, however that in his hospital he didn't really have the facilities to make an authoritative diagnosis and his behavior is of a type, I mean Ted's nature is the type that you associate with an individual with a brain tumor because sometimes he was a little irrational.

LTC FEENEY: And so there have been some type of method - just a method of covering it up so to speak or is this, you know, instead of saying he had a psychiatric problem that to let it go.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, he didn't have any psychiatric problem. His problems were organic, periodic and rather infrequent but there were times when Ted was obviously not himself. Now I never saw him this way at any activity involving the troops but I have seen him at social functions when he was just obviously not himself. My wife also remarked on it. But anyhow, Colonel Orr sent him up to Landstuhl to be further examined and I packed my bags to go to Augsburg. Before I got there, I got word from Augsburg that Ted was back and reassumed command. He had refused medical examination at Augsburg. So to this day, I do believe that he does have a brain tumor and I think this accounts for some of his irrational behavior since he's left. Incidentally, despite the fact that he's a personal friend of long standing, I've never had any communication from him since he left the division that day and I believe that was purposeful on his part. He felt that probably it

was not to my advantage or other friends to further carry on any associates so I've never heard from him from that day. I can understand why he had this inordinant fear of an examination at Landstuhl or anything to do with his brain. He read this book that came out about that time called, "Pentagon Papers that alleged the". . . it was the versive elements in the government that were sending people over from raid operations to change their behavior and outlook. He firmly believed that this was a true story. And later when he got in trouble down in Mississippi and I don't really know the circumstances that beyond what I saw in the paper. They sent him to a mental institution over, federal mental institution over here in Missouri and he must have been utterly terrified when they sent him. But anyhow, that's the Ted Walker story. I don't, unless you have some specific questions, I don't think that I have anything else to talk about much on my European experience. I was ordered from Europe back here to the Command and General Staff College as assistant commandant.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, one of the things that we've . . purposes and objectives of the Oral History Program is to determine how an officer, how they happen to team up with certain people. For example, we've heard of my career, Westy's Lieutenants. And there's the "Lemley-Johnson team." You may not appreciate that.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, no. As a matter of fact, I have the greatest respect and regard for General Johnson. I think he's one of the finest people I've ever known. However, we were not friends of long standing. I am sure I must have met General Johnson before, but the first contact I ever had with him that I recall was when I reported into Seventh Army in 1958 where he was General Eddleman's Chief of Staff. And we did get along extremely well. I think he had a pretty high regard for my abilities. I went on up to USAREUR and he was

the G-3 when I went up there and I worked for him there for a while. He and I tend to see things, some things in the same light and some things we don't, and I think he appreciated that he, like anybody else, has a blind side and the fact that I would sometimes pack up his blind side and he appreciated it. For one thing, I think -- I couldn't swear by this but it's my impression that General Johnson felt very keenly the fact that he had been a prisoner of war all during World War II which he was in the Philippines, you know, and that he had missed out on a lot of experience that I had had and he tended to rely on me rather considerably for tactical and strategic judgements. At least he listened to me and more often or not, went along with my views on these matters. I did serve under him at USAREUR fairly briefly and then took his place. It was none of his doing getting me here to Leavenworth as assistant commandant. In fact, that was General Eddleman's idea, not General Johnson's. I think I probably knew I was coming here before General Johnson did. He didn't even know I was coming until it was publicly announced and he was not consulted on the assignment. One rather interesting sideline, the first year we were here, I wrote General Johnson's efficiency report. Then the Fifth Army commander was retiring, General Arnold. No, it wasn't Arnold either. I forget who it was. He was an ordnance officer. And he came down here to Leavenworth shortly before he retired and he said, Johnny he said, I don't really know too much about what you do down here and I just wondered if you would mind writing up your own efficiency report and sending it up to me and Johnny told him no, he wouldn't really be unwilling to do that but he suggested if he wanted somebody else to write it, perhaps I would have a good suggestion. So I wrote his efficiency report for that year when he was the commandant and I was his assistant and sent it up to Fifth Army for the Army Commander to sign. This is not as unusual as you might think. When I was an Indian in DCSOPS, I wrote efficiency

reports on, oh, a half a dozen general officers who were in the European Middle East area of interest and sort of odd jobs, not troop jobs, you know, MAAGS, missions and that sort of thing. I recall I wrote one on General Swartzcoff, for example, who was in Iran and, oh, several others. I think I made about five or six. I finally rebelled when they asked me to write one on General Schuyler because by that time, he had come back and was brigadier general at OPS and I just didn't sort of feel that it was very appropriate that I write the efficiency report on a BG who was then in OPS. He had been in Rumania but that's the period that they needed a report on. But that is, or was at that time, customary, you know, for the OPS Indians to prepare efficiency reports on the Chiefs of all the odd missions, MAAGS, and that sort of thing.

LTC FEENEY: I've heard of that being done in the OACSI cause of the people were in the attache system or something like that.

LTC LEMLEY: And incidentally, I never thought those in OACSI were very well done either. A great many of them were written by civilians with a pretty narrow outlook. You know, their outlook was in their own particular area of interest in their own particular area in the world and I don't think anybody was damaged by them, but of course you know they were passed all around. Everybody and his brother took a crack at them and by the time they saw the light of day, they were pretty noncommittal. I don't think anybody was ever damned, but nobody ever got any, very many brownie points out of those either. On the other hand those in OPS, we conscientiously to the limits of our ability tried to do them. They were one man products. They weren't coordinated products . . .

LTC FEENEY: What would you feel like your relationship to General Johnson was as, you know, as a subordinate? I know he relied upon you but it must

have been . . . you said you had similarities and differences. Could you describe those?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I think we shared the same broad outlook on what the Army ought to be and how it ought to behave and that sort of thing.

LTC FEENEY: What do you think the Army ought to be?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I think both of us have pretty high standards on integrity on professionalism in the sense of doing a thorough and professional piece of work on anything that your given. I think we both had quite high standards, both of troop performance and student performance here in college. And I guess really in areas of differences -- one thing, he's a very religious man which I am not. And his active and organized religion which I'm not. He carries on an extensive correspondence on scholarly military matters and is inclined to interject himself into a wide variety of things that probably call a little outside of his responsibilities which I'm not. I tend to stick to my knitting pretty much and I don't really worry about the other guys job so long as what he does doesn't impinge on what I'm doing. He was a great believer in studies and that sort of thing. And I think probably has the attributes and instincts of a great military writer now. He hasn't written very much because I don't suppose he's ever had time too. I hope he will because he has lots of good ideas that are very well developed. I'm not. I've always rather detested studies. I think we waste tons of paper, brain power, time and money in proving something that we already know before we do the study. I guess I'm more inclined to operate on instinct, background, clear-cut spur of the moment decisions than General Johnson is. I don't mean to say that General Johnson is any way indecisive because he's not. He's a very decisive individual but he does like a lot of backup on a decision paper. I don't particularly . . . I like to know the facts and I'm perfectly

willing to make a decision based on the facts and if anybody wants to argue with me, I'll be glad to listen to their arguments and they might talk me out of it, but I just don't . . .

LTC FEENEY: Could you talk to General Johnson on it?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, oh, yes. Yes, I have on many, many occasions.

LTC FEENEY: Even though he's done all this thorough research and spent all that time on resources he's still . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I have. Oh, yes. I have. He's objective. Very receptive to contrary opinion on the part of anybody. I've seen great numbers of Indians in his JCS briefings back him off of a position. It's not at all unusual and he expects you to speak up and I do too as a matter of fact. I suppose as a result of my 4 years as an Indian in OPS, I had a pretty deep appreciation for the position of the Indian, what he knew. He's really the only guy that knows a great many of these things and his views. I was very receptive to contrary opinion on the part of the Indian. Now, this -- The same thing was not approved throughout the Army Staff though I was extremely suspicious of anything that came up from OACSI in communications, electronics I did just trust him an inch and not too much from ONT or OACSI, I guess they call it at that time. And the reason for this is that in all these areas you find some special interest that are not above pushing their viewpoint beyond the round of respectability if you know what I mean.

LTC FEENEY: Wouldn't that be kind of inherent, though, in OACSI or . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, it is. And you've also got to remember that these people might do one JCS paper in 6 months whereas our OPS people did them everyday so they knew how the system worked and they had a better feel for what I needed as the DCSOPS to go down in the tank. I also had trouble with OACSI on clearances and that presented some problems. For example . . .

LTC FEENEY: Is this when they were doing all the polygraphs on everybody?

LTG LEMLEY: No, no. I never got involved in that. What I was involved in primarily was the reconnaissance program. I was deeply involved in the Publeo and the reconnaissance ship that got put off the coast of Israel and some of these things. Well, I once had this major from OACSI come up and recommend I concur in a paper he had never seen because he wasn't cleared for it. Well, you know, that really brought it a little far because this was on submarine operations is what it was and they are very, very tricky things.

LTC FEENEY: 558 and 558 operations. Infiltration, exfiltration operations?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, this was the entire submarine intelligence effort. I'm not -- I know what your talking about, but it's beyond that . . . In fact, I don't think anybody in the Army was . . . and this was true a number of things, particularly in the nuclear business. But anyhow, we diverged here. But really, my relationship with General Johnson was one that developed as a result of mutual respect. First at Seventh Army, here at the Command and General Staff College and later when I was at DCSOPS. Now he first planned to bring me up as OACSI a year before I left here and I didn't really want to go. I was saved by a personnel shuffle which left him with a general he couldn't put anywhere but OACSI. So I didn't go up at that time. But really, that's the only time he has carried me along so to speak. Both our personal and our official relationships were very fine though under the circumstances. We were so involved in business activities that we didn't just sit and visit very often ever.

LTC FEENEY: You still have that same relationship today or is

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, yes. No, no. I don't see him very often. I've seen him a couple of times since I've retired. Once he came here to Leavenworth and

visited me at my house. I saw him 11 years ago over in Lawrence, where he was speaking for the Regional Rotary Club and we had a nice visit there. But we don't correspond very much. In the first place, I'm not a very good correspondent and he's a busy guy. But our relationship is very, very warm, yes.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, when he left as Chief of Staff, I guess Westmoreland was taking over. He must have had some influence on who his successor could be or maybe he didn't but . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, he had absolutely no influence on Westy's appointment as Chief of Staff. In fact, he had very low regard for Westy. He was fired and it was a terrific blow to him and it was a really a very dirty way to do it because you came during a JSC meeting. General Wheeler, the Chairman, had been over to the White House and he came back into the meeting and said, "Johnny, I've got to see you right away." So Johnny went in his office and was told that he would not, that he could either take the job as the U. S. Rep to the NATO military committee or retire and he elected to retire. He didn't have any . . .

LTC FEENEY: Senator President Nixon, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: No. This was under Johnson. Lyndon Johnson. And the reason -- he should have been the chairman. And I believe had they -- there was no member of the JCS that would not have welcomed his appointment because he towered above the other Chiefs and there's no question about it. And it was widely expected that he would be the Chairman. Now the reason that they didn't want him was because, I'm speaking Secretary of Defense, President . . .

LTC FEENEY: The civilian hierarchies.

LTG LEMLEY: The civilian hierarchy. The reason they didn't want him was that he was a very outspoken individual and he never hesitated to differ with

him, to challenge their assumptions to -- and he always was better informed and better equipped to challenge their position than they were to defend against him and Mr. McNamara just didn't like this at all. He didn't care to be challenged. So I'm sure he's responsible for Johnny's going. They roundly detested him in the systems analysis office because he was so far ahead of them.

LTC FEENEY: Just cause he did his homework?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Yes.

LTC FEENEY: Did you find that to be true of most of the civilian hierarchy and the government at that time as opposed to say Mr. Kissinger who seems to do his homework quite indepth. Is it pretty true, say, of the Deputy SEC OP and the SEC OP and these people?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, they did their homework, but their homework wasn't objectively prepared. There was, at this period, while Mr. McNamara was still there, there was and the same was true with Clark Clifford too. There was an atmosphere of total dishonesty in the civilian hierarchy of the Pentagon. You know, Mr. McNamara always said there was no limit on the people, equipment and that sort of thing that the services could have if they really needed them. So his whole staff directed their efforts to demonstrating that things weren't needed. And some of them were rather absurd. I mean they were totally absurd. Some of the rationales they came up with were shooting down, budgetary items. You see, there really was a very tight sealing on the budget though this was never admitted, you see. Mr. McNamara never would admit there was a sealing. But there was a very tight ceiling. And this was under the Johnson program of "guns and butter." I mean, we were fighting a tremendously costly war and at the same time exercising no physical restraint at all at home in our social programs. So the limits on the military were

extremely tight and really what it came down to was that we were nickled and dimed to death on fighting the war, I mean on the cost of operations. I'm talking about ammunition and people and this sort of thing. We were nickeled and dimed to death on that. Of course we eventually, I mean a war sucks things in that you eventually probably spend it anyhow, but it was handed out in a very niggerdly manner. I mean, we never got ahead of the power curve at all. We were always behind it and all of our new development programs we're just completely neglected. In otherwords, we just didn't put anything in the bank for the future.

LTC FEENEY: And that's capital so to speak.

LTG LEMLEY: That's right. Nothing in R&D and that sort of stuff. And new weapon. And that's why the pressure is on the military budget right now because they're trying to catch up of 5 years of near starvation. So it was a sort of a bad time and being in the Pentagon at that time was a pretty unpleasant sort of business. I think mine was less unpleasant than some because as the DESOPS, I had a little different area. I didn't deal in money very much. I suppose it derives everything but I didn't deal with the details of money to any considerable degree and the Chiefs, I think, were fulfilling their requirements for military advice at that time on a very objective basis. Now the advice was generally ignored but nevertheless, I think that the Chiefs were functioning very effectively during this period. But we've sort of diverged here I guess.

LTC FEENEY: Yes. I was going to say just because General Johnson was fired, was he fired in order to get Westy in there? Was that . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. They had to have a place for Westy. Westy had to be received politically. He had to be relieved and there was just no other place to send him.

LTC FEENEY: What do you mean he had to be relieved politically?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the anti-war pressures on Johnson were so strong that he had to do something different in Vietnam and I guess the easiest thing to do different was to bring Westy home. You know, it was sort of a throwing a bone to the dog, bringing Westy home. That's really what it amounted to. Course he also had to fire Mr. McNamara though, this I think was because, was personal because he felt that Mr. McNamara was a little too close to Bobby Kennedy and he felt that he was a member of that part of the administration and democratic party that we're trying to get rid of Lyndon Johnson.

LTC FEENEY: I guess that's probably a political reality though.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes. It is a political reality and I never understood why Johnson kept this Kennedy crew on that sabotaged him at every move. I mean, you know, he's an old hand at politics and an individual who supposedly treasures loyalty very highly and in fact, with the exception of perhaps Dean Rusk, all of his Top people in the government were fighting him at every corner. And this was true. The anti-war movement in the civilian elements of DOD in the Army were very, very strong. I mean, some of these people didn't really want us to win that war.

LTC FEENEY: In order to blame it on somebody or . . .

LTG LEMLEY: I really have never quite understood their rationale but it's just a tenet of the left wing that that was a bad war, that it would be better if we didn't win it.

LTC FEENEY: Did you perceive this as the DCSOPS or did you receive this as a person? I mean an official capacity, could you see this?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I could see it from an official capacity.

LTC FEENEY: Is there any way that you could describe that?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes. I mean in ISA and DOD, they were constantly opposing any extension of the bombing, constantly opposing any reenforcement of Vietnam. They were against every move that the uniform military people wanted to make. The same was true of the systems analysis people. It was true of the Under Secretary of the Army and it was very much true in CIA. In fact . . .

LTC FEENEY: What Under Secretary was that, sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, I wish I could remember the guys name because he cost me my fourth star. But, I can't think of it right now. He cost me my fourth star because I accused him of lying once when he was and I wouldn't back down. Oh, what was his name? I can't think of it. Brilliant guy. But crooked if I ever saw one. This opposition was also true in CIA that were distorting intelligence and incidentally, Mr. McNamara would never accept his own intelligence. He always got this crooked product from CIA and I think there was a little group over there that wrote it all up like they wanted it to be. I don't know how true it was in the State Department because course we had Dean Rusk at the time and he was a pretty objective solid guy and I'm sure there was a lot of funny stuff going on over there but they didn't get away with it.

LTC FEENEY: McNamara then never used DIA.

LTG LEMLEY: He never accepted DIA's intelligence product. And this was not only true with regard to Vietnam. It was also true with regard to the NATO estimate. ISA completely rewrote the U. S. contribution to the NATO intelligence estimate and grossly distorted the facts. Now, this didn't sell in the NATO counsel because the other countries recognized it.

LTC FEENEY: How could they distort these, sir? You mean the total threat of the . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes. They always tried to downgrade the threat.

LTC FEENEY: Yes.

LTG LEMLEY: But I don't think that they look to CIA for support on this. I think they just rewrote it out of hand. Well, I said earlier that CIA was furnishing some distorted intelligence on requests for McNamara on the Vietnam situation and that the NATO intelligence inputs were also distorted. I don't want to blame CIA for that because I think they were just manufactured out of the whole cloth and I don't believe CIA would have subscribed to them. I can't imagine anybody in the intelligence community subscribing to those things. But basically what CIA was doing with Vietnam was polishing up the threat rather than downgrading it. They were, I think, trying to support a position that we were in an impossible position over there and ought to get out. I think that's what this was. And there were some pretty unprincipled people over there. There were also some rather unprincipled people over there when I was in OACSI and involved in the intelligence board deliberation.

LTC FEENEY: What level did you . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the ones that I came in contact with were primarily in the board of estimates. Now who was turning out this Vietnam stuff I don't honestly know because you see, I was sort of on the referee of this. I wasn't involved in, it was then the intelligence business then. I was a recipient and not a producer so I really don't know really who specifically was doing that at that time. I suspected it was somebody right in the directors office because I don't think this kind of stuff would have boiled out of the, you know, the mill so to speak. But things were pretty vicious in the Pentagon during this period of Vietnam war.

LTC FEENEY: What kind of relationship was there like with the military and executive branch? Was it openly hostile or was it kind of in the meeting room hostile and outside . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I suppose your talking about in the high level counsels and Mr. McNamara never let the chairman talk and after McNamara left when President Johnson did consult General Wheeler, the Chairman, he was just astounded at the extent to which he had been misled by Mr. McNamara and some of those other people.

LTC FEENEY: What do you mean by misled? Because of these intelligence things? Or that the war wasn't as bad as it was presented by the CIA?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he was just generally misled on both the intelligence situation and on what we were doing and what needed to be done and why it needed to be done and he had been fed Mr. McNamara's personal philosophy exclusively and Mr. McNamara's a very dangerous man. You know, he can't be wrong. And that kind of individual is a very dangerous one to have in the high levels of government at any time particularly at a time like this. He also was very prone to snap judgements and when you couple these two tendencies, you've really got a very dangerous individual. He had many of the characteristics of Hitler.

LTC FEENEY: In what way?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, in that he could never be wrong. He was inclined towards snap judgements. He was arbitrary and ruthless.

LTC FEENEY: You don't mean in his desire to expand the United States to take over other countries?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, no. No. I don't mean in that regard.

LTC FEENEY: Just as a personality?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. He would brook no opposition. Yes, unless you have some other question, I don't.

LTC FEENEY: Well, how important as the DCSOPS did you come in contact with people like Walt Rostow and this type of individual who, I mean, how did

they influence? Did it all of a sudden come down that the DCSOPS wasn't doing anything and was all the executive branch giving you direction or . . .

LTC LEMLEY: No. I had no contact with, no extensive contact with anybody out of uniform. The decision making during President Johnson's term of office while I was in Washington from '66 to '69 until Nixon was elected. It was generally done at a group they called the Tuesday Luncheon. And General Wheeler sat in on this Tuesday Luncheon. He used to complain that they always had liver and it was tough liver. And Mr. McNamara would be there, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Rostow, and then there was sort of a kitchen cabinet of other people. You know, people who really had no official place in government. They weren't always the same people, but they tended to be some, a fairly small group, and they would sit over there and wrestle with these decisions primarily on the reenforcing, troop reenforcement, and bombing. Those were the big issues. They also thought out whether or not to hold Kaesan which really they should have stayed out of. They panicked over TET and all this sort of business. But it was a very informal decision making group and the decisions were made an inch at a time. So it was sort of difficult to live with. And General Wheeler would come back from these meetings and brief the joint chiefs and tell them what went on. And my contact with it was through the Chairman's debriefing of these decision making meetings. Mr. Johnson you know, President Johnson, never used the National Security Council at all. He convened it occasionally, but as a public relations gimmick when he was going to do something and felt that he wanted to say that this had been considered by the National Security Council, he would convene it and they would have a meeting, but the decision making was done at these Tuesday Luncheons.

LTC FEENEY: Were these formal written papers that you'd get out of these things formal directives or . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, no. Most of them came in the form of approving a message or a little position paper or something that after General Wheeler had taken over and it would be modified and approved or approved or not approved. But there were no written directives from the White House that I recall. And of course this same shuffle went on with regard to the riots and civil disorders, though that was a different group than the Vietnam group and it was dominated primarily, I suppose, by the attorney general. How he fell into this I'm not exactly sure, but he was the right arm of President Johnson. In the riot area though, his suggestions were not always accepted by any mean and in this area, the Joint Chiefs weren't involved at all. It was the Army directed with the President that we used to talk to him from the Army Warroom during the bad riots several, oh, a good many times a day. And he also leaned rather heavily on Mr. Cauliferno in this area.

LTC FEENEY: In your position at DCSOPS, what was your opinion of the Army effort in Vietnam?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I thought we did a great job in many respects. I mean, I think our troops were fine. I mean, they were great. The mistake that was made in Vietnam that I think for which the Army must bear the blame was this business of fighting out of Garrisons. We should have never gone in there and built up this tremendous interstructure of base camps, PX's, movies and all of this sort of thing. For one thing, it absorbed much too much manpower and you just couldn't justify it in my opinion by any threats to the imagination. For another thing, it's psychologically bad for a soldier to go from all the comforts of home at daylight and go out and fight a couple of days. It's just bad. I mean, the soldier never really gets his fully adjusted to a combat environment as he should be. But the troops perform very, very well and the commanders, the troop commanders, perform very well

but this tremendous logistic effort that we put into making the troops comfortable was wrong.

LTC FEENEY: Did we really perform well as troop commanders? It seems to me that there has been a tremendous number of relief of commanders over there.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you always have a lot of reliefs. That's just a fact of life in any war. You always have that. And I suppose the reason that there seemed to have been more in Vietnam than you may be found somewhere else was the short tour so to speak. I mean, you floated so many commanders through that it seemed like a lot more of them were relieved whereas in World War II, we had an awful lot of reliefs in World War II but eventually, you know, after you relieved a couple you'd get somebody you wanted and he stayed with you the rest of the war and this was not true in Vietnam. Also I think influencing it was the feeling that you had to get your tickets punched by commanding troops in Vietnam and so there was a great competition for command positions in Vietnam and that is not particularly healthy.

LTC FEENEY: Not a back biting type of thing?

LTG LEMLEY: I suspected there was. I couldn't personally verify this. Also particularly when you get up in your more senior people, this fighting a war out of a helicopter is a very strenuous sort of thing. I'm sure there were, I couldn't document this, but I'm sure there were many cases of people wearing themselves out, you know. So I, actually I think our troops were better in Korea than they were in World War II on the whole and I think they were better in Vietnam than they were in Korea. This partly extends from the better educational level here at home and it partly results from the fact that we had enough wars in the last 30 years to develop a lot of pretty season fighters and commanders and some of your NCO's and that sort of thing.

And the training centers did a truly remarkable job in the training establishment during the Vietnam War was just marvelous. They really turned out fine soldiers in a minimum of time. And of course they had to do it because it was a one year tour.

LTC FEENEY: Was the war fought within what you considered to be Department of the Army concepts? You know, it's very difficult for an Indian such as myself to get an idea of where we were going.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, yes, I know what you mean. No, I would say it's not because this goes back to the war of limited objectives, limited geographically, and I don't think you could with the restraints that were operating, I don't think you could really fight a good war. I mean, there were some things that you should have done that you weren't permitted to do. Another thing that I found extremely distasteful was all this body counting business. You know, we never did that until Vietnam and the only reason we did it then was to feed Mr. McNamara who had to have numbers. I suspected we lost a lot of people just counting bodies, which is a very imprecise art at best and I honestly don't know what it means.

LTC FEENEY: You know, we were accused an awful lot of during the 60's of plotting to assassinate a lot of people and conducting all types of notorious operations. Was this a reality that we really do that or getting into some area that is too classified?

LTG LEMLEY: No. Are you talking about these sales that were set up?

LTC FEENEY: I was not only talking about the Phoenix Program or Iceps, but I'm talking about, say the Diem thing so called by the CIA. Certain things went on in Laos where military people were involved in and could we really be accused of the Army? Could they really be accused of plotting assassinations and people?

LTG LEMLEY: No. The Army was not involved in the Diem thing at all.

LTC FEENEY: I'm aware of that, but I mean . . .

LTG LEMLEY: But Diem was removed with our concurrence. Lets put it that way and I think maybe we pushed the Vietnamese a little now. The party line is that it was never intended that he be assassinated and I guess that's probably true though I can hardly conceive of any rational individual who would see him getting away. Now I don't know of, with the exception of the Armies participation in the Phoenix Program, which it involved assassinations. I don't know, none have come to my mind. You mentioned in Laos. I don't believe we were deeply involved in that sort of thing in Laos. I suppose our primary interest in Laos was just to have a government. I don't think we really cared too much what government we had. And of course CIA and the Army were deeply involved in operations in Laos. My brother was closely involved with them there in 1960, I guess it was 1962. But they weren't involved in assassinations. Basically what they were doing was running these hill tribe efforts, you know, which were very successful, very successful.

LTC FEENEY: In otherwords, we weren't plotting to overthrow governments through assassinations and that type of thing?

LTG LEMLEY: No. The Army really never been involved in any degree in my experience in overthrowing governments. Now I know of a great many such efforts on the part of the United States. They were run by CIA to the extent that there were Army people in CIA. I suppose they were involved in them, but for the most part, the Army opposed all of these things. We opposed them not particularly, I suppose, as a matter of principle but we always thought that they were pretty half baked operations which in fact they were and I've seen them flop all over the place in Syria, Indonesia. In fact, it

got so bad in Indonesia we were supporting both sides at one time and this was sort of over our dead body of the military people. Now I don't know anything personally about the Bay of Pigs but I'm sure it boiled up in the same sort of way that this does. There all a great big secret. Well, a lot of people know about them but their not supposed to, so there's no real participation by the military in these things. And I'm sure that was true of the Bay of Pigs. So they had to have somebody to blame so they pointed their finger at the Joint Chiefs.

LTC FEENEY: How strong, and we talked about this at the Tuesday Luncheon group, but how strong were the executive directives in shifting the strategy of fighting the VC and NVA maybe from a day to day basis or a month to month basis?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, the only Washington participation was in the form of restrictions. I mean, you can't go into Cambodia. You can't go into Laos. You can't cross the border. You can't bomb this. You can't bomb that. And that was the sort of thing I was talking about.

LTC FEENEY: More of the can'ts than the can's.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. There was no -- I don't recall anybody saying, go do something, but there was a lot of, don't do something. But there were, as I say, all sorts of inhibitions on operations.

LTC FEENEY: How did you feel that the, from the DCSOPS standpoint, your ability to give staff supervision or direction to CONUS, MACV?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, at that time I guess it was General Westmoreland.

LTC FEENEY: Yes, it was.

LTG LEMLEY: And I expect we did a great deal in that regard because General Johnson was a regular and frequent visitor of Vietnam and I'm sure he personally gave a great deal of guidance and advice to Westy. But as far

as, you know, official communication staff type communications, they were for the most part, devoted to what resources would be provided and what wouldn't be provided. In other words, we were in the resource business rather than the strategic guidance except for General Johnson. Personally now, he and I discussed this sort of thing at length but we didn't generally commit it to paper and he exercised his influence through personal visits. Now I didn't go over there. I went over there at Christmas. I used to go with him at Christmas because the JCS business was pretty slow during Christmas and all the Christmas holidays and this was the only time that he would permit me to be out of Washington if he was going to be out. See, one of us pretty much had to be there all the time because there really, only three people who, in the Army who have any authority in the Joint Chiefs and there's always the nuclear threat, you know, and somebody has to be there to speak and so the Chief, the Vice Chief, and the DCSOPS normally at least two of them have to be there and never are they all three out of touch with the National Military Command Center.

LTC FEENEY: What did you think about General Westmoreland? Did he ever to the average -- I guess I should rephrase that question. To the average American, it seemed like General Westmoreland was the Army. Did this cause a lot of consternation back there? It seemed like he was the whole thing.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Well, of course when you get into personalities, different people have different feelings and there were many senior people in the Army who felt this was great and there were many senior people who thought it was not great. But this is enviable you know. The field commander in any war reflects in the public eye his service. And of course any field commander in a war tends to be paraded by the President as sort of a backup for the Presidents decisions. I mean, I guess this partially is a result of the

public prestige of military people and despite some of the things you might have heard during the Vietnam War. The military people still in the eyes of most Americans have a great deal of prestige and this is particularly true in the Congress. The Congress does not particularly like to talk to Secretaries of Defense and Secretaries of the Army and that sort of thing. The military affairs people in the house and the senate tend to put pretty high premium on military advice from a uniformed person.

LTC FEENEY: Was there any way we could have extracted ourselves out of Vietnam say during your 10 year as DCSOPS or was it because the other side wasn't listening to us?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there was certainly no basis for any negotiation during the time 1966-69, that I was in DCSOPS. I mean, the North Vietnamese just weren't interested in negotiating. In fact, there was no reason there should be because this tremendous anti-war pressure back in the United States and that's what they relied on all along to win the war because in a military sense, they were suffering tremendously but they always felt that they could hold out until this pressure in the United States reached such proportions that we'd have to pull out. That's the way they licked the French. And people like Fullbright, these prominent Senators, Congressman and people like that, did a great disservice to the country. Now they were entitled to their own views as to what was best for the country, what was right and what was wrong. But to publicly condemn the country as a great disservice and those people cost us a great many lives. In effect, they were great. Now I don't condemn them for pressing their view in the closed council for government. What I object to is for rating them on the front page of the New York Times and the Washington Post.

LTC FEENEY: Did the Army really want to have an negotiation? Weren't we really thought we could whip them and that we want to stomp them and destroy the enemy and yet we hadn't done it?

LTG LEMLEY: No, I wouldn't say that.

LTC FEENEY: Would we have been in favor? Would we have favored negotiations say prior to 1968?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I would say so yes, yes. If any reasonable grounds for negotiation could have been found, yes, I would say so. But I don't believe that it's proper for the military services to take any position on things like this. Now, sure the Joint Chiefs are obliged and required to comment on the military consequences of any given course of action whether it be negotiations or anything else. They are required to present a military judgement on any of a number of options that in the area of national policy that might be under consideration. But the Chiefs don't and should not become involved in guiding national policy. Now as individuals they may have very strong views on it, but in their official capacity, they had no charter for doing this sort of thing. They shouldn't have and I know of no incidence where they've ever done things like this in the period between 1947 and the time I retired.

LTC FEENEY: Well, I was just thinking that where the U. S. executive branch and the congress are split on an issue involving confrontations of war if you will. When does the militaries obligation come to make a judgement on a decision. We certainly, for example . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you don't make a judgement on a decision. You are required really by law to put forth the military consequences of a decision to say that we just don't have the troops to support this or that if we do this, it will require so many more divisions. Your required to make those sorts of contributions to the decision making process both in the Congress and to the President, but it's not up to the military to guide a national policy and it's -- and as far as I know, they don't do it. Now this same thing comes up with regard to the military budget. It's not up to the military to say,

we don't have enough of this, we don't have enough of that. It is obligatory that they say, we don't have the troops to do this but not to say that we have enough too much or not enough in a general way because you, and they should bring out the risks involved. But if things worked in a very orderly fashion, we would have annunciated a national policy and a national military policy. I'm talking about something in a very definitely stated in a piece of paper. If we have those, then it's up to the Chiefs to say what the military requirements of this policy are. Now the President is not obligated to provide, nor the Congress, provide all that the military says is required for this or that policy or action. It's up to the decision making elements at the national level and the President and the Congress to determine what risks their willing to take. They're the decision makers. Not the military. The military doesn't make decisions. And there are lots of people in the service at the lower levels that really don't understand this. You know, they think the Army has to take a position on everything. Well, that's not, it's not neither right nor proper and it shouldn't be that way. The role of the military in national decision making is to present objectively and clearly the military requirements or consequences of any given course of action or any national policy and it's up to the President and the Congress to determine what risks to this policy their willing to accept in the base of other pressures, economic pressures, political pressures and what have you. For example, and you mentioned Vietnam. Now General Johnson had a very crucial role back in 1965 and the decision to go to war in Vietnam in effect. In other words, to use U. S. troops to fight the war as opposed to advisors and this sort of business. But he went over there on a mission to determine what course of action we should follow in Vietnam, you know, when things pretty much collapsed there in '64-65, really when the North Vietnamese came in. He didn't say, well, we've got to send troops. He says, we've either got to fold up and let it go

down the drain or we've got to send troops. I mean, there was that choice. You could either drop us out at Vietnam or you could up the ante and make it a different ball game. So his role in this was not to tell President Johnson to send more troops. It was really to say, if you go to stay there, you've got to send more troops. And we unfortunately, I think, the decision to intervene directly with U. S. Forces while it was made, we never intervened forcefully enough. We were never willing to make the massive effort in an foreshortened period that was required to make this policy of intervention successful. You see, when we would send a division to Vietnam properly, we should have activated 3 or 4 more divisions or 2 or 3 or some number and gotten them ready to replace them, but we didn't you see. We never started activating units, generally speaking, until there was a requirement to deploy them. And this means that you've got a minimum of about 9 months leave time before you decide to commit a division before it can get there. Cause it takes just about 9 months to get one ready to deploy. So that's really what I mean when I say we never stayed ahead of the power turn. Every program, military program, was based on the budgetary assumption that the war would end the next 30th of June. So when it didn't, then you just got further and further behind. But had we really gone in to win, if in 1965 we'd said, well, our job is to get in there, get this over as quickly as possible and we'll devote any resources to it that are needed to do that. The war would have ended successfully, quite a lot longer before it did. I mean, probably in the course of a couple of years. We could have wound it up and you wouldn't have had this tremendous anti-war pressure develop in the United States because a lot of this was a product of impatience rather than any particular opposition to fighting the war in Vietnam. In other words, the American people usually say, if we've got to do it let us get in there, provide

the resources that are required, and get it over with and that political decision wasn't made and had it been made of course of necessity, we would have cut back our, at least not started hundreds of very expensive social programs that were initiated during the same '60's.

LTC FEENEY: This ties in with the distortion of intelligence so that we thought we could do something when we really didn't have the horses to do it when we went there because we certainly didn't . . . I certainly think that somebody when they sent him there thought we were going to win the game.

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, yes. Yes. But this, you see, is going back to intentions. When I first went to Vietnam in 1962 and that was just when the advisory effort was building up very rapidly and that was a very successful program. Actually, when Mr. McNamara said, 'We'll be bringing troops home in 2 years, I think he said that in '62. It might have been 1963. He was facing that on his estimate of North Vietnamese intentions. He was basing it on the assumption that the NVA would not intervene in Vietnam to prevent the defeat of the Vietcong and in point of fact, we were -- we had the Vietcong on the rocks and then the NVA came in, but when I was there in '62, there were 3 divisions of ~~native~~ Southerners NVA who had gone North as refugees sitting up there on the border. Well, as an old Army intelligence guy, to me that was a capability to shove them down there and really I was not surprised when they intervened because they wouldn't have had them there if they hadn't been counting on this as a reasonable course of action. So that was -- it was this old business of intentions versus capability that led us to nickel and dime this and plus restraints that were put on. Now when they first bombed in the North, the Chiefs wanted to really let them have it. In other words, if we're going to bomb, let's go all out and hit them real hard in a short time, but that's not what we did. We just gradually preped

up a little bit and in fact it wasn't until shortly before the war ended when Mr. Nixon turned them loose that the bombing was ever effective. It was never effective but it was when he took the raps off. Now had we done that when we first decided to bomb, I think the war would have been over a hell of a long time before it was.

LTC FEENEY: This was one place where air power could really . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. But its got to be applied massively. I mean, creeping up the peninsula and this sort of stuff, that's not going to do anything. Oh, yes, we could have choked them all because they could have never supplied themselves over the land. They had to have, what . . .

LTC FEENEY: What was the objection to bombing in the North and blockading the port? I mean, once the 1967 . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there were two objections. There were two objections. One was a fear as to how the Soviet Union and Communist China might react and an unwillingness to take this risk. So I'm not sure that the risk of a creeping bombing is any greater than the risk of a sudden one. I can't rationalize that myself. What's the difference between dropping one bomb in Haiphong and dropping thousands of them. None as far as I can see. If the Russians and the Chinese were going to intervene, they would and actually I don't believe they had any real capability to intervene directly effectively. I just don't think they did, particularly China at this time. You know, you had the cultural revolution and all that sort of stuff and I just don't believe -- I think they were pretty well crippled. The Russians about all that they could do would be nuclear attack and I don't think in their wildest dreams the Russians ever considered this as a viable course of action. So I think the risk was overestimated, the risk of Chinese and Soviet interventions over this. The other aspect and this is the one that I really don't

understand, is this bombing civilians bit and for the life of me I can't see the difference between bombing German civilians and North Vietnamese civilians and I don't mean attacking the civilian population. This was never considered, you know, a massive attack to kill civilians and handle it in Haiphong. But valid military targets were excluded because you might kill 10 civilians. Well, this just doesn't -- I just don't . . .

LTC FEENEY: Did it get down to the number of civilian casualties they thought . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Every bombing target that you presented to President Johnson in North Vietnam you had to, and he had to approve each one. You had to include an estimate of probable civilian casualties and these figures might run 10, 15, 25, I mean, you know, there were not any thousands or anything like this but yes, every charge that was presented to him had this estimate of probable civilian casualties and it was a key factor in his decision to bomb or not to bomb. But as I say, I don't really understand that.

LTC FEENEY: What was the real feeling of the PW situation in Vietnam? There's a lot of mixed feeling, times about . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you mean how did the presence of PW's involve military decision making. Well, it weighed very heavily on it.

LTC FEENEY: For example, I'm thinking, why didn't we go into something like that earlier?

LTG LEMLEY: Was that the PW camp?

LTC FEENEY: That was that PW in '71 which was a little late, you know.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, well, we never really had good enough information and wasn't good enough then. We never really had good enough information to carry out a raid like that with any assurance of success. I mean, that was just a fact of life. The probable results were not, were never balanced

out very well with the risks involved, the costs as it went all sour. But the PW situation didn't weigh very heavily on the Chiefs, primarily on the Air Force and the Navy. I guess we in the Army have come to accept that when you fight your going to have lots of casualties, large numbers of prisoners, lots of people killed. But the Air Force and Navy people down deep in their hearts -- they don't really accept this because their not accustomed to it and the prisoners were Air Force and Navy almost entirely. So I think the prisoner situation weighed more heavily on the Chiefs for that reason.

LTC FEENEY: To kind of get off the Vietnam thing for a minute if you wish, unless you have something else, I was thinking about the checkup rising in 1967, a significant period.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it was a rather significant thing, but the fact of the matter is, it was pretty thoroughly accepted that we were not going to intervene in anyway and for that reason, we were interested spectators but not officially greatly concerned by it. I don't mean we weren't concerned, but I think it was very obvious to everybody we weren't going to intervene. It was never suggested that we do so and so it didn't bloom large in decision making deliberations.

LTC FEENEY: There's no mobilization in Europe?

LTG LEMLEY: No. I'm sure there was a little great alert U. S. Forces, but those things come and go, you know, and there was no real expectation that we would do anything, that anything would have to be done. People were rather impressed with the efficiency with which the Russians conducted the operation. You know, that was really pretty fine piece of work on their part.

LTC FEENEY: Were we aware that there was going to be an uprising?

LTG LEMLEY: No. I don't think that your ever aware that there's going to be something like that because if the . . .

LTC FEENEY: You mean we weren't in the background from any of that?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, no. No. I think it was pretty much spontaneous reaction. In other words, I don't think that the Czechs had any particular plan. It just exploded on them I believe. Same things true in Hungary back in 1950.

LTC FEENEY: I would like to go continuing with this check thought. I would like to go to the Bay of Pigs, White Start Program in Laos, the Berlin crisis during that period of time, Cuban missile crisis, and of course the Pueblo, but I think I'd like to stop at this time and put on a new tape.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, O.K.

The following is a tape recorded interview of conversations between LTG Harry Lemley and LTC Gerald F. Feeney. Recorded in the Sixth Session at the Command and General Staff College on 14 May 1974.

LTC FEENEY: Well, sir, to continue our interview many things happened during your time while you were in the sixties such as the Bay of Pigs and the White Star and I was wondering, sir, if you'd like to comment on these as individual instances.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, well, I was not directly involved in most of these things. I would be glad to give my views on them. I think the Bay of Pigs had all the characteristics of many of our subversive operations of this type that CIA has run over the years. During my experience, I was sort of on the sidelines of one in Indonesia which was a miserable failure and really doomed to failure from the start. Another in Syria which also was a rather miserable failure and although I did not know of the Bay of Pigs in advance, I believe had I been privy to it it would of been my estimate that it would of failed. We are just not very good at this sort of thing and I just don't think that we ought a get into this business very often. I think it's one thing to support a spontaneous uprising and it's another to create one. One thing on the Bay of Pigs, I think we grossly overestimated the dissatisfaction within Cuba with Castro. No government ever survives in the face of massive opposition and massive dissatisfaction. Now people maybe a little unhappy and you'll have one French that is actively opposed to the government but usually the great majority of the people are inclined to be rather passive towards it. They tend to accept things as they are; however, distasteful and it's pretty hard to arouse active opposition in the average citizen without completely blowing your security. I mean it takes a massive effort that inevitably is going to be detected and it seems to me that this had little if any chance of success to begin with. Now much was made at the time of

the failure to provide air support and perhaps if air support had been provided a great many of the insurgents might of come out alive who ended up dead or in jail but I don't believe air support in and out of itself would of been decisive in this operation. It seems to me what you have to have to pull off one of these things is something very much like the situation in Chile 6 or 8 months ago when they did in fact have a successful uprising but it was entirely an internal thing. Why it wasn't -- didn't receive outside support? It wasn't stimulated from the outside. It was a inside job so to speak. To the best of my knowledge the only operation of this type that we've ever conducted successfully was in Guatemala and back a good many years ago and I'm not familiar with the details of that operation but of course Guatemala is much different from Cuba and as I say all of them of which -- which I have been privy have been failures and I just don't think this type of thing has any great future as far as we're concerned. Well, next you asked about the operations in Laos and you referred to the White Star program. I think I would like to talk in a little broader term because White Star as I recall it, was the special forces portion of the total guerilla operation in Laos. Now the one thing I've never understood is why we sort of threw in the towel at Laos back in, oh, I don't know, I guess it was '63, I'm not sure, '63 maybe '64, because the fact of the matter is we had the upper hand in Laos. We had the North Vietnamese in Laos in much the same situation that we were in Vietnam. Through the use of the mountain tribes we were pretty much able to deny them the use of roads and force them to use porters in the jungle or air and to say this was a highly successful operation and I think had we elected to pursue it instead of, well, more or less folding it up. We never did completely I suppose. That it held out some pretty tempting fruit because had we wanted to, I think we could of organized the mountain tribes not only in Laos but also in North Vietnam and

perhaps created some trouble on their home front. You see, they're basically all the same people. Same tribes.

LTC FEENEY: Why were we successful there in that situation when the government really wanted a sting of trouble and yet we were unsuccessful and other so many other subversive operations?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, Laos is a very peculiar place to begin with. Both it's physical characteristic's and it's people's and the real fighters in Laos are these mountain tribes. However, they have their limitations too. For one thing they're only good on their home territory. They have this thing that I call a peasant complex whereby they become very insure and fearful when they get outside their home territory and of course some of the tribes a great many of them are only comfortable at the higher levels. I mean you have to keep them in the mountains because they don't function very well at lower altitudes. So I think that was one reason we were successful. Another reason we were successful I think is that the Laos⁺ian people and they're not a hell of a lot of them were mostly friendly towards us. Now maybe this was because we flew around and kicked out bags of rice. Maybe it's for some other reason. I don't know why it is but the fact remains that when we lost people, Laos and air crashes and that sort of thing. They could almost invariably walk out and they would always receive help from the local citizens. So I think actually that's the reason we were successful. You see, there never was any indigenous communist movement that amounted to very much. The Pathet Lao are pretty much of a "joke" and for the most part their so called operations were in fact entirely North Vietnamese operations and not local insurgency. Now there are two northern provinces, one of them was Samneua and I forget what the other one is. They perhaps might be an exception. I don't know because we didn't operate up in that area to any extent and I

really don't know much about the people up there but certainly in most of Laos we were well received and had the passive if not the active support of the people. Now you mention the Berlin crisis. As I understand it, the Berlin crisis, this is a rather indefinite term. I know it's one that's commonly used but when I use that terminology I really refer to two things. One the wall and the other Khrushchev to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and I talked about that a little earlier and what I felt we should of done about that at that time which of course we didn't do that, is the peace treaty. Now as far as the wall is concerned, I think we should of bulldozed it down the first time they started putting it up and I'm pretty sure they would of backed off. I just don't think the Russians were ready to go to war over the Berlin Wall. Now it did stimulate some activities on our part that probably made our task in Vietnam easier and that it did alert the administration to our relatively poor conventional military posture and set in motion a good many measures to improve it which probably contributed considerably to our ability to intervene in Vietnam rather promptly in 1965. I'm not sure that without the Berlin crisis we would of been able to do that as well as we did and I think -- as I said earlier, well, maybe we didn't do it to well at that.

LTC FEENEY: Is there any -- you brought up a good point there sir, just a question from my standpoint. Is there any plotting or any maneuvering by the military or by the government in order that, say we have one crisis that really isn't a crisis but we kind of fake it in order to get the public opinion or to get the military build up. Do we kind of manage this type of type . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Not in my experience though it is possible that this Berlin crisis and the Khrushchev-Kennedy consultation might have had a element of

this in it. I don't know because you see I was pretty far from the centers of power at the time and I've never heard that it did but that administration was not above manufacturing a crisis, I think, but never in my experience have we sort of drummed up any crisis to improve our military posture for other reasons.

LTC FEENEY: I was just thinking in terms of the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, Gulf of Tonkin. These type of things are sometimes, you know, there's been quite . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it's been alleged that the Gulf of Tonkin was a frame up and I'm quite sure this was not true. I think it was a mistake. I mean, I think mistakes were made. I don't believe that the circumstances that were presented to the American people were factual but on the other hand I think that everybody believed that they were. You know, when you start dealing with radars and I'm not saying this to criticize radars. Radars a wonderful thing but they sometimes produce information that can easily be misinterpreted and I know of two occasions of my own personal knowledge when this has happened. Once was at Anzio when I was awakened one night in the middle of the night by a call from the Deputy Corps Commander who was a Brit and said turn all of your guns around, the German fleet is coming down the Tiber and this impressed me as being a little doubtful. I told him, well, I didn't think that we really should turn all of our guns around after all they didn't know what we'd shoot at but that I would get in touch with our Naval Liaison Officer who was a British Commander and alert him to the fact that the German fleet was coming down the Tiber at which I did and he sort of turned over in his sleep, looked up at me and he said, "I see, they can't do that." These are our waters and turned over and went back to sleep which is the proper thing to do. Here was, you know, here's your

radar again then another instance of which I'm very much aware is when the U. S. Air Force took on the U. S. and Australian Navies up off the north coast of South Vietnam one night and that really it was pretty bad. The Air Force inflicted severe damage on an Australian cruiser which we repaired at our expense purely voluntarily. They didn't even ask us to but here again the radar got things screwed up and the Air Force thought the North Vietnamese Navy was coming down and our Navy thought the North Vietnamese Air Force was coming down so they took on each other. This lasted as much as perhaps a half an hour and was a very serious thing. Then to, in a somewhat more nebulous fashion I suppose, back in my intelligence days I was deeply involved with UFO's which we examined in the watch committee all the time. I never arrived at any conclusion. Another incidence not -- again this isn't radar but back in the mid fifties somebody called the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was an Admiral Radford from the war room and told him that BBC was being jammed. Well, of course, this is a very bad thing. Any communications jamming is a very bad sign. Well, Admiral Radford set out SAC on a fail-safe basis as a result of this report. The report was true. It was being jammed but it was being jammed by a harmonic and not intentionally jammed. So I think really that probably from what I know of the Gulf of Tonkin and I don't know all of it by any means that this was one of these electronic incidents which was interpreted to be something other than it was. I'm not sure to this day that anybody knows with absolute certainty what the true facts are.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, you did mention UFO's. Do you have any little stories to relate about those as to their creditability or to how they affect the Army staff and its planning?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, they really don't affect the Army staff at all. The only reason I was involved with them in any way was that I was a member of the watch committee and I think rightly we did not take them lightly. We were not looking for men from Mars or anything like that. We were looking for a Soviet attack and of course these things take on the same sorts of connotation and they were all, I believe they were all electronic detections. Most of these we didn't get involved with these where people see flying saucers and that sort of thing because generally we didn't get the word in time to concern ourselves with them but we used to get lots of -- I say lots of reports, half a dozen a year maybe from our early warning network up in Canada and they -- some of them were never explained. Mostly turned out they were aircraft that had strayed from their flight plan or had failed to file one.

LTC FEENEY: Did they try any deception at this to just to keep us on our toes? Could this of been anything like that?

LTC LEMLEY: I don't think so. They used to fly over and activate the radars occasionally. I don't recall any instance of a overflight of friendly territory but they used to fly up to the, you know, the outer limits of our coverage and activate the radars but I expect that the purpose of this was, you know, they wanted to activate the radar so they could get electronic intelligence on them. At least I would guess that's what it is because that's what we do the same thing for.

LTC FEENEY: How did you perceive the -- in the same light the Cuban missile crisis?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, of course the Cuban missile crisis was widely accepted by the public as a very brave and proper move to make and indeed I think it was a proper thing to do. What I think is not generally known as there was a deal on it and in return for the Russians moving their missiles out of Cuba

we moved a number of our own out of Turkey and I practically speaking, I don't think that means a hell of a lot because I don't think they were terribly useful in Turkey anyhow. They were sort of old and out of date and no particular reason to have them there except psychological reasons but we did make a deal with them. We moved out of Turkey and they moved out of Cuba.

LTC FEENEY: Was this a real attempt by the Soviets? There's no honest or respect. Everybody accepts it as a real attempt by them. You know all those strategist but was it -- were they really trying to do what -- you know for almost no expense because they always could recall them and they took them back home again. They went down there and did this. Was this a real attempt to plan or were they just . . .

LTG LEMLEY: No, I think it was real. I expect they were prepared to get them out in a hurry to but had we reacted less forcefully, I think that they would of let them there and they would be a thorn in our side. Here again this comes back to what I said about the Berlin Wall. I imagine they were a little surprised that we didn't bulldoze it down but no, I think it was real.

LTC FEENEY: Do you think -- how far -- to what point. Now you brought up an excellent point here is that you have seen a chink in our armor that we haven't been forceful enough at certain occasions when it really wouldn't of -- the Russians wouldn't react probably because they wouldn't want to go to war as you say over the excel traiting of people into West Germany. Particularly much if we bulldozed down their wall but do you believe that most everything that the Russians do to us that we should react with this great strength and say, get the hell out of here or whatever, you know, stop what you're doing?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I do as long as . . .

LTC FEENEY: Is this a pattern . . .

LTG LEMLEY: As long as you've got the -- the cards in the hole to back it up and at the time of the Berlin Wall and at the time of the Cuban missile crisis we had these cards. Now we don't have the same kind today because -- and strategic nuclear capability. The Russians have overtaken us to a very considerable degree and we just can't back up a nuclear bluff today. I mean the risks are infinitely greater then they were back in the '50's and '60's and early '60's. So it's fine to play a strong hand but you gotta have good cards to back it and our cards aren't as good as they once were in that regard. In fact they're not nearly so. Actually I think the in product of the Cuban missile crisis worked to our disadvantage because it illustrated to the Russians their gross Naval inferiority and really there except for submarines prior to the Cuban missile crisis their Navy was just sort of living off any bones that happened to be thrown this way and that's changed drastically since the Cuban missile crisis so we in effect stimulated the Russian Naval buildup of the same might be said for their strategic missile forces, though I'm much less sure that this wouldn't of happened in the normal course of advance. I rather think it would have, but in any case we're not very well situated for the bluffing game anymore. Did you want to talk anymore about the Cuban missile crisis?

LTC FEENEY: No sir, I think that -- because I want to get in your ideas in concepts of strategy later on and what you feel the Army situation is today and will be in the future but I would like to cover one more major incident that you have personal knowledge of and that's the Pueblo.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, well, that was a debacle anyway you look at it and really it -- well, primarily I -- I think it was a personal failure on the part of

the commander of the Pueblo. It's true that it was essentially an unarmed ship. It's only armament was a 50 caliber machine gun and it's also true that the North Korea gunboats threatened to blow him out of the water but the fact remains that he did surrender and I -- it's my personal belief and of course nobody can prove anything in this regard because it's water under the dam now but it's my personal belief if he had unlimbered his 50 caliber machine gun and let fly that they probably would of backed off but in any case he didn't. Now much has been made of our failure to react promptly with our own forces. To the initial word that the Pueblo was in trouble and really the reason for this was a very practical one that the only aircraft we had in South Korea and they were the only ones that were close enough to, you know, get there in any reasonable time where in a nuclear configuration and required several hours of work to put back in a conventional configuration. Now you can say, well, why didn't we send them on up there with the nukes as a show of force and I just don't think there's any great future in this because I don't think any Naval ship under conditions like that will accept a hostile aircraft within range without reacting. I don't believe our ship, our Navy would and so I think it would of been wrong to send them up without -- without bombs so to speak. There was another failure and this again comes from the old compartmentation of intelligence. There was an awful lot going on in the back room that never got to uncleared duty officers and that sort of thing. The kinds of people who would have been the ones that you would expect to initiate counter action. There was a lot of carrying stuff around in briefcases instead of picking up the telephone. So it's true that we probably wouldn't have reacted on a timely basis even had we had the resources to do so but I think really that the failure of the commander of the Pueblo was the root of the problem and

though really it was pretty disgraceful. You see I go back to my young lieutenant I mentioned several days ago at Triest who when the Yugoslav division pulled up he moved out his little Recon squad and stopped them while I think the Pueblo was in much the same sort of shape and looking at it from a purely -- from a standpoint of pure national interest it would of been much better to have him guess wrong and get sunk then to let the ship be captured as it was. Now we went into an awful lot of soul searching on what to do about the Pueblo and this was from the White House all the way down the line. Oh, we talked about sinking the ship, bombing the harbor, sinking a submarine or sinking the North Korean Navy and when it all came down to it there was nothing we could do that was in anyway appropriate either as -- even as punishment and absolutely nothing you could do that would in anyway help the crew or salvage our national honor so to speak.

LTC FEENEY: When does national honor and national interest conflict? When, you know, when does one supersede the other?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, that's a little hard to say. I'm not sure that they conflict necessarily. I don't think they do. I don't think they're in conflict. I mean there are some things you pretty much have to respond to and some you don't. Now I don't think this was something that we had to respond to and certainly short of bombing North Korea off the face of the earth. There was damn little we could do and that probably would not of been useful from the standpoint of national interest and I think it would probably of not reflected very well on the United States in the eyes of the world.

LTC FEENEY: Was there any -- there was a movie not too long ago about the Pueblo of the atrocities that were -- the punishment that these German underwent and it was really -- looked quite harsh on TV.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think it was. They were very harshly treated but the Koreans were a pretty tough bunch of folks. All Koreans and I think they sort of enjoy this sort of activity. Just for the record the Pueblo was not in North Korean waters and never was until they towed it in. Now they may of thought it was, you know, maybe they -- they had a little trouble with their range finders and that sort of stuff just like we have with our electronic gear sometimes but it never was. In fact, it stayed outside the 12 mile limit which we don't recognize but which we do accept but I hope -- I think that we restored a little more orderly chain of command and responsibility to our reconnaissance activities of this type after the Pueblo. You see, this was the second such incident in the relatively short time we had the Liberty, and you know off the coast of Israel and that was sort of a disgrace too. Everything went wrong. In the first place the CNO, 12 hours before the Liberty was attacked was becoming very nervous about where the Liberty was and he dispatched an order to the Liberty to move out which only reached it after it was attacked and the reason it took so long was that -- well, in the first place, the Army method center clerk who got the message said, "Well, the Navy's all in the Pacific," so he routinely routed the message out to the Pacific. Then it did go to Europe, but the Navy has a very funny communication system. When you want to communicate with a Navy ship, you have to know what land station its monitoring and because they switch from one station to another and in the case of the Liberty they had moved off of one station and on to another one without ever telling anybody. So the second tribe went to the wrong station. Then in the inner room, the CNO had gotten still more nervous about the Liberty because he couldn't seem to move it and he had sent a message through command channels to the commander of the Sixth Fleet, but the commander of the Sixth Fleet was being briefed for

a press conference and his operations officer didn't see fit to interrupt the briefing to deliver the message on moving the Liberty. So here again, another -- that's three failures. As a matter of fact the commander of the Sixth Fleet, I don't think was by any means sure that he really commanded the Liberty and I don't -- I can well understand why he didn't, because when it came aboard it had come up from Africa and changed crews in Spain because they had the wrong kind of languages on it. He had tried to visit the ship and was told not to. So you see it's a little garble and I hope we tighten that up because there is a dual chain of command on these operations. One is out of NSA who is responsible for the technical operations of the ship and through the Naval Commander in the area who is responsible for the safety of the ship. Now this was an awful mess and when the Pueblo came on top of the -- the Liberty, it -- it just shook the foundations of the Joint Chiefs. Interestingly enough we got very cautious after this and we had a similar ship operating off the Cuban coast and we had insisted -- the Joint Chief had insisted and directed CINCLANT to provide a destroyer escort and to keep aircraft alerted in Southern Florida to intervene should it become necessary. Well, this particular ship was an old one and it's engines broke down off the coast of Cuba and it started drifting in toward the shore. This was about a month after the Pueblo. Started drifting into the Cuban coast and well, the destroyer threw it a line and tried to tow it out, but the cable broke, but finally they got another line in and pulled it out just as it was drifting into the three mile limit. These are a very tricky operations and it's hard to know whether some of them are worth the risk or not. It's just very hard to know.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, I'd like to comment on this dual chain that you've been talking about here. That still exists today's. NSA still has two technical supervision of these things.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, that's true but . . .

LTC FEENEY: Do you think that this is the way that should be done? As long as they're operating abroad military vessels in so and so port. Shouldn't each service have it's own electronic type of intelligence service. Shouldn't we really control this a little bit better than . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, we should control it a hell of a lot better than we did at this time, but I'm not sure that the dual chain is necessarily bad as long as you have it firmly established in everybody's mind as to which chain is preeminent and I think that's the case now. In other words, I don't think there's any question in any commanders mind today that he has an absolute override on these things and I don't think there would be any hesitation to use it. Now this was not true obviously at the time of the Pueblo and the Liberty.

LTC FEENEY: I guess basically my question is -- do we need an NSA? Could -- with the services, we do have a director of NSA, we have a civilian component there also, I think a Deputy Director is always a civilian, military director is, of course, I think is rotated but don't we really need to bring this more into line of -- of a military organization that's -- NSA's still thought of as a civilian agency.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it is primarily a civilian agency, of course. No, I don't really think you could -- could justify an NSA in each service and that's what it would inevitably become because the needs don't necessarily follow service line. When you don't have a central processing in a central library so to speak a lot of pretty useful information gets lost in the shuffle going from one agency to another or maybe not going and I'm not saying that it wouldn't go because of any desire to withhold it but it's just -- people frequently don't think of sending something to somebody else

who's very vitally concerned with it and of course it's a tremendously expensive operation and I just think that part of the centralization of intelligence is not bad. I think that's not bad although I do think the centralization of intelligence in DIA, for example, is probably bad because I think there your basic intelligence means of the services, particularly the Army, will never be met. Now I do think it's proper that the services have their security agencies because each service does have some specialized requirements and needs, resources that it can place a disposal on our field commanders as opposed to placing them at the disposal of the national intelligence effort, and I think this was very well demonstrated in Vietnam where the Army Security Agency did provide extremely valuable support to the commander of which certainly would never who have been available had we had a single national security agency as opposed to a national security agency plus the three service agency. Now I can't speak with any great authority on how this same sort of thing applies to the Air Force and the Navy but I'm sure it does. Well, I know it does. The Air Force because they had a very useful theatre operational capability that serve both the Air Force and the Navy. It was absolutely essential and you just had to have it. So I think the arrangement of those agencies is not bad today though it may of changed some since I left the Pentagon in 1969. I'm not at all sure that it hasn't. It may of changed for the worst.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, you did mention it and I want to get strategic here for a minute if I may. We've heard an awful lot about during the '60's and all these incidents that we've been talking about here today. About the policy of flexible response. Was this a reality? Were we capable of this type of a policy? How did it affect you . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it had a very drastic affect on all military planning and on your first fore struction. Now the philosophy or policy of flexible response was not something that suddenly dawned on the upper echelons of the military. It was forced on us because in fact we really, since the mid '60's, have not enjoyed the sort of strategic balance in nuclear weapons and this is what I'm talking about now. That would realistically allow us to rely on the strategy of massive retaliation, that was the national strategy in the '50's. We just don't enjoy the balance that would permit a rational man to elect a nuclear attack as a reasonable course of action. It's just not reasonable. I don't think that any President of the United States could bring himself to the decision to launch a nuclear weapon with the full realization that he is accepting with a fairly high degree of certainty some 50 to 60 million casualties in the United States. I mean, you know, this just doesn't float.

LTC FEENEY: How about an artillery cannon or tactical on the battlefield?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't believe in those either. I have heard this tactical nuclear weapons debated at great length and discussed. I've seen various methodologist propose for using it but the fact the matter is that when you let the cat out of the bag you don't know where the cat's going and the chances at what we consider a tactical nuclear weapon might trigger a nuclear attack on the United States and this is a risk that this is just always there. It just won't hold water because you see, you don't know how the other guys gonna interpret this and he can't afford the weight either because your decision time and any nuclear response is on the order of ten minutes and so, suppose in the Kremlin -- they get word that a new -- there's been a nuclear attack on one of their airfields in East Germany. Well, they've got ten minutes to decide what to do and they just might get a little irrational under those circumstances. Now I don't even think that any President

of the United States could arrive at a decision to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Going to stop to think about. Suppose, and I've gone through drills on this, in the MNCC when we were tied up with the White House and everything, and I've seen the kind of soul-searching that goes on even when you know it's just a game. The atmosphere gets very realistic down there, you know it's just for exercise and when you stop to think about it, suppose that we had a strike on a large portion of our missile force. We had, oh, perhaps 5, 10 million casualties. You probably wouldn't get much more than that because by enlarge they're not in heavily populated areas. What in the hell is the point of knocking off 25 million Russians when you know you still got 50 million more Americans to throw into the pot. It just doesn't hold water, and so the way I feel on nuclear weapon is we've got them and as long as the Russians have them too, we've got to have them and this applies to tactical nuclear weapons as well as to the strategic variety, but I don't think that a nuclear weapon will ever be fired again . . .

END of TAPE:

LTC LEMLEY: We were talking about nuclear weapons and I don't know whether it got on the tape or not but it's my own belief that never again will a nuclear weapon be fired in anger, but I certainly don't by any stretch of the imagination want to convey the impression that we don't need them as long as we live in a nuclear world. We have got to have a measure of parity with the Soviet Union and when I say parity I'm not talking about exactly the same number of missiles. I'm not talking about exactly the same throw weight. Not even necessarily talking about the same qualitative characteristics because you see the nuclear problem, the Soviet Union is vastly different in attacking the United States, is vastly different than is our problem in attacking the Soviet Union. To begin with, you've got the tremendous dispersion of population and industry in the Soviet Union, and in this country a very high degree of concentration of population and industry. So the strategic problems of the two countries are very different and I don't know what the answer really is. There's also another fact that you have to consider when you're talking about nuclear forces and that's the question of reliability. I mean it's true that the missiles have been tested but the fact of the matter is a very, very, small sample of production line type weapons have ever been tested and I don't believe we have any real fix on the reliability of our weapons. I don't imagine the Russians are better off in that regard. There's a question you have to consider. There are constantly new discoveries in the nuclear field of effects that drastically modify your nuclear needs and I really don't feel at liberty to talk at any length about these. Some of them are rather fearful and so this is just a very big, very questionable area of national policy and I'm sorry to say that a great many people in the Army I don't think view this very objectively. The first requirement of US military policy is an effective strategic nuclear

force and anything that has to suffer to pay for this is worth it. I mean you, I guess what I'm saying is, strategic forces are a national question and not a service question and although there may be some empire building involved in this. Certainly anybody in the Army should always support a reasonable program in this area and I think they do on the higher level though I did find at the action level in the Pentagon there was a inclination to snip at this. Somewhat partly I suppose, to influence by sharing my belief that they'll never be used in anger but the thing of it is if you let the balance get out of whack they might be and you just can't afford to let that happen. So . . .

LTC FEENEY: Well, where did you think we made our biggest mistake in the '60's in allowing this to happen? Was it because of this policy of flexible response?

LTG LEMLEY: No, it wasn't. It was in part a lack of appreciation of the problem in the Congress and in the administration but primarily I would say that it was the guns and butter policy in financing the war in Vietnam. In other words we just didn't make the investment in R and D and hardware that needed to be made. We were unwilling to sacrifice social programs to finance this investment and as wars always do they just sucked in all the military money that we had in the bank and they always do that. Wars in being always suck resources. Now there's been a lot of talk about nuclear disarmament, treaties and that sort of thing and I believe it's generally believed that military people oppose this sort of thing which isn't necessarily so. Actually if we could arrive at a good SALT Treaty it would probably be advantageous for both us and the Russians but where the military tend to part company with the disarmers is over what is a good deal and you have to -- this is a very complex sort of thing because it does you little good to discover some fine

morning in 1980 that the Russians have been violating this thing for five years and we just never did know it. You got to have your agreement so drawn that you can detect violations with sufficient leave time to do something about it and this leave time tends to get pretty long. It gets in the range of five to ten years in most cases before you can respond to a initiative on the other guys part to violate the treaty. It also comes down to taking a good deal on faith. Now just as an illustrative point, one of the aspects of the current negotiations it was -- caused a good deal of soul-searching. What do you do about the mobile land missiles? Do you ban them or don't you say anything about them? Well, if you don't say anything about them then they're not covered by the treaty and it's entirely feasible to have them. If you do ban them it's generally accepted that it would take us on the order of three to five years to detect a Soviet buildup of nuclear -- of mobile missiles with the means we now have available. So what do you do? Do you ban them or you don't -- don't you say anything about them and you run into all sorts of things like this. You can limit the number of missiles but with your MERV's, this doesn't really mean a hell of a lot because the relationship of missiles to warheads is variable and it's warheads that count. But you can't detect what's inside a nose cone, you know, I mean one with one warhead looks very much like one with five. So this is an area you have to think about. Submarine missiles it's very difficult to know with any certainty at any given time just how many missile launching submarines the Soviets might have and then you go over to their side of the fence and they begin thinking about aircraft in West Germany. We consider these tactical aircrafts. We won't talk about these because they're tactical. They're not strategic, therefore, they're not within the

range of talk but when with considerable ease they can drop a bomb on Moscow from a airfield in Germany. This doesn't look quite so tactical to the Russians you see. So they're just tremendous complexities to this thing and even with an awfully good measure of good will on both sides it's still impossible to draw an acceptable compromise agreement and of course when you say this -- when I say this -- I guess I better confess that I take the cynical view of treaties. Treaties are not sacred and to the best of my knowledge no country has ever fully honored a treaty when it ceased to be in its national interest to do so and then I guess I ought to say a little something about the arms race. Now this gets such a big play in the Congress and in the newspapers and everything. See we didn't want to deploy ballistic missile defense because it would heat up the arms race. Well, that always seemed a little far fetched to me. For a couple of reasons. One, my ballistic missile defense isn't going to kill any Russians anywhere. It's not gonna hurt them a damn bit. All it does is protect us. For another thing there hasn't been any arms race since the early '60's anyhow, because it takes two to make a race and we haven't been racing. Now the Soviets may have but we haven't so there really hasn't been any arms race. We haven't really done any much at all to our strategic nuclear force in the last 15 years. Oh, we done some. We spent a good deal of dough but, you know, I mean it's sort of peanuts when you think of what could of been done if we had really wanted to have a arms race with the Russians.

LTC FEENEY: But here again hasn't this Vietnam thing kind of limited us on arms also. We had to pour so much money into such things as logistics, you know, lines of communication and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, yes.

LTC FEENEY: . . . and that just kind of brings the American attitude toward -- for everything and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, that's true.

LTC FEENEY: I guess maybe what I'm driving at here, sir, is the question of when is it more important that we get involved in something like Vietnam as opposed to maintaining our superiority in the strategic forces?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, of course.

LTC FEENEY: It's a hard question to answer.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, that's one you really can't answer because in the current atmosphere it's a hypothetical question and you -- any answer I gave would be against the background of perceptions that I might have that you might not and I -- I don't think I could usefully answer that question. I think we are trying now to repair some of the damage to our strategic forces but the trouble is that with this fantastic inflation we've had particularly in the cost of military hardware. They cost a hell lot more now so the same number of dollars don't produce anything like the in product that they used to and in this connection the volunteer of force concept along with the tremendous increases in personnel cost have tended to further erode that portion of the budget that you can put in the -- into strategic forces and I really think our personnel costs have gotten out of hand. I have sought for several years and this was true before I retired I'm not just saying it now that really the Army was getting over paid, oh, for the last five or six years. Now I'm for it for this reason because they finally got this bill, who was the Congressman from South Carolina? Gosh, I can't think of his name. He finally . . .

LTC FEENEY: Mendall Rivers?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, Rivers finally enacted this thing that at anytime they raise the pay of the civil service they had to raise the military pay by a comparable amount. Now I heartily support that for where I think it's really

gotten out of hand is that we've raised the civil service pay much too fast, much too fast.

LTC FEENEY: Well, you know, sir. I think there's a image thing here and -- and I think possibly and it's my opinion and I probably shouldn't be offering my opinion on your tape but possibly if they had -- if the Army had become a profession based on success and accomplishments rather than based on pay then I think our results might be better today. I think we've put, you know, successes money type of thing and that we haven't given enough to -- enough pats on the back to American society and said, Hey Army, you're doing a good job or we appreciate your devotion to duty and then instead of giving us that pat on the back, they've raised our pay type of thing.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, it's probably.. . . .

LTC FEENEY: I don't know that but I

LTG LEMLEY: . . . in what you say and -- but basically my own philosophy on pay is that military pay should be at a level which will provide long range security to the professional soldier and when I say that I mean if he can educate his children, that he can live on a good middle class standard, and I don't think you have to make anybody rich. I don't think that you can attract the kind of people that would be useful to you with pay. Now I mean I -- in other words when you sort of go beyond this sort of adequate level that I described not very precisely. I don't think adding more money to the kitty is going to attract the kind of people you want because really, you can hardly compete with the other professions. Medicine, the Law, and that sort of thing on a financial basis and just look at our doctors for example, on that score. So what I guess I'm saying, is there are a given percentage of the American population and what this percentage is I'm not sure. The British found it to be about five percent that accept

and enjoy and sort of treasure the profession of bearing arms and as long as you provide reasonably well for them this same percentage is gonna come along. Now, what I think we've gone a little overboard in attributing too much importance to pay in attracting people to the military life. You can't pay a guy to fight a war in Vietnam or Korea or someplace like that. I mean there's no financial reward that you can set on that, you know, makes it attractive. In other words what I'm saying is a guy has to want to serve his country and want to serve it as a soldier and if he's going to take it for better or worse and I think most of us do.

LTC FEENEY: We almost touched on it and I should of interjected this, sir. I was wondering about the sufficiency of documents that come to DA for interpretation as national policy. You mentioned once before earlier on our talks. I thought it might be a good time to discuss this since force development enters these things. How do we -- I think you've mentioned that the President should be a little more definitive in policy guidance and in the strategy. Could you talk about that and maybe some of the pitfalls of that?

LTC LEMLEY: Well, yes, and I guess I would certainly have to say that guidance on national policy is pretty hard to find. That is the kind of guidance you need to prepare an appropriate military program. Now to the best of my knowledge, for the last 100 years or so, we've had really only one basic national foreign policy and that is that no single nation shall dominate either Europe or the Orient. Now you wouldn't find this written down anywhere and it probably isn't universally accepted in the Congress and by the people. So I don't think you could ever put it in writing and make it stick but this has been our policy and basically this is what we fought wars for but when you try to translate this derived policy into a

concrete fore structure in a program of R and D, procurement and that sort of thing. It really becomes a little difficult and in all my years in the upper echelons of planning, the only time I ever saw anything definitively stated in this regard was while I was DCSOPS when we had the stated military objective of maintaining forces capable of fighting a major war in Europe and a holding action in the Far East. Now I expect this at the same time plus responding to localized emergencies in Western Hemisphere and I think this really was a firm policy, oh, up and until perhaps about 1966 or '67. I mean this really was the guiding principle and it's very easy to develop requirements based on that. Well, it's not easy but it can be done with I think relative precession. We did it but without changing the trouble you run into on this is without changing the policy after a period of years it tends to lose force. I mean people still talk about, but neither the Executive Branch nor the Congress any longer really accepts it, you see. In other words, it tends to erode. Now I notice somewhere in here you had a question about the 14th Division Force and I -- that was one incidentally -- I was not going to answer because I don't know what policy assumption the 14th Division Force is based on. If we still on the surface adhere to the policy I just stated that I worked with; 14th Division Force won't cut it but perhaps we've fallen off this policy and have a new one stated. I suspect though that's not the case. I suspect we don't have any -- any currently stated because I think in this time frame if I read between the lines correctly, that we are back to the old system of saying, okay, you can have X billion of dollars and you split it however you think best and I -- this incidentally is not a -- not a bad way to go about it so long as the X is reasonable but without national policy guidance it's -- it's really not possible to construct well, that's the same old one. It's really not possible to construct a very

precise fore structure but you see, you say that because somebody in the bows of the Pentagon and I guess I ought to explain, we're talking about the same old strat -- somebody in the bows of the Pentagon is probably still hanging on to the old one because it looks pretty good when in fact it's long since been abandoned in the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, but I think I want to go back when we talking about fore structure. I think I want to go back to something I said the other day and I want to reemphasize, and that is the role of the military and national planning and the proper role is to state requirements based on strategy and threat but it's not up to the military to say what risk is excessive. You can lay out the consequences of taking this or that risk but it is the responsibility of the President and the Congress to establish the risk that they're willing to accept and once that's established it's really not up to people in uniform in their official capacity to quarrel with it. Now if they want to quarrel with it as citizens, that's their prerogative but it isn't their prerogative to quarrel in public forums.

LTC FEENEY: That brings to point something I haven't talked to you about and that's during the '60's we did have some military personalities who had retired from the service and I think of General Gavin and General Taylor and people of course who, I guess we could give General Taylor credit because he was in a political role almost but they're military people such as General Gavin who was very, very much against the war. I think the commandant of the Marine Corps even was against it.

LTC LEMLEY: Yes, and I think any individual who's retired from the service ought to enjoy considerable freedom of expression. I don't think that that freedom really extends to -- to opposing a war we're already in, in public forums. Now if he wants to privately express his opinion that's one thing,

but I don't think it's appropriate for a retired officer to oppose publicly a war in being. I think it's disgraceful. He can speak with his vote if he wants to because -- so I don't think that was proper and incidentally I've never had any respect whatever for Gavin and not a hell of a lot for Shoup who I know pretty well, though he is a colorful character.

LTC FEENEY: Is this Gavin thing -- is this something that you started way back in . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I never, I never had . . .

LTC FEENEY: Were you classmates with him maybe?

LTG LEMLEY: No, he was far enough of me. I think I first met him in World War II, but I didn't know him then. I achieved a dislike for him in the Pentagon when he was the Chief of R&D, and was trying to get us to distort intelligence to support his programs which I didn't appreciate and I must say we didn't do it either.

LTC FEENEY: I wanted to ask you a question if I may, sir, since we are talking about guidance and national policy. What -- how do you perceive the Soviet military and political leadership? You talked about fighting their advances with force. Apparently you must have your own opinions as to the insight of -- known insight into this?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I have my opinions. I don't know whether you'd call it insight or not but I think the Russians, and I'm speaking of the leadership, has an inferiority complex and while we're accused from time to time of thinking they're ten feet tall. It's my belief that they consider us to be about fifteen feet tall and in fact, I think they're even afraid of the Germans. I think they have a pathological fear of the Germans but they're sort of practical you know and when you start weighing the balance of backing down or not backing down over the Berlin Wall, Cuban missiles and this sort of thing. The balance sheet is pretty clear and I think they would approach

that rationally and that's the way I feel about them and perhaps I'm wrong but that's my own belief.

LTC FEENEY: Strategist seem to put an awful lot of faith in or I won't say that. They hypothesize in the rationality of each side. They feel that that's kind of an unquantifiable asset or capability or something and . . .

LTG LEMLEY: Well, you can't . . .

LTC FEENEY: . . . are pretty rational.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I think they are but this is something you can't count on because when you get involved in this your playing intentions versus capabilities which I've said I think's a very dangerous thing to do but it seems to me that there is a Soviet weakness which isn't generally recognized even in the military and that is their lack of capability to project their forces. You see everybody talks about how lean and mean they are and what their ratio of combat to combat and service support forces is. How high that ratio is in comparison to our own. Well, to me that means that they have sacrificed their ability to project their forces over long distances. In other words, I think they could run pretty fast at first but they would soon run out of steam because they don't have the sorts of capabilities you need to support combat forces over long lines of communication and until their recent buildup in their Navy, this was particularly true in their Navy which was really basically a coastal Navy plus submarines. It was true of their Army, which is a European Army. They're not a world power. They're a European power, and it was true of their Air Forces too. They're a European Air Force. They're not a world Air Force. In fact, the United States is the only country in the world and has been for the last 34, 35 years. The only country that has had the real capability to project it's Forces anywhere in the world and support them in combat and this is the reason that I find this old business of cutting

out the fat awfully hard to accept and because it's just so called fat that provides us the mobility to project these combat forces and to support them in action and believe you, me, this capability is extremely hard to come up with in a very short time. It's pretty easy to turn out a infantry platoon to go fight because you don't have any long lead time skills involved and you don't have any very complex one of a kind sort of equipment but when you start turning out a boat company or a heavy ordnance maintenance company. This sort of stuff. You have really got a tough problem to produce it. It takes time and this was the bind in developing forces to go to Vietnam. It wasn't infantry battalions. It was the back up forces that are hard to come up with. Well, I think you said you wanted to talk a little bit about where the reserve forces fit into our national military fore structure and they are indeed a very important element of it and I don't think they're always viewed in perspective. For example, over the past 10 years we've dealt at length on improving readiness of the reserve and the national guard and accepting them as deployable on short notice and I don't think this is really sound. The national guard and reserve provide a tremendous military asset but it's not one -- it's not a liquid asset because with the exception of a few relatively small highly specialized units whose civilain skills really fill a military need and they're lots of these. They aren't very liquid as assets. I would guess that today it would take at least a year to ready a national guard division for combat and this is not a hell of a lot different than the time lag that you had in World War II. The kinds of training programs that they have and the kinds of equipment that they have and I'm not saying they should have a lot more equipment because it's very hard for them to maintain it properly in any large quantities. Are not such that you can just call them up and ship them over to fight. To begin with,

their senior commanders are not up to the job. It takes a different kind of guy to raise a militia unit then it does to fight a active Army unit. The militia commander has got to be an established citizen in the community which means that he's not very young. He's got to be pretty wealthy or he can't afford the time to give to his unit. He's got to have the prestige to attract recruits and to make it sort of a social club and these things are not necessarily compatible with a good commander in the field. You also have this old business of the localized nature of these units and it's an awful lot harder to send the neighbor across the street out to get killed when the chance of his coming back are not too good then it is to send some stranger that you have just sort of a normal active military unit relationship with. So they aren't really ready. Their commanders are not ready. Their training is not adequate. Now I'm not talking about the company's and the platoons. They probably are in pretty good shape. I'm talking about the combat and combat support forces at division level because you can only exercise these people in large scale maneuvers and field exercises of a type that the guard and reserve don't undertake and couldn't realistically undertake in peace time. So it's a tremendous asset but it's not a liquid one. Now I want to take a small slice at our policy right now with regard to what kinds of unit will be in the reserve and kinds will be in the Active Army and we more or less have accepted that the Active Army will be combat troops, division troops primarily with some combat support and that our backup units will be reserve units. Well, this is felicious because you can't deploy the combat units without the others without it's back up and so you basically got this same one year or maybe more flagged before you can make these Active Army units really effective. Now realistically speaking, we would probably be in better shape if we reversed the process and kept the support units in

the active structure and the combat units in the reserve structure, but this would make a rather funny looking Army and obviously it would never sell, but basically those are the problems of reserve forces. Now there's another inhibition to using the reserve forces that really doesn't meet the eye and I'm sure is not generally accepted in the country and that is that inevitably the Active Army, if it's committed while they're being ready for commitment, is going to draw down drastically on their people and equipment. They're gonna draw down on the people for combat replacements which is something that people who weren't in World War II or the early days of Korea really don't understand. They don't understand the tremendous requirements for warm flesh. For example, I think I mentioned earlier the 3d Division at Anzio had nine thousand casualties in the first two weeks. Well, that's nine thousand warm bodies that had to be fed into them and in the early days of the war they're gonna come right out of the National Guard as individual MOS's. So they're gonna draw down on the people. They're also going to draw down on their equipment. You know, just as they did during Vietnam. We completely cleaned the Guard and Reserve of all of its critical equipment. You see, you don't run out of rifles very often, but you run out of bulldozers very rapidly and you run out of tanks and you run out of aircraft and helicopters and that sort of stuff. I mean the attrition on those are tremendous and we just don't have the warehouse supplies to do it so where do they come. They come out of the guard units that are being readied and which in turn delays their training and equipment for deployment. So there are lots of hookers in this reliance on reserve forces and really, it's more appropriate to the climate of 30 years ago than it is today when things tend to happen a great deal more rapidly than they used to and not only do they happen more rapidly but we're infinitely more exposed because --

although I certainly don't expect it we could be in a war tomorrow and have troops fighting whereas in World War II, gosh, it took us a long time to become engaged and just think how rapidly the Seventh Army if it was fighting in Europe could just consume our relatively small reserve forces. I mean, well . . .

LTC FEENEY: Are we kind of fooling the reserves a little bit?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes.

LTC FEENEY: . . . by . . .

LTG LEMLEY: We're fooling ourselves.

LTC FEENEY: Well, maybe we aren't fooling ourselves. Maybe we just want them to be there so -- and build them up with this concept of being division . .

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, well, . . .

LTC FEENEY: Then we're gonna zap them.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, yes, we do intend to deceive them somewhat. Yes, that's right. That's not really avoidable but I was gonna cite another example and I think I mentioned earlier in the day. We broke out of the beachhead at Anzio, the first armored division lost every tank in the division. Well, where would a divisions worth of tanks come from right now. You'd know where they'd come from. They'd come right out of a guard and reserve because they sure as hell aren't any stashed away in quantity.

LTC FEENEY: I don't -- my own personal opinion is that the United States couldn't -- couldn't fight anything right now. Like today. I don't think . .

LTG LEMLEY: . . . but you've also got to remember though that the National Guard particularly is a dual purpose force. This is something that back in the old days, well, I guess in the early days we probably paid a good deal of attention to it but it was very forcefully brought out during the riots of the '60's that we are very dependent on reserve forces for internal security and

even if they weren't organized as divisions in this sort of thing and considered as -- as reserve for Active Army, we would still have to have them for this purpose. We still need so I really can't quarrel much with the reserve forces program. I guess my quarrel is what's the picture that's painted of it rather than what's the program itself. I think before we leave this area we've talking about I ought to spend a little bit on my philosophy's about the Joint Chiefs and joint actions and this sort of thing. There is a tendency, I think, for all of us in any service and of course, I'm speaking for the Army to look at the problems of the world as the problems of the Army and I think this is unfortunate. The fact of the matter is you can't view the Army in isolation. You have to consider the total military force structure of a country. You also have to consider some of the financial aspects, you have to consider the political situation and almost all of the things you do in the Joint Chiefs in Washington and there is too much of a tendency I'm sure in all of the service's to view the problems quite narrowly and perhaps to seek advantage for the service as opposed to advantage to the national interest. In part this is due to ignorance because the cross understanding of requirements, capabilities and that sort of things between the various services is not very well taught in most Army people until they get really to the top. Don't have the opportunity to access these things. You live a little too much in isolation and even serving on joint staffs, I don't think that . . .

END OF TAPE:

THIS IS THE 2ND TAPE OF THE 6TH SESSION OF TAPED RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LTG LEMLEY AND LTC FEENEY, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, ON 14 MAY 1974.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, you were talking about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint actions.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, I don't believe that any of the services adequately educate their officers in the total military picture as opposed to their own service requirements. In truth, this is very difficult to do. I'm not sure that even service on the Joint Staff necessarily acquaints us with the proper concept of the requirements, capabilities, limitations of the other services. I don't know really how you can get around this because the only very good school I ever saw on it was in the "tank." After all, there are only three people from each service that get in the "tank." Contrary to what most people in the Army think, I believe the Chief of Staff doesn't really go to the "tank" to defend the Army interests. This is a part of his job, but really it's only a small part of his job. Because the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body have a national responsibility to best serve the national interests. In my three years in the "tank", I believe this was generally well recognized by the Chiefs themselves and by the OPDEPS. But on the other hand, when I was briefed by action officers in the Department of the Army, either my own or those from other staff divisions, I was almost always presented with an Army position. Usually this didn't involve any particular problems because it really didn't necessarily conflict with what anybody else thought or with what the requirements of the situation were. But frequently, I was handed positions that couldn't possibly stand up in court. I mean they just were totally selfishly oriented.

LTC FEENEY: Could you describe one of these?

LTG LEMLEY: I'll take a pickyunish one. We were splitting up the ground communications complex around Washington between the services. I was briefed that this was essential to maintain a training base to support our overseas installations. This was by the communications-electronics people, and it was VHF communications. Actually, the Army didn't have any particular requirement for these, so they sold it to me on the basis of protecting the training base. I guess I bought it without looking too deeply in it. It wasn't one of the weightier matters. I found out that this training base that we were talking about consisted of exactly eight enlisted men. That was somewhat of an embarrassment because I discovered that in the "tank" from somebody in the Air Force. What I'm saying is that you've got to be objective about these things. You've got to know what you're talking about. You have to look at a broader picture than just the Army. I guess what I'm saying is that you have to be aware of crusaders. It would well serve every action officer in the Pentagon to be sure that when he's going to crusade for something that it really is in the total national interest as opposed to a narrowly based interest in his own particular service. I guess I haven't said that very well.

LTC FEENEY: What's your recommendation for this? Should we as Army officers have more training in joint operations as joint staff officers? You know the doctrine that comes out of JCS in many cases is pretty ambiguous at best.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, there's hardly any doctrine that ever came out of the JCS.

LTC FEENEY: Well, I'm talking about joint planning doctrine that's formulated under the auspices of being a joint service type of thing.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I only know of one that ever emerged.

LTC FEENEY: I can talk about EW planning for example at the joint level.

It's very, very broad and mission oriented that type of thing.

LTG LEMLEY: It should be because the Chiefs don't do a very good job when they get involved in areas where they don't really belong. They get involved in a lot of these. I would say that the EW is one of these areas where they don't do very well. There is a requirement for them to do something, but I think in technical areas such as this, they tend to get bogged down in detail and don't do their job on a broader basis. Really, what you generally come out with is something not very definitive. Now, the Chiefs are properly concerned with requirements for electronic warfare, but I would say in terms of qualitative requirements on the national level; insuring that we don't leave gaps. But they don't do well when they get involved in too much detail. But joint doctrine is something that has never been very successful. The only doctrinal publication to the best of my knowledge that the Chiefs have ever turned out was the Amphibious Warfare Doctrine. That emerged with great, great difficulty. It's not an area where they do very well. They do better on questions of broad policy, force requirements, and that sort of thing. That's the area that they should stick to. I think you ought to understand, and I guess really people who haven't served in the environment don't understand this, that about 95 percent of the JCS documents are handled in a very routine fashion. The document is published. If nobody objects to it within three days, it becomes an agreed paper. Maybe 5 percent of the questions that come before the JCS are discussed in open meeting by the OPDEPS or their assistants. That's a pretty small percentage. A good deal less than one percent of the JCS papers are considered by the Chiefs themselves. In fact, I suppose in the three years I was in the Pentagon going to three JCS meetings a week, I doubt that the Chiefs themselves discussed 100 papers. In fact, I would guess that it was more on the order of 20 or 30. So you see, it's not the constant scrap that a lot of people think it

is. A great deal of the Chiefs time was spent in my time discussing the progress of the war in Vietnam and discussing with the Chairman the things he was going to take up with the President . . . things like that. It was really a very satisfactory sort of relationship. Now, I remember what it was that I was going to talk about before. I guess this goes back to force structure and budgetary controls. This is not well understood. This was when we were talking about what is enough. The uniformed military participate in this force requirements planning and budgetary planning in really two ways. They participate jointly in establishing force requirements. In the case of the Army, this is force requirements in terms of really divisions. In the case of the Navy, it's a ship building program really. The Navy force structure is a ship building program. This is not well understood. They don't plan like we do. Their program is a ship building program. The Air Force, of course, participates in terms of numbers and types of aircrafts. This is jointly considered. One year, we even had an agreed paper on what these requirements were. But then this is passed to the Secretary of Defense's Office who hopefully use it in preparing military program. I suppose he did to some extent. The services participate on the other side of the house in the budgeting process in their unilateral service capacity. The Army is just a big factory, you see. It doesn't fight any forces or do anything like that. All it does is produce resources, men, equipment, units, and supplies, which it turns over to a unified commander to command in the field. The Chief of Staff of the Army really has no operational command of any kind nor does the Chief of any other service. So in his unilateral service hat, he participates in translating this broad program into units, equipment, supplies, and that sort of stuff in money terms and in program terms. The Chiefs don't get into this. In other words, when we say a division in the JSOP, actually this is

a division force which is a division plus its short term and long range backup. It's a hell of a lot bigger than the 15,000 men. It runs around 60,000 people. Of course, you have your schools, your training base, and all sorts of things that go into your unilateral planning that never see the light of day down in the Chiefs and shouldn't. When this process is brought together in the Secretary of Defense's Office, and he arrives at his tentative decision, the Chiefs both individually and collectively are given a right of reclama. They can protest the tentative decision to the Secretary of Defense. He either accepts it or he doesn't accept it. Then the budget goes to the President. The Chiefs are given a day in court at the White House to protest to the President these decisions. Now obviously, you're not going to bring every nickel and dime to the President's attention because you couldn't explain it to him in the time involved anyhow. Anyhow, it wouldn't be appropriate. So the Chief had this appeal to the President. Once he has appealed to the President, and his appeal has not been accepted, sometimes they are. I mean the President personally sometimes accepts these reclama. But if he has appealed all through this channel and has been turned down, then he is at liberty to state his view to the Congress. But if he has not made this protest, then he is obliged to support the program in his Congressional testimony. I thought that that was sort of interesting. I'm sure that this process is not widely understood. People, I'm sure, don't understand why the Chief goes up to Congress and testifies in support of a program which they know doesn't meet what he considers to be the needs of the situation. But this is it. In other words, if he has not protested, he is obliged to support the decision.

LTC FEENEY: This is an unwritten law.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, it's an unwritten law. It's a very binding one. Now, at one time, this went out when Nixon came in and it should have gone long before, the Chiefs and the Secretary were required to take what is known as the "blood oath." They were required to certify to the Secretary of Defense that his budget was adequate. His budget, in the case of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army . . . that his budget decisions provided an adequate force to carry out the mission. They could jointly include an inclosure with exceptions. But as a practical matter, this became a little hard to do because the service secretaries during Mr. McNamara's days tended to just be messenger boys and they weren't about to take exception to any decision Mr. McNamara made. This really put General Johnson anyhow on quite a tough spot, reconciling his conscious with his acceptance that while this might not be really a very good budget, that at the same time under the circumstance, it was the best that could be done.

LTC FEENEY: There were no withholding any of the provisos. It was all or nothing.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, as I say, you could take exceptions, but there was great pressure not to put any exceptions in. He did always put exception. But really, his option . . . He really had only one option. That is, to sign the paper or resign. But I thought that was sort of interesting because I'm sure that's something relatively few people really understand . . . this process that you go through.

LTC FEENEY: There is a kind of a contract type of a relationship that Secretary Schlesinger talks about . . . of a certain amount of monies to do what you think is your deal.

LTG LEMLEY: This was true in the McNamara days. He didn't just make a decision on how much money you got. He made a decision on exactly what you

did with it. I think this has been relaxed quite a bit since then. Because there was a tendency toward relaxation as soon as Mr. Nixon came in. I know what Mr. Schlesinger is talking about. He's talking about the deal reserving decision on national programs: missiles, SAC bombers, ships, numbers of division, and this sort of thing, and probably on tanks. I'm not sure, but I'm sure on helicopters . . . these big money programs . . . and letting you do the rest. Mr. McNamara didn't let you do any of it. Though there was a certain amount that was really beyond his reach. In fact, it's beyond anybody's reach, particularly when you're fighting a war. This is the number of flying hours in Vietnam. If you change the flying hours per aircraft from 100 to 120, you put that 120 in a computer and it spews out one hell of a lot more spare parts that cost one hell of a lot of dollars. There are a great many things like this that are sort of beyond decision in areas where pretty big ticket money is dispensed at a pretty low level. Because that kind of thing never even gets to see the light of day in the Pentagon. Another thing in the case of the Army that really has an impact is your required supply rate on ammunition. This is established by the commander in the field . . . the RSR. Believe you me, this is a real big dollar item. The civilians in the Pentagon were always very wary of messing with this. Because if they cut it back, it made them look bad, and they didn't really understand it anyhow. The truth of the matter is there's no really very good way except sort of a horseback guess on establishing a required supply rate for ammunition. We struggled with this through World War II; again through Korea where we based our RSR on consumption in World War II, but the consumption was not a very realistic figure because we were always a little short in World War II. Though I think we did have enough ammunition in Korea and in Vietnam. That's what I was thinking.

LTC FEENEY: Yes, sir. I have two questions. Let's see if I can get them both. What is your concept of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Now, you've seen General Wheeler operate very closely plus others, General Taylor.

LTC LEMELEY: Yes, I have. I really never saw General Taylor at very close hand as Chairman. I saw him as Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chairman is the mouthpiece of the Chiefs in negotiating with the President and the Secretary of Defense. That's really what his job is. He in turn is their mouthpiece in dealing with the Chiefs. He has an extremely difficult job. Because by the nature of his job, he has divided loyalties between the civilian command structure and the military command structure. Now, you know, of course, that the Chief has no vote in the Joint Chiefs. Or did you know that?

LTC FEENEY: Yes, sir.

LTC LEMELEY: He is the Chairman. Now, he can express a view that's at variance with the Chiefs. Really, the requirements of his job are that he enjoy the confidence of the President and Secretary of Defense and in turn enjoys of the Chiefs, which General Wheeler did to an exceptional degree. He enjoyed the confidence of the Chiefs to an exceptional degree. To the extent that they permitted him considerable discretion in transmitting their views to the SEC DEF, and the President. This is really what I was talking about when I highlighted the fact that the Chiefs didn't act on a whole lot of papers, but they did a hell of a lot of discussing among themselves. The primary purpose of these discussions was to have a meeting of the mind on what General Wheeler presented as their view to the SEC DEF, and the President in the absence of a formal piece of paper. Because obviously, you can't come equipped with a piece of paper to attend an unstructured Tuesday luncheon.

LTC FEENEY: How strong does the Chairman have to be? Can he be a military-political personality? Should he be a military personality? Or should he be . . .

LTG LEMLEY: He should be a military-political personality because he has a very narrow trail to follow. He's got to have a thorough appreciation of both the military picture, the national political scene, the economic situation, and all of these areas. In other words, he's dealing in an area where he has to weigh the desirable against the possible perhaps in this sort of thing. It's a rather tough job.

LTC FEENEY: I was looking from the standpoint of saying that Westmoreland did go to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he fully expected that he would be. But I don't think anyone else did.

LTC FEENEY: Admiral Zumwalt will probably not be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

LTG LEMLEY: I will say that he certainly will not be.

LTC FEENEY: I don't know if General Abrams will ever be. He's pretty much of a military man.

LTG LEMLEY: No, you grossly underestimate "Abe" Abrams. He has the reputation of being a real field soldier, and very close to the troops, and all of this sort of thing, which in fact he is. But he also has a very broad practical outlook on things. He would make a superb Chairman. Incidentally, you were asking about the qualities of the Chairman. It's well now impossible, I think, for a member of any service other than the Army to be a successful Chairman. The reason for this is that it's very, very much a people job. The only service that really develops an understanding of people is the Army. The Navy and the Air Force are hardware oriented almost entirely.

They don't really deal with people to any considerable extent. As a result, they rarely develop the qualities that one needs for this kind of a job. For example, I doubt that Admiral Moorer has been a particular successful Chairman. Yet, he's a fine old sailor. He's a very fine man personally, I am very fond of him. I respect him greatly, but I have the feeling that he's a good deal at more at home on the bridge of a battleship or what have you than he is in doing the kinds of things that he of necessity does as Chairman.

LTC FEENEY: He's a very plain talker.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes, he's a very outspoken . . .

LTC FEENEY: Isn't Abrams also?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes.

LTC FEENEY: He's not eloquent by any means as Taylor is.

LTG LEMLEY: No. I wasn't criticizing Admiral Moorer for being outspoken. I think that's one of his better qualities. But I don't think his outlook is particularly broad. He was awful easy to get along with as a CNO in the "tank" . . . extremely so. But he didn't really take a lead role in the Chiefs. I can only recall two occasions when he really sort of charged in the "tank." One was when they were going to reactivate the battleship New Jersey, which he bitterly opposed, but felt that he had to support. The other was in the case of the TFX bomber the famous flying Edsel. When we had wound up the JSOP and we had thought everything was all finished, he insisted on having a final meeting. We went down, and he asked one question of General McConnell who was then Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He said, "I don't want to argue about this thing anymore." He said, "But, I just would like to have your personal assurance that this thing will fly." That was the meeting. I think Admiral Moorer is probably too narrowly based to be as effective as General Wheeler was. Oddly enough, while I think General

Wheeler was a first rate Chairman and first rate Chief of Staff of the Army, I am no means sure that I would want to fight under General Wheeler in the field.

LTC FEENEY: I guess the question arises, why?

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I just question his capabilities as a field commander.

LTC FEENEY: His ability and his decisiveness, you mean.

LTG LEMLEY: Well no, his appreciation of any given situation. This really, I guess . . . Well, in the first place, I did know him slightly in World War II, and he was the Chief of Staff of a not particularly effective division that came in very late in the war. They played around a lot, but never really did much. I sort of had the feeling that he panicked to a considerable extent during TET . . . to a greater extent than I thought he should. But a lot of other people did too. But he certainly was a fine Chairman and a very fine man. I think very highly of him.

LTC FEENEY: I don't want to dwell on this particular subject because I don't know how pertinent these different qualities are. I don't know after listening to this whether a gentleman who was a real field commander could ever be Chairman of the JCS.

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, I think so.

LTC FEENEY: It would be an unusual person. He would have to be terribly broad.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. But we've had them. There's Bradley. There's Abrams. We were talking about.

LTC FEENEY: Things were different back in the Forties. They're so damn hard now.

LTG LEMLEY: Things were different and he enjoyed to an exceptional degree the confidence of President Truman. A much greater extent than Wheeler enjoyed the confidence of Johnson, for example. There are lots of them that hit both ways and some that don't. A lot more don't than do.

LTC FEENEY: The other question I had, sir, was involving the flexibility. I'd like to have you, if you could, talk about it just a little bit more. As to when you have a relationship of the Secretary of Defense to the various Chiefs of Staff and the various military departments. McNamara wanted, it seemed, to make every decision, no matter how big or little . . . very tight on the way the budget was spent.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, he was the only guy who could say, "Yes." There were thousands that could say, "No."

LTC FEENEY: I'd like to have you explain the difference in the flexibility. What should the relationship of the Secretary of Defense be to these? What's the ideal? Could we talk about two different polls here?

LTG LEMLEY: That's sort of tough to say. You know being SEC DEF is a rough job. I suppose the first requirement is complete honesty and a free exchange of views. In other owrds, no playing cards under the table. Neither of these was characteristic of Mr. McNamara. Very important, too, is a clear delineation of what the SEC DEF does and what the services do. In this connection, I find it extremely difficult to find a useful role for the service secretary. That guy has no power of decision really. Yet, he can make an awful nuisance of himself.

LTC FEENEY: This one might be loaded. Since you say that, how about Froehlke?

LTG LEMLEY: I don't know Mr. Froehlke except very slightly. My contact with him was when he was Assistant SEC DEF for Administration or something. That may not be the proper title, but that's what he was. Our relations with his office were pretty good as compared with relations with Systems Analysis and some of the other elements of the SEC DEF Office. I didn't really know him at all as Secretary of the Army. Mr. Resor was the Secretary the whole time I was there. I regarded him as completely ineffective. I think he would be

ineffective in anything. He was just a damn nuisance. I think when they put him together, they forgot to put his spine in. He was a handringer if I ever saw one.

LTC FEENEY: A real politician type?

LTG LEMLEY: No, he wouldn't have been a very good politician. He was a worry wart. I don't think he had any confidence in himself. I can see why. He was sad. He was a nice enough little guy. I mean, he meant well.

LTC FEENEY: I hope nobody ever says that about me. I am a nice enough guy but I meant well.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I have a pretty low opinion of Mr. Resor.

LTC FEENEY: To continue on with this relationship of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chief; I guess then, what you feel is that the Service Chief and the SEC DEF should be really tagged close to one and other?

LTG LEMLEY: If you're speaking of the Chief of Staff and the SEC DEF, the Chief of Staff and the SEC DEF really don't see a hell of a lot of each other. Perhaps they should see more. Mr. McNamara never wanted to talk to any of them. In fact, he never liked to talk to anyone in uniform really. The dealings that he had . . . I wouldn't say all of them, but most of them were with the Chairman and with the service secretaries. I had the distinct feeling that the service secretaries had always been told what to tell him before they went up to talk to him, which was what he wanted to hear. You know he used to have a monthly meeting with the Chiefs. I think it was a monthly meeting. It sort of fell by the wayside. But that was the most useless thing I ever saw. There was never any dialogue. He'd come down and get a briefing on the Vietnam situation in which he showed little interest. Because I'm sure it was already old stuff by the time he got there. He might ask a question or two. Then he would get up and leave. It was not a useful

thing. I always had the feeling that he had the meetings just to say that he had had a meeting. It wasn't much different when Mr. Vance attended instead either. It was just the most useless sort of thing.

LTC FEENEY: Well, sir, we do have one large subject to cover before we finish. That is, of course, what many people know you for . . . probably at least the students. I shouldn't say many people. The faculty knew you for best. That is your tenure as Deputy Commandant and the Commandant of the school. I think if it would be possible as to talk about the history as it's related to its purpose and goals.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, of course, as you know, I never attended the college as a student. I wish I had. It would have been very useful to me, had I attended before World War II. But back in those days, I was a good many years from it by the standards that they used then. I never did get here even for a short course. I really came to the college as Assistant Commandant and perhaps somewhat of a doubting Thomas. I had a lot to learn about it. I suspect that to some degree I was sort of a thorn in the side of the faculty because . . . here's an example. In those days, we wrote in the college a fair number of field manuals. These were always approved by the academic board of which I was the chairman. I had the temerity to read some of these things before I approved them. I was really a little bit shook, particularly by the length of them and all of the detail that they went into in everything. So I took a very active role in the field manual writing thing. I'm sure that the faculty found it a little distasteful. I suspect my predecessors had regarded this performance perfunctory. Of course, I really never had any influence on the course as Assistant Commandant because of the lead time. You see, when I came here, I not only . . . I came here the first of August, and obviously the course for that year was absolutely in concrete. The course

for the following year was pretty well down the track on the drawing board. I suppose my impact if any on the curriculum was not very sudden. That was proper. I really didn't perceive any glaring defects. The college here had been running for a good many years. It had done an extremely fine job. I got worked into it, I really saw little or no reason to make any drastic changes. General Johnson and I discussed the structure and curriculum of the college in some length over the first year I was here. One thing we did was to restructure the divisional instruction. When I came here, we had a Department of the Infantry Division, a Department of the Armored Division, and a Department of the Airborne Division. We had the feeling, and I think with considerable justification, that these instructional departments weren't always running down the same track. There was a certain parochialism involved, so we did restructure the faculty and made a Department of Division Operations and a Department of Airborne and Special Operations. We took the airborne division pretty much out of that. All of the divisions were taught by the same faculty, and we felt we insured a more coherent course that way. The other area that I suppose I took a considerably more active role in was the lecture program. When I came here, every Chief of Tech Service and every special interest in the Army felt that they had charter to come out and sell their wares from the lecture platform here. For the most part, the lectures served no useful purpose. They were generally pretty dull. The Quartermaster General used to come out and set up a display out here in the center with tents, and sea rations, and stuff, and that sort of thing. They tried to make them sexy sideshows instead of instructional vehicles. First, General Johnson and then later I, to an even greater degree, eliminated all of this. We gave the DA staff a half of a day on the platform in the main auditorium. That was the extent pretty much of the uniformed lectures

except for the Chiefs of Service. Now heretofore, the Chiefs of Service hadn't generally come, and we were able to get the Chief of Staff. We never got the Chief of Staff of the Air Force while I was here, but we got some pretty senior people. We did get the CNO, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and, of course, the Chief of Staff of the Army. They came out. But that generally was about the extent of our uniformed lecture corps. We moved into a civilian lecture force pretty much. We got some very, very fine ones. These were partially geographically oriented, partially political-military oriented, and a little bit on economics. My purpose in doing this was really to broaden the perspective of the student body. Now, I couldn't hope in the time that we could scrape up for this, and then this number of lectures that we could get to, really provide much in the way of hard core instruction. But it was my hope that we could stimulate interest in the student in pursuing this in their own reading. So really this is the area where I took, I think, a more direct interest in the curriculum. Except in this area, I thought we were doing very well. I suppose that maybe I should sort of outline my philosophy as to what Leavenworth should do and what I think has done over the years and done extremely well. In the first place, the college has the obligation of accepting students from varied and somewhat narrowed backgrounds. By in large, when a student comes here, for the most part, he's been involved in branch activities. He has perhaps some appreciation and understanding of what some of the other parts of the Army do but not a hell of a lot. For example, I think the average infantry officer that comes here has a pretty good appreciation of artillery and what it can do for him. He has probably a fair appreciation of armor. Because that's one of the jobs I was given while I was Commandant here. It was unifying the training programs at Benning and Knox. I didn't make them identical

but pulling them together and using a common program. He has probably, if he's a combat arms officer, a fair appreciation of the other combat arms and none of the logistic and administrative services. On the other hand, if he's a logistics officer, he probably has no real appreciation of the combat arms and their requirements. I think the first requirement of the college is to give the student body as a whole a common understanding of the elements that go to make up a field army. Some of these sound sort of earthy but they are very important. Secondly, we produce a body of people who speak a common language and who understand each other. In the kinds of jobs that we are preparing them for, this is extremely important because the language is part of the trade. We also develop a common way of doing things. This is important because this is my quarrel with SOP's. You know I mentioned somewhat earlier if your school system is functioning correctly, you don't need a SOP. Because everybody learned how to do it in the same school. I think the college's role in that area is a very important one. On a more theoretical level, I think the principles of war is a pretty important element of the college curriculum. Now, this may sound a little odd, but it isn't really. Because if you study, understand, and accept the principles of war, you probably will develop a method of thinking and problem solving in military matters which is important. Then, of course, the college also indoctrinates the student with a common methodology in planning and decision making. This too is important. Because they're going out as staff officers where they will be presenting things to people who had been brought up in the same environment. If they can do it the right way, it facilitates common understanding in decision making on the part of their commanders. Then I thought these strategic studies were important. Because I guess I've emphasized a number of times that I think to be an effective military officer

particularly as you get in the more senior grades and serve in higher headquarters, you require a broaden perspective. It was through these strategic studies that I hoped to stimulate enough interest on the part of the student to have him pursue in his personal reading some of these areas and broaden his outlook in this regard. I think it was a good program. I'm now speaking of the whole course. I was fairly uniquely fortunate in checking out the product after I left here. Because when I went to DCSOPS, I would guess that probably of the action officers with whom I had dealings as DCSOPS that on the order of 60 per cent were graduates out here during my five year tenure with the college. I must say that they came in well prepared for their jobs and did a first class job. I sort of think that at least to my own satisfaction, we turned out some pretty fine people. There is one area of the instruction that I worried about a lot. I don't think we ever arrived at any solution while I was here and I'm reasonably certain they haven't since. That's this leadership question. I'm just not awfully sure that that area lends itself to the kind of instruction that we put on here. I thought we did some pretty good periods in it. But I'm not sure when they got through that any particular student has any better concept than when he came. I guess one reason for this is I don't think leadership is something that has a body of doctrine or rules. In other words, I don't think that you can memorize and follow a set of 10 or 20 rules and make yourself a good leader. The reason for this, is that leadership is a personal sort of thing, and something that no two individuals tend to do in the same sorts of ways. This comes down to in way integrity, I suppose. I don't think anybody can be a successful leader when he doesn't maintain his personal inner integrity. In other words, there are Pattons and there are Bradley's. They're as different as day as night. Both were great leaders.

There are Abrams and Johnsons. They're as different as day and night. There are all sorts of in-betweens. So I think that every individual, if he's going to be successful, has to do it in his own way, and in a way that makes him feel comfortable, and reflects the sincerity that is there. I'm not sure that area of instruction is ever going to be tied down to anything very concrete. I think what we did was useful. I don't know what they do today. But we certainly never solved the problem of instructing in leadership. Actually, I think that every individual to a degree learns this as he goes along from observing his own seniors, good or bad. I mean I never served under anybody that I didn't learn something from them along leadership lines. Sometimes I learned things not to do and sometimes I learned things to do. As I say, that process went on for 36 years. I was still learning from Admiral Rivero the day I retired. Incidentally, he said something once that made a very considerable impression on me. We were getting him ready for a press conference or something. He says, "You know, I never tell a lie because that way I don't have to remember what I said before." I suppose that he didn't put it on a very high moral plan, but I thought it was a pretty interesting comment. I enjoyed my years here at the college very much. One aspect of the college program that I put great emphasis on both in terms of personal effort and in terms of the orientation program, was the Allied Students. It's my belief that the finest and cheapest foreign policy program the United States has is the Allied Program here at Leavenworth. It's not the same anywhere else. At the Air Force and Navy institutions they put them out in the cold and run separate classes for them. The branch schools, I have the feeling that the courses are too short, and the instruction is too technical to permit much cross fertilization between the Allied students and the U.S. students. I did put great emphasis on that year. I spent a hell

of a lot of time with the Allies myself. I followed their orientation program very closely. Both to insure that it was a broad based program and that it was an objective program and not a salesmanship effort. The understanding on the part of other important people in other countries depends to a hell of a degree on what goes on in this Allied Program here. When I came here . . . really the only concrete thing that I recall that I did . . . the Allies all lived together in a separate enclave. And sort of over the dead bodies of everybody who ran the program, I integrated them. That really only applied in truth to maybe the BOQ's. Because obviously the married ones that had their families lived downtown. That's a tremendous asset, that Allied Program. Incidentally, my sensitivity on this subject got to be well known around the Pentagon. Nobody ever touched the foreign student program at Leavenworth without checking with me. I'm sure that wasn't normally the case.

LTC FEENEY: I don't mean to put you on the spot with this question. But can you think of any concrete examples of how this paid off to us?

LTG LEMLEY: Oh, sure. Hundreds of them. But the one that comes to mind immediately is in Sudan. If the head knocker down there hadn't been a student here, he would never had acted as he did in the case of the assassination of the diplomat.

LTC FEENEY: Do you mean President Numeri?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. I found that my relations with the Turks were just eased tremendously because the commander of the Turkish ground forces when I was there was a graduate of Leavenworth. He thought I was a classmate of his. I never disabused him of it. But that eased my path with the Turks tremendously. Well, with the Italians, the aide to the Chief of the Italian Armed Forces Staff had been a student when I was here. Although I presume I would have gotten along with him very well anyhow, that eased my relations. It just makes a tremendous difference.

LTC FEENEY: Do you think that . . . I don't want to get away from the school curriculum too far, but this, I think, is a kind of pertinent question. We seem to lose track of these guys though when they leave the school unless you have a personal . . . for example, you being the ex-Commandant, people would have a greater awe of you. As opposed to me if I went to a foreign country. It seems to me that there's no real way that MAG or that attache or something to get me involved and reacquainted with this.

LTC LEMLEY: I don't think we do as good a job as we ought to in keeping in touch with these people. One of the things that we started while I was here was this Allied Refresher Course. With that in mind, you know, keep sending them a little update course every year. I don't know whether that program is still in effect or not. We tried to follow them through the attaches. But you see, this depends on the interest and enthusiasm for it of the individual attache because we have really no control over the attache system and there was no way that you could put any leverage on them if they didn't follow up on this very well. One other thing I did, I developed this Allied Badge, you know, that they get on graduation day. You have not seen one of those. Well, it sort of modeled on the General Staff identification except it's all silver. That program, I think, was very useful. Because I was amazed at how the foreign graduates wear them and are proud of them. I think that was useful. But it would really be rather nice to have sort of an alumni association. But if you had it just for the Allies, this might look a little odd. I don't think it would be very managable on a full scale basis. I don't know. But that's something that we did worry about was keeping track of them. The record in that regard was spotty.

LTC FEENEY: Where was your main emphasis as the Commandant. During your time here, you have a tremendous repaire with the people at Leavenworth.

I won't say revered, but very well thought of. The faculty members at the time don't think that there was anybody that walked like General Lemley or could walk like General Lemley. The members of the staff today who remember you still speak of you with great kindness. You know this is pretty difficult environment at times. You know there's a lot of hostility here between the students and the administration.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. Well, I guess I ought to say that I don't know . . . I did most of my work in the office. I guess I put in a good many hours signing papers and deciding things. Maybe not very important things, but that sort of business. I really depended on my social activities to keep track of what was going on. In this sort of environment, that perhaps is a better way to do it. For example, my wife and I accepted all student parties on a first come, first serve basis. Now, we figured we could make three on Friday and three on Saturday if they weren't sit down dinners. We would normally go to six student cocktail parties a week. You learn an awful lot at cocktail parties. It's really a pretty good way to keep track of things. So that's one thing I did. In the first place, I took that opportunity to mix with the students and to listen to them and talk to them. I think it was useful. This is sort of like a commander getting around and visiting with the troops. Let's face it, the Commandant here can't do that in the classroom. You can go around and maybe visit at breaks, but you won't visit a hell of a lot. This was, I thought, a good way to do it . . . an obligation which I had. I also went to all of the other parties I was asked to if I could make them . . . nearly all of them. I got to know the junior faculty that way. Now, I entertained a lot myself. The last year I was here, my wife and I invited 8,000 guests to social functions that we hosted. Although I could never hope to get all of the faculty and all of the student body in my house obviously, I did bring

some in. For example, when we'd have a reception, and we had a lot more in those days than we do now . . . 8,000 is a lot. But if we had a reception, we'd have from 5 to 10 students selected moreorless at random; from 5 to 10 junior faculty; and by that time you didn't have much planned . . . 5 civilians from Leavenworth or Kansas City. After you did that, you didn't have much flexibility because you had to have the command hierarchy. You also had to have if it was a foreign guest which many if not most of them were . . you had to have the people from his own country. If he was from Saudi Arabia, you also had to have the Jordanians and this sort of thing. We brought as many people as we could into our home. I participated actively in civilian activities. Less so than I did on a post, but my relationships with Leavenworth and Kansas City were extremely good. The prestige of the Commandant here for miles around is just tremendous. I mean, I doubt if most of you all appreciate the reverence which is accorded to the college in this part of the country. Really, unless the Commandant purposely insults them, it's pretty hard not to be on very good terms with them. Some have done that, you know. I guess what it sounds like is that all I did was go to parties which isn't strictly true. But it is true an inordinate amount of my time was devoted to entertaining visitors and public relations type activities and that sort of thing. Now, I was fortunate in having an exceptionally fine Assistant Commandant in General Carter Townsend who was a graduate, had served on the faculty at length, and was a tremendously capable person. I really didn't have to worry too much about the day to day running of the college when he was here. We talked every day and kept in touch with it. But he was entirely competent to run it and did so extremely well, I felt. Also, I spent a fair amount of time traveling. Now, this really had nothing to do with the college, but it did have quite an impact on the efforts which

I could devote to the college. Because you see, I was not the first CG of the Combined Arms Group. General Johnson was. But it so happens that he was off on a study group almost the whole six or eight months that that was being activated. I had to spend a hell of a lot of time getting the CDC side of the house going. I tried to visit all of our agencies, and we had ten, stretching from Fort Monmouth to Fort Huachuca. I tried to visit each of them once every three months, and frequently I had to go for special things like studies and that sort of thing. I was from time to time called into the Pentagon to discuss various matters. I don't think this was normal. I expect that was primarily because General Johnson was there. But I was called in to discuss things. Also, though this was never committed to paper, the CG of CONARC who ran the schools at the time designated me as his Deputy Commander for the Army School System. So I had a responsibility not only for the Combat Arms Schools but for the Tech Service Schools as well. I had to do things like harmonize the curriculum at Benning and Knox. He expected me to visit these schools and keep the curriculum in touch, so that they didn't overlap too much. So I devoted a fair amount of time to that. Then I had a good deal bigger post responsibility than we do now. For example, I commanded the DB among other things which they don't do now. I also had subposts in St. Louis; one up here in Nebraska; a subpost of sorts in Kansas City. All in all, a substantially bigger administrative and supply and maintenance job than I believe the Commandant has today. That is the sort of things I did. In looking back at it, the hardest part of my job was the after hours work.

LTC FEENEY: This is probably the one facet of your life that I probably have more information on than anything because of Dr. Birrer. You had a concept or at least an outwardly way of running your staff here. You didn't have a lot of staff meetings.

LTG LEMLEY: No, I never liked staff meetings. I never did and I don't today.

LTC FEENEY: That's a good subject to comment on. I think the only time you need a staff meeting is when some decision . . . fairly critical decision has to be made in short order. Then you only need the ones who are concerned and not everybody and his brother. Now, I did religiously attend the quarterly reviews . . . management reviews you know. In fact, we put one of them on the stage of Bell Hall. I don't know whether they still do or not. Did you have one of those? Well, that was a very useful period of instruction, I thought. I think the class probably dreaded it, but I have a fairly good sense of humor. I think I managed to make it interesting to them. I think they probably learned a lot. Because, you know, most people in the Army that haven't been involved in running a post have little concept of what goes on in managing a post. Managing a post is a pretty damn big job. Of course, we were fortunate here. I suspect that this is about the only old Army Post that's left. In that we have, I think, a very substantial civilian work force that's exceptionally dedicated to its job and has a history and tradition of high grade performance and service to the post. I don't think that's true universally. But I think people like the finance people here and the travel and transportation people are exceptionally considerate of both permanent personnel and the students and generally do a pretty good job for them.

LTC FEENEY: What was your concept of the student life here?

LTG LEMLEY: Actually, I think probably the contacts that the students make with other students while they are here are about as important as anything that goes on from the platform. Because that in itself is very broadening. I think we are extremely fortunate in having the student body on post where they can have routine social contacts as well as contacts in the classroom.

Now, the only school that I ever went to except short courses was the National War College, and we lived all over Washington. There was almost no contact outside of the building. Now, it was very useful in the building, but it would have been much better, I think, for example, at Carlisle where people get together for the evening like they do here. It was always my belief though, and I'm still convinced that this is true, that the pressure on the student ought to be great enough to keep him up on the bit. In other words, I considered when I was here that this was very properly a pressure course. I think it ought to be a pressure course. Because the kinds of things that you're learning to do in real life are always done under pressure. So I wanted to make the course hard. I wanted to make them worry. I wanted to make it competitive, and I still believe in it. Oddly enough, the only people who didn't make the grade, and that incidently is one of the least desirable jobs that the Commandant has is calling in the non-graduates before graduation. Inevitably, in every case, those who didn't make it, couldn't operate under pressure. They couldn't think under pressure. You know, this is a good place to find it out. Because it's a hell of a lot better to find it out here than it is in the stress of battle when a hell of a lot of lives depend on their ability to think straight and operate under pressure.

LTC FEENEY: Do you feel that the curriculum can teach a soldier to do this?

LTG LEMLEY: When I say, "operate under pressure," I wanted to have the curriculum challenge the student to such an extent that he was always a little bit behind. In other words, I wanted him to feel pressure, and I think most of them did. In the case of the Associate Course which we had then, they felt it all of the time, because that was only a four month course. In the case of the regular course, I think the pressure inevitably tended to

subside a little around April. For one reason, mechanically we had to have most of the exams then. For another thing, they had really, you know, reached a point where they were thoroughly drilled in the way we do things and everything, and that life was just easier for them. But that didn't . . . the fact that they were relaxed toward the end of year didn't worry me much. It gives them a chance to look back and spend more time with each other and everything. That didn't bother me.

LTC FEENEY: The one facet that I understand was extremely important, and if you could give the background of it, I would appreciate it. That was the recognition, and your role in obtaining the recognition, of it as an accredited school.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. This thing had come up and had been batted down or let fall by the wayside for many, many years. I don't know a good many years before General Johnson and I decided to do something about it. That was really at the tail end of his regime. He left right after we decided to do something about it. So I carried the burden on it. In the first place, let me say, I have a limited regard for advanced degrees. There are a lot of masters and doctors floating around that would be just as useful if they didn't have them. I didn't look kindly and I don't look kindly on any program of affiliation with a civilian university where they give you some civilian credit for the work that you do here or your experience or anything like that. In other words, I would not have agreed to a program of that type like they had at the Army War College and various other places. I think that this detracts from the main purpose of the course, and it doesn't produce anything except a set of initials that the individual can tie on his name which really don't mean a hell of a lot. In going into it, I determined that if we were going to do it, we would do it in our own right. In other words, we would grant the degree, and that the degree would be in Military

Arts and Sciences and not in political science or something like that. That any civilian university can grant and do better than we can. I was adamant on that score. Having decided that we were going to do it, we went up to Chicago to find out how. Maybe you've heard this before. I was astounded to find out how poorly organized the academic fraternity is. We went up to the office of the Midwest Association of Colleges and Secretary Schools. I took Ivan Birrer and one of the instructors with me. We were well received. I told them that I wanted to tell them what we did down here. I wanted to show how we went about it. Then I wanted them to answer two questions. Was it worth pursuing getting an accreditation? If it was worth pursuing, how do we go about it? They said, "Yes, it was worth pursuing," and told us how to go about it. So we went on about it.

LTC FEENEY: What do you mean by "was it worth pursuing," sir?

LTG LEMLEY: Were they going to kick us out of hand? Did we have a case to present to the association that stood a reasonable chance of being heard? Because getting heard is the first step toward getting in?

LTC FEENEY: Of the battle.

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. They were very helpful up there. So we went through the rigormoreroll of applying, put together a little book, and wrote a request for accreditation. Much to our surprise . . . because I really never had high hopes for this; so I put a lot of politics on it. I had a good many friends in the academic community in those and still do. I, through them, did a hell of a lot of politiking to get our case up, and most of them had some connection with the college. We put our case up, and they agreed to consider it. As I say, I was very pleasantly surprised. Then they appointed this examining board to come down here. The examining board consisted of a Professor Starcher from North or South Dakota, I'm not sure; the President

of one of the colleges out here in Colorado, A&M I think; the Head of the Junior High School Program in Phoenix, Arizona. They were the board. With the exception of the guy from Colorado who was ex-military . . . he had served during the war . . . they were about as hostile bunch of folks that I have ever seen when they came in. But they did come in, and we presented our pitch. Each department head gave his curriculum . . . what it consisted of, what it covered, and that sort of stuff. They looked at the library. They looked around the college. I gave them my concept of how we would handle the degree granting program and what that the standards would be. They made their report to the North Central Association. At the next annual meeting, I was brought before the accrediting committee to defend myself against their report. Well, there wasn't anything to defend against, really. They had a few suggestions like changing the hours that the library was open and minor stuff like that. I found no problem whatever with. But really their report was quite laudatory. For example on faculty tenure, you know this is a great thing in the academic community. They say it would be dangerous to national security to have that sort of thing here which I think is true. They commented most favorably on the quality of the instruction and the breath of the course. I didn't really have any thing to defend myself about when I went into the whole committee. I told them that I didn't find any problem with what the examining board had recommended. I went over and told them what I was going to do about each one and that I had no further comment on the report. The only discussion was the President of this Catholic University over here in St. Louis . . . I can't think of his name. His brother's up here in Omaha at Creighton. The only comment that he made was he asked Starcher, who was there on behalf of the board, how they had any merit to make any suggestions about such a fine institution. So we were accredited. Then I made a mistake. Before we had entered into

this thing, General Johnson had asked the JAG whether we needed legislative approval to get this thing through. He told him, "Yes, we did," and gave him a piece of paper. This is something that I found very hard to explain to the academic fraternity. Finally, they accepted that it was necessary. I wish I had stayed off of that wicket. They ought never to ask for legislative approval unless you're awfully sure that you need it. I wasn't awfully sure that I needed it. That's where it came as a cropper. It fell into the hands of an Indian up in DESPER in the Pentagon who didn't think it was a good idea and sat on it from hell to breakfast.

LTC FEENEY: You say legislative approval. You're talking about Congressional approval?

LTG LEMLEY: Yes. A law. Really, the law doesn't mean zilch. You know there is a law that permitted West Point to give a degree, but the law was passed, I think, 14 years before they granted the first one because they weren't accredited. It's the accreditation that counts. You can have laws until hell freezes over. Apparently, there's almost no legislation of this type. I mean it's not something that you need at all. So if I hadn't made that blooper, I guess we would have been sailing along merrily now because that was the only hurdle. We even eventually got the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to endorse it. The National Education Association in Washington endorsed it. But it's one of these things that sort of gets on the bottom of the heap in Congress, and so it was never really acted on. These people up in Chicago kept asking us how we were coming on it. Finally, they suspended our accreditation until we got legislation which they've never gotten. I don't know whether they're still trying or not. I don't think so. I might add that it would be very difficult to go back and get it. Because this accreditation of Leavenworth hit the academic community as a

bomb shell. They couldn't understand what had happened to the North Central Association that they had done any such thing. You know, it was opposition on the part of people who really didn't know anything about the college. But as I say, we overcame all of that. We just never quite got the legislation and the accreditation together. I've always felt very badly about it. One of these educators that helped us no end was a Doctor King who at that time was President of Kansas State Teachers College down here at Emporia. I went to a meeting out in San Francisco of the National Education Association the year after we were accredited, and he sort of shook them up out there. He was making some sort of presentation to the assembled multitude. When he got up, he addressed the group, "General Lemley, ladies and gentlemen," which sort of shook them a little bit. He was a nice guy. I don't know what has happened to him. Do you have anything else?

LTC FEENEY: Yes, I do have some more. Another hundred dollars worth, I'm sure. How do you perceive the Army of the future in its role as a faction of military element of power? That's a loaded question.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I don't perceive it very clearly if you really want to know. Because I can't perceive the world environment twenty years from now, and I'm not alone in this. I don't think anybody can. But I don't see the Army's role in national policy as changing much. Nor do I see any very revolutionary developments in terms of hardware or doctrine that are going to change things very much. Basically, you know, the Army hasn't changed much in the last hundred years. Now, it's true that we have things like the helicopter that provide us mobility that we didn't enjoy before. But we just do things better and quicker. I mean, it's still not a hell of a lot different. I don't think it will ever be too much different. I do think we've gone off the deep end in some respects. I think we have grossly overemphasized the

Army's role in missiles and nuclear weapons. I don't think that we have any use for things like Lacrosse, Pershing, and all of this sort of stuff. I think that's a bunch of junk. I'm not just saying this since I'm retired. I said it in the intercouncils before. We don't really have the intelligence means to support weapons of that type. I don't think we should have. You're never going to have enough of them to scatter them around indiscriminately. They're going to be sort of like the 8 inch gun was in World War II. We had them with us the whole time, and they were never useful. The only time they ever used them that I thought they might was when we got close enough to Karlsruhe and dumped what ammunition we had on Karlsruhe and started to run on the bank. But those things are expensive, and I think that we can spend our money and resources a hell of a lot better. I think that we need to restrain our flyers somewhat. I don't mean to downgrade the importance of helicopters and Army Aviation. But, that's an area where a good deal of empire building goes on. I think we need to use a good deal of discretion in stating our requirements for Army Aviation. I'd rather by far have a lot of cheap machines than a few very fancy ones. We've sinned in this regard. Tanks, I think we went off in the wrong direction by trying to build a tank to do everything. I think we'll be well advised to keep things simple and have a lot of good weapons.

THIS IS THE SEVENTH SESSION OF TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY LEMLEY AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD FEENEY AS RECORDED AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL ON 16 MAY 1974.

LTC LEMLEY: Well, I guess we're gonna wind up today and run back over my some 41 years in uniform if you count my year in ROTC at Prep School, and I must say that I found all of them very rewarding. Some jobs were better than others. Some perhaps weren't awfully stimulating but by enlarge they were and I guess really the sort of key points in my career in the Army. Well, of course, the first one I suppose was when I decided to stay in at West Point under the influence of a Major Anderson who I have never seen since. He was a tremendously fine person and he not only convinced me I ought to go into the Army, but that I ought to go into the field artillery and work as he put it, and I think I was extremely fortunate in having rather exceptional commanders. First, General Honeycutt, then General Gus Franke, and later General Craig, my first three unit commanders regimental of battalion commanders were all extremely fine people and taught me a lot and I think this is sort of important. It's largely a matter of luck but it would seem to me that for a young officer just entering the service, the quality of his bosses is pretty important and while these officers were very fine, my battery commanders by enlarge, my immediate superiors were relatively run of the mill or worse. They were sort of tired old men but these people did by setting a example with their leadership gave me some ideas on how to do my job which later proved very useful to me and of course, my service in World War II, I found very satisfying. I spent six years in the same outfit. Essentially the same outfit. I joined in December of '39 and left it in September of '45. In the course of which I went from first lieutenant to a colonel and my superiors did me -- did give me advantages to assigning me responsibilities that were far in excess

of those normally associated with an officer of my service at that time. For example, in 1942 I was the executive officer of a brigade as a newly promoted major and since my commanding officer, my commanding general was in poor health, I pretty much had a free hand running the brigade. I was fortunate in having some very able young officers to help me in the key staff positions. Mostly in the S-3 section. Contrary to what the number of my contemporaries did, I never went out of my way to seek an overseas assignment. I obviously wanted to go overseas because anybody in the Regular Army has both an obligation to the country and to himself. Well, to serve in combat, I think, to the country and that it's invested quite a lot in his training and education and to himself in that it just doesn't pay to miss wars. So I was glad when we went to Africa though as I say, I never made any determined effort to go around my bosses back and get assigned there as an individual and I think my wartime service was very useful. I had a relatively wide range of experience from slugging it out down in Italy and that's really what it was. It was just a hard, hard fight for every mile to the pursuit and exploitation in France and in Germany basically most of what we did in France and Germany was pursuit and exploitation. We had a few pretty rough battles but it was nothing like the grim days down in Italy. Here again, I think, I was very fortunate in serving under General Truscott, whom I consider one of the finest field commanders that I've ever known. He was just a tremendous leader. He had fine tactical sense and ability to inspire confidence and loyalty on the part of his subordinates. He had very high standards of performance which he demanded and got and he was just a great man to serve under. In a way, I suppose it was unfortunate that my immediate commander, the two that I had, General's Vincent Meyer and Carl Bair were both in bad health, but on the other hand, that gave me an opportunity to

exercise command which I would not otherwise have had because in fact I did command the 18th Field Artillery Brigade in Italy and the Sixth Corps Artillery in France even though I never held the title. So it was a great opportunity for me. I think Berlin was an interesting experience not so much because of a job because to be perfectly honest, the job really didn't amount to much. It was in no way challenging, but the opportunity to be in the environment of Berlin at that time, which in effect reflected the problems of most of the world, gave me a pretty broad understanding of the foreign policy problems of the United States and where we went wrong and where we went right. Following Berlin, I found my experience in DCSOPS to be extremely interesting. I spent four years there as an action officer and I honestly sort of think that this is something that everybody ought to do. I mean, it's really only in the Pentagon on the Army staff that you develop an appreciation of how things are done at the top level and how to get things done and I considered myself fortunate to be there at the time of pretty interesting and demanding time. We had the intervention in Greece, aide to Turkey which I cut my teeth on. We had the Berlin blockade, the Korean War the build up of the five division force in Europe, and in this particular era being a DCSOPS Indian was probably a much easier job in some ways then it is today. In other ways, a much more difficult job. Certainly when I was there my responsibility and authority extended a good bit beyond what my counterpart today would have because decision making was a much easier problem. I could be in the Chief of Staff's office in ten minutes if I had something important in those days and the Chief of Staff could pretty well make a final decision on it and of course he can't today and the Indian usually finds it a little harder to get to him. Here again I had the opportunity to serve with a fine group of people and they do have a fine group of

people in DCSOPS. They don't carry any duds much there. In fact when I went there, you served a three month trial period before you were even listed in the phone book and of course the DCSOPS has almost absolute discretion as to who works for him and who doesn't. Now this is not a discretion that I ever exercised any considerable degree because I found that the career management people really did a very fine job of providing for my needs and except in a very few cases where certain individuals asked to come to DCSOPS and in the case of my general officers, I really never took any personal part in the assignment process. I did generally get involved in the firing if the individual was a colonel or higher, but I didn't collect them and of course after my four years in DCSOPS, I had a delightful couple of years in the First Armor Division serving under General Bruce Clarke, who is a great troop leader, a fine commander, and a wonderful person to work for. I had not known General Clarke before but he welcomed me and showed me every consideration. In fact he let me command the division artillery a good part of the time I was there as colonel which of course was a little unusual and assigned my boss as Deputy Post Commander. That was a good experience as was my time in Korea. In Korea, I served with General Art Trudeau, who commanded the Seventh Division when I checked in and he too is a wonderful guy to work for and I enjoyed very much my assignments as Division Artillery Commander and as Chief of Staff of the division. I came back and I went to the National War College and that was a pleasant and a useful year but really the National War College in those days and I don't imagine it changed very much was more like a sabbatical year. I mean you really didn't have to do anything except go to the lectures which were almost uniformly outstanding. You had a great opportunity to read. A great opportunity to associate with other people who were moving up the line in the Air Force, Navy, Marines, a

few civilian and it was a useful experience from the standpoint of collecting your thoughts and reflecting on some of the things that had happened in the past and how you might do things differently in the future. As I say though, it was really not -- I think the opportunity to be there was the -- it's prime value. Not so much what they did there but it was a pleasant experience and even though I was somewhat reluctant to go to ACSI afterwards I found my tour in ACSI to be extremely valuable to me and rewarding and that I got to see a side of the house that I hadn't seen much of before. I don't think I was universally popular in ACSI because I always have a tendency to delve into the back rooms and to see if jobs are really worth doing and I did something when I was chief of estimates and I'm sure all of my action officers thought it was a dirty trick when we made a contribution to a national estimate. I routinely signed it without reading it and then I would go over afterwards and explain to him what was wrong with it. This may sound like careless supervision but in fact the contribution itself as long as it was factual and I never -- we never really had any factual problems and was not as vital a document as it might of been. In other words you had several opportunities to read and direct it if you wanted to after the initial contribution and by censoring after the fact I got a much higher quality of submission out of my people I think but that was an extremely interesting job and I think I appreciated for the first time the extent to which intelligence drives national policy and in fact it does drive it. I also developed a very considerable respect for some of the not so prominent people in the intelligence business whose efforts tend to be hidden from the public view but that was a fine experience. I enjoyed it thoroughly. I worked hard. In fact, a number of people have always asked me if being in ACSI was very much like being in OPS and it's not. ACSI, I found to be just a long hard

drag everyday from about six in the morning to eight or nine at night or later everyday and the work level one day didn't differ very much from the work level any other day. On the other hand, in OPS you have frequent periods of very intense activity, but on the other hand, then you have periods when really you're not too deeply involved in anything much. So in a sense, I suppose, I found ACSI to be somewhat more waring than my first tour in DCSOPS even though there were a good many nights I never got home and the first four years I served there and some in my last three, but it was a good period and provided me some insights that I hadn't had prior to my service there. It also, I think, proved a great -- this experience proved a great value to me later when I was the DCSOPS because it -- I could better evaluate the situation than I would of been able to had I not served in ACSI. In other words, I guess what I'm saying is, I knew what our capabilities and limitations in the intelligence field were and I had some understanding of the process which permitted me to do a somewhat better job. Actually, I suppose my tour in Europe after that, was probably wasn't a great deal exceptional about it. I think it's greatest significance for me was the opportunity to serve under General Clyde Eddleman and to become rather closely associated with him on a personal as well as an official basis, and I developed a great respect for General Eddleman. He's a man of tremendous abilities and very high standards, and contrary I suppose to what an awful lot of people thought is not in anyway hard to get along with. He's a very reasonable man. He likes to listen to contrary opinion and he's receptive to innovation. So my association with him in Stuttgart and Heidelberg was a very satisfying one and of course this also brought me in contact with General Harold K. Johnson for the first time. That which is an experience that I obviously treasure both during this period and later

when we served together here at Leavenworth and then the Pentagon. Actually, I suppose my tour in the 24th Division was sort of a pretty well earned holiday. You know, really being a division artillery commander is a very pleasant sort of a job. You do have some knotty little problems from time to time and you sometimes have disciplinary problems that are rather distasteful but by enlarge I enjoyed that period very much. I was fortunate in having for the most part a very fine battalion commander. I stayed out of their hair and to a considerable degree I set goals for them and let them reach the goals in their own fashion and generally speaking they did achieve these goals. I did have to relieve one battalion commander and it was a rather painful thing. He was a nice guy technically, very capable officer, but he had absolutely no ability to develop enthusiasm and drive in the unit. I guess he always thought I relieved him because he flunked the battalion test, which he did, and also a technical inspection but that was a reflection of the reasons I relieved him not the reason. I think the commander has to underwrite some failures in the part of commander but I don't think you can ever underwrite a sloppy unenthusiastic and lazy outfit and that's really what he had and he had had it over rather a considerable period so it didn't reflect any inherited troubles for not to any extent and then of course I suppose going through General Walker's relief was a useful experience. Certainly not a very pleasant one but useful and I suppose I gained some insights and to things that I had not come into contact with before and it was a challenge in that the moral of the division was at such a low ebb. I think I shook it up a little bit. I used to go to odd things, like guard mount and see if the individuals were qualified in their -- the weapon they were carrying on guard and things like that and it's surprising how a few visits like that will pep up some of the subordinate commanders. I also

always liked to visit motor pools and motor shops. They have a tendency to go unwatched and I think when a commander drops in occasionally on some of those things that brings an alertness in the command that they don't otherwise have. I did this both in the 24th Division and the 1st Armored Division and in the 7th Division when I served there as the artillery commander and I suppose coming back to Leavenworth really was one of the most satisfying periods that I had. It was tremendously interesting, challenging and pleasant to serve here. I think perhaps that being the Superintendent at West Point and the Commandant at Leavenworth in some respects are about the best jobs a major general can have and the superintendent was a major general at that time. He's since been inflated and I wouldn't of cared for West Point because despite my respect for the institution and my love for it I still can't honestly say that I enjoyed being a cadet at West Point, and I don't think I could in conscience bring myself to preside over the military academy. I much preferred the atmosphere here at Leavenworth where I was dealing with more mature people and dealing with more military things than spit and polish and the academic program at West Point. When I say that I'm fully aware that I'm sure the atmosphere at West Point is far different today than it was when I was a cadet, but basically I think the superintendent at West Point got to be a tall, thin, good looking soldier, which I'm not and I think he ought to be perhaps something of a martinet which I'm not, and never have wanted to be, but was a delightful and stimulating five years that I had here and perhaps the all around way was the most rewarding period of my service. I think we covered it in a good deal of detail and I don't know that there's anything much to add that I haven't already said about it. I suppose when I went to DCSOPS that in a sense was the -- sort of the peek of my achievement. I suppose

down inside me, ever since my initial service there immediately after the war, I had wanted to be the DCSOPS. I think it's just a tremendous job and it's one where there are almost limitless opportunities to influence the Army in our national military policy and to influence it hopefully for the good and so when I went there I was delighted to receive the appointment. At the same time I approached it with a fair amount of trepidation because having observed it over a good many years from afar I was fully cognizant of the problems associated with it and the nature of the work and I hardly think that anybody really could move into the job and without a certain fearfulness because you know the margin of error is very very great there and I never found it troublesome in point of fact. Though it is a demanding job. Terribly demanding job but I -- we never had a dinner hour at home. I would just call home about a half an hour before I was going to leave and tell my wife I'd be in at nine or ten or eight, rarely before eight in the evening. Every social affair that we -- posted every personal social affair I missed. When we had guests for dinner I would generally arrive while the others were having their after dinner drinks but at the same time I did feel that I was accomplishing things. I took great pride in my first JASOP for example. To the best of my knowledge, that's the only agreed JASOP in history and I'm sorry to say that the next two I couldn't produce the same record but that was primarily because of Navy-Air Force fights. In that connection I always sort of felt that if you were a minority one and JCS that maybe you ought to go back home and reconsider your position. Now this isn't necessarily so. I'm not saying that the Chief should never take a minority position. There are some things that matters of conscience and deeply held reservations where I don't think you should join the majority. In other words, I think

you have to approach it on each occasion with a good deal of soul searching and follow the dictates of your conscience because there are such occasions that arise but I think they should be very infrequent and I don't recall in my three years there more than two or three times that I recommended to the Chief that he split on a point and say it was wonderfully rewarding experience. Perhaps I think it's the hardest job in the Army because you're really in sort of a compression chamber with pressures on you from the other services. Pressures on you from your boss, pressures on you from your Indians and it takes a pretty calm unexcited outlook to come out on top of that. It's a fine job and I enjoyed it very much and the last tour in all honesty I must say was sort of a dude. I debated at length whether to retire when I received the assignment. I think I would of retired except my wife had never been to Italy. She says, well, we've never been to Italy why don't we give it a try. So I think that's the reason. I knew it was not much of a challenge, and it wasn't, but it was pleasant enough and I suppose the fault I found with it most was that I just didn't have enough to do. And the kinds of things I did have to do, which were meeting and greeting visitors, and that sort of stuff, I didn't particularly enjoy. I did learn quite a lot from Admiral Horatio Riberro who was my boss. He is a man of tremendous abilities. He apparently placed great confidence in me. We had known each other slightly before but not well and from that standpoint it was very good. He did have some personal idiosyncrasies that stemmed, I think, in part from being an admiral and in part from his Puerto Rican background that made him a little difficult to deal with and in social matters -- matters of protocol and that sort of thing. He and I didn't really see eye to eye and so from that standpoint I guess it wasn't as pleasant as it might of been but the only real objection I had was the fact

that I didn't have enough to do and when I found that there were no plans to move me from that assignment, I elected to retire. I just didn't see any reason to spend another year in Naples where I wasn't particularly happy and of course two of my three children were back here in the States and I had a new grandson that I'd never seen and that sort of thing, so that really is why I elected retirement when I did.

LTC FEENEY: Sir, before we close this thing off and we got an excellent summary of your career. I would like to have if possible, maybe not so much discussion of what a young officer should do to further his career, but maybe some of the more introspective parts of an officer that he should possess and look at. For example, this thing of national policy that we've gone into so deeply here and have surfaced so many situation and problems that I just think it's so vitally important that people be prepared for this kind of thing and I think they should do their homework and read about this, but this is just one facet of this national policy business and I don't know how many people really pay an awful lot of attention to that and yet it's such a vital part of the whole thing and to understand it and be able to work within it to, you know, to foster it's implementation, but you talked about -- I think you've made a excellent point about the DA Staff position, but I'd like to have you comment on what you think that the interpart of an officer should have towards -- how he should be looking towards the Army in the future.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, I think you can't have anything less than absolute integrity and when I say that I am going considerably beyond just not telling lies. I include such things as telling the boss the bad news even when it hurts to do so. I mean even when the failure you're reporting is your own. You owe an obligation to do that. You also owe an obligation to speak up against the

boss from time to time. Now I don't mean speak up publicly or I don't mean going down to your own outfit and saying, well, this is crazy as hell but this is what the old son of a bitch says to do. That's no good at all. What I'm talking about is in speaking very frankly to your boss either when he is arriving at the decision hopefully or afterwards if you have not previously had an opportunity to express your views and you owe it to your boss to do this. Now he can take it or leave it but -- and so I think this absolute integrity is a must and it goes both ways. I've been talking about the boss, but the absolute integrity goes down as well as up. For example, however distasteful it may be, you have the duty and the obligation to relieve ineffective subordinates and to relieve them with prejudice which a lot of people don't like to do. There are a lot of them just like to shuffle them off and you can do this but it's not -- you're not really being honest when you do that. You also have the obligation to be honest with your men. To explain things to them, to keep them abreast of why you're doing things. Now I know this has received a certain amount of criticism in professional circles in recent years. A thing that you don't have to explain in order but the fact of the matter is an order is always much better executed if the recipient understands the reasoning behind it. So for this reason I think the commander has the obligation to speak to his men quite often. Sometimes in a formal way, sometimes in a informal way because the word gets around, but I guess what I'm saying is that a better informed soldier always does a better job and the onus is on the commander to establish his standards and to bring the team together so to speak. Another important aspect of command I think is recognizing achievement and I don't necessarily mean writing a bunch of letters of accommodation. I think you should write them when appropriate but it doesn't hurt to tell somebody he's doing a good

job once in awhile and I think you get more out of your people if you do that because if they believe that they're appreciated they then go out and try to do a much better job. So I think that's important. I think writing a efficiency report is an extremely important part of an officer's job and it's a tough one to do because you've got to recognize achievement appropriately in a rather artificial environment and this is one place where I will part company a little bit with perhaps with my integrity though I don't really think I'm doing so but it's just the fact of life that at least since World War II, efficiency reports have been inflated and so I think you have to recognize this inflation and hopefully know enough about the system to inflate your own people to the proper level. Oddly enough the worst thing you can do to a guy is give him a mediocre efficiency report. Giving him a real stinker may or may not hurt him much but giving him a perfunctory mediocre rating will always wreck him, but basically I think the system works. You know, if you read a period of efficiency reports over ten years you get a pretty good picture of the guy whether you know him or not because the same little things keep propping up here and there. I don't think that these people who go charging out trying to get jobs that they think will give them brownie points or bring them to the attention of senior people. Served themselves very well. For the most part these efforts are quite apparent and are easily detected by both your temporaries and by your superiors and I don't think either of these two categories of people appreciated it all. I never really asked for but one assignment and that was to the First Armored Division in 1951, and it wasn't particularly because I wanted to go to work for General Clarke. I didn't even know General Clarke. He didn't know me. I don't think we'd ever met that we may have. I guess the reason I wanted to go there was it was -- I was due to leave, obviously

I was going somewhere and I knew I was going to be promoted to colonel the second time and I thought that my opportunities for command and I'm not speaking of an artillery command, I really sort of had an idea I'd like to be a combat commander or somewhat better than a armored division, than an infantry division. I felt that the armored people were more flexible. This is not true I discovered. Also it was a new division, you know, and so that's really the reason I asked. I guess what I'm saying is that I think the best course for most people to follow is to take the jobs they're assigned and to give each job all they've got even though it's not one that they would prefer and I think you'll find or I think one will find that generally speaking, you can find challenges in any job you're given. I have had a couple, oh, my assignment in Berlin was one that I did want to go there. I mean it wasn't something I didn't want to do or I wouldn't of had to. I had the right of refusal on it but I guess I didn't think it was as important and as vital a job as maybe some others but on the other hand I was rewarded by serving in that environment which proved very useful to me later. I didn't particularly want to go to ACSI when I left the National War College. In fact I didn't want to go at all but on the other hand it had turned out that I consider one of my better jobs I've had. In any case I was smart enough to know that the less said about it the better, because after all the reason I was going was because General Art Trudeau, my former division commander had asked for me and if I protested the assignment I would probably go anyhow and would just arrive with him unhappy so it all works out and I think that this is generally true. That almost any job you get is worth doing and will present challenges that you can meet and I think you're well advised to meet them. Now if you should get a real dud where -- get a job that doesn't need doing and I did this once. At least you can go and try to get the

position wiped out and I did this, and Eighth Army in Korea, I don't think we've mentioned this particular period, but shortly before I left the 7th Division, you know, you had to serve half your tour in a staff assignment because I was one of those directed command MOS's when I -- I went there and the Eighth Army, G-1, was down visiting the division a couple months before I left and I asked him, what are you going to do with me when my time runs out here at the division and he said, well, I don't know. He said, what would you like to do? I said, well, I really don't off hand know of any particular job I want but I do know of one job I don't want and this is one that I knew would be coming open and I said, I don't want to be the Deputy Artillery Officer of the Eighth Army, and sure enough that's where I went and it was -- it did fall in the category of -- of make work in my opinion. I don't mean that we didn't work but I just didn't honestly think there was any place for an artillery section or an armor section or any of those aviation sections in the Eighth Army Headquarters and I still don't. I don't think there's a place in a Army Headquarters today for that kind of people. So I concentrated well. I didn't initially because my boss, General Ted Parker and I guess didn't see eye to eye on this question of the need for an artillery section. I never really discussed it with him. It was obvious to me that he thought it was a pretty vital job but when he left and I became the acting artillery officer and I devoted my efforts primarily to getting the artillery section eliminated which I did and so if you get one that really doesn't need doing spend your time getting the job abolished. You'd be serving yourself and your country too. So, and a lot of luck too in this business, and oddly enough I mean, contrary to what most people might say. I don't think the luck is necessarily in tying onto somebody's coattails and moving with him. I think where luck enters into it is in the kinds of

people you work for in the earlier years of your career and the sort of example that they set for you. The sort of things they teach you and so I guess I'm saying, is that the lucky guys get top flight commanders. They learn from them and in turn, practice these same principles that had been observed as marks of success and tend to succeed. The coattails theory I don't think holds much water. When you get right down to it, the only people in the Army that can really influence assignments and that sort of thing I -- I guess what I'm saying, is about the only people in the Army that have coattails that you can securely affix yourself to are general officers, and the fact of the matter is when your number comes up in later years these -- these coattails have long gone. They're long since retired and they really don't do much for you. Really I think, for me that General's Eddleman and Johnson contributed a great deal to my last years in the service. My success in later years. The third star and that sort of thing but on the other hand I never knew those people. I'd already been in the service 23 years when I first came into contact with them in any -- in any close contact and I could probably of tied on to somebody else's coattails if it had turned out that way. So I guess what I'm saying is the coattail theory is in my opinion grossly overrated as a formula for success. Did you have . . .

LTC FEENEY: No, sir, but I want to take this opportunity to say, you know, thank you and I also want to put here on the tape that -- of your continued interest in the program so that anybody listens to this later on and catches this part of it they'll know that your interest is still very high and that you'd be more than happy to talk into detail into certain specific areas that we've covered here and again thank you very much, sir.

LTG LEMLEY: Well, thank you.

26 June 1979
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, USAMHI, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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LTG H. J. Lemley, Jr.

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Harry J. Lemley Jr.
(Signature)

LT. GEN. H. J. LEMLEY, JR. (RET)
102 BROADWAY TERRACE
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66048

(Print Name)

26 June 1979
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ACCESS AGREEMENT

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Harry Lemley Jr.
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LT. GEN. H. J. LEMLEY, JR. (RET)
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(Please Print)

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and

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Harry J. Lemley, Jr.
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Harry J. Lemley, Jr.
(printed name)

5 Dec 1988
(date)